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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the interplay between energy security and law and policies 
promoting green energy. Based on empirical work carried out in two very different country 
case studies – Great Britain and Brazil – this thesis attempts to foster a better understanding 
of the role played by energy security in constructing and deconstructing green energy policy 
initiatives. Understanding the diversity of views on and the complexities of the interplay 
between energy security and green energy development is at the heart of this thesis. 
The diversity of views raised in national contexts leads to legal disputes in 
international forums when attempts are made to address the issues of this energy security-
green energy interplay. As such, building on the findings of the case studies of Great Britain 
and Brazil, this thesis then analyses the interplay between energy security and green energy 
development in international trade law as encapsulated in the law of the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), an international trade organisation which adjudicates between 
competing discursive claims surrounding energy security and green energy development and 
pronounces on their legal status.  
This thesis shows the complexity of the relationship between energy security and law 
and policies on green energy development and how the existing discursive constructions are 
broadening, deepening and transforming this interplay. In summary, the findings 
demonstrate the discursive contests that lead to divergent constructions of energy security 
not only in the context of different countries, but also in different sectors of the economy 
within a country. It also shows that the links between energy security and national and 
international law and policies on green energy pose challenges to a transition to a green 
energy system. 
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In order to assist the energy transition, this thesis puts forward the adoption of the 
broader energy security concept in law and policies which includes environmental, climate 
and social considerations. It also argues for the incorporation of a dominant positive frame in 
relation to the interplay between energy security and law and policy on green energy 
development since a positive frame in relation to this link has the implication to significantly 
contribute to the promotion of an energy source. In addition, it  advances the need to 
embrace emerging green energy technologies in energy systems and argues that an evenly 
distributed market share of green energy technologies and equipment around the world is 
the best solution to ensure green energy security in the context of the just energy transition. 
This thesis then proposes a way forward in creating the legal space in the law of the WTO for 
trade restrictive measures aimed at ensuring green energy security. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1. Introduction 
Energy is a multi-disciplinary research theme of pressing social relevance. Energy is an 
essential enabler of human wellbeing. It enables us to fulfil our basic human needs and is an 
indispensable catalyst of economic activity. Energy exists in various forms, such as heat, light 
and electricity, and is an essential part of maintaining our current, post-industrial revolution 
era, modern lifestyle. By waking up with a smartphone alarm clock, which is left charging 
overnight, turning the lights on and then the kettle to make a cup of coffee or tea in the 
morning, by using computers, tablets, microwave, refrigerators, cookers, toasters, 
dishwashers and a variety of available appliances throughout the day, by driving a car or 
taking a bus, train or aeroplane, for example, one cannot fail to notice that most of the objects 
we rely on in modern life are driven by energy. Being fundamental to the smooth running of 
modern societies, it is, therefore, of no surprise that energy is often said to be the lifeblood 
of modern society.  
The fast pace of the modern world involves the sizeable and continuous consumption 
of energy.1 According to the International Energy Agency, in 2017 the world energy demand 
increased at twice the 2016 growth rate.2 Energy demand has greatly increased with the rise 
of emerging economies which have become major energy consumers, with China, India and 
                                                          
1 Mogens Rüdiger, The Culture of Energy (Cambridge Scholars Publishing 2008), vii. 
2 International Energy Agency, ‘Global Energy & CO2 Status Report 2017’, March 2018, 2 
<https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/GECO2017.pdf> accessed 30 October 2018. 
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other Asian economies now accounting for around two-thirds of the growth in energy 
consumption.3 
Population growth adds an additional stress on energy demand. According to the 
United Nations, the world population grows approximately by an additional 83 million people 
annually and is projected to increase by more than one billion people within the next 15 years, 
reaching 8.5 billion in 2030, and to increase further to 9.7 billion by 2050.4 Furthermore, world 
GDP is forecasted to more than double by 2040, as more than 2.5 billion people are lifted 
from low incomes.5 Access to modern technological equipment by billions of new users will 
increase energy demand. Access to low-cost smartphones which will probably require a 
charge daily serves as an illustration. According to recent research, smartphone users in Africa 
are expected to more than triple, rising from 226 million in 2015 to 720 million in 2020.6 Thus, 
both population growth and increasing standards of living for many people in developing 
countries will substantially increase energy demand. BP’s Energy Outlook reveals that energy 
demand will increase by around one third over the next 25 years,7 which is the equivalent of 
taking all of today’s demand and adding another China and European Union to it.8 Although 
modern appliances, such as LED lights, TVs and refrigerators, have seen energy efficiency 
improvements of as much as 80%, energy efficiency improvements slowed down dramatically 
                                                          
3 BP, ‘2018 BP Energy Outlook’, 15 <https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/en/corporate/pdf/energy-
economics/energy-outlook/bp-energy-outlook-2018.pdf> accessed 30 October 2018. 
4 United Nations, ‘World Population Prospects, The 2015 Revision: Key Findings and Advance Tables’, 2 
<https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/publications/files/key_findings_wpp_2015.pdf> accessed 30 October 2018. 
5 BP, ‘2018 BP Energy Outlook’, 6 < https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/en/corporate/pdf/energy-
economics/energy-outlook/bp-energy-outlook-2018.pdf> accessed 30 October 2018. 
6 GSMA, ‘The Mobile Economy: Africa 2016’ 
<https://www.gsmaintelligence.com/research/?file=3bc21ea879a5b217b64d62fa24c55bdf&download> 
accessed 30 October 2018. 
7 BP, ‘2018 BP Energy Outlook’, 6 <https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/en/corporate/pdf/energy-
economics/energy-outlook/bp-energy-outlook-2018.pdf> accessed 30 October 2018. 
8 Bob Dudley, ‘Shaping the Future Energy Landscape’, speech at the AIPN International Petroleum Summit, 
London, UK on 24 April 2018 < https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/media/speeches/shaping-the-future-
energy-landscape.html> accessed 30 October 2018. 
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in 2017, because of weaker improvement in efficiency policy coverage and stringency as well 
as lower energy prices.9   
While the world’s energy needs continue to grow, almost one billion people – roughly 
one in seven, which represents more than the population of the whole of Europe – still live 
without electricity. The United Nations outlook for electrification shows that the world is not 
yet on track to achieve universal access by 2030,10 making energy access a major topic for the 
2018 United Nations Sustainable Development goals. 
Against this background of an overpopulated world avidly consuming energy which, 
at the same time, leaves almost one billion in energy poverty, fossil fuels continue to exert a 
stranglehold on the global economy, despite two oil crises in 1973 and 1979.  Fossil fuels are 
used to power machines and cars, to produce electricity, and to manufacture various 
chemicals which pervade humans’ daily lives. The overall share of fossil fuels in the global 
energy demand in 2017 remained at 81%, a level that has remained constant for more than 
three decades despite growth in renewables.11 Fossil fuels, nevertheless, are an exhaustible 
energy resource and the world is not in a position to maintain abundant fossil energy supplies. 
This means that sooner or later the world will face a global energy crisis, if non-fossil fuels 
energy sources are not widely deployed. All of these factors have amplified concerns about 
security of energy supply and have challenged the world’s capacity to deal with the risks of 
global fuel shortages and interruptions in energy supply.  
                                                          
9 International Energy Agency, ‘Global Energy & CO2 Status Report 2017’, March 2018, 
<https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/GECO2017.pdf> accessed 30 October 2018. 
10 United Nations, ‘The Sustainable Development Goals Report 2018’, 23 
<https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/files/report/2018/TheSustainableDevelopmentGoalsReport2018-EN.pdf> 
accessed 30 October 2018. 
11 International Energy Agency, ‘Global Energy & CO2 Status Report 2017’, March 2018, 2 
<https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/GECO2017.pdf> accessed 30 October 2018. 
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In tandem with energy security challenges are climate change – driven by global 
warming – and environmental challenges. Global climate change as well as air pollution, water 
availability and quality, land-use change and biodiversity loss are strongly associated with 
energy security. For instance, water is used for energy and energy is used for water. Thermal 
power generation and hydropower generally require large quantities of water.12 
Hydroelectric power, for example, is a form of energy generated through the use of the 
gravitational force of falling or flowing water.13 Shrinking water supplies, therefore, can cause 
serious energy security concerns. In 2015, drought in Brazil depleted reserves at its 
hydroelectric plants, leaving power generation at precariously low levels.14 Conversely, 
energy is required for the collection, treatment and delivery of water.15 In Texas, for instance, 
energy production consumes enough water to provide for the needs of approximately 3 
million people, while the energy used for water treatment could provide enough power for 
about 100,000 people.16  Energy is also the largest source of air pollution in many countries, 
especially in emerging countries, and this is the reason for several millions of deaths in 
developing countries.17 
                                                          
12 United Nations World Water Assessment Programme, The United Nations World Water Development Report 
2015: Water for a Sustainable World (UNESCO 2015), 67. 
13 Monika Manglik and Mangey Ram, 'Behavioural Analysis of a Hydroelectric Production Power Plant under 
Reworking Scheme' (2015) 53(2) Int J Prod Res 648. 
14 Jonathan Watts, 'Brazil’s Worst Drought in History Prompts Protests and Blackouts' The Guardian (23 January 
2015).  
15 United Nations World Water Assessment Programme, The United Nations World Water Development Report 
2015: Water for a Sustainable World (Paris: UNESCO, 2015), 67. 
16 Ashlynn S Stillwell and others, 'The Energy-Water Nexus in Texas' (2011) 16(1) Ecology & Society 1. 
17 International Energy Agency, ‘Energy and Air Pollution: World Energy Outlook Special Report’, 2016 
<https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/WorldEnergyOutlookSpecialReport2016Energ
yandAirPollution.pdf> accessed 30 October 2018. World Health Organization (WHO), ‘7 Million Premature 
Deaths Annually Linked to Air Pollution, 2014 <http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2014/air-
pollution/en/> accessed 30 October 2018. 
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Climate change can itself disrupt energy systems18 as in 2016, when interconnectors 
between France and Britain were partially severed during Storm Angus.19 Moreover, climate 
change can have a negative effect on biofuel feeder crop production. For instance, the record 
storms and floods in the Midwest of the United States in June 2008 struck at the heart of 
America’s grain belt at a time when the United States had become more reliant on corn-based 
ethanol for its fuel supply.20 
Climate change is also likely to exacerbate resource scarcity, amplifying water 
scarcities and loss of agricultural production21 whilst aggravating food insecurity as a result. 
The effects of climate change on crop and food production are already being felt in several 
regions of the world.22 In 2008, 21 countries with a combined population of about 600 million 
were considered to be either cropland or freshwater scarce.23 The combined effects of climate 
change and the increased demand for food production are likely to alter the productivity and 
distribution of the world’s ‘bread-basket’ regions and accelerate soil degradation in 
previously fertile areas.24 In this context, climate-induced weather patterns could play a 
greater role in food prices.25 In 2018, the heatwave across Europe and considered the driest 
                                                          
18 Marcus King and Jay Gulledge, ‘Climate Change and Energy Security: An Analysis of Policy Research’ (2014) 
132(1) Climate Change 57.  
19 Emily Gosden, ‘Winter Power Crunch Fears as UK-France Cables Severed during Storm’, The Telegraph (29 
November 2016) < https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2016/11/29/winter-power-crunch-fears-uk-france-
cables-severed-storm/> accessed 10 October 2018. 
20 Frank Umbach, ‘The Intersection of Climate Protection Policies and Energy Security’ (2012) 10(4) Journal of 
Transatlantic Studies 374, 377. 
21 National Intelligence Council (NIC), Global Trends 2025:  A Transformed World (2008), viii 
<www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_2025_project.html> last accessed 22 March 2018. 
22 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), ‘Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and 
Vulnerability’ (2014), 488-514 <https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg2/> accessed 15 February 2019. 
23 National Intelligence Council (NIC), Global Trends 2025:  A Transformed World (2008), 51 
<www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_2025_project.html> last accessed 22 March 2018 
24 The Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC), ‘Global Strategic Trends – Out to 2040’ (Ministry of 
Defence 2010), 26. 
25 National Intelligence Council (NIC), Global Trends 2025:  A Transformed World (2008), 52 
<www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_2025_project.html> last accessed 22 March 2018; Donald J Wuebbles, Aman Chitkara, 
Clay Matheny, ‘Potential Effects of Climate Change on Global Security’ (2014) 34(4) Environment Systems and 
Decisions 564, 569. 
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summer in Britain, for example, pushed up food prices in the United Kingdom (UK), as a result 
of farmers struggling to raise crops.26  
The current forecasts for rising sea levels due to climate change will severely impact 
territories, such as Tuvalu, Kiribati, and the Marshall Islands in which the current predicted 
sea level rise of 2 meters by 2100 would mean the submersion of these States by the Pacific 
Ocean.27 Moreover, the spread of infectious disease, stimulation of mass migration and 
extreme weather events are all acknowledged as consequences of climate change. The 
potential for disaster is well recognised. According to scientists, in order to lower the risk of 
impacts on natural and human systems from global warming, current emissions of 
greenhouse gasses need to be reduced by 80% by the year 2050 and lowered to zero 
sometime after that. In recognition of this situation, 195 countries adopted the Paris 
Agreement in December 201528 with the aim of strengthening the global response to climate 
change by ‘holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above 
pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above 
pre-industrial levels’.29  
                                                          
26 Zoe Wood and Sarah Butler, ‘Heatwave in Europe Set to Push up UK Food Prices’, The Guardian (3 August 
2018) < https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/aug/03/heatwave-in-europe-set-to-push-up-uk-food-
prices> accessed 31 October 2018. Terri-Ann Williams, ‘Food Prices Are Set to Rise by £7.15 a Week as Heatwave 
Hits Britain's Struggling Farmers with Crops of Potatoes, Onions and Carrots Slumping by as Much as One-fifth’, 
Daily Mail (4 September 2018) < https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-6129469/Heatwave-hits-Britains-
struggling-farmers-crops-potatoes-onions-carrots-slump.html> accessed 31 October 2018. 
27 John J Marra, Mark A Merrifield and William V Sweet, ‘Sea Level and Coastal Inundation on Pacific Islands’, in 
Victoria Keener and others, Climate Change and Pacific Islands : Indicators and Impacts: Report for the 2012 
Pacific Islands Regional Climate Assessment (Island Press 2015), 79. 
28 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, ‘Report of the Conference of the Parties on its 
twenty-first session, held in Paris from 30 November to 13 December 2015, Addendum’, 29 January 206 
<https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/10a01.pdf> accessed 30 October 2018. 
29 Article 2, paragraph 1 of the Paris Agreement 
<https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/english_paris_agreement.pdf> accessed 30 October 2018.  
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Current energy systems are considered the largest single source of greenhouse gas 
emissions from human activities and the latest report from the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) now projects that by mid-century the majority of primary energy must 
come from non-fossil fuels if we are to keep warming below 1.5 or even 2 degrees.30 The need 
for a fundamental transformation of the global energy system via the scaled-up deployment 
of non-fossil fuels technologies is widely accepted. However, how the decarbonisation of the 
energy system will take effect is uncertain. While some scholars advance studies of the 
feasibility of 100 per cent renewable technologies,31 others argue that it is extremely difficult 
to achieve complete decarbonisation of the energy system, even when using every current 
technology and tool available, including energy efficiency, wind, hydroelectric, bioenergy, 
nuclear and solar energy as well as carbon capture and storage.32 Also, competing with a 
scenario of high renewable energy share,33 there are scholarly analyses proposing a large role 
for nuclear energy in the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions.34  Nonetheless, the global 
energy market at the moment is still monopolised to a great extent by the production, trade, 
and consumption of oil and gas35 and the International Energy Agency estimates show that 
global energy-related CO2 emissions reached a historic high in 2017.36 
                                                          
30 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, ‘Global Warming of 1.5 °C’, 2018, 51 
<http://www.ipcc.ch/report/sr15/> accessed 30 October 2018. 
31 M Z Jacobson and others, ‘100% Clean and Renewable Wind, Water, and Sunlight All-Sector Energy Roadmaps 
for 139 Countries of the World’ (2017) 1(1) Joule 108. 
32 Christopher T M Clack and others, ‘Evaluation of a Proposal for Reliable Low-cost Grid Power with 100% Wind, 
Water, and Solar’ 114(26) Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 
6722. 
33 Felix Creutzig and others, ‘The Underestimated Potential of Solar Energy to Mitigate Climate Change’ (2017) 
2(9) Nature Energy 17140.  
34 See, for example, A Berger and others, ‘How Much Can Nuclear Energy Do about Global Warming?’ (2017) 40 
International Journal of Global Energy Issues 43. 
35 International Energy Agency, “World Energy Outlook,” 2016, 5 
<https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/WorldEnergyOutlook2016ExecutiveSummary
English.pdf> accessed 30 October 2018. 
36 International Energy Agency, ‘Global Energy & CO2 Status Report 2017’, March 2018, 
<https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/GECO2017.pdf> accessed 30 October 2018. 
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Nonetheless, the mitigation of global warming produced by emissions from burning 
fossil fuels has become a significant issue in many parts of the world with a focus on limiting 
humanity’s carbon footprint. Green energy promotion worldwide was driven in great part as 
a necessary measure to mitigate climate change, and formed part of countries broader 
strategies to cut carbon emissions. The Climate Change Act 2008 in the UK, for example, 
established a legally binding target to reduce the UK's greenhouse gases emissions to at least 
80% lower than the 1990 baseline by 2050, and the increase of renewable energy 
consumption in electricity, transport, and heating sectors was proposed as one of the ways 
to help keep the UK on track to hit the targets.37 Commitments were also adopted by Brazil 
with the enactment of the National Policy on Climate Change in 2009 when Brazil voluntarily 
committed to adopt actions to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions with the purpose of 
reducing between 36.1% and 38.9% of projected emissions by 2020. Increasing the share of 
green energy sources, such as wind, solar and biomass, in the power supply to 23% was one 
of the intended strategies to meet this target.38 China committed to increase the share of 
non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption to around 20% by 2030, including from wind, 
solar, geothermal energy, bio-energy and maritime energy.39 By 2014, China had scaled up 
installed capacity of on-grid wind power and solar power.40 Australia adopted the Renewable 
Energy Target's schemes to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases in the electricity sector and 
                                                          
37 Department of Energy and Climate Change, ‘UK Renewable Energy Roadmap’, July 2011 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/renewable-energy-roadmap> accessed 7 October 2018. 
38 See Brazil, Brazil´s Intended Nationally Determined Contribution towards Achieving the Objective of the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (28 September 2015) 
<www4.unfccc.int/submissions/indc/Submission%20Pages/submissions.aspx> accessed 25 January 2017; 
Eduardo Braga, A Matriz Energética Brasileira e os Desafios do Setor em Decorrência das Mudanças Climáticas 
(Senado Federal, Comissão Mista Permanente Sobre Mudanças Climáticas 2015).  
39 Department of Climate Change, National Development and Reform Commission of China, ‘China’s Intended 
Nationally Determined Contribution: Enhanced Actions on Climate Change’, 30 June 2015, 5-7 
<http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/China/1/China's%20INDC%20-
%20on%2030%20June%202015.pdf> accessed 2 November 2018. 
40 Ibid 3. 
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deliver its 2020 target of having over 20 per cent of Australia’s electricity coming from 
renewable energy sources.41 The role of green energy in tackling climate change is, therefore, 
widely accepted.   
 
1.1. A just energy transition 
Effects of climate change and the necessary measures to mitigate it brought to the 
fore the need for transformative changes in the global energy sector and turned public policy 
and energy studies attention to the energy transition. In the energy transition, energy systems 
move away from fossil fuels and towards the adoption of energy technologies that leave a 
much smaller carbon footprint. Transitioning away from our current global energy system is 
considered ‘of paramount importance’42 and ‘widely apparent’43. More energy efficiency and 
cleaner use of energy are considered central pre-requisites to the energy transition. These 
are not, however, the only issues in debate. The concept of a just energy transition has also 
emerged which promotes the transition to a low carbon economy with the inclusion of social 
justice, by bringing everyone in society along with that transition.44  
                                                          
41 Australian Government, ‘About the Renewable Energy Target’, 31 May 2018 
<http://www.cleanenergyregulator.gov.au/RET/About-the-Renewable-Energy-Target> accessed 2 November 
2018. Australian Government, ‘How the Scheme Works”, 31 May 2018 
<http://www.cleanenergyregulator.gov.au/RET/About-the-Renewable-Energy-Target/How-the-scheme-
works> accessed 2 November 2018. See also the Renewable Energy (Electricity) Amendment Bill 2015 and 
‘Australia’s Intended Nationally Determined Contribution to a new Climate Change Agreement’, August 2015 
<http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/Australia/1/Australias%20Intended%20
Nationally%20Determined%20Contribution%20to%20a%20new%20Climate%20Change%20Agreement%20-
%20August%202015.pdf> accessed 2 November 2018. 
42 Benjamin K Sovacool, ‘How Long Will It Take? Conceptualizing the Temporal Dynamics of Energy Transitions’ 
(2016) 13 Energy Research & Social Science 202. 
43 Grubler Arnulf, ‘Energy Transitions Research Insights and Cautionary Tales’ (2012) 50 Energy Policy 8.  
44 Raphael J Heffron, ‘The Just Transition to a Low-Carbon Economy’ (2018) 8(4) Renewable Energy Law & Policy 
Review 39. 
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The concept of a just transition was originally proposed by global trade unions in the 
1980s, and one of the key aspects is related to the need to move workers in a high carbon 
economy into areas that will support the transition away from fossil fuels.45 Just transition as 
a new framework of analysis is promoting the unification of climate, energy and 
environmental justice scholarships which all seek justice – albeit conceptualised in distinct 
ways – in the transition to a low carbon economy.46 The just energy transition, therefore, does 
not involve only the shift from fossil fuels to forms of low carbon energy, but also the need to 
include strategies that promote social justice across the globe.  
Against this background, one can observe that energy production and use today create 
a dilemma. On the one hand, energy brings economic growth and well-being to humankind 
which permanently requires more and more availability of energy supply to meet the needs 
of a growing world. On the other hand, energy is the largest source of greenhouse gas 
emissions, considered to be causing climate change and other environmental concerns, 
particularly air pollution, which can impede humanity’s progress and appear to be leading the 
planet to the verge of collapse. 
Humanity, therefore, needs to address this dilemma and the complicated situation it 
is rooted in: how can we ensure energy security without environmental and climate change 
imbalances and with social justice worldwide? These are competing priorities that need to be 
untangled across the energy sector. It is in attempting to contribute to the answer to this 
question that this PhD thesis has been written. Green energy’s role in tackling climate change 
and environmental concerns is widely debated, but less so is its links with energy security. 
                                                          
45 Darren McCauley and Raphael Heffron, ‘Just Transition: Integrating Climate, Energy and Environmental Justice’ 
(2018) 119 Energy Policy 1, 1. 
46 Raphael J Heffron and Darren McCauley, ‘What is the ‘Just Transition’?’ (2018) 88 Geoforum 74, 74. 
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The objective of this thesis is, therefore, to address the interplay between energy security and 
green energy development.  
 
2. The point of departure: thesis aim, research questions and contribution 
 
2.1. Thesis aim and research questions 
Simply put, the purpose of this study is to examine the interplay between energy 
security and law and policies promoting green energy. This thesis’ central argument is that if 
we want to have a just energy transition we ought to pay closer attention to the relationship 
between energy security and law and policies on green energy development. The energy 
system is in a state of change, particularly as a result of the development, commercialisation 
and deployment of green energy technologies. Thus, in attempting to foster a better 
understanding of the role played by energy security in constructing and deconstructing green 
energy policy initiatives in the context of the just energy transition,  this thesis initially seeks 
to answer the following three research questions: 
1. How has energy security been discursively constructed? 
2. What are the discursive links between energy security and law and policies 
promoting green energy? 
3. What are the implications of energy security construction to law and policy on green 
energy development? 
The answer to these three research questions are sought in the context of two 
countries case studies: Great Britain and Brazil. Previous studies have demonstrated that 
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energy security concerns are shaped by contextual and national concerns.47 Therefore, it 
made sense for the thesis to focus on specific country case studies. The multifaceted 
dimensions of energy security and its complex relationship with green energy initiatives 
worldwide as well as the global nature of green energy technologies deployment and energy 
system transformations mean that there would need to be variation in the case studies 
selected. Any focus on only one specific and localised area would not provide the multiplicity 
of perceptions and range of understandings required to answer the research questions. Thus, 
Great Britain and Brazil were selected as case studies because of their differences. Great 
Britain is a developed economy with an energy system dominated by fossil fuels,48 but which 
is in a major period of transition.49 Brazil is an emerging economy and considered to have the 
greenest energy mix worldwide.50 Also, as will be demonstrated in this thesis, the issues 
surrounding energy security and law and policies on green energy development are 
demonstrably different in each country. 
The just energy transition is also an opportunity to widen access to emerging green 
energy technologies globally. Today, there is disparity between different countries 
worldwide, with some getting ahead with green energy technologies while others are being 
                                                          
47 Bert Kruyt and others, ‘Indicators for Energy Security’ (2009) 37(6) Energy Policy 2166; Benjamin K Sovacool 
and others, ‘Exploring Propositions about Perceptions of Energy Security: An International Survey’ (2012) 16 
Environmental Science & Policy 44; Janelle Knox-Hayes and others, ‘Understanding Attitudes toward Energy 
Security: Results of a Cross-national Survey’ (2013) 23(3) Global Environmental Change 609; Yann B Blumer and 
others, ‘The Precarious Consensus on the Importance of Energy Security: Contrasting Views between Swiss 
Energy Users and Experts’ (2015) 52 Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 927; B W Ang, W L Choong and 
T S Ng, ‘Energy Security: Definitions, Dimensions and Indexes’ (2015) 42(1) Renewable and Sustainable Energy 
Reviews 1077. 
48 In 2017, the UK obtained 81.6 per cent of its primary energy from fossil fuels. See, Department for Business, 
Energy & Industrial Strategy, UK Energy in Brief 2018 (Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy 
2018), 13. 
49 Frank W Geels and others, ‘The Enactment of Socio-technical Transition Pathways: A Reformulated Typology 
and a Comparative Multi-level Analysis of the German and UK Low-carbon Electricity Transitions (1990–2014)’ 
(2016) 45(4) Research Policy 896. 
50 Fatih Birol, ‘Renewables 2018: Market Analysis and Forecast from 2018 to 2023’ 
<https://www.iea.org/renewables2018/> accessed 6 November 2018. 
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left behind. It is also acknowledged that we must accelerate progress toward energy 
technologies and trading patterns to transition to a low carbon energy system.51 In connection 
with that, the challenge of energy security is also impacted by trade relationships around the 
globe. With that in mind, understanding the law on energy security and international green 
energy trade is paramount. Developing a proper global response to energy security and green 
energy development concerns in the context of a just energy transition may require paying 
close attention to the global trade regime. As such, as a third case study, this thesis analyses 
the interplay between energy security and green energy development in the law of the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO).  
The WTO is an international trade organisation, which sets international trade 
obligations through its agreements that Member States have to comply with and these 
influence their own national law and policies on energy security and green energy 
development. The WTO system also adjudicates between Member States competing claims 
via its dispute settlement body and has been acting as a forum for green energy trade-related 
disputes. Therefore, it is important to show the multiplicity of views on the case studies on 
Great Britain and Brazil, because these different perspectives will likely be at stake in legal 
disputes within the WTO dispute settlement body. As such, the findings of the country case 
studies on Great Britain and Brazil will inform the analyses on the intersection of trade, energy 
security and green energy.  
The law of the WTO can offer opportunities for countries to transition to a green 
energy system and to ensure energy security. With a view of increasing the participation of 
                                                          
51 Carlos Pascual and Jonathan Elkind, Energy Security: Economics, Politics, Strategies, and Implications 
(Brookings Institution Press 2010), 2. 
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green energy in the energy mix to ensure energy security, countries may adopt trade 
restrictive measures to support the development of the national green energy sector.  
However, these measures may be incompatible with the law of the WTO. Thus, the case study 
on the WTO explores whether there is any flexibility within the current WTO rules and the 
interpretations given to them that permit trade restrictive measures that support national 
green energy development with a view of ensuring energy security, i.e. green energy security. 
This third case study, therefore, aims at answering the fourth research question of this thesis: 
4. Is there policy space for national green energy security in the law of the WTO? 
Understanding the diversity of views on and the complexities of the interplay between 
energy security and green energy development not only in national laws and policies but also 
in international law is at the heart of this thesis. 
 
2.2. Contribution  
This thesis seeks to contribute to the literature on energy security and green energy 
within the sphere of national energy law and policy and the law of the WTO. Energy law and 
policy rests essentially on markets, security of supply and efficiency. It is about government 
policies aimed at securing energy sources at the least possible cost, including social cost.52 
Energy law, however, is a complex area of law, which demands that a scholar in the area 
engage with other disciplines like, for example, politics, economics, geography, 
environmental sciences and engineering.53 Energy law is also derived from international, 
                                                          
52 Raphael J Heffron and KimTalus, ‘The Evolution of Energy Law and Energy Jurisprudence: Insights for Energy 
Analysts and Researchers’ (2016) 19 Energy Research & Social Science 1, 1. 
53 Ibid 2. 
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national and local laws and thus across several levels.54 Therefore, this thesis contributes not 
only to scholarship on national energy law with the case studies on Great Britain and Brazil, 
but also to international energy law within the analysis of the law of the WTO.  
Notwithstanding the growing number of studies of energy security and green energy 
taken separately, there is seemingly no legal analysis into the link between these two 
phenomena. In particular, there are no comprehensive socio-legal studies that bring together 
the issues of the multifaceted concept of energy security and its connections and implications 
to national and international law and policies on green energy development.    
Instead, the literature on the subject is fragmented and does not provide a coherent 
analysis and an overarching critique of the interplay between energy security concerns and 
green energy development. Traditionally, the debate on energy security has centred on 
conventional energy sources, while the debate on green energy has focused on climate 
change and environmental concerns. However, as we move from a fossil fuel dominated 
energy system to one that utilises more green energy, an analysis of these two isolated 
themes has to be unified. Therefore, the unification of these two separate themes is a central 
contribution of this thesis. By looking at green energy from the energy security angle, this 
thesis provides new knowledge and insights into critical global issues, thereby seeking to 
foster changes in the perceptions of the interlinked dimensions of energy security and green 
energy development. By doing so, it also seeks to influence the processes of creating new 
laws, regulations and policies.  
 
                                                          
54 Raphael J Heffron, Energy Law: An Introduction (Springer 2015), 4. 
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3. The task being tackled: structure of the thesis 
The structure of this thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 focuses on the methodological 
approach adopted in this thesis. As will be discussed, this research takes a socio-legal 
perspective and operates within a broadly constructionist frame to examine the interplay 
between energy security and law and policy on green energy development in the context of 
three case studies (i) Great Britain, (ii) Brazil and (iii) the World Trade organisation (WTO). The 
two country case studies employ discourse analysis as an additional methodological tool to 
examine the two national contexts. The third case study is based on a legal analysis of the law 
of the WTO. Each context required a different mode of engagement so each case study has 
its specific data collection technique, i.e. the first case study is based on semi-structured 
interviews,  the second on archival research and the third on jurisprudence. 
Chapter 3 contains the literature review and the concepts and definitions in play in 
the subsequent chapters of this thesis. It starts with the basic definitions of energy and green 
energy. It then proceeds to discuss the notions of energy security in the scholarly reviews, 
followed by an explanation of the processes of securitisation and politicisation around energy. 
The chapter finds that energy security is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon and the 
mainstream academic literature on energy security presents a pervasive lack of consensus in 
relation to its different concepts and dimensions. It also demonstrates that literature on 
securitisation and politicisation is not clear cut and entirely unproblematic and that these 
different processes imply different ways where energy security issues are acted on.   
Chapter 4 contains the first case study. It examines the interplay between energy 
security and green energy in the context of Great Britain (GB) and focuses on the first three 
research questions of the thesis stated above. Based on semi-structured interviews with 24 
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leading energy experts, the chapter explores participants’ views on green energy 
development. This is followed by an analysis of the core themes identified from the interviews 
with a focus on energy security definitions and on the interplay between energy security and 
law and policy on green energy development. The chapter demonstrates the multiple 
framings employed by leading energy experts in GB as part of discursive contests that lead to 
divergent constructions of energy security. In summary, energy security not only means 
different things to different people in different contexts, but also to different sectors of the 
economy. Based on participants’ discursive constructions, this chapter shows challenges 
posed to a transition to a green energy system in GB and the emergence of novel themes in 
relation to green energy and energy security. 
Chapter 5 contains the second case study. It examines the interplay between energy 
security and green energy in the context of Brazil and focuses on the first three research 
questions of the thesis stated above. Based on documents obtained from the Brazilian 
National Archive, the President of the Republic Archive and the Federal Senate Archive, the 
chapter traces the way that energy security is construed and given meaning and significance 
through the articulation and production of ‘texts’ of many kinds, from speeches to policy 
statements and laws, with emphasis on the role the discursive frames surrounding energy 
security play in constructing or deconstructing green energy initiatives over a period of fifteen 
years (January 2001-December 2015). It demonstrates that energy security is discursively 
framed differently in different green energy law and policies within different energy sectors. 
Due to its importance to economic and social stability in Brazil, when a positive frame in 
relation to the links between energy security and green energy development is made, it has 
the implication of promoting green energy. On the contrary, when a negative framing of the 
connections between energy security and green energy development is deployed, it has the 
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implication of hindering green energy development. In particular, this chapter reveals two 
main findings: (i) that a positive frame for energy security and green energy connection is 
advanced in the context of the transport sector, which, as a result, supported biofuels 
development; and (ii) that a dominant negative frame is advanced in the context of 
deployment of green energy, solar and wind in particular, in the electricity system in Brazil, 
which, as a result, hindered solar and wind energy technologies and promoted fossil fuels 
development. This negative frame coupled with the absence in the official discourse of 
reference to emerging innovative technologies with the potential to minimise green energy 
intermittency issues, such as energy storage and smart grids, have had the result of 
contributing to Brazil moving in the opposite direction to a low carbon energy transition. 
Chapter 6 builds on the findings of the case studies on Great Britain and Brazil and 
focuses on the fourth research question of the thesis: is there policy space for national green 
energy security in the law of the World Trade Organisation (WTO)? It reveals how energy 
security has been raised within the WTO green energy jurisprudence so far and explores 
whether there is any flexibility within the current WTO rules and the interpretations given to 
them that permit trade restrictive measures that support national green energy development 
with a view of ensuring energy security. The chapter argues that an evenly distributed market 
share of green energy technologies and equipment around the world is the best solution to 
ensure green energy security in the context of the just energy transition. It then proposes a 
way forward in creating the legal space in the law of the WTO for trade restrictive measures 
aimed at ensuring green energy security. 
Finally, chapter 7 summarises the main conclusions and contributions of the thesis, 
discusses the main limitations of the study and makes recommendations for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2  
METHODOLOGY 
 
1. Introduction  
The purpose of this chapter is to present the theoretical assumptions underpinning 
this research as well as to introduce the study’s methodological bases and chosen method. 
As will be discussed, this research takes a socio-legal perspective and operates within a 
broadly constructionist frame to examine the interplay between energy security and law and 
policy on green energy development in the context of three case studies (i) Great Britain, (ii) 
Brazil and (iii) the World Trade organisation (WTO). The two country case studies employ 
discourse analysis as an additional methodological tool to examine two national contexts. The 
third case study is based on a legal analysis of the law of the WTO. Each context required a 
different mode of engagement so each case study has its specific data collection technique, 
i.e. the first case study is based on semi-structured interviews,  the second on archival 
research and the third on jurisprudence.  
This chapter is divided into four sections. In the first two sections, the broad 
methodological framework is set out. The third section describes discourse analysis as the 
chosen method for the two country case studies. Finally, section four deals with case studies 
as the research design for the thesis.  
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2. The project’s socio-legal focus 
The definition of socio-legal studies is not confined neatly within well-defined 
boundaries.1 However, this thesis adopts a socio-legal perspective understood within the 
broad terms of the ‘living law’ which Ehrlich suggests gives primacy to ‘living’ sociality over 
the ‘stagnant’ official law.2 The ‘socio’ in socio-legal studies represents ‘an interface with a 
context within which law exists’.3 Socio-legal research thus considers the law and the process 
of law (law-making, legal procedure) beyond legal texts, seeking to study law in its multiple 
and interconnected contexts.4  
In this thesis, then, the socio-legal perspective offers a starting point for developing 
an understanding of the role played by energy security in constructing and deconstructing 
green energy policies in and through situated legal processes, procedures and practices. 
 
3. The constructionist orientation 
As well as adopting a socio-legal perspective, this thesis could also be characterised as 
broadly constructionist in orientation. Constructionism (or, as it is sometimes called, 
constructivism) has long been influential in the study of social problems, but it has also 
become prominent in legal studies.5 Constructionism is often defined in philosophical terms 
as a commitment to the idea that participants actively make or construct the worlds of 
                                                          
1 Fiona Cownie and Anthony Bradney, ‘Socio-legal Studies: A Challenge to the Doctrinal Approach’ in Dawn 
Watkins and Mandy Burton (eds), Research methods in law (Routledge 2013), 35. 
2 Eugen Ehrlich, Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law (Harvard University Press 1936). 
3 S Wheeler and P A Thomas, ‘Socio-Legal Studies’ in D J Hayton (ed), Law’s Future(s) (Hart Publishing 2002), 271. 
4 Alan Bradshaw, ‘Sense and Sensibility: Debates and Developments in Socio-Legal Research Methods’, in Philip 
A Thomas (ed), Socio-Legal Studies (Dartmouth 1997), 68. 
5 David Bogen and Michael Lynch, ‘Do We Need a General Theory of Social Problems?’ in Gale Miller and James 
A Holstein (eds), Constructionist Controversies: Issues in Social Problems Theory (Routledge 2017), 83. 
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everyday life and their constituent elements.6 Rather than offering a metaphysical position as 
such (i.e., ‘reality is a social construction’), constructionist studies are perhaps better thought 
of as fostering an open orientation to the kinds of activities and practices social actors engage 
in and seek to learn about them in their own terms.  Thus, the main point in this thesis is to 
treat the law and the category of ‘energy security’ within it as a construction in this sense, 
i.e., as a product built up out of, and which gains relevance through, the activities and 
practices of people all working to shape it (often against one another) in various ways. 
According to constructionists, one does not commit to any particular view of the 
nature of what is being studied prior to going out and studying it. Instead of operating with a 
pre-established theoretical view, a constructionist orientation analytically examines the work 
people themselves do and the resources they employ (including, for example, language, 
institutions and technologies) in order to shape things themselves. Given this, no grand theory 
was adopted before the study commenced. Instead, the point of the study was to explore 
how understandings of energy security and their relation to law and policies on green energy 
development were being shaped by people in real situations in the energy field, by letting 
them tell us how things are and show us how they seek to (re)shape reality according to that.  
 This thesis therefore proceeds on the basis that the law is actively constructed in and 
through people’s efforts to define and apply categories like ‘energy security’ and ‘green 
energy’.7 For Hacking, the aim of an inquiry set out on these terms is to situate concepts in 
their sites – the rich fields of activity they operate within which can be described from many 
                                                          
6 Jaber F Gubrium and James A Holstein, ‘The Constructionist Mosaic’ in James A Holstein and Jaber F Gubrium 
(eds), Handbook of Constructionist Research (The Guilford Press 2008), 3. 
7 SS Strum and Bruno Latour, ‘Redefining the Social Link: from Baboons to Humans’ (1987) 26(4) Social Science 
Information 783, 784. 
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points of view and perspectives – and the work they do in them.8 In the course of their 
activities, socio-legal actors forge links between the discursive and the social, political and 
material contexts or conditions within which concepts acquire their particular meaning or 
where their meanings are contested or fought over. As Hackings notes, concepts do not exist 
in a vacuum, they inhabit a social setting.9 Following Hacking, this research focuses on the 
discursive construction of concepts of energy security and examines the category of ‘energy 
security’ in its sites. These are simultaneously political, legal and discursive, they vary across 
national boundaries and levels of governance and allow for processes of contestation in 
various ways as a result. Given this characterisation, the thesis investigates how the concept 
of energy security is being constructed and what the concept is being used to do. This thesis 
will demonstrate how the concept of energy security can be and is put to work for many ends 
and how it contributes in different ways to both the construction and deconstruction of green 
energy policies.  
 
4. Discourse analysis 
Alongside the socio-legal and constructionist elements, the additional methodological 
approach employed for the two country case studies is discourse analysis. Discourse analysis 
has increasingly been used across social science fields as an approach to understanding the 
social dimension of green energy policies.10 Nonetheless, a review of the literature shows that 
discourse analyses of the links between energy security and law and policies on green energy 
                                                          
8 Ian Hacking, ‘Let’s Not Talk about Objectivity’, in Flavia Padovani, Alan Richardson and Jonathan Y Tsou (eds), 
Objectivity in Science: New Perspectives from Science and Technology Studies (Springer 2015), 19. 
9 Ian Hacking, The Social Construction of What? (Harvard University Press 1999), 11. 
10 See, for example, Sarah Mander, ‘The Role of Discourse Coalitions in Planning for Renewable Energy: A Case 
Study of Wind-energy Deployment’ (2008) 26(3) Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 583;  Brad 
Jessup, ‘Plural and Hybrid Environmental Values: A Discourse Analysis of the Wind Energy Conflict in Australia 
and the United Kingdom’ (2010) 19(1) Environmental Politics 21; Philipp Späth, ‘Understanding the Social 
Dynamics of Energy Regions - The Importance of Discourse Analysis’ (2012) 4(6) Sustainability 1256. 
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development remain rare. This thesis attempts to address this gap by examining how links 
between energy security and green energy are being established (or denied) in and through 
discursive practices.    
There are a great variety of definitions of discourse. Following Parker, this work treats 
discourse as “an interrelated set of texts, and the practices of their production, dissemination, 
and reception, which bring an object into being”.11Discourse analysis, then, investigates 
discourse in terms of the way phenomena like energy security are  defined and given meaning 
and significance through the articulation and production of ‘texts’ of many kinds, from 
speeches to policy statements to legal rulings, and the practices those texts are part and 
parcel of. Particular emphasis is placed on discourse’s practical role in constructing and 
reconstructing social, political and economic realities.12 In the present case, that translates 
into an examination of the construction and reconstruction of energy security over time 
based on an investigation of specific kinds of discursive ‘moves’ in terms of their connection 
to law and policies on green energy development and implications for social, political and 
economic life.   
In order to do this, this study analyses the discourses of particular texts in the wider 
contexts which they are presented and made sense of within. From a discourse analytic 
perspective, texts are seen as ´intertextual´ in that they are not produced or interpreted in 
isolation from one another.13 The analysis seeks, therefore, to go ‘beyond the text’ in order 
to show the specific ways in which texts speak to other texts. By proceedings in this way, it is 
                                                          
11Ian Parker, Discourse Dynamics (Routledge 1992), 4. 
12 Nelson Phillips and Cynthia Hardy, Discourse Analysis (Sage 2002). 
13 Adam Hodges, ‘Intertextuality in Discourse’ in Deborah Tannen, Heidi E Hamilton, and Deborah Schiffrin (eds), 
The Handbook of Discourse Analysis (John Wiley & Sons, Inc 2015). 
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possible to arrive at a more nuanced understanding of the role that energy security discourse 
plays in law and policies on green energy development in those wider contexts.  
This thesis attempts to identify the discursive complexes which define the contexts 
examined through the country case studies. More specifically, this study examines the 
discursive frames which dominate energy security discourse in different contexts. A discursive 
frame is a means of structuring understandings.14 As a concept, it is closely related to the idea 
of a ‘frame of reference’, i.e. a set of understandings about the world and what it contains 
that makes it possible to make judgements, draw distinctions and establish connections. As 
Nelson Goodman puts it:15 
 Frames of reference ... belong less to what is described than to systems of 
description ... [and competing] statements relate what is described to such a 
system [and a different one in each case]. If I ask about the world, you can offer 
to tell me how it is under one or more frames of reference; but if I insist that 
you tell me how it is apart from all frames, what can you say? We are confined 
to ways of describing whatever is described. Our universe, so to speak, consists 
of these ways rather than of a world or of worlds.  
  As such, for Goodman, competing interpretations present the world in different ways 
– within them actors do different things in different ways in a different order for different 
reasons at different times because they are driven by different reasons and different forces. 
If one interpretation wins out and others are rejected, things change and that process carries 
often serious implications. Understanding the discursive framing of energy security is, 
                                                          
14 Stephen D Reese, ‘Prologue—Framing Public Life’, in Stephen D Reese, Oscar H Gandy Jr and August E Grant 
(eds), Framing Public Life: Perspectives on Media and our Understanding of the Social World (Lawrence Erlbaum 
2001), 11. 
15 Nelson Goodman, Ways of World Making (Hackett Publishing 1978), 2. 
25 
 
therefore, important, because when one frame is selected from among a range of competing 
frames that has consequences for how things are subsequently seen and acted on, 
particularly how green energy development is seen and acted on, as this thesis will 
demonstrate.  
  
5. Case studies 
5.1. Why case studies? 
In order to unveil the contextual specificity of ways of discursively framing energy 
security as well as the different ways that energy security and green energy are discursively 
linked, this thesis adopts case studies as a research design. There is not a single definition of 
case study research.  According to Hamel, Dufour and Fortin, a case study consists of an in-
depth investigation of a case, which uses a variety of methods to investigate the phenomena 
in question.16 Similarly, in Yin’s view, a case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a 
real life contemporary phenomenon in depth.17 Miles and Huberman suggest that the 'case' 
is the unit of analysis, or in other words, the 'heart of the study'.18 
The case study approach has become progressively popular among researchers,19 
including energy law and policy researchers.20 Several arguments can be made in favour of a 
case study approach for this thesis. First, the research questions of this thesis focus mainly on 
exploratory ‘how’ and ‘what’ questions, and more explanatory questions are likely to lead to 
                                                          
16 Jacques Hamel, Stéphane Dufour & Dominic Fortin, Case Study Methods (Sage 1993). 
17 Robert K Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods (SAGE Publications 2018), 18. 
18 M Miles and A Huberman, Qualitative Data Analysis (Sage 1994). 
19 G Thomas, ‘A Typology for the Case Study in Social Science following a Review of Definition, Discourse, and 
Structure’ (2011) 17(6) Qualitative Inquiry 511; N Hyett, A Kenny and V Dickson-Swift, ‘Methodology or Method? 
A Critical Review of Qualitative Case Study Reports’ (2014) 9 International Journal of Qualitative Studies on 
Health and Well-being’ 23606.  
20 See, for example, Heffron, R J, ‘The Application of Contrast Explanation to Energy Policy Research: UK Nuclear 
Energy Policy 2002-2012’ (2013) 55 Energy Policy 602; Richard L Ottinger (ed), Renewable Energy Law and 
Development: Case Study Analysis (Elgar 2013). 
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the use of case studies as one of the preferred research methods.21 Second, a case study 
approach allows the particularities and complexities of local meanings associated with 
different cases to be more fully explored, without losing the meaningful characteristics of the 
wider context.22 Third, case studies are ideal for exploring interactions between people and 
their understanding of a situation where the richness of the data obtained by multiple means 
from multiple perspectives provides a real insight into the main issues at play.23 Fourth, the 
use of case studies enables a certain amount of analytical generalisation24 by providing 
insights into recurring themes, issues and discursive practices across the cases analysed; 
thereby avoiding purely idiosyncratic conclusions and contributing to wider understandings 
of the role played by energy security discourse in constructing and deconstructing green 
energy policies. 
Case studies, however, also have drawbacks. Case studies have been frequently 
criticised because they provide little basis for generalising conclusions.25 Nonetheless, case 
studies do not represent ‘samples’ and the goal in the thesis is to provide analytic 
generalisation and not statistical generalisations.26  As will be fully explained in the following 
subsection, this thesis adopts a multiple-case design where three case studies are presented 
that together form a body of evidence for the different ways of discursively framing energy 
security as well as its link with green energy development. 
                                                          
21 Robert K Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods (SAGE Publications 2018), 9-11. 
22 Robert E Stake, ‘Qualitative Case Studies', in Norman K Denzin and Yvonna S Lincoln (eds), Strategies of 
Qualitative Inquiry (Sage Publications 2008), 119-149. 
23 Darren Dalcher, ‘Stories and Histories: Case Study Research (and Beyond) in Information Systems Failures’ in 
Michael E Whitman and Amy B Woszczynski (eds), The Handbook of Information Systems Research (Idea Group 
Publishing 2004), 314. 
24 Roger Gomm, Martyn Hammersley and Peter Foster, ‘Case Study and Generalization’, in Roger Gomm, Martyn 
Hammersley and Peter Foster, Case Study Method: Key Issues, Key Texts (Sage 2000). 
25 Robert K Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods (SAGE Publications 2018), 15. 
26 Ibid 15. 
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Another drawback is in relation to concerns over the lack of rigor of case study 
research, particularly in cases where the investigator has not followed systematic procedures 
or has allowed biased views to influence the direction of the findings and conclusions. As will 
be seen in the subsequent chapters, the method adopted for each case study has followed a 
systematic procedure and, as a strategy for interpreting the study’s findings, the author has 
identified rival explanations or alternative perspectives for the findings in order to avoid bias.  
 
5.2. Selection of case studies 
This thesis examines the interplay between energy security and law and policy on 
green energy development in the context of three case studies (i) Great Britain, (ii) Brazil and 
(iii) the World Trade Organisation (WTO). This thesis’ central argument is that if we want to 
have a just energy transition we ought to pay closer attention to the relationship between 
energy security and law and policies on green energy development. Understanding the 
diversity of views on and the complexities of the interplay between energy security and green 
energy development is at the heart of this thesis.  
Great Britain and Brazil were then selected as country case studies to show this 
diversity in their national context rather than a direct replication.27 The selection of these two 
cases is based on a desire to ensure the greatest difference or maximum variation between 
the cases. Given the differences in their economic and geography characteristics as well as 
energy policies, energy systems, energy governance and regulatory frameworks, areas where 
they diverge systematically provide a rich basis for analysing how the discursive frames 
                                                          
27 Ibid 61. 
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surrounding energy security and law and policies on green energy development are being 
practically construed.  
 Great Britain is a developed economy with an energy system dominated by fossil 
fuels,28 but which is in a major period of transition.29 Brazil is an emerging economy with one 
of the highest shares of energy generated from renewable sources30 and, according to the 
International Energy Agency, it has the greenest energy mix worldwide.31 Energy policies  are 
also demonstrably different in each country, i.e., GB has been active in grid modernisation 
efforts, including the shift to smart grid32 with, for instance, the integration of green energy 
sources into the system, vehicle-to-grid and vehicle-to-home technologies33 and it is pushing 
nuclear energy (which is a grey area for its categorisation of ‘green’ energy), while Brazil has 
focused on biofuels as a policy for its transport sector and has not included the shift to smart 
grid in its national energy policy yet.  
In terms of legal systems/framework and energy governance, there are distinct 
differences here, too. England and Wales are common law countries and the UK has a more 
                                                          
28 In 2017, the UK obtained 81.6 per cent of its primary energy from fossil fuels. See, Department for Business, 
Energy & Industrial Strategy, UK Energy in Brief 2018 (Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy 
2018), 13. 
29 Frank W Geels and others, ‘The Enactment of Socio-technical Transition Pathways: A Reformulated Typology 
and a Comparative Multi-level Analysis of the German and UK Low-carbon Electricity Transitions (1990–2014)’ 
(2016) 45(4) Research Policy 896. 
30 In the power sector, renewable sources account for 80.4% of the domestic supply of electricity in Brazil. See, 
Ministério de Minas e Energia (MME), Balanço Energético Nacional 2018: Ano Base 2017 (Ministério de Minas e 
Energia, Empresa de Pesquisa Energética 2018), 16.  
31 Fatih Birol, ‘Renewables 2018: Market Analysis and Forecast from 2018 to 2023’ 
<https://www.iea.org/renewables2018/> accessed 6 November 2018. 
32 According to the European Commission, smart grid is an ‘an electricity network that can cost efficiently 
integrate the behaviour and actions of all users connected to it – generators, consumers and those that do both 
– in order to ensure economically efficient, sustainable power system with low losses and high levels of quality 
and security of supply and safety’. See European Commission, ‘Smart Grids’ 
<http://s3platform.jrc.ec.europa.eu/smart-grids> accessed 7 October 2018. 
33 See, for example, João Crispim and others, ‘Smart Grids in the EU with Smart Regulation: Experiences from 
the UK, Italy and Portugal’ (2014) 31 Utilities Policy 85; Nick Jenkins, Chao Long, and Jianzhong Wu, ‘An Overview 
of the Smart Grid in Great Britain’ (2015) 4(1) Engineering 413; Dimitrios Xenias and others, ‘UK Smart Grid 
Development: An Expert Assessment of the Benefits, Pitfalls and Functions’ (2015) 81 Renewable Energy 89; P 
M Connor and others, ‘Sources of Risk and Uncertainty in UK Smart Grid Deployment: An Expert Stakeholder 
Analysis’ (2018) 161 Energy 1. 
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decentralised system for responsibility of the energy sector when compared to Brazil.  The 
principle of devolution in the UK has transferred energy-related powers to be exercised by 
the Northern Ireland Executive, Scottish Government and Welsh Government.34 The 
devolution, however, did not affect the fact that, formally, the UK central government 
retained overall responsibility for key energy policy agendas,35 where the Department for 
Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy is the main ministry with energy responsibilities. In 
contrast, Brazil is a civil law country with a much more centralised system for responsibility in 
the energy sector centred in the hands of the President of the Republic who ultimately defines 
the country’s energy policy,36 as will be further explained in chapter 5. 
 There are also differences in the drive for their green energy policies. Green energy 
promotion in GB has risen to the forefront of energy policies mainly as a result of the 
transition to a low carbon energy system, where an increase of renewable energy 
consumption in electricity, transport, and the heating sectors was proposed as a way to help 
keep the UK on track to hit the targets set in the Climate Change Act 2008.37 In Brazil, energy 
security initially appeared as a major force driving green energy policies, as will be shown in 
chapter 5 of this thesis. Demonstrating this diversity here contributes to the scholarly debate 
as legal academic literature on green energy development, in particular, focuses mainly on 
environmental and climate change concerns.38 However, growing academic literature and 
                                                          
34 Richard Cowell, ‘Rescaling the Governance of Renewable Energy: Lessons from the UK Devolution 
Experience’ (2017) 19(5) Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning 480, 485 
35  Richard Cowell, ‘Rescaling the Governance of Renewable Energy: Lessons from the UK Devolution 
Experience’ (2017) 19(5) Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning 480, 485. 
36 Law 9,478 of 6 August 1997, article 2, and Provisional Measure N 870 of 1 January 2019, article 14. 
37 Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC), ‘UK Renewable Energy Roadmap’, July 2011 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/renewable-energy-roadmap> accessed 7 October 2018. 
38 See, for example, Rafael Leal-Arcas, ‘New Frontiers of International Economic Law: The Quest for Sustainable 
Development’ (2018) 40(1) University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 83; Md Ershadul Karim and 
others, ‘Energy Revolution for Our Common Future: An Evaluation of the Emerging International Renewable 
Energy Law’ (2018) 11 Energies 7; Paolo Davide Farah and, Tivadar Ôtvös, ‘Competition Law And Trade in Energy 
Vs. Sustainable Development: A Clash of Individualism and Cooperative Partnerships? (2018) 50(2) Arizona State 
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media worldwide are increasingly acknowledging the role of green energy in ensuring energy 
security.39 The case of Brazil, therefore, contributes to the literature on energy security by 
bringing empirical data which supports the latter growing scholarly studies.  
Revealing these differences in the country case studies is also relevant because this 
divergence of views and approaches, learnt in each country case study, may be at stake in 
legal disputes. In particular, legal disputes between countries concerning energy security and 
green energy development have already taken place within international trade law as 
encapsulated in the law of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), an international trade 
organisation which adjudicates between competing discursive claims and pronounces on 
their legal status. As previously stated, GB developed green energy as a result of climate 
change, while Brazil primarily developed it, particularly wind and biofuels, to ensure energy 
security.  A legal dispute involving the driving force behind the promotion of national policies 
to develop green energy has recently been seen in the WTO Dispute Settlement Body on the 
case of India – Solar Cells40 between India and the United States (US). As will be demonstrated 
in chapter 6, India raised energy security as the main argument for developing their domestic 
                                                          
Law Journal 497; Kati Kulovesi, ‘International Trade Disputes on Renewable Energy: Testing Ground for the 
Mutual Supportiveness of WTO Law and Climate Change Law’ (2014) 23(3) Review of European Community & 
International Environmental Law 342. 
39 For academic journals, see, for example, Tareq Abu Hamed and Lindsey Bressler, ‘Energy Security in Israel and 
Jordan: The Role of Renewable Energy Sources’ (2019) 135 Renewable Energy 378; Pushpendra Kumar Singh 
Rathore, Durg Singh Chauhan and Rudra Pratap Singh, ‘Decentralized Solar Rooftop Photovoltaic in India: On the 
Path of Sustainable Energy Security’ (2019) 131 Renewable Energy 297; For media articles see, for example, 
World Bank, ‘Improving Energy Security In Gaza Through Solar Energy’ World Bank (10 October 2018) 
<https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2018/10/10/improving-energy-security-in-gaza-through-
solar-energy> accessed 10 May 2019; Peter Alagos, ‘Solar Test Facility 'Key to Qatar’s Energy Security' Gulf Times 
(8 June 2016) <https://www.gulf-times.com/story/497371/Solar-Test-Facility-key-to-Qatar-s-energy-security> 
accessed 11 May 2019;  ‘MIL-OSI Asia-Pacific: Promote New & Renewable Energy to Ensure Energy Security, to 
Protect Climate & to Reduce Pollution: Vice President’ ForeignAffairs.co.nz (4 April 2019); International 
Renewable Energy Agency, ‘Renewable Energy Can Build Prosperity and Improve Energy Security in Pakistan’ 
IRENA (10 April 2018) < https://www.irena.org/newsroom/pressreleases/2018/Apr/Pakistan-RRA> accessed 10 
May 2019. 
40 India — Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules, WT/DS456. 
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solar energy policies, while the US did not even acknowledge energy security as an argument 
and focused only on environmental issues.  
The WTO, therefore, was selected as a third case study because it shows how this 
diversity of views raised in national contexts leads to legal disputes in international forums 
when attempts are made to address the issue of the interplay between energy security and 
green energy development. In particular, the WTO acts as the primary global trade 
governance body and plays a key role in settling interstate trade disputes through panels and 
the Appellate Body of its Dispute Settlement Body, which has come to act as a significant 
international forum to channel complaints related to international green energy trade. It is 
acknowledged that the world is currently going through a period of legal, economic and 
political quarrelling around the evolution of green energy technologies,41 particularly with 
respect to trade. In the last nine years, for instance, fifteen cases involving green energy trade 
have been initiated under the WTO Dispute Settlement Body.42 It is therefore relevant to 
explore the diversity of views being raised by countries in connection with the interplay 
between energy security and law and policies on green energy development in the WTO legal 
disputes. 
Another reason as to the choice of the WTO as a case study lies in the fact that trade, 
green energy and energy security are intrinsically connected. The green energy sector of 
today is highly international with vast amounts of green energy technologies trade across the 
globe. In a study on trade analysis of technologies and goods relevant to the green energy 
supply sector, for instance, solar and wind figured quite prominently in terms of traded 
                                                          
41 Gary C Hufbauer, Ricardo Meléndez-Ortiz and Richard Samans, ‘Setting the Horse Before the Cart to Preserve 
a Viable World’, in Gary C Hufbauer, Ricardo Meléndez-Ortiz and Richard Samans (eds), The Law and Economics 
of a Sustainable Energy Trade Agreement (Cambridge University Press 2016), 2.  
42 Please see appendix 3 for a list of green energy trade disputes under the WTO system. 
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technologies.43 Green energy technologies are made up of packages of goods, services and 
embedded intangibles (such as software) that come together as a result of multiple 
transactions involving the providers of supply chains operating across several jurisdictions. 
There has also been an increasing number of examples internationally of green electricity grid 
transnationalisation and regionalisation via the installation of interconnectors, spurring green 
electricity trade amongst countries.44 As will be seen in the case study on GB in chapter 4, 
participants highlighted this green electricity grid regionalisation in the context of the 
European Energy Community. Green energy, therefore, must be viewed through the lens of 
trade amongst countries. 
International green energy trade interdependence then also raises energy security 
issues. On the one hand, some scholars propose enhancing openness to trade through 
liberalisation of the trade barriers to result in green energy technological diffusion.45 In this 
sense, for countries with a high level of green energy in their energy mix, energy security is 
enhanced by having access to tradeable green energy technologies. On the other hand, it is 
acknowledged that public policies and government economic incentives are key drivers for 
the stimulation of national green energy markets46 and relaxing trade barriers does not 
                                                          
43 Veena Jha, ‘Trade flows, barriers and market drivers in renewable energy supply goods: The need to level the 
playing field’ (2009) 3(3) BIORES 1. 
44 Natalie Ralph and Linda Hancock, ‘Energy security, Transnational Politics, and Renewable Electricity Exports in 
Australia and Southeast Asia’ (2019) 49 Energy Research & Social Science 233; Sharlissa Moore, ‘Evaluating the 
Energy Security of Electricity Interdependence: Perspectives from Morocco’ (2017) 24 Energy Research & Social 
Science 21; Mark T Nance and William A Boettcher, ‘Conflict, Cooperation, and Change in the Politics of Energy 
Interdependence: An Introduction’ (2017) 24 Energy Research & Social Science 1. 
45 See, for example, Rafael Leal-Arcas, ‘New Frontiers of International Economic Law: The Quest for Sustainable 
Development’ (2018) 40(1) University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 83; Muntasir Murshed, ‘Does 
Improvement in Trade Openness Facilitate Renewable Energy Transition? Evidence from Selected South Asian 
Economies’ (2018) 19(2) South Asia Economic Journal 151, 153. 
46 Veena Jha, ‘Trade flows, barriers and market drivers in renewable energy supply goods: The need to level the 
playing field’ (2009) 3(3) BIORES 1; Marianne Fay, Stephane Hallegatte, and Adrien Vogt-Schilb, Decarbonizing 
Development: Three Steps to a Zero-Carbon Future (World Bank 2015); Paolo Davide Farah and, Tivadar Ôtvös, 
‘Competition Law And Trade in Energy Vs. Sustainable Development: A Clash of Individualism and Cooperative 
Partnerships? (2018) 50(2) Arizona State Law Journal 497; A A Amrutha, P Balachandra and M Mathirajan, 
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effectively relieve the dependence of importing countries on green energy technologies. 
Asymmetric green energy trade interdependence may be a source of power to be used as an 
‘energy weapon’47 and it may potentially cause major disruption in green energy supply. If, 
for example, a country is dependent on green energy equipment and most of its energy mix 
is based on green energy sources, a green energy technology embargo due to political 
considerations would negatively impact the importing country’s energy security. 
As will be seen in the country case studies in chapters 4 and 5, opposing arguments 
appeared in the data collected for analysis. In the case study of GB in chapter 4, for instance, 
on the one side, there were participants who stressed that energy security is ensured via the 
ability to manage energy supply from around the world, a view which exposes a reliance on 
global trade networks and nondomestic actors for provisioning of energy supply. In this sense, 
sourcing and distribution diversification is a chief component of energy security.48 The 
literature on energy security, which is examined in chapter 3, also presents trade as an energy 
security indicator.49 On the other side, there were participants who expressed concerns over 
the country’s energy security due to import dependency, not only in relation to import 
dependency of green energy sources but also dependency on importation of green energy 
equipment, technology and energy expertise – particularly in the context of Brexit. 
The relationship between the country case studies in chapters 4 and 5 and the case 
study on the WTO in chapter 6 lies in the fact that different arguments concerning the 
                                                          
‘Model‐based Approach for Planning Renewable Energy Transition in a Resource‐constrained Electricity 
System—A Case Study from India’ (2018) 42(3) International Journal of Energy Research 1023. 
47 Johan Lilliestam and Saskia Ellenbeck, ‘Energy security and renewable electricity trade — Will Desertec make 
Europe vulnerable to the ‘‘energy weapon’’?’ 39 Energy Policy 3380, 3382. 
48  M Gruenig and B O’Donnell, ‘Reshaping Equilibria: Renewable Energy Mega-Projects and Energy Security’ in 
Patrizia Lombardi and Max Gruenig (eds), Low-carbon Energy Security from a European Perspective (Elsevier 
2016), 116. 
49 See, for example, the 372 indicators proposed by Sovacool and Mukherjee in Benjamin K Sovacool and Ishani 
Mukherjee, ‘Conceptualizing and Measuring Energy Security: A Synthesized Approach’ (2011) 36 Energy 5343. 
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interplay between energy security and green energy development may be raised by countries 
in international legal disputes under the WTO dispute settlement body. Two examples may 
illustrate this: (i) a dispute may arise between a country which promotes green energy to 
ensure energy security and a country which only links green energy with 
environmental/climate change concerns, such as the previously mentioned WTO case of India 
– Solar Cells; and (ii) a dispute may arise between two countries which promote green energy 
security, but in opposing ways, i.e. one country may adopt a national policy on green energy 
security based on managing energy supply from around the world and, therefore, will 
advocate trade liberalisation in the area; the other country may adopt a domestic policy on 
green energy security based on reducing import dependency and, thus, may seek the 
adoption of trade restrictive measures to develop its national green energy industry. 
Generally speaking, WTO rules are aimed at liberalising global trade. However, due to these 
different approaches to national energy policies on green energy security, it is relevant to 
examine how the WTO jurisprudence perceives the interplay between energy security and 
green energy, and how the law of the WTO applies to countries that want to reduce green 
energy import dependency on the grounds of energy security.  
Developing a proper global response to energy security and green energy 
development concerns in the context of a just energy transition requires, therefore, paying 
close attention to the global trade regime. As such, building on the findings of the two very 
different country case studies in chapters 4 and 5, the third case study in chapter 6 of this 
thesis analyses the interplay between energy security and green energy development in the 
law of the World Trade Organisation (WTO).  
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5.3. Methods of data collection 
 
For the case studies, this thesis adopts multiple methods of data collection – i.e. semi-
structured interviews, archival data and jurisprudence – in order to assemble a richer, 
stronger and diverse array of evidence related to the discursive construction and 
deconstruction of green energy policies in a variety of contexts. Accordingly, (i) the case study 
of Great Britain is based on empirical data collected from face-to-face semi-structured 
interviews with 24 leading energy experts; (ii) the case study of Brazil is based on data 
collected from three major archives in Brazil: the Brazilian National Archive, the President of 
the Republic Archive and the Federal Senate Archive, and (iii) the case study of the WTO is 
based on the WTO jurisprudence. The particularities of each method is further explained in 
each respective chapter.50 Both methods of data collection for the country case studies have 
the benefit of providing information not straightforwardly available in official published 
documents and, therefore, add novelty to this thesis. The findings of the country case studies 
then offer useful data that inform the legal analysis of the interplay between energy security 
and green energy in the law of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), which is largely 
unexplored. 
  
6. Conclusion 
In this chapter, the theoretical and methodological framework of the thesis and 
methods were set out and described. For the thesis, a socio-legal approach was taken based 
                                                          
50 Due to time and resource constraints, it was not possible to carry out interviews and archival research in both 
country case studies. Thus, as the data collected are not alike, a comparative approach was not taken as it would 
lead to incorrect results. As such, a ‘typical’ case study research approach in which methods are replicated in 
each case was not adopted. For further discussion on this, see Robert K Yin, Case Study Research: Design and 
Methods (SAGE Publications 2018). 
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on a constructionist view. Discourse analysis was the method chosen for the two country case 
studies, which form materials for the legal analysis of the third case study on the WTO. Having 
set out the methodological approach and the detailed research methods which will be used 
for this thesis, the next chapter will explore the literature review and the concepts and 
definitions in play in the subsequent chapters of this thesis.
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CHAPTER 3 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
1. Introduction 
This chapter provides the literature review and outlines the concepts and definitions 
in play in the subsequent chapters of this thesis. It starts with the basic definitions of energy 
and green energy. It then proceeds to discuss the notions of energy security in the scholarly 
reviews. The debate on energy security is not only about conceptualisations, meanings and 
measures, it is also about the processes which understandings of energy security are 
embedded in and affect political practices. As will be demonstrated in this thesis, the 
processes of securitisation and politicisation around energy are particularly relevant for the 
analysis in subsequent chapters, and therefore an explanation on their concepts will also be 
elaborated here. 
This chapter will demonstrate that there is a rich literature centred on the study of 
energy security. However, the existing scholarly debates on energy security present a 
pervasive lack of consensus in relation to its different concepts and dimensions. While some 
academic studies reduce energy security to the simple proxy of energy supply relative to 
demand, other commonly cited definitions stipulate that energy security is about 
uninterrupted availability at reasonable prices. There is also recent evidence in the scholarly 
debate of a broadening of the energy security concept with the inclusion of environmental, 
climate and social considerations. The subsequent chapters of this thesis will assess whether 
this broader approach in the existing literature feeds through into practice. 
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 Moving on to the examination of the processes of securitisation and politicisation 
around energy, this chapter will show that literature on securitisation and politicisation is not 
clear cut and entirely unproblematic. The boundaries of these processes around energy are 
not sharply defined and are contentious among scholars. What the conceptual analysis of 
these energy processes will show is that different processes imply different ways in which 
energy security issues are acted on.   
 
2. The definition of energy 
The Nobel Prize winning physicist, Richard Feynman, defined energy as follows: 
  There is a fact, or if you wish, a law, governing all natural 
phenomena that are known to date. There is no known exception to this law—
it is exact so far as we know. The law is called the conservation of energy. It 
states that there is a certain quantity, which we call energy that does not 
change in the manifold changes which nature undergoes. That is a most 
abstract idea, because it is a mathematical principle; it says that there is a 
numerical quantity which does not change when something happens. It is not 
a description of a mechanism, or anything concrete; it is just a strange fact that 
we can calculate some number and when we finish watching nature go 
through her tricks and calculate the number again, it is the same.1 
 Scientifically, energy is an abstract mathematical concept,2 and, as such, it is a difficult 
concept to comprehend.3 However, energy is classically defined as the capacity to do work.4 
                                                          
1 Richard Phillips Feynman, The Feynman Lectures on Physics. Volume 1 (Basic Books 2013), 4-1. 
2 John William Warren, ‘The Teaching of Energy’ (1991) 26(1) Physics Education 8, 8-9. 
3 Evelyn Chrystalla Pielou, The Nature of Energy (University of Chicago Press 2001), 5; Manuel Bächtold, ‘How 
Should Energy Be Defined Throughout Schooling?’ (2018) 48(2) Research in Science Education 345, 345. 
4 Cutler J Cleveland and Christopher Morris (eds), Dictionary of Energy (Elsevier 2015), 196. 
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Here ‘work’ means the application of effort to accomplish a task, and the rate at which work 
is performed is called ‘power’. Thus, machines consume energy, perform work, and provide 
power.5 The Oxford English Dictionary provides us with an additional meaning, which is used 
in everyday contexts, i.e., the power or force used to operate machines and devices, to 
provide light and heat, etc. This is what is meant by energy in non-scientific literature and 
governmental reports. Against this background, Slesser has remarked that energy is ‘a generic 
term used to cover sources of heat and power without specifying what sort and without 
regard to quality.’6  
 There are also different sources of energy generation. Some energy sources are stores 
(repositories) of energy that can be liberated for useful purposes, such as coal, oil, or uranium. 
Other energy sources are flows of energy through the natural environment that are present 
in varying degrees at particular times and places, such as wind and solar energy.7 Energy 
sources are commonly categorised into renewable and non-renewable sources, or 
conventional and unconventional (or alternative) energy sources.8 Non-renewable energy 
sources include energy resources which are available in limited quantities, such as fossil fuels 
(oil, gas and coal) and uranium.9 Renewable energy sources are sources that are continuously 
replenished by natural processes and include, for example, solar, wind, tidal, wave, hydro, 
geothermal, ocean thermal and biomass.10 Conventional or traditional energy sources are 
typically oil, natural gas, coal, large scale hydro and nuclear power. Unconventional or 
alternative energy sources can provide either an alternative or a supplement to conventional 
                                                          
5 James H Clark, R M Dell, and D A J Rand, Clean Energy (Royal Society of Chemistry 2004), 1. 
6 Malcolm Slesser, Dictionary of Energy (The Macmillan Press Ltd 1982), 88. 
7 Robert Ehrlich, Renewable Energy: A First Course (CRC Press 2013), 8. 
8 Lisa C Klein, ‘Conventional Energy Sources and Alternative Energy Sources and the Role of Sol-Gel Processing’ 
(2012) Sol-Gel Processing for Conventional & Alternative Energy 1; Balasubramanian Viswanathan, Energy 
Sources: Fundamentals of Chemical Conversion Processes and Applications (Elsevier 2016), 3. 
9 Marc A Rosen, ‘Energy Sustainability: A Pragmatic Approach and Illustrations’ (2009) 1 Sustainability 55. 
10 Michael A Laughton (ed), Renewable Energy Sources (Elsevier Science Pub Co 1990). 
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energy sources,11 such as solar, wind, ocean thermal, wave, tidal, small scale hydro, 
geothermal, biomass, energy from waste and hydrogen. This thesis will focus on green energy 
which will be discussed in the following section. 
 
3. The definition of green energy 
There is currently no accepted or adopted definition of ‘green energy’ and it is not the 
purpose of this thesis to analyse the debate surrounding what types of energy sources fall 
within the ‘green’ category. In the case studies in the subsequent chapters, the scope of green 
energy will be limited to emerging non-conventional energy sources. As a general overview, 
the Oxford English Dictionary defines green energy as ‘energy produced or harnessed in an 
environmentally responsible manner.’   
Green energy does not imply the absence of environmental impacts. All sources of 
energy have some environmental impact, but the impacts of different sources vary 
considerably. Fossil fuels have very harmful environmental impacts in terms of air, water, and 
land pollution, particularly in event of accidents and disasters, like oil spills and coal mine 
disasters.12 Nuclear power is carbon-free unlike fossil fuels, and, given this, some scientists 
are of the opinion that nuclear power is the greenest option even though this source of energy 
has received considerable criticism and public opinion on the possible dangers associated 
with nuclear reactors, especially after disasters such as the Japanese Fukushima-Daiichi, 
Russia’s Chernobyl, and Three Mile Island.13 There are, additionally, environmental concerns 
over radioactive waste and new nuclear power plants have also been controversial because 
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12 Richard L Ottinger and Mindy Jayne, ‘Global Climate Change Kyoto Protocol Implementation: Legal 
Frameworks for Implementing Clean Energy Solutions’ (2000) 18 Pace Environmental Law Review 19, 22. 
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of costs as well as risks. There has been a recent move towards the development of small 
nuclear power reactors, but this is not a wholly new technology, simply a different way to 
package nuclear energy to produce heat or electricity for commercial energy markets.14 There 
are, moreover, few differences in terms of environmental impacts between large and small 
nuclear power reactors. The main differences between small and large nuclear power 
reactors in terms of environmental impacts are their enhanced ability to withstand 
earthquakes, and a reduction in water usage as, contrary to conventional nuclear power 
reactors which are usually cooled by water, small nuclear power reactors can be cooled by 
air, gas, low-melting point metals or salt.15  
Beyond fossil fuels and nuclear power, there is also hydroelectric power which is also 
controversial. New large-scale hydroelectric dams involve flooding of large areas of land and 
this typically creates problems due to the displacement of people or agriculture to make way 
for them. Dams themselves create some methane (another greenhouse gas) emissions from 
decaying vegetation.16 In terms of problem-free energy sources, then, the search continues.  
In many respects, hydrogen might be considered the ideal fuel from an ecological 
viewpoint.17 It may, in principle, be derived from water using a non-fossil energy source (e.g. 
solar, geothermal) and combusted back to water in a closed chemical cycle involving no 
release of carbonaceous pollutants.18 However, today, most hydrogen is produced by the 
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steam reforming of natural gas, coal or naphtha, and by the partial oxidation of heavy oils to 
produce synthesis gas, a process that contributes to large emissions of carbon dioxide.19 
Non-conventional renewable energy sources are considered more environmentally 
benign, even though they too have some harmful impacts. As an illustration, in the case of 
wind energy, concerns have been raised over the noise produced by the rotor blades, visual 
impacts, deaths of birds and bats that fly into the rotors as well as loss of habitat for some 
species.20  When it comes to solar energy, concerns have been raised over photovoltaic solar 
panels as most of the solar cell technologies are using hazardous chemicals to achieve higher 
conversion efficiency.21 Geothermal, the available stored thermal energy in the Earth’s 
interior, has the issue of emission of noxious gases, although in relatively low concentrations, 
as well as the inducement of earthquakes during the hydrofraction process.22 In the case of 
tidal energy, there are concerns over the installation of tidal current turbines as they intrude 
upon ecological region and local species communities and can cause potential injury to 
marine wildlife such as fish, diving birds, and marine mammals that may come into contact 
with the moving components of turbines.23 
Brief mention ought to be made to a not yet commercially viable though scientifically 
feasible form of energy, nuclear fusion.24 Nuclear fusion is the process of combining atoms. It 
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differs from nuclear fission which is the process of splitting atoms. Nuclear fusion, the process 
by which the Sun and other stars generate their energy, is being developed for the production 
of electrical power on Earth.25 The fusion reaction between deuterium and tritium has been 
considered the best candidate for a fusion power plant useful to mankind.26 A kilogram of 
fusion fuel can produce as much energy as 10,000 tons of coal, oil, or natural gas.27 Contrary 
to nuclear fission, the fusion fuel cycle produces no long-term radioactive waste products for 
future generations.28 However, there are still considerable scientific and technical difficulties 
encountered with regard to its feasibility and the construction of commercial-scale fusion 
power plants,29 as well as uncertainties concerning the cost to the environment.30 
 
4. Understanding the concept of energy security: scholarly views 
There is wide consensus among scholars that ensuring energy security is of key 
importance for society. The notion of “energy security” is widely discussed within academic 
literature and debates around the concept have given rise to a multitude of definitions and 
interpretations. One review, for instance, identified 83 specific definitions of energy 
security.31 However, an agreed definition has not yet been reached, apart from the 
recognition that the concept of energy security is polysemic, multi-dimensional, contextual 
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and dynamic in nature.32 Although there has been debate surrounding security of demand,33 
most of the literature uses energy security, security of energy supply or security of supply as 
synonyms. This thesis proceeds in similar fashion, focusing on energy security in the sense of 
security of energy supply. 
 Ciută has already highlighted the terminological profusion and ambiguity of the 
concept of energy security.34 While some scholars advocate that a broader array of criteria 
needs to be considered as a key component of energy security concepts,35 others argue for a 
narrow notion of energy security and a clear separation between energy security and other 
policy objectives, leading to the definition of energy security as the continuity of energy 
supplies relative to demand.36 
Against this backdrop of disagreement, however, the International Energy Agency 
(IEA)’s mainstream definition of energy security as “the uninterrupted availability of energy 
sources at an affordable price”37 has been generally repeated in the literature. Bielecki 
defines energy security as the “reliable and adequate supply of energy at reasonable prices”.38 
Barton defines energy security as “a condition in which a nation and all, or most, of its citizens 
                                                          
32 L Chester, ‘Conceptualising Energy Security and Making Explicit its Polysemic Nature’ (2010) 38 Energy Policy 
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and businesses have access to sufficient energy resources at reasonable prices for the 
foreseeable future free from serious risk of major disruption of service”.39  In Asif and 
Muneer’s words, energy security means “consistent availability of sufficient energy in various 
forms at affordable prices.”40 In line with these definitions, the common elements for energy 
security are availability, reliability and affordability. 
However, availability, reliability and affordability are only part of the story. In the later 
decades of the 20th century, energy security came to be discursively reconfigured to include 
the environment. Cherp and Jewell describe this change in the framing of energy security as 
‘robustness perspective’ which was influenced by the idea of globally limited resources.41 
Thus, by 1999, energy security became associated with efforts to “minimize vulnerability to 
resource supply disruptions, access reliable energy at reasonable or market driven prices, and 
consume resources that least damage the environment and promote sustainable 
development.”42  
A similar emphasis on the environmental dimension can be discerned in definitions 
adopted in academic research on energy security. For instance, Yinka Omorogbe adopts the 
concept of energy security as “the provision of adequate, affordable, efficient, and reliable 
energy services with minimal adverse impacts on the environment”.43 Sascha Müller-
Kraenner refers to “the provision of reasonably priced, reliable and environmentally friendly 
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energy”.44 Carolina Hernandez defines energy security as “access to reliable, affordable and 
environmentally sustainable energy supplies”.45 According to the UNDP (United Nations 
Development Programme),46 energy security is “the availability of energy at all times in 
various forms, in sufficient quantities and at reasonable and/or affordable prices, without an 
unacceptable or irreversible impact on the environment.”47 In the view of Constantini and 
others, energy security has physical, economic, social, and environmental dimensions, as well 
as long and short-term dimensions.48 For Elkind, a contemporary understanding of energy 
security must include not only availability, reliability, and affordability, but also environmental 
sustainability.49 The 4 A’s of energy security – availability (geological), accessibility 
(geopolitical), acceptability (environmental and social) and affordability (economic) 
introduced by the Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre (APERC) – has also gained traction in 
recent literature.50 Therefore, scholarly definitions also encompass social and environmental 
sustainability as core components of energy security, making these aspects a condition for 
energy security to be met. This approach endorses, as such, the idea that energy security and 
social and environmental sustainability are inseparable and indivisible and thus cannot be 
treated as distinct. 
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Various factors contributed to this discursive shift. Environmental disasters 
demonstrated that energy and the environment impact one another with real-world 
consequences, with the pursuit of energy security causing growing threats to the 
environment and disaster disrupting access to energy. For instance, the unprecedented Gulf 
War oil spill in 1991 caused extensive contamination of the natural habitat and long-term 
effects on aquatic ecosystems.51 In August and September 2005, the hurricanes Katrina and 
Rita shut down 27% of US oil production and 21% of US refining capacity in the Gulf of Mexico 
with worldwide implications for global oil prices, climate change, strategic oil stocks and 
perceptions of supply security.52 The oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in May 2010, to take 
another example, brought to the fore the negative impact on the environment as a result of 
pursuit of energy security.  
Beyond disasters and increased understanding of the risk of disasters, the problem of 
greenhouse gas emissions and the international commitments of governments under the 
Kyoto Protocol also prompted some countries to emphasise the environmental aspects of 
their energy policies.53 I also brought about the Post-Kyoto emission targets as well as actions 
and debates regarding low carbon energy transition and geopolitics of climate change. This 
latter factor, in turn, helped drive a further reframing of the concept of energy security to 
include climate change. The European Commission, for example, substituted references to 
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“environmental concerns” in its energy security definition in the year 200054 with references 
to climate change: “the uninterrupted physical availability of energy products and services on 
the market, at a price which is affordable for all consumers (private and industrial), while 
contributing to the EU’s wider social and climate goals.”55 
Nevertheless, the global energy landscape changes over time. As a result, changes in 
the emphasis of energy security dimensions are also seen. As such, although some scholars 
have included the environment and climate change within the concept of energy security, this 
is not uniform. Just as pronounced is the tendency to frame the environment, climate change 
and energy as independent issues, a process which generates tension and conflict around the 
concept of energy security and its implications for environmental protection and/or climate 
change policies. Many energy developments that negatively impact the environment have 
been controversially promoted in the name of energy security, such as the drill for oil in the 
Arctic National Wildlife Refuge,56 the exploration of oil sands in Alberta, Canada,57 and the 
recent grating of licences for shale gas exploration in the UK.58  
The competing dimensions of energy security have been a focus in the literature with 
one recent literature review, for instance, identifying 15 dimensions.59 Due to its 
multidimensional characteristics, a growing number of studies present a set of metrics for 
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energy security in order to measure and track progress on energy security, including future 
energy security performance.60 These studies present large variations in the choice of 
indicators and in the way energy security indexes are framed and constructed. The logic of 
measurement and quantification of energy security seek to transform a vague and weakly 
defined notion into a “practical decision space” and so bring energy security into the domain 
of management, modelling and scenario analysis,61 making it commensurable with other 
concerns for decision makers.62  
According to another recent literature review, 53 studies have dealt with energy 
security indicators.63 As an illustration, Sovacool and Brown, recognising each dimension – 
availability, affordability, energy and economic efficiency, environmental stewardship – to be 
of comparable importance, developed 10 indicators that constitute an Energy Security Index. 
Their index included oil import dependency, natural gas import dependency, dependence on 
petroleum transport fuels, retail electricity prices, retail gasoline/petrol prices, energy 
intensity, per capita electricity use, on-road fuel intensity of passenger vehicles, SO2 and CO2 
emissions.64 The higher the value of each indicator, the lower energy security is.65 However, 
a pitfall of this index is that, for the environmental criteria, only gases emissions are relevant 
in the equation, not including, as such, other environmental impacts.  
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Sovacool and Mukherjee provide a broader framework for analysing national energy 
security policies and performance, demonstrating its complexity by suggesting a total of 372 
indicators. They have proposed five dimensions for energy security: availability, affordability, 
technology development, sustainability, and regulation. These five dimensions are broken 
down into 20 components related to security of supply and production, dependency, and 
diversification for availability; price stability, access and equity, decentralization, and low 
prices for affordability; innovation and research, safety and reliability, resilience, energy 
efficiency, and investment for technology development; land use, water, climate change, and 
air pollution for sustainability; and governance, trade, competition, and knowledge for sound 
regulation. These 20 components then corresponded to 320 simple and 52 complex indicators 
that can be used to measure and track performance on energy security.66 
 Heffron, McCauley and Sovacool put forward the Energy Justice Metric as a way to 
try to achieve a just and equitable balance between the competing demands of the energy 
trilemma (economics, politics and the environment).67 Economics, politics and the 
environment are used as parameters of the Energy Justice Metric with energy security being 
included within politics, in which the cost of fluctuation and instability in energy supplies and 
the cost (benefit) of import/export of energy supplies are measured.68 In this way, energy 
security is a concept independent from the environment and economics. 
The existing literature, therefore, presents a wide variety of conceptualisations, 
interpretations and measurements of energy security, adding to the uncertainty surrounding 
its definition. They either advance a narrow interpretation of energy security in the sense of 
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energy supply only or they advance an understanding based on a mixture of economic, social, 
political, technological and environmental indicators.  
For Winzer, this lack of clarity makes energy security ‘hard to measure and difficult to 
balance against other policy objectives’.69 Despite this variety of energy security definitions, 
Cherp and Jewell suggest that attempts should still be made to find a useful universal 
definition.70 Meanwhile, others have argued that the complex and contested nature of energy 
security means that a universal definition is probably not a practical goal.71 This thesis does 
not aim to generate an agreed-upon definition of energy security, but rather to shed more 
light on the diversity of perspectives around it, something which will be shown in the following 
chapters. 
Within the context of energy security, there are also the dynamics that arise from an 
understanding of processes around energy. The processes of securitisation and politicisation 
around energy are particularly relevant for the subsequent chapters, and, therefore, an 
explanation on them will also be elaborated in the following sections.  
  
5. Securitisation of energy  
The securitisation of energy – the connection between energy and national security – 
was established more than a century ago.  Americans, for example, began to think about 
energy in terms of national security in the nineteenth century with coal and the fuelling of 
steamships.72 Until World War II, the notion of energy security was closely tied to the supply 
                                                          
69 Christian Winzer, ‘Conceptualizing Energy Security’ (2012) 46 Energy Policy 36, 36. 
70 Aleh Cherpa and Jessica Jewell, ‘The Concept of Energy Security: Beyond the Four As’ (2014) 75 Energy Policy 
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of fuels for the military. Energy resources, firstly in the form of coal in the nineteenth century, 
and later in the form of petroleum products, allowed the generation of electricity, power for 
vehicles, aircraft and ships essential to warfare, and provided power to the large 
manufacturing base required.73 Energy has also been considered to be a question of national 
security during times of war due to the significant impact of conflict on energy infrastructure, 
through its destruction and prioritisation as a target.74 
The importance of oil for armies did not decrease in the post-war period, but oil also 
became essential for the functioning of industrialised societies in many other ways too. 
Developed nations became dependent on oil products for motorised vehicles for passenger 
transport, food production, health care, manufacturing, heating, and electricity generation. 
At the same time, most industrialized countries did not produce enough oil to satisfy their 
needs and became dependent on oil imports. The vulnerability of this system came to light in 
1973 with the first oil crisis when oil was used as an instrument of coercion. Most Arab 
members of OPEC along with several non-OPEC Arab countries cut oil supplies to the USA, the 
Netherlands and later to several other countries in protest of the US support for Israel. The 
price of oil quadrupled triggering an economic crisis and exposing the fragility of the global 
oil supply system. 75 In the 1970s and 1980s, the world economy struggled to overcome the 
damaging effects of the oil crises of 1973–74 and 1979–80 and their knock-on effects, 
including economic recessions and high unemployment.76  In this context, the term energy 
security came to denote concerns relating to oil and potential costs of supply disruption, 
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associated with an over-dependence on oil imports.77 There is, as such, a close association 
between energy security and crude oil imports and the concept of energy security continues 
to be shaped in significant ways by the historical anxieties experienced by oil importing 
States.78 
Since the rise of coal in the industrial revolution, and later through petroleum-based 
products, energy has recurrently become entangled with questions of national security. 
Initially, energy was an essential aspect of national security due to societies’ dependence on 
energy for war fighting capabilities. Later, energy also became associated with national 
security as a result of societies’ dependence on fossil fuels.   
Adding to this, and particularly after the oil crisis, the security dimensions of energy 
have largely been shaped by perceptions of scarcity, based on the presumption that global 
reserves of fossil fuels are insufficient to meet the anticipated needs of a State due to the 
finite nature of fossil fuel reserves and their location in areas of recurring turmoil and conflict. 
As a recent example, disruptions in gas supply as a result of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and 
its actions in Ukraine have evoked the spectre of the use of energy as a weapon. In this, EU 
Member States’ reliance on and exposure to Russia on energy supplies said to have “critical 
national security implications”.79 
A series of other developments have also shaped concerns around scarcity. These 
include the rapid growth in energy demand outside of the OECD, notably in China,80 but also 
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in a number of major oil and gas exporting countries. This expansion of domestic demand 
means that their ‘exportable surplus’ is reduced.81  It also includes, however, the increasing 
prevalence of bilateral deals (particularly those associated with Chinese oil investment) that 
effectively remove oil from market channels.82    
There is also the presumption that energy-poor States must engage in whatever 
means possible and necessary — economic, diplomatic, and military — to ensure access to 
adequate energy supplies.83 To this day, perceptions of scarcity and a willingness to safeguard 
vital energy supplies through military means continue to shape government policy in many 
parts of the world and make energy security an essential component of national security.84 
Due to concerns over the energy security implications of developments in Ukraine, as a 
consequence of Russia’s violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, the G785 
leaders, for instance, associated energy security with national security by stating that 
‘[e]nergy security is a collective responsibility, a core component of our economic and 
national security’.86 In another example, the 2009 Wicks Report warned of ‘a global grab for 
energy’ following the coming out of the 2008 global recession, in which ‘nations will flex their 
muscles in the pursuit of energy resources.’87 
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The global security landscape has changed as well, with growing concerns about 
threats from non-State actors, which include piracy and terrorist attacks, including cyber 
ones, on critical energy infrastructure with the aim of disrupting the energy supply chain.88 
This also contributes to the configuration of energy security as a national security issue. In the 
words of NATO’s Assistant Secretary General: 
Given its critical role in the functioning of modern economy as well as in 
supporting collective defence efforts, energy infrastructure remains among 
the most critical components that determine a nation´s security. Increasing 
digitisation (e.g. smart grids, smart meters and the internet) has made the 
energy sector more efficient, yet at the same time more vulnerable. For 
example, attacks on Industrial Control Systems can result in massive physical 
damage such as the breakdown of critical machinery, which cannot be 
replaced quickly. A well orchestrated cyberattack could thus bring down crucial 
components of a country's energy infrastructure, resulting in massive 
economic and financial disruption and arguably even loss of life.89 
However, it is important not to take the meaning of the concept of security at face 
value. Approaching security as a concept embedded in discursive and political practices,90 the 
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theory developed by the Copenhagen School of security analysts and represented by the work 
of Barry Buzan and Ole Waever91 best epitomise this approach. In the words of Waever:92 
‘Security is a practice, a specific way to frame an issue. Security discourse is 
characterised by dramatising an issue as having absolute priority. By labelling 
this as a security issue, the actor has claimed the right to handle it with 
extraordinary means, to break the normal rules of the game (e.g. in the form 
of secrecy, levying taxes or conscripts, limitations on otherwise inviolable 
rights).’ 
Thus, linking a specific matter to security can create a sense of importance and 
urgency required to resolve the problem. As Barry Buzan and others note, ‘issues 
acknowledged to be inside the security box—by virtue of their seriousness—warrant priority 
and may allow decision makers to pursue emergency measures outside the realm of normal 
politics.’93 Consequently, by securitising energy, energy is moved to the field of emergency 
politics, ‘where it can be dealt with swiftly and without the normal (democratic) rules and 
regulations of policy-making.’94 Thus, a security issue is characterised by urgency, secrecy and 
the employment of extraordinary measures. 
Framing the energy debate in security terms is consequential in several ways.  
First,  as a  component  of  national  security,  energy  security  can  become  the  
justification for using military force or other instruments of coercion. For example, this stance 
was articulated by several US presidents when authorising military action in the Persian Gulf 
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area.95 Tying energy to militarised solutions may be an inappropriate way of resolving 
underlying issues, such as oil dependency, and divert attention from seeking a less drastic 
alternative.  
Second, associating energy with national security can override access to information. 
The UK Freedom of Information Act 2000, under section 24, for example, allows a public 
authority not to disclose information if it considers releasing the information would make the 
UK or its citizens more vulnerable to a national security threat.  
Third, it reinforces the discourses of control and can restrict public participation. 
Under article 6 of the Aarhus Convention, for instance, public authorities can limit public 
participation in decisions to proposed activities serving national defence purposes.96 
According to Copenhagen School scholars, the securitisation process results in a lack of open 
or collective political deliberation as decision making takes place behind closed doors. As a 
result, if public decision cannot be analysed in detail and discussed in public, it affects 
transparency of practice in public administrations and also erodes democratic accountability. 
Recent critical security literature, however, has suggested that securitising moves do not 
always have to result in secret decision making.97 
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Fourth, discourses of security are frequently exclusionary and violent, limiting 
individual freedom.98 Thus, they can allow a broad range of actions from curtailing public 
access and rights of way to withholding the right to protest/strike.99  
 Fifth, security concerns can be devised in order to achieve certain policy aims. Policy 
makers can place a specific matter of interest under the security umbrella to prioritise and 
push forward the approval of preferred policies. Leese and Meisch argue, for example, that 
issues of energy have often been placed under the general framework of security to push 
forward and foster a new 'green' economy.100 According to Bridge, by conjoining energy with 
security a broad range of actions and clusters of technologies may be licensed by appealing 
to the term, from wind farms to nuclear power.101 
Sixth, securitisation of energy – the claim that energy is a matter of security – can be 
used by governments to derogate from other obligations. The State may invoke exceptional 
security clauses in national, regional or international agreements to resist challenges to 
regulatory or other measures adopted by the State to implement its policy or to avoid other 
obligations embedded in agreements constraining its chosen policy. If a measure is taken that 
adversely affects a national security interest, the government can take appropriate measure 
to address the threat, including breaching other interests protected by law which do not fall 
under the security umbrella. Thus, some countries have been restricting foreign investments 
to protect their energy security interest. In May 2008, Japan, for example, ordered the 
Children’s Investment Master Fund (TCI), a British hedge fund, to drop a bid to raise its stake 
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in J-Power, the biggest wholesale electric company in Japan on the grounds that foreign 
ownership holdings in strategic energy companies like J-Power would threaten Japan´s 
maintenance of public order and national security.102 The same applies to the restrictions 
placed by Venezuela (2001), Bolivia (2006), Kazakhstan (2007) and Russia (2008) on foreign 
investment in national oil and gas industries based on energy security.103  
Seventh, the securitisation of energy can be used as a rationale for justifying State 
intervention in energy markets in order to, for example, increase or reduce the pace of 
renewable energy deployment.104 
Eighth, it can be used to justify energy developments which cause environmental 
degradation. Redgwell highlighted the fact that substantive treaty obligations such as the 
obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment and to conserve biological 
diversity generally are not subject to express treaty exceptions permitting derogation for 
energy purposes.105 Nonetheless, placing energy within the national security exception in 
treaties leaves scope for environmental derogation for unsustainable energy purposes.  
Traditionally, security has largely been thought of as encompassing military or war-
related threats or concerns. Of late, however, the boundaries of such an understanding of the 
term have been challenged, which has led to a broadening and deepening in understandings 
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of what security comprises.106 For instance, the environment,107 climate,108 food109 and 
water110 – elements closely linked to energy – have been included within the security domain. 
This emerged within the context of non-military threats to national security under the 
assumption that threats to security arise less from the relationship of nation to nation and 
more from the relationship of human beings to nature based on the fact that pressures on 
the earth's principal biological systems, namely oceanic fisheries, grasslands, forests and 
croplands, on which humanity depends for food and industrial raw materials, are mounting 
rapidly as population expands and global consumption climbs.111  
Increasing securitisation of energy and related policies – and the rise of different 
notions of security – bring about the problem of different security interests competing with 
each other. Placing energy, the environment, climate, food and water under the security 
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umbrella raises the problem of determining which security issue prevails when there are two 
or more security issues at stake.  
A good example of the tensions that can arise around the pursuit of energy security is 
the development of unconventional reserves and the use of hydraulic fracking, commonly 
referred to simply as fracking, and its impact on climate, environmental and water securities. 
The development of any non-low carbon energy conflicts with climate security. Fracking, a 
technique used to unlock oil and gas from deposits of shale via the injection of high-pressure 
streams of sand, water, and chemicals into underground shale,112is generally associated with 
spills, risk of air pollution, contamination of surface and groundwater by chemical 
constituents, and harm to people’s health and welfare.113 Fracking has raised significant 
concerns around its impact on water security, including: (i) concerns over water withdrawals 
associated with shale gas development, and the extent to which it may deplete local water 
supplies or adversely impact local watersheds; (ii) concerns over managing wastewater as 
wastewater treatment facilities are not equipped to process such wastewater; and (iii) 
concerns over water contamination.114  
Another instance of competing securities is the development of biofuels and the food 
versus energy debate it brings to the fore. Biofuels have been criticised for their 
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unsustainability, particularly in relation to land-use change, and their competition with 
agriculture for land resources.115  
As such, different logics of security interact and shape energy security discourses, 
challenging disciplinary boundaries and security practices. 
 
6. Politicisation of energy  
Politicisation can be understood as placing a subject into the realm of deliberation, 
decision making and human agency when previously they were not.116 Accordingly, 
politicisation of energy security occurs when it becomes subject to political scrutiny, 
generating debate and usually multiple policy approaches. This demonstrates public and 
political interest in the matter, requiring government decision and resource allocations, while 
not imposing the threat-urgency modality of securitisation. 
The oil crises of the 1970s made people aware of energy, and energy issues, previously 
only discussed mainly by experts, began to be reported massively by the media. This in turn 
led to demands for new governmental responses, resulting in a political transformation of 
energy security issues. While some scholars argue that energy security as a national security 
issue has promoted depoliticisation, others suggest links between politicisation and 
securitisation in energy. Kuzemko, for example, argues that the framing of energy supply as a 
security issue influenced an opening up of UK energy, which had been subject to processes of 
depoliticisation since the late 1980s, to greater political interest and deliberation.117 
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According to Kuzemko, energy in the UK was politicised partly through the impact of 
narratives of national energy supply (in-)security in the context of mounting political support 
for climate change mitigation, Russian energy policy restructurings, the emergence of China 
as a powerful energy actor, of rising oil and gas prices, and of the Russia–Ukraine gas transit 
disputes, and on the brink of the UK becoming an importer of oil and gas after decades as a 
net exporter.118 
Energy security is considered both a strategic issue and public policy issue.119 
Superimposed on all the strategic considerations is a political issue, as there is the core 
assumption that satisfying national energy requirements is a critical government 
responsibility.120 Scholars argue that the public is increasingly demanding participation in 
energy policy,121 although meaningful interactions between energy experts and lay-people 
remains difficult, and existing energy policy processes, from power plant siting planning 
decisions to the design of energy legislation, tend to limit rather than expand public 
participation and engagement.122 
Many factors can promote the politicisation of energy.  
First, when there is some risk to energy supply. Rand, for instance, suggests that 
politicians and the general public are concerned more with the affairs of the moment. 
Politicians focus on immediate threats, general political discontent and the prospects for 
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winning the next election as opposed to more distant issues. The ‘man in the street’, by 
contrast, is said to be occupied with short-term matters that involve family, food, job, 
housing, finance, recreational activities. Whether true or not, it is when supplies of energy 
show signs of becoming inadequate that politicians and the general public jointly turn their 
attention to energy.123 In the UK, for example, it is said that a debate about energy security 
started to appear in the public realm in the most loud and persistent way since the 1970s oil 
crises.124 However, when the stability of energy supplies is recognisably at risk, it is most likely 
that the militarisation of energy-resource management will occur,125 and the securitisation 
discourse takes over as a result.  
Second, politicisation occurs when there are safety issues. For instance, during the 
second half of the 1990s, several accidents in nuclear-related factories in Japan – a liquid 
sodium leak at the Monju fast breeder reactor in December 1995; a fire at the Tokaimura 
reprocessing plant in March 1997; and an accident at the Japan Nuclear Fuel Conversion Co. 
in September 1999 – began to draw public attention, and the Fukushima incident on 11 March 
2011 triggered the politicisation of the nuclear power issue at the national level in Japan.126 
Third, when there is contention about which energy source should be developed. The 
politicisation of renewable energy – where proponents and opponents have engaged in fierce 
debates about the merits of renewable sources of energy which have brought about intense 
political debates in many countries – serves as an example. On the pro-renewables front, 
thousands of people joined a protest rally in Germany when the government tried to cut 
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support for solar photovoltaics (PV).127 On the opposite side, there has been immense 
opposition to renewable energy development.128 The Koch brothers in the United States, for 
instance, have invested significant sums in antirenewable lobbying.129 Entwined with 
contentiousness about choice of energy source promotion is the growing political pressure to 
address climate change.   
Fourth, when there is rising energy prices. According to Moran and Russell, high 
energy prices would probably not be a sufficient motivation for a well-grounded calculation 
that war for energy pays off.130 However, the affordability element of energy security as a 
cause for politicisation and as a justification for State action is widely accepted131 as increasing 
energy prices brings about pressure from the public. Rising energy prices are even capable of 
causing a ‘political panic’.132  
The above-mentioned examples are merely illustrative. They do not constitute an 
exhaustive list. Some energy matters may remain local and specific, but they may be elevated 
to the national agenda, and may also become entangled in electoral politics. 
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7. Conclusion 
This chapter has introduced and discussed the concepts and definitions in play in the 
subsequent chapters of this thesis. The chapter explored the variety of definitions in the 
existing literature of energy security, its multidimensional character as well as the processes 
of securitisation and politicisation surrounding energy policymaking. The purpose of this 
chapter was not to add a new notion of energy security to the already existing literature. The 
aim was instead to look at key concepts, whose discursive framing and reframing will be 
returned to throughout the thesis. 
 The scholarly debate on energy security has demonstrated that the concept of energy 
security is not static, but dynamic, changing over time. The processes of energy securitisation 
and politicisation are not black or white either, establishing states of affairs in which energy 
issues fall on one side of the divide or the other clearly at any given moment. They are, 
instead, complex and contested with disagreements among scholars. The concept of and 
phenomena surrounding energy security cannot, therefore, be oversimplified. The different 
shifts in understandings of energy security thus point to the primacy of discursive practices at 
different times and in different places.133 
With discourse analysis as the particular analytical approach adopted in the case 
studies under chapters 4 and 5, the main objective of these chapters is to investigate, via a 
bottom-up approach, how discourses of energy security have been framed in the specific case 
studies chosen for this research and the impact of those frames on green energy 
development. The case studies of Great Britain and Brazil will highlight the diversity of 
discursive practices in play around energy security, and how they contribute to the 
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construction, but also the dismantling or de-construction of green energy policies. They will 
also explore what the stakes are in these discursive contests. The findings of these case 
studies provide valuable data which will inform the examination of the law of the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) in chapter 6, focusing on policy space for trade restrictive measures 
which support green energy development with a view of ensuring energy security.
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CHAPTER 4 
ENERGY SECURITY AND GREEN ENERGY IN GREAT BRITAIN: THE DISCOURSE OF THE LIGHTS 
GOING OUT  
 
1. Introduction 
1.1. Aim and contribution of the chapter 
This chapter delves into energy security and green energy in the context of Great 
Britain (GB)1 and focuses on the thesis key research questions: (i) how has energy security 
been discursively constructed? (ii) what are the discursive links between energy security and 
law and policies promoting green energy? And (iii) what are the implications of energy 
security construction to law and policy on green energy development?  
The interplay between energy security and law and policies on green energy fits within 
the debate surrounding a just transition2 to a more sustainable, affordable, secure and 
inclusive energy system.  Great Britain was chosen as a case study because although its energy 
system is dominated by fossil fuels,3 it is currently undergoing a major transition.4 It is also a 
country where issues of energy security and climate change have come to the fore 
prominently. Green energy development in GB, in particular, has risen to the forefront of 
energy policies mainly as a result of the transition to a low carbon energy system. The Climate 
Change Act 2008 established a legally binding target to reduce the UK's greenhouse gases 
                                                          
1 As a note to the reader, the electricity systems in Great Britain and Northern Ireland are governed and 
regulated independently of one another. This chapter focuses on Great Britain, although some data is used which 
is reported at the level of the whole of the United Kingdom (UK). 
2 Raphael J Heffron, ‘The Just Transition to a Low-Carbon Economy’ (2018) 8(4) Renewable Energy Law & Policy 
Review 39. 
3 In 2017, the UK obtained 81.6 per cent of its primary energy from fossil fuels. See, Department for Business, 
Energy & Industrial Strategy, UK Energy in Brief 2018 (Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy 
2018), 13. 
4 Frank W Geels and others, ‘The Enactment of Socio-technical Transition Pathways: A Reformulated Typology 
and a Comparative Multi-level Analysis of the German and UK Low-carbon Electricity Transitions (1990–2014)’ 
(2016) 45(4) Research Policy 896. 
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emissions to at least 80% lower than the 1990 baseline by 2050, and an increase of renewable 
energy consumption in electricity, transport, and heating sectors was proposed as a way to 
help keep the UK on track to hit the targets.5  
At the same time, the closure of a number of coal- and oil-fired plants due to high 
pollution levels as well as the closure of nuclear plants which are coming to the end of their 
working lives have decreased the electricity capacity margin between supply and demand, 
which increases the risks to the security of energy supply.6 In addition, due to the decline of 
supplies from the UK Continental Shelf,7 GB has increasingly become dependent on energy 
imports, being an energy importer since 2004.8 These factors have all contributed to take 
energy security to the top of the political agenda in GB. Concomitantly, GB has been active in 
grid modernisation efforts, including the shift to smart grid9 with, for instance, the integration 
of green energy sources to the system, vehicle-to-grid and vehicle-to-home technologies.10 
The expansion of electric vehicle markets in GB has also raised security of energy supply 
                                                          
5 Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC), ‘UK Renewable Energy Roadmap’, July 2011 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/renewable-energy-roadmap> accessed 7 October 2018. 
6 DECC, ‘Energy Security Strategy’ (November 2012) <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/ 
uploads/attachment_data/file/65643/7101-energy-security-strategy.pdf> accessed 10 October 2018. 
7 OFGEM, ‘Wholesale Energy Markets in 2015’ 
<https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/sites/default/files/docs/2015/09/wholesale_energy_markets_in_2015_final_0.pd
f> accessed 10 October 2018. 
8 Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, ‘UK Energy in Brief 2018’, July 2018 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/728374
/UK_Energy_in_Brief_2018.pdf> accessed 20 December 2018, 11. 
9 According to the European Commission, smart grid is an ‘an electricity network that can cost efficiently 
integrate the behaviour and actions of all users connected to it – generators, consumers and those that do both 
– in order to ensure economically efficient, sustainable power system with low losses and high levels of quality 
and security of supply and safety’. See European Commission, ‘Smart Grids’ 
<http://s3platform.jrc.ec.europa.eu/smart-grids> accessed 7 October 2018. 
10 See, for example, João Crispim and others, ‘Smart Grids in the EU with Smart Regulation: Experiences from 
the UK, Italy and Portugal’ (2014) 31 Utilities Policy 85; Nick Jenkins, Chao Long, and Jianzhong Wu, ‘An Overview 
of the Smart Grid in Great Britain’ (2015) 4(1) Engineering 413; Dimitrios Xenias and others, ‘UK Smart Grid 
Development: An Expert Assessment of the Benefits, Pitfalls and Functions’ (2015) 81 Renewable Energy 89; P 
M Connor and others, ‘Sources of Risk and Uncertainty in UK Smart Grid Deployment: An Expert Stakeholder 
Analysis’ (2018) 161 Energy 1. 
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concerns due to the potential to substantially increase load across distribution networks and 
significantly change patterns of electricity demand.11  
Within this overall context, this chapter carries out an empirical exploration of the 
discursive construction of energy security and its link with law and policies promoting green 
energy amongst key energy experts from different sectors of the economy in GB. Although 
there are existing case studies of the UK in energy studies,12 as well as empirical studies 
exploring public and expert meanings of energy security in the UK,13 there is no empirical data 
examining the views of energy experts from different sectors of the economy in GB on the 
interplay between energy security and law and policy on green energy development. The 
overarching objective of this chapter, therefore, is to reveal some of the on-the-ground 
perceptions of key energy experts in GB on this interplay that so far have remained unseen in 
scholarly analysis. By doing so, this chapter presents original research that has never been 
published before and makes a novel contribution to the legal and socio-legal scholarship on 
energy security, green energy development and the just energy transition. 
As energy security is used as an argument in debates which inform law and policies on 
the transition to an energy system with increased share of green energy deployment, a 
contribution of the kind this chapter makes is important because it helps us understand how 
the concept is construed by different actors in the economy in GB and its impact on green 
                                                          
11 See, for example, Cedric Clastres, ‘Smart Grids: Another Step towards Competition, Energy Security and 
Climate Change Objectives’ (2011) 39 Energy Policy 5399, 5406; Ernst & Young, ‘Smart Grid: A Race Worth 
Winning? A Report on the Economic Benefits of Smart Grid’, April 2012 
<https://www.smartgrid.gov/files/Smart_Grid_Race_Worth_Winning_Report_on_Economic_Benefits_201209.
pdf> accessed 7 October 2018; National Grid, Future Energy Scenario (National Grid 2017); Joseph Archer, 
‘Centrica, Uber Launch Electric Vehicle Trial to Monitor Impact on UK Energy Grid’, The Telegraph (30 November 
2018).  
12 See, for example, Raphael J Heffron, ‘The Application of Contrast Explanation to Energy Policy Research: UK 
Nuclear Energy Policy 2002-2012’ (2013) 55 Energy Policy 602. 
13 Christina Demski, Wouter Poortinga and Nick Pidgeon, ‘Exploring Public Perceptions of Energy Security Risks 
in the UK’ (2014) 66 Energy Policy 369; Emily Cox, ‘Opening the Black Box of Energy Security: A Study of 
Conceptions of Electricity Security in the United Kingdom’ (2016) 21 Energy Research & Social Science 1. 
71 
 
energy law and policies. Rather than speak for them, therefore, the aim is to present the 
discursive realities according to participants themselves by letting them set out their accounts 
in their own words and in their own terms. This chapter, thus, seeks to go beyond assumptions 
and speculation to focus on discourses directly. This is in line with the methodological 
approach adopted in this study which is based on the assumption that discourses not only 
represent reality, but also help shape it in consequential ways.  
Understanding how participants discursively frame energy security and its links with 
law and policy on green energy development is crucial here because when one frame is 
selected from amongst a range of competing frames it can be incorporated into law and 
policies and it has consequences for how green energy development is subsequently seen and 
acted on. Gathering participants’ accounts is, therefore, relevant because their ways of 
framing the interplay between energy security and law and policy on green energy 
development provides on-the-ground insights into the discourses which inform and shape the 
creation of law and policies on green energy development.  
 
1.2. Structure of the chapter 
To set the stage for this empirical exploration of energy security and law and policies 
promoting green energy in GB, this chapter starts by outlining the investigative method used. 
It then explores participants’ views on green energy, followed by an analysis of the core 
themes identified from the interviews. The focus throughout is on energy security definitions 
and on the interplay between energy security and law and policy on green energy 
development.  
 
 
72 
 
1.3. Summary of findings 
This chapter will demonstrate the multiple framing employed by leading energy 
experts in GB as part of discursive contests that lead to divergent constructions of energy 
security. In summary, energy security not only means different things to different people in 
different contexts, but also to different sectors of the economy. Based on participants’ 
discursive constructions, this chapter will highlight the challenges posed to the transition to a 
green energy system in GB.  
First, this chapter will show that energy security in GB is first and foremost a political 
issue, particularly as a result of risks associated with governments toppling in cases of energy 
interruption in the country. Second, this chapter will demonstrate that energy politicisation 
in GB was framed as having negative impacts on green energy development due to vested 
interests, unequal lobbying power and association of green energy with left-wing politics. 
Third, the analysis also reveals a discursive struggle over energy security and green energy 
links with positive and negative frames identified. In particular, the analysis shows the 
emergence of two novel themes in relation to green energy and energy security: (i) the 
potential shift in the debate surrounding green energy intermittency as a result of large-scale 
commercial energy storage; and (ii) the emergence of ‘prosumers’, a new actor in the energy 
market which challenges the current energy system. 
By presenting the multiple voices of participants, this chapter will call for integration 
and dialogue among experts from different sectors of the economy in GB and suggests that 
green energy technological advancements should be embraced in the context of the 
transition to a green energy system. Further research should also be carried out to address 
the challenges and uncertainties posed by the increasing integration of green energy sources 
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into the system, particularly in how the legal and regulatory framework can assist in tacking 
those issues and support the transition to a green energy system. 
 
2. Method  
 
2.1. Sampling, access and recruitment of participants 
A representative sample “reflects the population accurately so that it is a microcosm 
of the population.”14 In trying to ensure the correct proportion of participants from different 
sectors of the economy which deal with energy, it was a priori determined that participants 
from the public, private and third sectors of the economy would be invited to participate. The 
range of interviewees was also determined on the basis of an assumption that different 
sectors will ex ante adhere to different viewpoints, and hence greater diversity among 
participants would provide the research with a range of competing constructions.   
Participants were identified initially through the literature review, an internet search 
of energy organisations and some personal contact made via attendance at workshops, 
conferences and energy events. A snowball sampling process – a process of reference from 
one person to the next15 – was then followed. Participants were approached in writing via 
letter or email. The main inclusion criteria were expertise, direct relevance (people directly 
involved and active in the energy and climate/environmental field) and experience.  
A total of 24 participants took part in the research. To adhere to the process outlined 
in the ethics application approved by the University of Liverpool Research Ethics Committee, 
                                                          
14 A Bryman, Social Research Methods (Oxford University Press 2004), 87. 
15 M Denscombe, The Good Research Guide: for Small-Scale Social Research Projects (Open University Press 
2003), 16. 
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responses and institutions visited were listed anonymously to protect confidentiality. 
Participants were placed into three categories according to who they worked for: (i) 
government/governmental organisations, (ii) private sector and (iii) not-for-profit 
organisations. From the total of 24 participants, 6 belonged to government/governmental 
organisations, 12 came from the private sector and 6 from not-for-profit organisations. In 
terms of positions of leadership, 15 were head of departments, directors or chairmen; the 
other 9 were managers, engineers, solicitors, senior policy analysts, policy analysts, energy 
analysts or researchers. 
Table 1: Summary of participants’ job positions 
SECTORS   
Private  
 
Government 
 
Not-for-
profit POSITIONS  
Director 2 3 - 
Head of 
Department 
4 1 1 
Chairman - 2 2 
Manager 1 - - 
Engineer 1 - - 
Solicitor 1 - - 
Senior Policy 
Analyst 
1 - 1 
Policy Analyst - - 1 
Energy Analyst 2 - - 
Researcher - - 1 
TOTAL 12 6 6 
 
2.2. Data collection 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted by the author with 24 participants from 
June 2016 to November 2016.  
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Table 2: Summary of interviews (sector/position/dates) 
 
Sector 
 
Position 
 
Date 
Government/Governmental 
organisation 
Managing Director 22 July 2016 
Private Head of Department 27 July 2016 
Private Engineer 3 August 2016 
Not-for-profit sector Policy Analyst 8 August 2016(a) 
Not-for-profit sector Senior Policy Analyst 8 August 2016(b) 
Private Energy Analyst 9 August 2016 
Government/Governmental 
organisation 
Head of Department 9 August 2016 
Private Director 11 August 2016 
Private Head of Department 17 August 2016(a) 
Private Solicitor 17 August 2016(b) 
Private Head of Department 18 August 2016 
Not-for-profit organisation Researcher 19 August 2016 
Not-for-profit organisation Chairman 23 August 2016 
Private Head of Department 24 August 2016 
Private Energy Analyst  25 August 2016 
Not-for-profit organisation Chairman 14 September 2016 
Government/Governmental 
organisation 
Director 14 September 2016 
Private Managing Director 28 September 2016 
Not-for-profit organisation Head of Department 29 September 2016 
Private Senior Policy Analyst 7 October 2016 
Government/Governmental 
organisation 
Director 11 October 2016 
Private Manager 17 October 2016 
Government/Governmental 
organisation 
Chairman 19 October 2016 
Government/Governmental 
organisation 
Chairman 20 October 2016 
 
The semi-structured research interview format meant it was possible to ask the 
experts involved a set of standard questions while also allowing the conversation to build and 
deviate to explore new ideas brought up by the interviewees during the interview. Interviews 
were face-to-face and took place in London, Leeds, Liverpool, Peterborough, Chester and 
Kings Langley. Interviewing time ranged from 15 minutes to 90 minutes. 90% of the interviews 
lasted between 45-60 minutes.  
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Participants were asked broad questions outlined in the interview guide under 
appendix 1. All participants answered all the questions outlined in the interview guide. 
Responses from 23 participants were captured with a digital audio recorder. One participant 
from the private sector did not wish to have the interview recorded, but note-taking was 
allowed and, therefore, notes were taken. 
All interviews were transcribed verbatim by the author. Transcripts were checked for 
errors against the taped version of each interview to ensure accurate and authentic 
reproductions of participants’ accounts. Participants received a copy of the interview 
transcript with the exception of three participants who verbally expressed that submission of 
the transcript to them was not necessary. Upon submission of the transcript, participants had 
the opportunity to carry out any amendments that they deemed necessary. In all cases, no 
amendments in relation to change of views were made. In addition, information was not 
omitted as participants did not remove any substantial part of the comments.  
 
2.3. Data analysis 
The transcripts were analysed thematically. Thematic analysis is a search for themes 
that emerge as important to the description of the phenomenon.16 It is a flexible method that 
can be applied across a range of theoretical perspectives.17 According to the constructionist 
paradigm adopted in the thesis, meaning and experience are treated as socially produced and 
reproduced, rather than inhering within individuals.18 In addition, within discourse analysis, 
                                                          
16 Jeanne Daly, Allan Kellehear and Michael Gliksman, The Public Health Researcher: A Methodological 
Approach (Oxford University Press 1997), 3. 
17 Virginia Braun and Victoria Clarke, ‘Using Thematic Analysis in Psychology’ (2006) 3(2) Qualitative Research in 
Psychology 77, 78. 
18 Vivien Burr, An Introduction to Social Constructionism (Routledge 1995). 
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discourses are orientated towards action and aim to establish a particular prevailing view or 
social reality. Therefore, following the constructionist paradigm and the discourse analytic 
approach, the analysis of the interviews did not seek to focus on motivation or individual 
psychologies of the participants, but instead sought to examine the underlying ideas, 
assumptions, conceptualisations and ideologies that were given voice within the participants’ 
accounts. A data-driven inductive or ‘bottom up’ approach focused on the lines of similarity 
and difference emerging from the interviews was followed and the 6-phase guide to 
performing thematic analysis of Braun and Clarke19 provided recursive and iterative tools for 
the analysis of the data.  
Firstly, transcripts were carefully read and re-read to familiarise myself with the depth 
and breadth of the content. Secondly, due to the narrowing of the research topic to be 
analysed for the purpose of this thesis, the data suitable for analysis was determined with a 
focus on energy security. Thirdly, codes were generated inductively, which means that the 
themes identified were strongly linked to the data themselves and not driven by the author’s 
theoretical interest in the topic. The process of coding the data was therefore carried out 
without an attempt to fit it into a pre-existing coding frame, or the author´s analytic 
preconceptions. Interviews were coded manually. Although Nvivo is a useful software 
package for managing data and coding, the limitation of seeing only sections of material on 
screen made it difficult for the author to visualise and contextualise all of the data. As the 
transcripts were also examined as a whole, with a view of identifying the overarching 
discursive frames deployed by the participants, the author felt that manual coding was better 
suited to the task.  
                                                          
19 Virginia Braun and Victoria Clarke, ‘Using Thematic Analysis in Psychology’ (2006) 3(2) Qualitative Research in 
Psychology 77. 
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Fourthly, once the data was coded, the codes were consolidated into broader themes. 
The development of the themes themselves involved the observation of patterns across 
accounts and issues of potential interest in the data. There is no universally accepted standard 
for establishing the relevance of a pattern in thematic analysis. In qualitative data analysis, 
the researcher is the instrument for analysis, making judgments about coding, theming, 
decontextualizing, and recontextualising the data.20 The author, therefore, used her own 
judgment to determine whether themes were present in the data, based on whether a 
concept captured something important to the research aims. Fifthly, those themes were 
reviewed to ensure that they were adequately supported by the extracts relating to that 
theme. This involved a constant moving back and forth between the entire data set, the coded 
extracts of data and the themes. Sixthly, each theme was given a name designed to give an 
immediate sense of its meaning and the specifics of each theme. Lastly, extracts were selected 
to best illustrate each theme. Participants’ quotes presented in this work are unedited to 
minimise the chances of any possible misinterpretation and distortion. The core themes 
identified from the interviews are presented in this chapter. Interview data was 
supplemented by literature review.  
 
2.4. Limitations and caveats  
The current study has some limitations. Primary among these is its small sample size 
relative to the entire pool of energy experts in GB and views are restricted to those 
participants. However, given that, at times, participants were recurrently returning to similar 
                                                          
20 Helene Starks and Susan Brown Trinidad, ‘Choose Your Method: A Comparison of Phenomenology, Discourse 
Analysis, and Grounded Theory’ (2007) 17(10) Qualitative health research 1372, 1376. 
79 
 
themes, sample size issues are not a significant concern with this data set given this study’s 
aims. Larger sampling would be needed if someone were to seek to replicate or re-enforce 
these findings but in terms of identifying recurrent themes and the discursive practices which 
underpin them, this sample provides clear insights into the discursive construction of the 
issues.  
Another limitation is regional representativeness, the sample being restricted to 
England. However, although all interviews were carried out in England, participants were 
familiar with the energy market in Great Britain and pointed out appropriate differences in 
energy markets in England, Wales and Scotland where pertinent. Therefore, regional 
representativeness does not significantly affect the analysis either. 
In terms of consistency of questioning, the same interview style was used for all 
participants and all questions on the form were posed to all participants. However, since a 
semi-structured interview protocol was employed, a few additional questions were addressed 
to each interviewee. Nonetheless, at the end of each of the interviews all participants were 
asked if they would like to add any additional comments in relation to the topic, offering  
participants, therefore, the opportunity to express their views in any aspect of the topic which 
they deemed important to mention. Given the aim of the exercise was to identify what 
participants saw as relevant, and to analyse how that was discursively constructed, that the 
questions asked were not identical in each case is not, again, a significant limit on the analysis 
offered. 
Finally, in this chapter, verbatim extracts are used as evidence of the frames 
discursively constructed by participants. This approach also helps towards the reduction of 
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subjectivity in writing and presenting data21 – as the author presents more than one account 
of the same event as advanced by participants, making sure that data which do not necessarily 
support the author’s view are also offered to readers.22 Therefore, due to the importance of 
verbatim extracts for evidencing participants’ use of discursive frames and for reducing 
subjectivity, the author disagrees with the view that interview extracts should be used 
sparingly since ‘overuse of quotes can become tedious and the point being made can get lost 
in the words’.23 While that means more space is given to participants’ responses, it also means 
their discursive work can be more closely evaluated. 
 
2.5. Ethical considerations 
Before commencing data collection, ethical approval for the study was obtained from 
the University of Liverpool Research Ethics Committee. Transparency was at the heart of the 
study and was observed throughout the empirical work. Participants were given an 
information sheet containing information about the author, the nature of the research (in 
non-academic jargon), the sponsor, the duration of the interview, how the data would be 
used, where the results would be disseminated and the anonymity of the information. All 
individual participants included in the study provided informed written consent on the day of 
the interview and were fully briefed about the project and the voluntary nature of their 
participation as well as anonymity.  
                                                          
21 For texts that address the issues of subjectivity in writing and presenting, see, for example, Marlene de Laine, 
Fieldwork, Participation and Practice : Ethics and Dilemmas in Qualitative Research (SAGE Publications 2000). 
22 Angela Thody, Writing and Presenting Research (Sage 2006), 19. 
23 Yvonne Darlington and Dorothy Scott, Qualitative Research in Practice: Stories from the Field (Allen & Unwin 
2002), 161. 
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3. “There are all sorts of scales as to how we define green energy”24: Conceptualising 
green energy 
Participants defined green energy in a variety of ways: from specific views such as 
“anything that is renewable, excluding large scale hydro”,25 “energy that is substantially 
better for the environment than traditional forms of energy production”26, “energy that is 
produced essentially from natural resources that are not being dug up or can be replaced”27 
to broader views such as “low carbon forms of energy generation, such as renewables and 
nuclear”28, “energy that is from other than a carbon source”29 and “low or zero carbon energy, 
including technologies that can support low or zero carbon output, such as carbon capture 
and storage being something that can help to make fossil fuels green energy”,30 and further 
to broader, more epistemically focused views, such as “there isn’t an accepted definition”31 
or “the definition of green energy depends on the discussion we are having and in what 
context you are talking”.32  
Participants, nevertheless, generally agreed that non-conventional renewable energy 
fits within the scope of green energy. Therefore, for clarity, in this chapter, the author uses 
the term green energy as a synonym for non-conventional renewable energy sources, such as 
wind, solar, wave and tidal.  
 
                                                          
24 Interview with participant from the not-for-profit sector on 8 August 2016(a).  
25 Interview with participant from the private sector on 9 August 2016. 
26 Interview with participant from the private sector on 17 August 2016(a). 
27 Interview with participant from the private sector on 24 August 2016. 
28 Interview with participants from the private sector on 28 September 2016 and 7 October 2016. 
29 Interview with participant from the private sector on 3 August 2016. 
30 Interview with participant from the private sector on 11 August 2016. 
31 Interview with participant from the government on 20 October 2016. 
32 Interview with participant from the private sector on 25 August 2016. 
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4. “We can get to a lot of places with your energy security”:33 the empirical definition 
of energy security in GB 
How energy security has been discursively constructed is one of this thesis’ key 
research questions. As explained in chapter 3, although the term ‘energy security’ has become 
commonplace in both academic and policy discussions, literature on energy security 
continues to resist a commonly-accepted definition. In view of the lack of clear understanding 
of what energy security actually means, this section presents an empirical view of energy 
security definition in the context of GB.  
During the interviews, all participants answered the question “what do you 
understand by the term 'energy security'?” The interviews with these leading energy experts 
enable us to find out more about the diversity of views on energy security as it is elaborated 
on-the-ground. By proceeding in this way, the study brings more clarity to the public debate 
by highlighting where the disagreements are and with respect to what in different sectors of 
the economy in GB. By bringing together the multiplicity of views of participants in one 
document, this study can also feed into energy decision-making processes and inform law and 
policies. This is not because the interviews generated an agreed-upon definition on energy 
security, they did not seek to. Instead, the interviews clarify the priorities of different energy 
actors from different sectors of the economy, how those priorities inform perceptions of the 
interplay between energy security and law and policies promoting green energy in GB and 
how both translate into action on these issues.  
 
                                                          
33 Interview with participant from the government sector on 22 July 2016. 
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4.1. Empirical view on energy security definition 
The polysemic, multi-dimensional, contextual and dynamic nature of energy security, 
as explained in chapter 3, can be observed in the variety of definitions of energy security given 
by interviewees. On the one hand, energy security was discursively constructed in an alarmist 
and fearful manner by focusing on “lights going out” which will be discussed at length later, 
and, on the other, in a broader and holistic manner emphasising sustainability and human 
welfare, in which, for example, “environment and energy security are the same things; they 
are two sides of the same coin”34 or “energy security is also a personal issue about poverty 
and inclusion”35. In line with this latter view, an energy system is not considered secure if it 
causes severe environmental and social externalities.  
Energy security was recurrently discursively constructed via the energy trilemma – 
security of supply, affordability and sustainability36 – albeit in different ways. Some 
participants presented them as conflicting aspects of energy production in which one goal of 
the trilemma – energy security in particular – is selected as most important and privileged 
over the other two. For instance, one participant claimed that “that is not a true trilemma. 
There is a hierarchy of the three and energy security comes first. Still the trilemma would 
need to be resolved, but if you had to choose, security always comes first”.37 In other 
participants’ words, “it has never been an evenly balanced trilemma. At various stages 
environmental policy or costs have been the most important of the three points and now I 
                                                          
34 Interview with participant from the not-for-profit sector on 8 August 2016(b). 
35 Interview with participant from the not-for-profit sector on 29 September 2016. 
36 World Energy Council and Oliver Wyman, World Energy Trilemma Index (World Energy Council 2016), 6. This 
is also the terminology used by National Grid, see National Grid, UK Future Energy Scenarios (July 2014) 
<http://www2.nationalgrid.com/uk/industryinformation/future-of-energy/future-energy-scenarios/> accessed 
10 October 2018.  
37 Interview with participant from the private sector on 11 August 2016. 
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would say that security of supply is clearly the most important to government”;38 “the real 
tension is between the affordability and the environmental and climate change aspects. The 
security of energy supply is a given”;39 or “energy security is a Minister’s top priority for 
energy policy. I think that you have heard of the trilemma. The requirements blend 
decarbonisation with security and affordability, and they [the government] put energy 
security on top amongst those. Even if you think about how you can maintain public support 
for decarbonisation, clearly if security is ever questioned, as a trade-off, then that really 
undermines support for energy decarbonisation”.40 Other discursive constructions, 
nevertheless, sought to establish a balanced view of the trilemma in which one or two goals 
did not need to be pursued at the expense of the other(s). 
The need for Britain to have a much broader and more flexible way of thinking about 
energy security and develop policies for energy security and climate change mitigation in the 
same silos is advanced in the academic literature.41 However, a summary of the elements of 
energy security raised by participants (table 3 below) demonstrates that climate change, 
environment and social inclusion were only part of energy security definitions of participants 
from the not-for-profit sector. It is important to point out here that one participant from the 
government sector showed awareness that energy security definition could include climate 
change considerations, but s/he ‘doesn’t think that at the moment people in the industry and 
politicians think of it in those terms’.42 Thus, this study finds that participants from the 
government and private sectors do not seem to consider climate change, environment and 
                                                          
38 Interview with participant from the Government sector on 20 October 2016. 
39 Interview with participant from the Government sector on 14 September 2016. 
40 Interview with participant from the Government sector on 9 August 2016. 
41 Catherine Mitchell and Jim Watson, ‘Conceptualising Energy Security’ in Catherine Mitchell, Jim Watson and 
Jessica Whiting (eds), New Challenges in Energy Security: The UK in a Multipolar World (Palgrave Macmillan 
2013), 1. 
42 Interview with participant from the government sector on 20 October 2016. 
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social inclusion to be a part of the current energy security concept in GB. This does not 
necessarily mean that climate change, environmental and social issues were fully excluded 
from the views of these participants in the debate on energy. Instead it means that they were 
not presented by participants within the energy security concept and, therefore, were each 
seen as independent concepts. By not presenting climate change, environmental and social 
considerations within the definition of energy security, the implication is that law and policies 
pursuing energy security can be created which negatively impact the climate, the 
environment and social inclusion. 
The dominant energy security frame deployed by most participants from the 
government sector was based on “the lights going out”. The focus here was on capacity 
adequacy – including whether capacity was of the right type to respond in a timely way, but 
also whether the relationship between peak demand and the amount of generation capacity 
was well balanced – and resilience – whether the energy system could be made robust 
enough to cope with external events and continue to deliver energy services and whether it 
could recover from those events.43 Thus, the primary energy security concern of government 
experts who took part in this study was with respect to availability and reliability.44 Costs were 
also considered important by participants from the government sector, but, with the 
exception of one participant,45 affordability was not presented as part of the concept of 
energy security. This emphasis on availability and reliability is in line with the government 
definition of energy security in the 2017 Clean Growth Strategy:46  
                                                          
43 Modassar Chaudry and others, ’Building a Resilient UK Energy System’, UK Energy Research Centre Working 
Paper REF UKERC/WP/ES/2009/023, 2009 <http://www.ukerc.ac.uk/publications/building-a-resilient-uk-
energy-system-working-paper.html> accessed 2 October 2018. 
44 5 out of 6 participants of the government sector (83.3%) framed energy security in the sense of availability 
and reliability or capacity and resilience / Keeping the lights on. 
45 Interview with participant from the government sector on 22 July 2016. 
46 HM Government, The Clean Growth Strategy: Leading the way to a low carbon future (HM Government 
2017), 156. 
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Energy security is about ensuring secure, reliable, uninterrupted supplies to 
consumers, and having a system that can effectively and efficiently respond 
and adapt to changes and shocks. It is made up of three characteristics: 
flexibility, adequacy and resilience.  
Surprisingly, all participants from the private sector also framed the concept of energy 
security in relation to availability and reliability alone.47 A summary of energy security 
definitions in table 3 below shows that a focus on availability and reliability was common to 
definitions of energy security offered by experts from all three sectors.  
Affordability was an important element in the discussion, but no participant from the 
private sector included affordability within the definition of energy security. It is also 
interesting to note that only one participant from the not-for-profit sector included 
affordability within the concept of energy security. What the analysis shows, therefore, is that 
a divergent construction of energy security is being advanced by participants from different 
sectors. Also, the broader concepts of energy security presented in the literature have not 
been fully incorporated into practice yet, particularly by the government and industry, as the 
majority of the on-the-ground views focused on narrow energy security definitions related to 
availability and reliability. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
47 Participants’ references to capacity and resilience/ keeping the lights on can also be interpreted as 
availability and reliability of energy supply. 
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Table 3: Summary of energy security definitions from participants per sector 
Government Private Not-for-profit 
Availability and reliability Availability and reliability Availability and reliability 
Availability, affordability and 
reliability 
- - 
- - Availability and 
environmental sustainability 
- - Availability, affordability, 
reliability, climate change, 
social and environmental 
sustainability 
Capacity and resilience / 
Keeping the lights on 
Capacity and resilience / 
Keeping the lights on 
Keeping the lights on in the 
context of climate change 
 
The changing nature of energy security also resonated in interviewees’ accounts.  
According to a participant, “energy security now means something quite different from when 
I first started looking into renewables.”48 These changes in definitions of energy security and 
the different priorities attached to their elements were presented as being driven by political, 
economic and social factors. They were also seen as a result of its correlation to local, national 
and global events, being intrinsically linked to externalities of the globalised economy. As 
pointed out by a participant:  
Energy security is driven heavily by what is happening in the world and the 
local situation as well, which is why it changes so much. So it’s very 
complicated and what you call security of supply today will be different to say 
ten years ago, twenty years ago and to ten years hence as well. 
[…] [Energy security] is driven by how the government strategically feels at the 
time about what is going on, which is interesting, because energy policy should 
be good in long-term, about generating electricity, but actually, if you look at 
                                                          
48 Interview with participant from the government sector on 22 July 2016. 
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it, it changes according to the social, economic and political kind of things that 
are going on in the world at the time.49 
 These contexts and external influences are well exemplified by the narrative of a 
participant explaining energy supply in Britain:  
In 2005, we had fairly cheap energy. We were still enjoying the tail end of that 
period of energy security. Until the early 2000´s, we had gas prices that were 
lower than the rest of the world as we had an oversupply. Then we became an 
importer just at a time that the international gas price started going up a lot, 
so our gas price went up even further because we had to catch up with the 
rising target, but before that happened we had relatively low energy costs, we 
had a high degree of security of supply, and therefore the focus was all about 
green energy. Then between about 2006 and 2010, energy prices went up a 
lot and the focus changed almost exclusively to consumer cost and how you 
achieve environmental objectives and security of supply at acceptable costs to 
the consumer. More recently, because we have been running down, in 
particular, coal-fired generation, the margin of supply over demand is 
narrower than it has been. That narrowness is often exaggerated, but it is 
narrower than it has been historically. Politicians are therefore focused on 
what they see as the real risk to them, which is the lights going out one day 
and something going horribly wrong.50 
 The “lights going out” frame was heavily influenced by a political memory of the 
energy supply interruption in the 1970’s, an outcome typically linked by participants to 
                                                          
49 Interview with participant from the government sector on 11 October 2016. 
50 Interview with participant from the government sector on 20 October 2016. 
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industrial action in the mining sector, during which coal miners went on strike and, as a 
consequence, the country experienced rolling power cuts. This event was framed as having 
“a huge amount of resonance and symbolism”51 in the national psyche and impacting on how 
people perceive energy security in the country as “it colours attitudes”52 to the conversations 
related to energy security today. As such, the construction of energy security was based on a 
‘fear factor’ which came as a result of the 1970’s strike and energy supply interruption and 
this was used as a recurrent reminder to politicians to take action for the lights not to go out. 
As mentioned by a participant: 
Now, when people whisper ‘Minister, do you really want the lights to go out?’ 
that is what they are insinuating, that is how this is going to be received. There 
will be no worse thing for a Minister than seeing this thing happen, because of 
this resonance, because the tabloid newspapers would just come out with that 
line. Energy security is imbued with that image of the lights going out.53 
 This section revealed the underlying concepts which were used by leading energy 
experts in relation to energy security. The fact that the majority of energy security definitions 
focused on the elements of availability and reliability does not question the construction of 
the broader energy security concepts also advanced by some participants. This empirical 
evidence on energy security definition demonstrates, therefore, that there is no uniform 
understanding of energy security among different sectors of the economy in GB. While some 
participants from the not-for-profit sector advanced a definition in line with broader scholarly 
concepts of energy security which include climate change and social and environmental 
                                                          
51 Interview with participant from the government sector on 14 September 2016. 
52 Interview with participant from the government sector on 20 October 2016. 
53 Interview with participant from the government sector on 14 September 2016. 
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sustainability considerations, participants from the private and government sectors 
presented a narrower view on energy security, focusing mainly on availability and reliability. 
Another divergence is that, while the element of affordability can be found in the energy 
security concepts of one participant from the government and one participant from the not-
for-profit sector, affordability is absent from definitions of participants from the private 
sector. 
 
4.2. Contending energy security indicators   
In connection with participants’ competing energy security definitions related to the 
elements of availability, reliability, affordability, climate change, environmental and social 
considerations, analysis of the interview data revealed a number of contending energy 
security indicators offered by participants. As pointed out under chapter 3, a number of 
energy security indicators have been developed in the academic literature. Sovacool and 
Mukherjee, for example, identified 372 indicators that can be used to measure and track 
performance on energy security.54 In this empirical study in GB, the elements of availability 
and reliability in particular were presented in a variety of ways by participants in relation to 
the following indicators: control over energy sources, import dependency, securing adequate 
investments and energy infrastructure.  
 
 
                                                          
54 Benjamin K Sovacool and Ishani Mukherjee, ‘Conceptualizing and Measuring Energy Security: A Synthesized 
Approach’(2011) 36 Energy 5343. 
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4.2.1. Control over energy sources 
 Control over energy sources was raised by participants from all sectors as an 
important energy security dimension. There were, however, different views here. On the one 
side, there were those who stressed control via the ability to manage energy supply from 
around the world, a view which exposes a reliance on global trade networks and nondomestic 
actors for provisioning of energy supply. For those who framed control in this way, energy 
security is ensured via the diversification of foreign sources of energy supply55 and by sourcing 
energy from places where there is minimal risk of interruption.56 This view is also rooted in 
scholarship via the association of energy security in the UK with promoting open and 
competitive energy markets.57 In fact, the UK relies in part on international energy trade to 
ensure adequate supplies of energy in the country.58 On the other, there were those which 
stressed control through reliance on (totally or mainly) indigenous sources of energy supply.59 
This narrative was presented by some participants from all sectors and is also found in 
scholarly work claiming an end to ‘market fundamentalism’ in UK energy governance.60 The 
empirical work, therefore, presented narratives that stand in direct contrast to each other. 
                                                          
55 Interview with participants from the government sector on 9 August 2016 and 20 October 2016. 
56 Interview with participant from the private sector on 9 August 2016. 
57 William J Nuttall and Devon L Manz, ‘A New Energy Security Paradigm for the Twenty-first Century’ (2008) 
75(8) Technological Forecasting and Social Change 1247, 1249; Y Chang and JL Lee, ‘Electricity Market 
Deregulation and Energy Security: A Study of the UK and Singapore Electricity Markets’ (2008) 29 International 
Journal of Global Energy Issues 109;  Marilyn A Brown and Benjamin K Sovacool, Climate Change and Global 
Energy Security: Technology and Policy Options (MIT Press 2011), 5. 
58 In 2017, 36% of energy used in the UK was imported. See, Department for Business, Energy and Industrial 
Strategy, ‘UK Energy in Brief 2018’, July 2018 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/728374
/UK_Energy_in_Brief_2018.pdf> accessed 28 December 2018, 11. 
59 Interview with participant from the government sector on 22 July 2016, from the private sector on 27 July 
2016 and 28 September 2016, and from the not-for-profit sector on 19 August 2016. 
60 Ian Rutledge and Philip Wright, ‘The Content and Delivery of Future UK Energy Policy’ in Ian Rutledge and 
Philip Wright (eds), UK Energy Policy and the End of Market Fundamentalism (Oxford Institute for Energy Studies 
2010). 
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4.2.2. Import dependency 
Import dependency was another significant frame raised as an energy security issue. 
This was not only in terms of fossil fuel imports but also in terms of imports of low carbon 
electricity from Europe via the use of interconnectors, particularly in the context of 
uncertainty in connection with Brexit61 and the internal European energy market. As pointed 
out by a participant “it is an energy security aspect if you are importing all of your electricity 
from the Continent, if we don’t generate it ourselves, because you are so reliant on another 
country supplying your power”.62 In terms of fossil fuel imports, a participant framed reliance 
on imported fossil fuel sources as “heavily overplayed in the UK context” based on the 
existence of sufficient global diversified supply and fairly well established resilience to pricing 
changes that there are in global supplies of fossil fuels.63  
Additional themes related to import dependency concern the importation of energy 
equipment and technology and energy expertise, which was framed as “really a point of 
energy security”,64 and maintaining human resources in the country and their energy skills 
capabilities was advanced as “essential for energy security”.65 As exemplified by participants: 
There is the wider energy security aspect if you are importing a lot of your 
equipment and your expertise in certain technologies. Is that actually secure? 
So, for example, in oil, gas and nuclear where most of the technologies and 
                                                          
61 In May 2015, the UK held a general election to elect members to the House of Commons. The Conservative 
Party won and took over the Conservative and Liberal Democrat coalition government (2010-2015). The victory 
of the Conservative Party was followed by a referendum concerning future UK membership of the European 
Union in June 2016, which resulted in the UK electorate voting to withdraw from the European Union (Brexit) 
by 51.9% to 48.1%. See EU Referendum Results: UK Votes to Leave the EU, BBC News 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/politics/eu_referendum/results> accessed 30 October 2018. 
62 Interview with participant from the not-for-profit sector on 8 August 2016(b). 
63 Interview with participant from the government sector on 14 September 2016. 
64 Interview with participant from the government sector on 22 July 2016. 
65 Interview with participant from the private sector on 9 August 2016. 
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equipment are not British, they are essentially imported, there is an energy 
security risk. […] Where the technology comes from and the benefits which can 
be accrued from that are almost as important as where the fuel is coming 
from.66 
The wind industry is based mostly on German and Scandinavian technology, 
particularly offshore wind, so now [post-Brexit] you have the challenge for the 
UK in attracting that technology into the UK, whether being manufactured in 
the UK under a licence or being exported into the UK. It is a security issue, the 
ability to source wind turbines. That is part of the economics of energy 
security. It is not only people, it is also equipment, markets supplying 
renewable energy equipment.67 
Therefore, participants also gave examples of dependence on foreign energy 
expertise, equipment and technology as energy security issues not only in the context of 
nuclear, oil and gas, but also green energy.  
 
4.2.3. Securing adequate investments  
Energy security in GB was also correlated by participants with the origin of foreign 
investment and the need to secure adequate investment. If foreign investment stopped, it 
was felt that this would negatively affect the steady supply of energy in the country. Securing 
adequate investment has already been highlighted in an empirical study as one of the most 
                                                          
66 Interview with participant from the not-for-profit sector on 8 August 2016(b). 
67 Interview with participant from the government sector on 22 July 2016. 
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critical aspects of ensuring energy security in the UK on all timescales.68 The study also found 
that there were concerns that the UK is currently at risk from a lack of investment in energy 
infrastructure.69 It is estimated that over the next decade, GB will need around £100 billion 
of capital investment in its electricity infrastructure to accommodate projected future 
increases in electricity demand and to replace ageing power stations.70 
According to Sir Philip Lowe, the post-Brexit framework, for instance, will certainly 
have an impact on the readiness of EU-27 companies to invest in the UK energy sector and 
Brexit will reduce the number of investors and suppliers operating in the UK.71 One participant 
exemplified dependence on foreign investment and energy security in the following way:  
If the Japanese banks are not going to invest in the UK anymore, for example, 
that is a big energy security issue. That is another strand or facet of energy 
security, where the investments in energy are coming from and they are not 
coming from the UK. Very little comes from the UK.72 
From another angle, some countries take the view that allowing foreign investment in 
energy industries endangers energy security73 or national security in the case of nuclear 
energy.74 The go-ahead for Hinkley Point C, for instance, was publicly controversial with media 
                                                          
68 Emily Cox, ‘Opening the Black Box of Energy Security: A Study of Conceptions of Electricity Security in the 
United Kingdom’ (2016) 21 Energy Research & Social Science 1. 
69 Ibid 3. 
70 OFGEM, ‘Electricity Market Reform (EMR)’ < https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/electricity/wholesale-
market/market-efficiency-review-and-reform/electricity-market-reform-emr> accessed 28 December 2018. 
71 Philip Lowe, ‘Brexit and Energy: Time to Make Some Hard Choices’ (2018) 7 European Energy Journal 38, 45. 
72 Interview with participant from the government sector on 22 July 2016. 
73 A Goldthau, 'From the State to the Market and Back: Policy Implications of Changing Energy Paradigms' (2012) 
3(2) Global Policy 198, 203. 
74 Kazuhiro Nakatani, ‘Restrictions on Foreign Investment in the Energy Sector for National Security Reasons: 
The Case of Japan’ in Aillen McHarg and others (eds), Property and the Law in Energy and Natural Resources 
(Oxford University Press 2010). 
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coverage on speculation about Britain’s national security concerns.75 However, one 
participant, giving Hinkley Point C as an example, discarded national security concerns 
grounded on Chinese and French Governments investments in nuclear energy in GB, on the 
basis that this is how investments in the energy industry currently works as “we are living in 
a global age where that happens everywhere”.76  
From another perspective, one participant pointed out the importance of energy 
security for ensuring investment and put energy security in a comparative perspective, where 
investment was presented as a zero-sum game, i.e. where if GB gets investment, someone 
else loses it: 
[…] if energy security isn’t there, the production, or consumption, of whatever 
the end goal is, isn’t reliable, you can’t guarantee production and in this fast 
paced changing business world guarantees are very valuable. […] 
It is the short-term production that you want your energy security for 
and that security will also inform investment decisions in the long-term. […]For 
the long-term, incentive is to keep investment flowing and confidence in your 
system, your network, your ability to produce and guarantee payments for the 
investment. These are all down to energy security. Energy security will actually 
impact that. If you don’t have energy security, then you won’t have investment 
                                                          
75 See, for example, Carrie Gracie, ‘Is China the Hitch for the Hinkley Point Deal?’, BBC News (29 July 2016) 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-36922898> accessed 10 October 2018; Andrew Ward, Jim Pickard and 
Michael Stothard, ‘Hinkley Go-ahead after ‘National Security’ Safeguards’, Financial Times (15 September 2016) 
< https://www.ft.com/content/0cde26b6-7b66-11e6-b837-eb4b4333ee43> accessed 10 October 2018. 
76 Interview with participant from the not-for-profit sector on 8 August 2016(a). 
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in the long-term to an extent. As long as you have more energy security than 
other countries you will do better, so I guess it is a rat race.77  
Therefore, participants in GB highlighted the importance of securing adequate 
investments as a critical aspect of ensuring energy security. On an interrelated angle, one 
participant pointed out the importance of energy security for ensuring investment. This 
demonstrates, therefore, a vicious circle where investments are necessary to ensure energy 
security and energy security is necessary to ensure investments, making it difficult to recover 
should either decrease. 
 
4.2.4. Energy Infrastructure 
The need to have a robust secure energy Infrastructure was also raised by participants 
as part of energy security concerns. This was characterised by four frames which are explained 
here in no particular order of importance. First, security of the energy infrastructure from 
bombing and terrorist attacks, including cyber-attacks in which the energy sector has become 
prime target.78 Only two participants, both from the private sector,79 mentioned this aspect 
of the physical security of the energy infrastructure. However, one of them clearly stated that 
this was not what s/he had in mind when talking about energy security.80 Some energy 
security scholarship, nevertheless, refers to this aspect of energy security.81  
                                                          
77 Interview with participant from the private sector on 25 August 2016. 
78 World Energy Council, ‘Managing Cyber Risks’, September 2016 
<https://www.worldenergy.org/publications/2016/the-road-to-resilience-managing-cyber-risks/> accessed 10 
October 2018.  
79 Interview with participant from the private sector on 3 August 2016 and 28 September 2016. 
80 Interview with participant from the private sector on 28 September 2016. 
81 See, for example, Catherine Redgwell, ‘International Energy Security’, in Barry Barton and others, Energy 
Security: Managing Risk in a Dynamic Legal and Regulatory Environment (Oxford University Press 2004); Donald 
N Zillman and Michael T Bigos, ‘Security of Supply and Control of Terrorism: Energy Security in the United States 
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Second, security of the energy infrastructure from deterioration in which networks 
must be kept healthy in order to avoid power failures.82 This is correlated to ensuring 
adequate investment in energy infrastructure, as pointed out in subsection 4.2.3. Third, 
security of the energy infrastructure from natural disasters or accidents, such as fires at power 
stations,83 which can cut people off from the electricity or gas supply.84 Fourth, security of the 
energy infrastructure from the impacts caused by climate change, particularly as a result of 
extreme weather events,85 such as damage to interconnectors during a storm,86 to the 
electricity transmission line network87 or to other aspects of the electricity power 
infrastructure.88 Following this line of thought, Paskal constructed climate change as a 
fundamental facet of energy security due to the fact that energy infrastructure tends to have 
a long lifespan and lies in areas that may become increasingly physically unstable owing to 
changes in the environment.89 One participant raised concerns surrounding the development 
                                                          
in the Early Twenty-First Century’, in Barry Barton and others, Energy Security: Managing Risk in a Dynamic Legal 
and Regulatory Environment (Oxford University Press 2004); Benjamin K Sovacool and Ishani Mukherjee, 
‘Conceptualizing and Measuring Energy Security: A Synthesized Approach’(2011) 36 Energy 5343, 5352. 
82 Interview with participant from the private sector on 3 August 2016. 
83 See, for example, fires at the Ferrybridge and Didcot B power stations. Hatty Collier, ‘Fire Hits Ferrybridge 
Power Station’, The Guardian (31 July 2014) <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/jul/31/fire-
ferrybridge-power-station-west-yorkshire> accessed 10 October 2018; Alice Philipson, ‘Didcot Power Station 
Fire: As It Happened’, The Telegraph (20 October 2014) 
<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/earth/energy/11173594/Didcot-Power-Station-fire-as-it-happened.html> 
accessed 10 October 2018. 
84 Interview with participant from the private sector on 3 August 2016 and from the government sector on 14 
September 2016. 
85 Interview with participant from the not-for-profit sector on 29 September 2016. 
86 In 2016, for example, interconnectors during France and Britain were partially severed during Storm Angus. 
See, Emily Gosden, ‘Winter Power Crunch Fears as UK-France Cables Severed during Storm’, The Telegraph (29 
November 2016) < https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2016/11/29/winter-power-crunch-fears-uk-france-
cables-severed-storm/> accessed 10 October 2018. 
87 Panagiotis Manis, ‘Climate Change and Extreme Wind Effects on Transmission Towers’ (2017) 170(2) 
Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers: Structures and Buildings 81. 
88 Lynsey McColl and others, ‘Assessing the Potential Impact of Climate Change on the UK’s Electricity Network’ 
(2012) 115 Climatic Change 821; Dana Abi Ghanem, Sarah Mander and Clair Gough, ‘“I think We Need to Get a 
Better Generator”: Household Resilience to Disruption to Power Supply during Storm Events’ (2016) 92 Energy 
Policy 171. 
89 Cleo Paskal, The Vulnerability of Energy Infrastructure to Environmental Change (Chatham House and Global 
EESE 2009), 2. 
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of Hinkley C nuclear power station in those terms in the context of the site being located near 
the coast line and uncertainties about sea level rises. According to the participant: 
 If they build another nuclear power station on that site, it will operate for forty 
or fifty years and it will take 200 years to decommission. The sea level will rise 
by a metre by 2100 but then will go on rising even with the carbon in the 
atmosphere at the moment for a very long time. In 250 years, we might have 
two to four meters of sea level rise and a very impoverished world trying to 
deal with an incredibly toxic nuclear power station clear up.90 
 Publicly, nuclear developer, EDF, however, acknowledged assessing sea level rise as a 
result of climate change and was taking preventive measures to protect the nuclear station 
from tides, storm surges and tsunamis.91 No participant from the private sector, however, 
considered security of energy infrastructure due to climate change as an indicator for energy 
security. It is worth noting that in the literature, climate change has increasingly been 
considered as having an effect on energy security not only related to impacts on the energy 
infrastructure as raised in this empirical study, but also due to impacts on energy demand and 
supply patterns.92 However, no participant in this empirical study framed energy security in 
these latter terms.  
 
 
                                                          
90 Interview with participant from the not-for-profit sector on 29 September 2016. 
91 ‘EDF Rejects Fears that Hinkley C will be Vulnerable to Rising Sea Levels’, Burnham-on-sea.com (1 August 2018) 
< http://www.burnham-on-sea.com/news/2018/hinkley-c-rising-sea-levels-01-08-18.php> accessed 10 October 
2018. 
92 See, for example, Michael T Klare, ‘Climate Change Blowback: The Threats to Energy Security’ (2015) 35(1) 
SAIS Review of International Affairs 61; Jim Watson and others, The Security of UK Energy Futures (UK Energy 
Research Centre 2018), 3. 
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Table 4: Summary of energy security indicators from participants per sector 
Government Private Not-for-profit 
Control over energy sources 
through reliance on (totally 
or mainly) indigenous 
energy sources 
Control over energy sources 
through reliance on (totally 
or mainly) indigenous 
energy sources 
Control over energy sources 
through reliance on (totally 
or mainly) indigenous 
energy sources 
Control over energy sources 
via the ability to manage 
energy supply from around 
the world 
Control over energy sources 
via the ability to manage 
energy supply from around 
the world 
- 
Energy import dependency Energy import dependency Energy import dependency 
Ability to source energy 
technology (equipment) 
- Ability to source energy 
technology (equipment) 
Ability to source human 
expertise  
Ability to source human 
expertise 
Ability to source human 
expertise 
Securing adequate 
investment 
Securing adequate 
investment 
- 
Security of energy 
infrastructure (from natural 
disasters or accidents) 
Security of energy 
infrastructure (from natural 
disasters or accidents) 
- 
- - Security of energy 
infrastructure (due to 
climate change) 
- Security of energy 
infrastructure (from 
bombing, attacks) 
- 
- Security of energy 
infrastructure (network 
maintenance, security from 
deterioration) 
- 
 
 
4.3.  The emotive and dynamic nature of energy security 
Participants from all sectors agreed on the use of emotive language surrounding 
energy security in GB and the use of this type of language for serving one’s own interest. It 
was said that the media, in particular, blows energy security matters out of proportion and 
uses emotional and inflammatory language.93 This emotional language along with energy 
                                                          
93 Interview with participant from the government sector on 19 October 2016, from the not-for-profit sector 
on 8 August 2016(a) and from the private sector on 11 August 2016. 
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security’s broad spectrum of definitions and dimensions, as shown above, were constructed 
as being used to lobby a particular point of view, be it pro-green energy or against green 
energy. As participants pointed out, “people will play the energy security card for their own 
interests”,94 and it is “often used as a buzz word”.95 This is something which is generally 
acknowledged by scholars that the language of energy security is “politically potent”96 and 
the lack of a commonly agreed definition affords energy security a wide range of political 
possibilities, including its capacity as a political “trump card”,97 in which protagonists use 
energy security to add more weight to their arguments.  
In line with this, a participant from the renewable energy private sector pointed out 
the use of the language of energy security for pro-green lobbying purposes: 
When I am lobbying government, or when I am talking to someone and trying 
to influence them, I mention energy security. I just don´t think it is on top of 
the list, but sometimes I think that it is one of those sound bites that you see 
that does sort of hit the mark with some people, especially if you say ‘of course 
we need to make sure that Russia isn’t in control of our energy supplies’ […].98 
In another way which shows how the language of energy security can be used for very 
different purposes, a participant mentioned the use of the language energy security by the 
government in support of conventional forms of energy, particularly exploration of natural 
gas via the use of fracking.99 This also resonates with a view presented by Noé and Pring, in 
                                                          
94 Interview with participant from the government sector on 14 September 2016. 
95 Interview with participant from the not-for-profit sector on 8 August 2016(b). 
96 Caroline Kuzemko, ‘Politicising UK Energy: What ‘Speaking Energy Security’ Can Do’ (2014) 42(2) Policy and 
Politics 259, 270. 
97 Gavin Bridge, ‘Energy (in)security: World-making in an Age of Scarcity’, (2015) 181 The Geographical Journal 
328, 329. 
98 Interview with participant from the private sector on 28 September 2016. 
99 Interview with participant from the private sector on 27 July 2016. 
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which energy security is misused as a justification to push forward energy development 
projects that ignore social and environmental sustainability.100   
Still in relation to this manipulation of energy security language for one’s own interest, 
a leading energy expert from the government sector indicated that stakeholders use the 
language of energy security in order to have financial resources allocated to them. As s/he 
put it, energy security “is the mechanism whereby, if you look at the big utility companies, 
they are always using this to get more money out of the government, always, that’s their 
mechanism, so is National Grid.”101 
What is observed in the empirical data, therefore, is the dynamic nature of energy 
security, one that can be continually taken up in new and different ways, where different 
players can break the concept up and reform it along lines which suit their own particular and 
sectoral interests.  
 
4.4. Complexity of energy security construction: summary and importance of 
findings 
The analysis under section 4 demonstrated the complexity of the discussion 
encapsulated in the concept of energy security and its dimensions. The examination of the 
interviews highlighted that energy security concepts are raised differently relative to different 
sectors of the economy. The fact that energy security “means a number of different things to 
                                                          
100 Susan Y Noé and George (Rock) Pring, 'The ‘Fear Factor’: Why We Should Not Allow Energy Security Rhetoric 
to Trump Sustainable Development' in Barry Barton and others (ed), Energy Security: Managing Risk in a 
Dynamic Legal and Regulatory Environment (Oxford University Press 2004), 431.  
101 Interview with participant from the government sector on 19 October 2016. 
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different people”102 or that “everyone has their own idea on energy security”103 has been 
discursively constructed as the “biggest problem”.104  
There is no consensus amongst participants from different sectors about whether 
climate change, and social and environmental concerns, in particular, should be a part of the 
energy security concept. Somewhat missing are attempts from industry and government to 
open up the energy security definition to broader issues of environmental protection, climate 
change and social inclusion. Interestingly, there is no consensus amongst interviewees from 
different sectors in relation to the inclusion of affordability within the meaning of energy 
security either, as affordability was absent from definitions of participants from the private 
sector. Non-inclusion of these elements within the concept of energy security means that 
energy law and policies pursuing energy security can be created which negatively impact 
affordability, the climate, the environment and social inclusion. Encapsulating these elements 
within the concept of energy security would, therefore, assist the move towards a just energy 
transition, as law and policies on energy security would need to be justified under this broader 
scope. 
 Different indicators of energy security are also seen differently from different sectors 
with narratives standing in direct contrast to each other. For instance, although control over 
energy sources was advanced by participants from all sectors, its meaning was cast in 
opposing terms from having control via reliance on indigenous sources of energy supply, on 
the one hand, to having control via the ability to effectively manage energy supply from 
around the world, on the other. This study, therefore, presents divergent constructions of 
                                                          
102 Interview with participant from the government sector on 14 September 2016. 
103 Interview with participant from the government sector on 20 October 2016. 
104 Interview with participant from the government sector on 17 September 2016. 
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energy security by leading energy experts from different sectors of the economy in GB. These 
differences do not promote efficient communication amongst the sectors, but instead create 
more distance and misunderstanding.  
The summary of energy security definitions and indicators advanced by participants 
per sector also reveals a partitioning of views across different sectors of the economy with 
regards to the different elements of energy security, where participants did not deliver a full 
picture in their discursive construction of the energy security complexity. This could be a 
result of the complexity involved in the concept of energy security or due to individual or 
sectoral bias, if participants just wanted to put forward their preferred energy security 
concept based on their own or their own sector’s interests.  
Having different energy security definitions amongst participants from different 
sectors of the economy means that efforts to improve energy security in the country will have 
to attenuate themselves to different audiences. This diversity of ways in which energy security 
was constructed by participants also shows that energy security, as stated by a participant, 
“isn’t one size fits all, at all”,105 and, therefore, there is not a single or common solution. This 
broad spectrum of energy security definitions and dimensions, along with a general 
acknowledgement of an emotional language associated with energy security, also showed 
that the language of energy security can be manipulated for one’s own individual/sectoral 
interest and used to advance a particular point of view. 
This variety of concepts amongst different sectors of the economy in GB can also be 
an obstacle to a meaningful debate surrounding energy security. Participants, for instance, 
may be referring to energy security from very different perspectives or may be selecting 
                                                          
105 Interview with participant from the government sector on 11 October 2016. 
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particular aspects of energy security to suit their agenda. One, therefore, needs to distinguish 
the different elements and dimensions of energy security upfront in order to have any 
meaningful debate surrounding the topic. Demonstrating the variety of arguments 
constructed by the protagonists in the energy field in GB is, therefore, relevant; not only 
because it brings more clarity to the public debate by highlighting where the disagreements 
are and with respect to what, but also because it might assist in decision-making processes 
and inform law and policies. Thus, awareness of this conceptual diversity in GB assists in 
creating clear law and policies on the transition to a low carbon energy system. 
 The definition of energy security by participants, however, is only one piece of the 
puzzle which will inform the following sections. The subsequent sections will focus on 
answering the remaining two key research questions of this thesis: what are the discursive 
links between energy security and law and policies promoting green energy? And what are 
the implications of energy security construction to law and policy on green energy 
development?  
 
5. Energy security and energy politicisation in GB 
This section examines energy security in the context of energy politicisation in GB as 
raised by participants in the interviews. It shows that energy security in GB is first and 
foremost a political issue and that governments are critical actors, in that is they who will be 
held responsible and accountable for energy supply interruption in the country. In connection 
with this debate, this section also demonstrates the implications of energy politicisation in GB 
to green energy development. The analysis of the empirical data showed that, according to 
participants’ narratives, energy politicisation in GB is hindering green energy development as 
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a result of three factors: vested interests, unequal lobbying power and association of green 
energy with left-wing politics. 
 
5.1.  “It is a political suicide for the lights to go out”106: Energy politicisation in GB 
As demonstrated in the previous section, apart from the very brief association of 
energy infrastructure with terrorist attacks, no participant associated energy security with 
national security, showing an absence of energy securitisation in the discursive terrain of this 
empirical work in GB. Energy politicisation, on the other hand, within the meaning explained 
under chapter 3, where there is public and political interest in the matter which is subject to 
contestation and political deliberation, was a remarkably dominant frame in the empirical 
data.  
As explained by participants, “governments fall if they don’t provide people with 
electricity, so there is an important political reason why people and Ministers take it 
seriously”,107  “if you are in government, you would never like to be the government that 
stands over a bunch of blackouts in the country, would you? It’s pretty terminal from a 
political perspective”108 or “for democratically elected governments it [energy supply 
interruption] means that those who are in power are likely to be out of power very quickly.”109  
As relevant as having a political party removed from government as a result of energy 
supply interruptions is the impact on the chances of getting re-elected, as explained by a 
participant in a mixed metaphor “you have got to keep governments with their feet to the 
                                                          
106 Interview with participant from the government sector on 22 July 2016. 
107 Interview with participant from the government sector on 19 October 2016. 
108 Interview with participant from the government sector on 11 October 2016. 
109 Interview with participant from the private sector on 17 August 2016(a). 
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fire and they are not going to keep their feet to the fire if the lights aren’t on”.110 Energy 
security in GB, therefore, was recurrently construed as a matter of priority because of its 
direct consequences of governments toppling and its negative impact on the chances of a 
political party getting re-elected in cases of energy interruption in the country. 
Energy security and energy politicisation in GB were, however, framed in apparently 
contradictory ways by participants. On the one hand, it was framed as a priority due to 
governments falling due to energy supply interruption. On the other hand, energy security 
issues were framed as policy concerns which “tend to be the football that is kicked around”,111 
and, as a result, were not high on the political agenda. In the words of a participant: “You can 
see that energy security is not top of the political pile, because it has become a political 
football, which means that people have been able to use it for politics.”112 
Some light is shed on this apparent contradiction when one observes that energy 
security is not only defined differently but also categorised into short-term and long-term.113 
What participants meant was that energy security in the sense of “the lights going out” was 
a government priority treated as a day-to-day threat, where interruptions to the energy 
system were known to foster political and social unrest, disrupt economic growth and topple 
governments.114 As exemplified by participants, “the lack of supply can lead to competition, 
and even social and political unrest. The ripple effect can be endless”115 or, with reference to 
GB, “people will riot if they arrive at home and can’t turn their TV on.”116 The association of 
                                                          
110 Interview with participant from the government sector on 19 October 2016. 
111 Interview with participant from the not-for-profit sector on 14 September 2016.  
112 Interview with participant from the private sector on 24 August 2016. 
113 A participant from the private sector interviewed on 17 August 2016(b) also made this distinction between 
short-term and long-term energy security.   
114 Various participants put forward this view.  
115 Interview with participant from the private sector on 3 August 2016. 
116 Interview with participant from the private sector on 17 October 2016. 
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public dissatisfaction as a result of energy interruption in GB and its direct impact on the 
collapse of a government was clear in the data.  
Conversely, long-term energy security was framed as not being taken seriously by 
governments in GB. As participants highlighted “everybody knows that in the long-term it 
[energy security] is really important, but in the immediate short-term, nobody is going to lose 
their political career over it”,117 “[energy] policy is being driven by today’s headlines and not 
on the long-term view that it needs”118 or “the problem about energy is that it is absolutely 
essential, but at the same time, when things are going well, not many people take much 
interest in it”.119 The challenge is that government tends to operate on a short timescale, 
based on electoral cycles, and this timescale is inappropriate for developing the policies 
needed to manage long-term energy security.  
Be it short-term or long-term energy security, however, there is the assumption 
presented in participants’ narratives that satisfying national energy requirements is a critical 
government responsibility in which the GB government will be held accountable for any 
energy supply interruption. This is seen particularly in relation to criticisms of government 
choices of energy policy or absence of clear long-term energy policies and the certainty 
advanced by participants of governments toppling as a result of energy outage in GB. In fact, 
the Secretary of State and the Gas and Electricity Markets Authority do have a legal 
responsibility for energy security in GB set out in the Electricity Act 1989. They have ‘the need 
to secure that all reasonable demands for electricity are met’.120 However, the language used 
in the Act implies that the responsibility is for security of the supply of electricity relative to 
                                                          
117 Interview with participant from the private sector on 24 August 2016. 
118 Interview with participant from the private sector on 17 August 2016(a). 
119 Interview with participant from the government sector on 19 October 2016. 
120 Electricity Act 1989, 3(A)(2)(a). 
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demand, not the broader definition of energy security examined under chapter 3 and section 
4 of this chapter.   
In addition to being political, two participants placed energy security on an equal 
footing with economics. For one participant, interest in energy matters reflects phases in 
economic cycles, i.e. during times of economic depression there is an interest in energy, which 
is driven by price and security; conversely, during times of economic prosperity energy 
matters have less importance, because “people feel less worried about price and security, 
because it is all free and it is all there and we can afford it, it is all jolly because we are trading 
with everybody.”121 For another participant, as previously mentioned under section 4.2.3, 
interest in energy security is related to its importance for ensuring investment in the 
country.122 These associations of energy security with economics as a primary factor were 
only raised by two participants, demonstrating that this is not the majority of views in this 
empirical work in GB. 
This section, therefore, demonstrated that short-term energy security in GB is first and 
foremost a political issue, as a result of its direct consequences of governments toppling and 
its negative impact on the chances of a political party getting re-elected in cases of energy 
interruption in the country. Participants also pointed out that energy security is also a priority 
because, in addition to political disruption, lack of energy supply can lead to economic and 
social disruption if measures are not taken to change the energy supply scenario. Energy 
security, nonetheless, was not associated with national security by participants. 
 
                                                          
121 Interview with participant from the government sector on 11 October 2016. 
122 Interview with participant from the private sector on 25 August 2016. 
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5.2. Political factors as barriers for the transition to a green energy system in GB 
As shown above, the interplay between energy security and law and policies on green 
energy development was framed by participants in the context of energy politicisation in GB. 
It demonstrated that energy security in GB is first and foremost a political issue and that 
governments will be held responsible and accountable for energy supply interruption in the 
country. In connection with this debate, this section reveals the implications of energy 
politicisation in GB to green energy development as raised by participants. The analysis of the 
empirical data showed that, according to participants’ accounts, energy politicisation in GB is 
hindering green energy development as a result of three factors: vested interests, unequal 
lobbying power and association of green energy with left-wing politics. 
 
5.2.1. Vested interests  
Vested interests were constructed as connected to the close personal relationships 
between the government and the nuclear, oil and gas industries,123 and their unwillingness to 
see the energy system changed. The rationale provided for this reluctance towards changes 
to a green energy system was not only due to their familiarity with conventional energy 
sources,124 but also because the conventional energy industries do not want to lose revenue 
streams or have their business models negatively affected.125  
Aspects of this are perhaps unsurprising as a fully-fledged policy drive to a green 
energy system will certainly have important consequences for future revenues of 
                                                          
123 Interview with a participant from the private sector on 27 July 2016 and interview with a participant from the 
not-for-profit sector on 23 August 2016. 
124 Interview with a participant from the not-for-profit sector on 19 August 2016. 
125 Interview with a participant from the government sector on 14 September 2016. 
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conventional energy industries. According to Petit, for instance, as the volume of renewable 
energies grows and becomes naturally competitive with conventional generation, many 
conventional power plants now face situations where their profitability is threatened.126 
However, a review of the three great energy transitions of modern times—the rise of steam 
during the first Industrial Revolution in the 18th century, electrification in the 19th century, 
and the advent of oil-fuelled cars in the 20th century—finds that where vested interests were 
overly protected, transitions were delayed at a high cost.127 A successful transition to a low 
carbon energy system will, therefore, require managing vested interests.  
 
5.2.2. Unequal lobbying power  
Unequal lobbying power was advanced by participants as a key issue. According to 
Barbier, vested interests and political lobbying help delay the transition to sustainable 
development because powerful interest groups influence governments to block policy 
reforms that redistribute costs and benefits against their interest.128 The nuclear, oil and gas 
industries in GB are made up of large, multinational and multibillion pound organisations and 
these were seen as having far more lobbying power over the government than wind, solar 
and biomass, because the renewable energy sector was framed as not wanting to speak with 
a single voice and not being as large.129 Valentine agrees with the existence of a fragmented 
structure of the renewable energy technology sector and argues that it places the sector at a 
                                                          
126 Vincent Petit, The Energy Transition: An Overview of the True Challenge of the 21st Century (Springer 2017), 
88. 
127 Clive Trebilcock, The Industrialization of the Continental Powers, 1780-1914 (Longmans 1981); Marianne 
Fay, Stephane Hallegatte and Adrien Vogt-Schilb, Decarbonizing Development: Three Steps to a Zero-Carbon 
Future (World Bank Publications 2015), 153. 
128 Edward B Barbier, ‘Transaction Costs and the Transition to Environmentally Sustainable Development’ 
(2011) 1(1) Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions 58, 62. 
129 Interview with a participant from the private sector on 27 July 2016. 
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financial disadvantage when compared to fossil fuels, a sector which does unite to engage in 
collective lobbying.130  
Publicly, fossil fuel companies were claimed to enjoy far greater access to UK 
government ministers than renewable energy companies or climate campaigns.131 In the 
literature, it has also been argued that a strong nuclear lobby in Britain orchestrated the UK 
plan to build two nuclear reactors at the Hinkley Point C site, although it is not readily 
apparent who that lobby might contain.132 Unequal lobbying power is, therefore, another 
issue which needs to be tackled to increase green energy deployment in the energy system in 
GB. 
 
5.2.3. Green energy as tied to left-wing politics  
Participants also advanced a construction of public perception based on people 
associating “wind turbines or solar energy as hippy”133, “totemic for the left”134 or that “green 
energy equals left wing”.135 This equation of green energy with left-wing politics then makes 
it difficult for a right wing government to support green energy development as a strategic 
energy policy choice. However, a participant mentioned that attempts have been made to 
move on from that discussion and associate green energy with business opportunity.136  
                                                          
130 Scott Victor Valentine, ‘Emerging Symbiosis: Renewable Energy and Energy Security’ (2011) 15(9) Renewable 
and Sustainable Energy Review 4572. 
131 Rob Evans and others, ‘Shell and BP Alone Eclipse Renewable Energy Sector on Access to Ministers’, The 
Guardian (28 April 2015). 
132 Stephen Thomas, ‘The Hinkley Point Decision: An Analysis of the Policy Process’ (2016) 96 Energy Policy 
421, 430. 
133 Interview with a participant from the private sector on 27 July 2016. 
134 Interview with a participant from the private sector on 28 September 2016. 
135 Interview with participant from the government sector on 22 July 2016. 
136 Interview with participant from the government sector on 22 July 2016. 
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In summary, vested interests, unequal lobbying power and association of green 
energy with left-wing politics were issues advanced by participants which need to be 
managed to increase the deployment of green energy in the energy system in GB. Law and 
policies in this area may, therefore, be useful in tackling these issues if the goal is to increase 
the share of green energy deployment in the energy system. 
 
6. Analysing the links between energy security and law and policies on green energy 
development 
As shown under section 4 above, energy security was recurrently discursively 
constructed as part of the energy trilemma – security of supply, affordability and 
sustainability. The majority of participants’ views advanced these three components – energy 
security, affordability and sustainability – as three independent concepts. One of the findings 
of the analysis of the empirical view on energy security definitions under section 4 above was 
that elements of climate, environmental and social considerations as part of the energy 
security concept were only part of energy security definitions advanced by participants from 
the not-for-profit sector. In this regard, only three participants in total, out of the 24 
participants which took part in this research, included those elements in the concept of 
energy security, representing just 12.5 per cent of the sample for this study. In terms of the 
element of affordability, it was interesting to find that no participant from the private sector 
included affordability within the concept of energy security. Only two participants in total – 
one participant from the government sector and one participant from the not-for-profit 
sector – included affordability within the definition of energy security, representing only 8.3 
per cent of the sample. As previously stated, this shows that the broader concepts of energy 
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security presented in the literature review under chapter 3 have not been fully incorporated 
into practice yet. The majority of on-the-ground views in GB focused instead on a narrow 
energy security definition, relating it primarily to availability and reliability.  
Law and policies on green energy development were debated by participants not only 
in the context of energy security, but also within the affordability and sustainability aspects 
of the energy trilemma. This thesis, however, is centred on the interplay between energy 
security and law and policies on green energy development. Therefore, since the narrow view 
of availability and reliability of energy supply was the prevalent energy security definition 
presented by participants in this study, this section will focus on energy security based on this 
definition. This narrow energy security construction will serve as the basis for the subsequent 
examination of the interplay between energy security and law and policies on green energy 
development in GB as framed by participants. 
As a first step in that analysis, it is worth noting that there has been an increasing 
recognition in the literature of energy security factors behind the support for green energy 
deployment, particularly in the context of energy security strategies with a view to 
diversification of energy sources and/or energy import dependency reduction,137 including in 
the context of GB.138 In fact, Lucas, Francés and González identified energy security strategies, 
and not environmental concerns, as the main driver in current green energy deployment in 
                                                          
137 See, for example, Samantha Ölz, Ralph Sims and Nicolai Kirchner, ‘Contribution of Renewables to Energy 
Security’, International Energy Agency, April 2007 
<https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/so_contribution.pdf> accessed 10 October 
2018; A C Marques, J A Fuinhas and JR Pires Manso, ‘Motivations Driving Renewable Energy in European 
Countries: A Panel Data Approach’ (2010) 38 Energy Policy 6877; Scott Victor Valentine, ‘Emerging Symbiosis: 
Renewable Energy and Energy Security’ (2011) 15(9) Renewable and Sustainable Energy Review 4572; M Aguirre 
and G Ibikunle, ‘Determinants of Renewable Energy Growth: A Global Sample Analysis’ (2014) 69 Energy Policy 
374; Javier Noel Valdés Lucas, Gonzalo Escribano Francés and Enrique San Martín González, ‘Energy Security and 
Renewable Energy Deployment in the EU: Liaisons Dangereuses or Virtuous Circle?’ (2016) 62 Renewable and 
Sustainable Energy Review 1032. 
138 M Grubb, L Butlerb and P Twomey, ‘Diversity and Security in UK Electricity Generation: The Influence of Low-
Carbon Objectives’ (2006) 34 Energy Policy 4050. 
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the European Union (EU)139 and a Renewable Energy Security Index has even been developed 
as a quantifiable energy security index of national power generation sectors.140 In addition to 
these EU-wide moves, political leaders in the UK have recognised the role played by green 
energy in ensuring energy security. As stated by the UK Secretary of State for Energy in 2014, 
‘[i]nvesting in homegrown clean energy and energy efficiency across our economies is 
fundamental to greater energy security, just as it is to fighting climate change.’141 
This section, therefore, investigates how participants discursively constructed the 
links between energy security and law and policies on green energy development in GB at a 
time when the government approach appeared to be shifting.142 As previously stated, 
understanding participants’ discursive framing of energy security and its links with law and 
policies on green energy development is important because when one frame is selected from 
amongst a range of competing frames it can be incorporated into law and policies and it has 
consequences for how green energy development is subsequently seen and acted on.  
                                                          
139 Javier Noel Valdés Lucas, Gonzalo Escribano Francés and Enrique San Martín González, ‘Energy Security and 
Renewable Energy Deployment in the EU: Liaisons Dangereuses or Virtuous Circle?’ (2016) 62 Renewable and 
Sustainable Energy Review 1032. 
140 Diego García-Gusano, Diego Iribarrena and Daniel Garraín, ‘Prospective Analysis of Energy Security: A 
Practical Life-cycle Approach Focused on Renewable Power Generation and Oriented towards Policy-makers’ 
(2017) 190 Applied Energy 891. 
141 Department of Energy & Climate Change and the Rt Hon Edward Davey, ‘Statement by Edward Davey, 
Secretary of State for Energy, Following His Meeting with G7 Ministers in Rome’, 6 May 2014 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/news/g7-energy-ministers-meeting-in-rome> accessed 1 January 2019. 
142 The interviews were carried out from June 2016 to November 2016. In May 2015, the UK held a general 
election to elect members to the House of Commons. The Conservative Party won and took over from the 
Conservative and Liberal Democrat coalition government (2010-2015). In terms of energy policy, the new 
Conservative Party pushed forward the exploitation of domestic sources of oil and gas, including from fracking, 
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some renewable technologies, particularly onshore wind and solar. These approaches to energy policy were 
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2015, 56 <https://www.bond.org.uk/data/files/Blog/ConservativeManifesto2015.pdf> accessed 1 October 
2018; Roger Harrabin, ‘Renewables subsidy cuts could increase energy bills’, BBC News (3 March 2016) 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-35706645> accessed 1 October 2018; Andrew Ward, ‘Hinkley Point: Is 
the UK getting a good deal?’, Financial Times (15 September 2016) <https://www.ft.com/content/9037d7c4-
7ade-11e6-b837-eb4b4333ee43> accessed 1 October 2018; Adam Vaughan, ‘Fracking given UK go-ahead as 
Lancashire council rejection overturned’, The Guardian (6 October 2016) < 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/oct/06/uk-fracking-given-go-ahead-as-lancashire-council-
rejection-is-overturned> accessed 1 October 2018. 
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Against that background, the analysis presented in this chapter shows, in summary, 
that the construction of energy security and green energy links involves three competing ways 
of framing how energy security impacts on green energy development. These frames are not 
entirely clear cut and uniform amongst participants: (i) the positive frame, (ii) the negative 
frame and (iii) the emerging frame. Generally speaking, the positive frame, which associates 
energy security and green energy in a positive way, has the implication of promoting green 
energy development. The negative frame, which associates energy security and green energy 
in a negative way, has the implication of hindering green energy development; however, 
there is the potential shift in the debate surrounding the negative frame as a result of large-
scale commercial energy storage. Finally, the emerging frame, centred on ‘prosumers’ as a 
new actor in the GB energy market, is challenging the current energy system and threatening 
the maintenance of the existing energy infrastructure. 
 
6.1. Analysing the positive frame 
Data analysis produced four themes associated with the interplay between energy 
security and law and policies on green energy development in a positive way: energy 
availability, energy diversification, energy independence and energy decentralisation. 
Participants deployed this positive frame to point out the importance of developing green 
energy to ensure energy security. In the analysis which follows, there has been no attempt to 
rank these themes in order of importance. 
First, participants praised green energy for its wide availability, for not being subject 
to depletion like fossil fuel resources, and for delivering energy security as a result of its 
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contribution to meeting energy demands and contribution, second, to the diversification of 
the energy matrix.143  
Third, energy independence, in the sense of green energy being a domestic source and 
in the sense of less or no imported fossil fuels, was also mentioned in a positive way in relation 
to green energy, albeit raising some controversy. Participants pointed out that the emphasis 
on energy independence does not favour green energy exclusively as this argument has also 
been used extensively for fracking in the UK.144  
Moreover, the debate about energy independence was criticised from two different 
perspectives: (i) less imported fossil fuel was seen as not completely shielding the energy 
sector from the price effects of a global constraint on oil and gas, and it was recognised that 
reducing high priced imports would not mean that everybody would be better off because of 
the way that energy markets work and because of customers contractual structures in 
place;145and (ii) energy independence was constructed as an outdated debate in the context 
of the current energy interdependence in GB, particularly as a result of installation of 
interconnectors with neighbouring European countries which allows for energy exportation 
when there is over-supply or energy importation when there is under-supply,146 providing, of 
                                                          
143 For example, interview with participant from the government sector on 11 October 2016, from the not-for-
profit sector on 8 August 2016(b), from the not-for-profit sector on 19 August 2016. 
144 Interview with participant from the government sector on14 September 2016 and from the not-for-profit 
sector on 19 August 2016. See also, for example, Harry Cockburn, ‘More than 6,000 Fracking Wells Needed in 
UK to Halve Gas Imports, Study Says’, Independent (25 April 2018) 
<https://www.independent.co.uk/environment/fracking-uk-gas-imports-energy-environment-renewable-
a8320661.html> accessed 6 October 2018. 
145 Interview with participant from the government sector on 14 September 2016. 
146 Interview with participant from the not-for-profit sector on 8 August 2016(a). Britain´s electricity market is 
currently interconnected with France, Netherlands, Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. There are 
additional interconnector projects in place with France, Belgium, Norway, Denmark and Ireland with estimated 
delivery date from 2019 to 2021. See OFGEM, ‘Electricity Interconnectors’ 
<https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/electricity/transmission-networks/electricity-interconnectors> accessed 6 
October 2018. There were discussions to build a power interconnector from Iceland to Britain, but this has been 
delayed due to Brexit. See Jemima Kelly and Nerijus Adomaitis, ‘Giant Iceland-UK Power Cable Plan Seen Facing 
Brexit Delay’, Reuters (21 October 2016) <https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-iceland-power-
idUKKCN12L1O5> accessed 6 October 2016.  
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course, that the continental energy producers themselves are not under stress to produce 
more for their own local markets. Lindquist has argued that cross-border interconnectors 
have been seen as key to improving the reliability of the energy system and reducing power 
interruptions.147 This position reveals a preference for an integrated energy system that is 
based on high quality infrastructure. Nevertheless, Brexit and the future uncertainty over the 
internal energy market was constructed as being capable of influencing the rhetoric around 
energy independence and energy security as Brexit could potentially make it harder to secure 
energy supplies from the Continent.148 
Fourth, energy decentralisation – where a generation plant can be connected to the 
distribution network or off grid, at a location close to the point of use – as a characteristic of 
green energy deployment was constructed as contributing to energy security. By being able 
to supply energy in a decentralised manner, green energy was framed as contributing to the 
flexibility of the energy system and its resistance to central shocks or system-level failures.149 
Similar views can be found in the literature where decentralised energy systems are 
considered to have positive impacts in the operation of electric grids, as they increase system 
reliability and power quality, minimize land use effects, reduce grid congestion costs and the 
need of peak power supply, and allow savings in transmission and distribution losses whilst 
offering greater levels of energy security.150 The literature on energy decentralisation, 
                                                          
147 Helena Lindquist, ‘The Journey of Reinventing the European Electricity Landscape’ in Lawrence E Jones (ed), 
Renewable Energy Integration: Practical Management of Variability, Uncertainty, and Flexibility in Power Grids 
(Elsevier 2017), 8. 
148 Interview with participant from the not-for-profit sector on 8 August 2016(b). 
149 Interview with participant from the not-for-profit sector on 14 September 2016. 
150 See, for example, Jon Coaffee, ‘Risk, Resilience, and Environmentally Sustainable Cities’ (2008) 36(12) Energy 
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however, also point to factors that can negatively impact energy security, such as increased 
need for load balancing151 and the possibility of lack of coordination between different 
network operators.152 
Thus, energy security concerns framed around energy availability, energy 
diversification, energy independence and energy decentralisation were generally advanced 
by participants as a positive frame which pushed forward the promotion of green energy 
development in the discourse.  
 
6.2.  “Energy security is being used as a stick to beat green energy with”153: 
Analysing the negative frame 
Data analysis produced two themes associated with energy security and green energy 
development when framed negatively: grid upgrading issues and unreliability due to 
intermittency. This negative frame in the discourse had the implication of hindering green 
energy development. The allegation that some green energy projects in GB could generate 
energy but could not have the energy gridded due to grid upgrading issues154 was constructed 
within the negative frame. In fact, there are large parts of the GB energy network which are 
in need of replacing or upgrading.155 This shows that, although green energy can provide 
energy availability, modernisation of the electricity grid is a critical element to ensure energy 
                                                          
(2014) 66 Energy Policy 62; R Hoggett, ‘Technology Scale and Supply Chains in a Secure, Affordable and Low 
Carbon Energy Transition’ (2014) 123 Applied Energy 296.  
151 J Barton and others, Distributing Power, a Transition to a Civic Energy Future (Realising Transition Pathways 
Research Consortium 2015). 
152 Alfredo Vaccaro and others, ‘An Integrated Framework for Smart Microgrids Modeling, Monitoring, Control, 
Communication, and Verification’ (2011) 99(1) IEEE Proceedings 119; Eng Tseng Lau and others, ‘Efficient 
Economic and Resilience-Based Optimization for Disaster Recovery Management of Critical Infrastructures’ 
(2018) 11(12) Energies 3418. 
153 Interview with participant from the private sector on 17 August 2016. 
154 Interview with participant from the government sector on 22 July 2016.  
155 Department of Energy and Climate Change, Delivering UK Energy Investment: Networks (Department of 
Energy and Climate Change 2015). 
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security and has been used as an argument which negatively impacts green energy 
development. 
Green energy’s intermittent nature was also recurrently presented as negatively 
affecting the energy security element of reliability. An acknowledged issue with green energy 
sources, such as solar and wind energy, is the variability in its output. The period during which 
wind or solar power is produced is not controllable or even always predictable. These sources, 
therefore, do not produce power in synchrony with demand. In order to ensure energy 
security, it is, nonetheless, mandatory to permanently balance electricity production and 
consumption. The lack of balance has devastating consequences for the electrical network, 
including frequency and voltage variations. Beyond certain limits, these variations can result 
in damage to connected equipment as well as blackouts.156 This, therefore, created a general 
indisposition among some participants to associate green energy sources with energy security 
in a positive way. 
This negative frame was mainly constructed in connection with green energy’s impact 
on the security of the electricity system, particularly the transmission system, due to 
challenges for the energy system operator to keep the system stable as a result of the 
intermittent character of green energy. As explained by one participant: 
[…] the characteristics of green energy sources are such that they tend to mess 
up the smooth operation of the system and so they bring short-term energy 
security problems. Partly because they are normally intermittent, they don’t 
run all the time or exactly when you need them, so you need back up sources 
                                                          
156Anthony Price, ‘The Exploitation of Renewable Sources of Energy for Power Generation’ in Jürgen Garche and 
Patrick T Moseley (eds), Electrochemical Energy Storage for Renewable Sources and Grid Balancing (Elsevier 
2014), 5. 
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of supply to fill in the gaps which is expensive, because those sources are sitting 
around doing nothing for some time.157 
As a result of the negative impact on the functionality of current electricity systems, 
green energy was framed as causing “genuine risks to energy security in the sense literally of 
the lights going out”.158 In Japan, for example, a utility curbed the use of solar power supplies 
in order to maintain grid stability and avoid the threat of sudden blackouts.159 The 
International Energy Agency (IEA) has underlined the point that the sweeping green energy 
generation revolution has propelled a new debate over the design of the evolving power 
market and electricity security.160 Therefore, as shown under section 5, taking into account 
the political nature of interruption of energy supply in GB, capable of toppling governments, 
some participants have placed heavy weight on this negative frame surrounding the interplay 
between energy security and green energy in GB. That negativity is exemplified by a 
participant labelling green energy as a “threat” to the energy system’s operation.161  
Those who contested this negative framing sought to refocus the debate on the role 
of technological advancement. Indeed, in regard to the operational aspects of green energy 
integration by transmission system operators (TSOs) and distribution system operators 
(DSOs), the variability of electricity generation from green energy has led many not to rule it 
out but to call for the use of new technologies to make better production forecasts and 
                                                          
157 Interview with participant from the government sector on 20 October 2016. 
158 Interview with participant from the government sector on 20 October 2016. 
159 Reuters, ‘Japan's Kyushu Elec Restricts Renewable Energy Supplies for First Time’, Reuters (15 October 2018) 
<https://www.reuters.com/article/japan-nuclear-renewables-restrictions/japans-kyushu-elec-restricts-
renewable-energy-supplies-for-first-time-idUSL4N1WS390> accessed 15 October 2018. 
160 The International Energy Agency, ‘World Energy Outlook, OECD/IEA 2016, 1 
<https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/WorldEnergyOutlook2016ExecutiveSummary
English.pdf> accessed 16 October 2018. 
161 Interview with participant from the government sector on 14 September 2016. 
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increase grid flexibility.162 In an attempt to reverse key aspects of the negative frame, these 
short-term energy security challenges, particularly grid balancing, were framed positively as 
stimulating innovation via the development of new energy technologies, such as energy 
storage.163 Large scale commercial energy storage was also advanced as one of the answers 
to the short-term energy security challenges that come with green energy deployment in the 
system,164 where energy storage would constitute a “game changer”165 or, as Winfield, 
Shokrzadeh and Jones have put it, a “technology which may disrupt conventional utility 
models”.166 According to one participant: 
They say that energy will be too cheap to bill because it will be everywhere. I 
am sure you have seen how much energy is hitting the earth at any given time 
and how much of that energy we are capturing and using, it is very small. If we 
are able to harness a percentage of the solar power and store it in batteries, 
then you wouldn’t need anything else.167  
While the addition of energy storage technologies to the energy system addresses 
some problems, however, it also raises legal, regulatory and social issues, such as lack of 
agreed legal definition of energy storage,168 jurisdictional uncertainty to regulate energy 
                                                          
162 Helena Lindquist, ‘The Journey of Reinventing the European Electricity Landscape’ in Lawrence E Jones (ed), 
Renewable Energy Integration: Practical Management of Variability, Uncertainty, and Flexibility in Power Grids  
(Elsevier 2017), 7. 
163 Interview with participants from the private sector on 17 August 2016(a) and (b). Energy battery and solar 
technology, for instance, are being installed at 100 homes in Cornwall, UK as a trial. See Michael Holder, ‘Clean 
energy technologies could save UK industry £540m on bills’, Business Green (24 September 2018) < 
https://www.businessgreen.com/bg/news/3063237/report-clean-energy-technologies-could-save-uk-industry-
gbp540m-on-bills> accessed 6 October 2018. 
164 Interview with participants from the government sector on 20 October 2016. 
165  Interview with participants from the private sector on 25 August 2016 and from the government sector on 
20 October 2016. 
166 Mark Winfield, Shahab Shokrzadeh and Adam Jones, ‘Energy Policy Regime Change and Advanced Energy 
Storage: A Comparative Analysis’ (2018) 115 Energy Policy 572, 572. 
167 Interview with participants from the private sector on 25 August 2016. 
168 Penelope Crossley, ‘Defining the Greatest Legal and Policy Obstacle to Energy Storage’ (2013) 4 Renewable 
Energy Law and Policy Review 268. 
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storage facilities and the services they provide as well as costs recovery uncertainty,169 
contractual issues in the context of energy storage services170 and issues of social acceptance 
of and resistance to energy storage as a technological change to the energy system.171 
It is acknowledged that low-cost, reliable, and efficient methods to store energy would 
constitute a valuable addition to a network with a high penetration of green energy 
generation.172 Nevertheless, energy storage is not yet a technology that has been 
commercially proven at large scale and readily available at low cost, although we can see 
widespread energy storage projects worldwide173 and in GB.174 An analysis of participants’ 
narratives shows large-scale commercial energy storage to be an essential factor to shift the 
negative frame to a positive frame surrounding the interplay between energy security and 
law and policies on green energy development. Thus, in order to increase the share of green 
energy in the energy system in GB and move towards a low carbon energy system, further 
investment and research in this area are necessary to lower the cost, increase scalability of 
energy storage technologies as well as understand legal, regulatory and social issues around 
the addition of energy storage technologies to the energy system. 
 
                                                          
169 Amy L Stein, ‘Reconsidering Regulatory Uncertainty: Making a Case for Energy Storage’ (2014) 41 Florida 
State University Law Review 697. 
170 Andrew Burlinson and Monica Giulietti, ‘Non-traditional Business Models for City-scale Energy Storage: 
Evidence from UK Case Studies’ (2018) 45(2) Economia e Politica Industriale 215. 
171 Patrick Devine-Wright and others, ‘A Conceptual Framework for Understanding the Social Acceptance of 
Energy Infrastructure: Insights from Energy Storage’ (2017) 107 Energy Policy 27. 
172 Anthony Price, ‘The Exploitation of Renewable Sources of Energy for Power Generation’ in Jürgen Garche 
and Patrick T Moseley (eds), Electrochemical Energy Storage for Renewable Sources and Grid Balancing 
(Elsevier 2014), 7. 
173 There are more than 800 energy storage projects worldwide. See US Department of Energy, ‘Global Energy 
Storage Database: Projects’, 2016. <http://www.energystorageexchange.org> accessed 10 January 2019. 
174 So far a total of 40 energy storage projects are currently operational in the UK, according to the United 
States’ Department of Energy. See US Department of Energy, ‘Global Energy Storage Database: Projects’, 2016. 
<http://www.energystorageexchange.org> accessed 10 January 2019. 
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6.3. Analysing the emerging frame: ‘Prosumers’ and energy security 
Adding green energy to the power sector has given rise to a new actor in the energy 
debate called the “prosumer”, defined as “an energy user who generates renewable energy 
in his/her domestic environment and either stores the surplus energy for future use or trades 
to interested energy customers in smart grid.175 Other definitions of prosumers are found in 
the literature.176 However, in general, prosumers are both producers and consumers of 
energy and they can also trade energy surpluses. Nowadays, the concept of ‘energy 
prosumer’ is gaining more ground within the energy market as multiple consumers produce 
domestically electricity.177 A recent study, for instance, speculated that by 2050, 44% of UK 
energy could be generated by prosumers.178 It has also been predicted that the number of 
British energy ‘prosumers’ could grow from one million in 2015 to 24 million by 2050.179 
Prosumers are an illustration of how the deployment of emerging green energy 
technologies has disrupted the manner in which the existing network and energy sector 
operate, by creating a shift in the value chain from transmission through distribution. 
Electrical power systems are usually broken down into 3 element types: generation, 
transmission, and distribution. The current energy system structures in GB revolve around 
                                                          
175 A D Rathnayaka and others, ‘Framework to Manage Multiple Goals in Community-based Energy Sharing 
Network in Smart Grid’ (2015) 73 International Journal of Electrical Power & Energy Systems 615. 
176 Y Parag and B K Sovacool, ‘Electricity Market Design for the Prosumer Era’ (2016) 1 Nature Energy 1; R Zafar 
and others, ‘Prosumer Based Energy Management and Sharing in Smart Grid’ (2018) 82 Renewable and 
Sustainable Energy Reviews 1675. 
177 Junyeon Hwang and others, ‘Energy Prosumer Business Model Using Blockchain System to Ensure 
Transparency and Safety’ (2017) 141 Energy Procedia 194, 194. 
178 Bettina Kampman, Jaco Blommerde and Maarten Afman, The Potential of Energy Citizens in the European 
Union (CE Delft 2016), 23. Good Energy, ‘Community Energy”, October 2016, 4 
<https://www.goodenergy.co.uk/media/3538/good-energy_community-energy-report_oct-16.pdf> accessed 
10 October 2016. 
179 Ian Clover, ‘UK Could Be Home to 24 Million Clean Energy Prosumers by 2050, Says Report’, PV Magazine (27 
September 2016) <https://www.pv-magazine.com/2016/09/27/uk-could-be-home-to-24-million-clean-energy-
prosumers-by-2050-says-report_100026268/> accessed 10 October 2018. 
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large‐scale centralised generation to deliver energy security. The electricity transmission 
system operator in Britain is a monopoly, performed by National Grid Electricity Transmission 
plc (National Grid),180 which is responsible for ensuring the stable and secure operation of the 
whole transmission system,181 and the distribution network is run (and owned) by the UK’s 
Distribution Network Operators (DNOs). There are now 6 DNOs running the 14 distribution 
networks in England, Scotland and Wales,182 and the dominant supply business model has 
been the corporate utility (commonly known as ‘the big six’ in the UK), selling units of energy 
to consumers in national markets.183  
  However, the installation of photovoltaic (PV) panels in properties, for 
example, along with storage technologies is changing the roles played by the participants in 
the energy system. For instance, solar energy is directly transmitted to the property via 
installed solar panels and can be stored via the use of domestic energy storage.184 As a result, 
consumers can generate, store and consume energy independently from the grid, reducing, 
as such, revenues for the utilities sector, and replacing the traditional role of an energy 
supplier. Thus, prosumers are altering the fundamental geography of energy networks, 
blurring previously fixed distinctions between consumers and producers, sites of energy 
                                                          
180 For an overview about the National Grid, see Pierre Bernard, Marta Navarrete Moreno and Aurore Vanhay, 
‘An Overview of the Evolution of the European Unbundling Process in the Electricity Sector: The Cases of France, 
the UK and Belgium’ (2013) 3 European Energy Journal 24. 
181 OFGEM, ‘The GB Electricity Transmission Network’ < https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/electricity/transmission-
networks/gb-electricity-transmission-network> accessed 6 October 2018. 
182 OFGEM, ‘The GB Electricity Distribution Network < https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/electricity/distribution-
networks/gb-electricity-distribution-network> accessed 10 October 2018. 
183 M J Hannon, T J Foxon and W F Gale, ‘The Co-evolutionary Relationship between Energy Service Companies 
and the UK Energy System: Implications for a Low-carbon Transition’ (2013) 61 Energy Policy 1031. 
184 See, for example, Andy Colthorpe, ‘Duracell to Launch AI-enabled Home Battery System Next Month for UK 
Market’, Solar Power Portal (4 October 2018) 
<https://www.solarpowerportal.co.uk/news/duracell_to_launch_ai_enabled_home_battery_system_next_mo
nth_for_uk_market> accessed 6 October 2018. 
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production and of use, and the relationship between supply and demand in general.185 This 
transformation in the energy system structure has recently been acknowledged by the 
Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy in his statement that ‘[t]he 
distinction between [energy] supplier and distributor may no longer hold in this new 
world’.186 
The appearance of prosumers has been claimed to have both positive and negative 
implications for energy security. According to Staffell, prosumers add to energy security by, 
for instance, reducing the need for new generation and infrastructures by generating energy 
where it is used and by adding to the diversity of the energy supply.187 However, in an 
opposite vein, one participant pointed out how prosumers can have a negative impact on 
energy security. This participant advanced issues related to undermining the integrity of the 
national energy networks, ownership of the assets and consumer law issues as prosumers 
impact the perceived fairness of who pays for the physical maintenance and operation of the 
energy network infrastructure.188  
Those engaged in producing and consuming their own energy do not want to pay for 
the maintenance of the energy infrastructure, but if the energy network costs are shifted onto 
a smaller group of energy consumers, their electricity costs can become very high. This means 
that prosumers have important consequences for future revenues related to the energy 
infrastructure. As seen under section 5, the physical maintenance of the energy infrastructure 
                                                          
185 Katherine Ellsworth-Krebs and Louise Reid, ‘Conceptualising Energy Prosumption: Exploring Energy 
Production, Consumption and Microgeneration in Scotland, UK’ (2016) 48(10) Environment and Planning 1988, 
1989. 
186 The Rt Hon Greg Clark MP, ‘After the Trilemma - 4 Principles for the Power Sector’, Speech on the future of 
the energy market on 15 November 2018 <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/after-the-trilemma-4-
principles-for-the-power-sector> accessed 9 January 2019. 
187 Iain Staffell and others, Domestic Microgeneration: Renewable and Distributed Energy Technologies, Policies 
and Economics (Routledge 2015). 
188 Interview with participants from the government sector on 20 October 2016. 
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from deterioration was advanced as one of the elements of energy security and, with the 
introduction of green energy to the system, grid modernisation is also needed. Maintenance 
and upgrading of the energy infrastructure are, however, costly processes189 which can be 
jeopardised if funding is not available.  
Diesendorf and Elliston also add that the increase in local energy self-reliance may 
reduce the political power of the large energy utilities and the fossil and nuclear power 
industries.190 This, therefore, may also cause resistance to further deployment of green 
energy via prosumers. In any case, the appearance of prosumers is evidence that the energy 
system is evolving into a more decentralised, distributed and multi-directional energy grid. 
With an increasing share of green energy in GB and with the introduction of home energy 
storage to the market,191 the role of consumers as active participants in the energy system, 
as energy producers and/or suppliers is bound to increase. Further research on the 
implications of prosumers for the energy system is, therefore, needed. 
One can observe that technological advances, such as energy storage, and the 
appearance of prosumers are bringing a shift in the frame of the debate. Where green energy 
was presented as being an energy security concern mainly as a result of supply interruption 
in the electricity system due to its intermittent nature, as new technologies come on-stream 
now it is increasingly being presented as a concern because it undermines the integrity of 
national energy networks, disrupting the traditional way of doing things, disturbing the 
                                                          
189 In March 2018, around £250 of a typical household's dual fuel energy bill went towards running and 
maintaining the network - around a fifth of an overall bill of £1,100, see OFGEM, ‘How the Energy Networks 
Work for You’ <https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/network-regulation-riio-model/how-energy-networks-work-you> 
accessed 16 October 2018. 
190 Mark Diesendorf and Ben Elliston, ‘The Feasibility of 100% Renewable Electricity Systems: A Response to 
Critics’ (2018) 93 Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 318, 319. 
191 Emma Woollacott, ‘How Your Home Could Generate, Store and Sell Energy’ BBC News (26 June 2018) 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-44540726> accessed 10 October 2018. 
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‘business as usual’ scenario, driving changes in old monopoly industries and “forcing big 
monopoly industries to start thinking differently”.192 How monopolies, such as the electricity 
transmission system operator, adapt to these changes has been raised as a current challenge. 
As a participant put it, “how do you transform a massive business like the National Grid to go 
from being quite rules based, loving the process and doing the same old thing, quite stagnant, 
quite stale and not very agile to start being more like a Google or a Tesla?”193  
Indeed, policies favouring more distributed or decentralised electricity generation 
have led to concerns in some circles about a ‘death spiral’ for traditional monopoly electric 
utilities.194 This demonstrates the need for energy players to learn how to effectively manage 
the uncertainties associated with the technological advancements which play a critical role in 
offsetting the inherently variable nature of green energy sources and can fundamentally 
change electricity market dynamics. As pointed out by a participant, “any business that has 
tried to be defensive has just died, it is just death by a thousand cuts”.195 It cannot be denied 
that changes to adapt and improve the energy system in GB are greatly needed in the just 
energy transition. The solution then may be to embrace the changes rather than fight them. 
In light of the above, then, it becomes clear that the relationship between energy 
security and green energy is being constructed as a dilemma. On the one hand, green energy 
is constructed as offering solutions to many energy supply challenges by being able to provide 
environmentally-friendly availability of energy, energy independence and diversification. On 
the other, it is constructed as a threat to the current energy system in two different ways: (i) 
as a threat to short-term energy security as a result of grid balancing and intermittency issues; 
                                                          
192 Interview with participant from the private sector on 11 August 2016. 
193 Interview with participant from the private sector on 11 August 2016. 
194 Robert C Armstrong and others, ‘The Frontiers of Energy’ (2016) 1 Nature Energy 1, 2. 
195 Interview with participant from the private sector on 11 August 2016. 
128 
 
and (ii) as a threat to the maintenance of the current energy infrastructure as well as to the 
current electricity market dynamics and its dominant players as a result of technological 
development and challenges associated with consumers seeking independence from utilities 
through energy self-sufficiency.  One can observe, therefore, that green energy is framed as 
tackling energy security issues, but also being the cause for the upsurge of emerging energy 
security problems.  
This section has demonstrated that the links between energy security and green 
energy are far from straightforward. It has also revealed how existing discursive constructions 
are broadening, deepening and transforming the relationship between energy security and 
law and policies on green energy as well as showing its complexity, particularly as a result of 
technological innovation and the introduction of new challenges to energy infrastructure and 
market operators following the increasing integration of green energy sources into the 
system. These challenges will certainly benefit from further research for a deep and thorough 
analysis in terms of solutions, particularly in how legal and regulatory frameworks can assist 
in tacking those issues. 
 
7. Conclusion 
This chapter delved into the interplay between energy security and law and policies 
on green energy in the context of Great Britain. It sought to examine empirical perceptions of 
leading energy experts in GB, by presenting the discursive realities according to participants. 
The analysis revealed a contested terrain around the topic. In terms of how participants 
construed energy security, although the majority of the on-the-ground views on energy 
security definitions focused on the elements of availability and reliability, there was a multiple 
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framing employed by leading energy experts as part of discursive contests that led to 
divergent constructions of energy security. While some participants from the not-for-profit 
sector advanced a definition in line with broader scholarly concepts of energy security with 
the inclusion of climate change, environmental and social considerations, participants from 
the private and government sectors presented a narrower view on energy security, focusing 
mainly on availability and reliability alone. Interestingly, there was no consensus amongst 
interviewees from different sectors in relation to the inclusion of affordability within the 
meaning of energy security either, as affordability was absent from definitions of participants 
from the private sector and could only be found in the energy security concepts of one 
participant from the government and one participant from the not-for-profit sector. 
 Thus, this study has found that somewhat missing are attempts in industry and 
government to open up the energy security definition to broader issues of environmental 
protection, climate change and social inclusion and only a minority of definitions included 
affordability within the concept of energy security. What this shows, therefore, is that the 
broader concepts of energy security presented in the literature have not been fully 
incorporated into practice yet. One of the consequences of the non-inclusion of these 
elements within the concept of energy security is that energy law and policies pursuing energy 
security can be created which negatively impact affordability, the climate, the environment 
and social inclusion. Encapsulating these elements within the concept of energy security 
would, therefore, assist the move towards a just energy transition, as law and policies 
pursuing energy security would need to be justified under this broader frame, with much 
present law and policy falling short of that standard. 
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Different indicators of energy security were also seen differently by different sectors 
with participants’ accounts standing in direct contrast to each other. For instance, although 
control over energy sources was treated as important by participants from all sectors, it was 
cast in opposing terms from, on the one hand, having control via reliance on indigenous 
sources of energy supply to, on the other, having control via the ability to effectively manage 
energy supply from around the world. This broad spectrum of energy security definitions and 
indicators along with a general acknowledgement of the emotional language associated with 
discussions of energy security also showed that the language of energy security can be 
manipulated for one’s own interest and used to advance a particular point of view. The 
analysis, therefore, reminds us that energy security meanings reflect contradiction and 
contestation, and that the concept possesses interpretive flexibility exploited by different 
protagonists to advance their own positions. 
These divergent constructions of energy security by leading energy experts from 
different sectors of the economy in GB do not promote effective communication amongst the 
sectors, but instead create more distance and misunderstanding. Participants, for instance, 
may be referring to energy security from very different perspectives or may be selecting 
particular aspects of energy security to suit their agenda when making it an issue. It is critical, 
therefore, to distinguish the different elements of energy security upfront in order to have 
any meaningful debate surrounding the topic. This diversity of ways in which energy security 
was constructed by participants also shows that there is not a single or common solution for 
achieving energy security and efforts to improve energy security in the country will have to 
attenuate themselves to different audiences. 
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Another principal finding in this chapter was that energy security in GB is first and 
foremost a political issue and governments will be held responsible and accountable for 
energy supply interruption in the country. The analysis of the empirical data showed that, 
according to participants’ narratives, energy politicisation in GB is hindering green energy 
development as a result of three factors: vested interests, unequal lobbying power and 
association of green energy with left-wing politics. Therefore, these issues need to be 
managed to increase the deployment of green energy in the energy system in GB, and law 
and policies in this area may be useful to tackle these issues. 
The analysis also found that the construction of energy security and green energy links 
have been characterised by competing perspectives on how energy security construction is 
impacting green energy development. Three frames were found which were not entirely clear 
cut and uniform amongst participants: (i) the positive frame, where energy availability, energy 
diversification, energy independence and energy decentralisation were generally advanced 
by participants as a positive frame which pushed forward the promotion of green energy 
development in the discourse; (ii) the negative frame, where grid upgrading issues and 
unreliability of green energy due to grid balancing challenges and its intermittent nature were 
construed as hindering green energy development. However, there is the potential shift in 
the debate surrounding the negative frame as a result of large-scale commercial energy 
storage; and (iii) the emerging frame, focused on ‘prosumer’ as a new actor in the energy 
market which is challenging the current energy system and threatening the maintenance of 
the current energy infrastructure. 
The interplay between energy security and law and policies on green energy 
development is, therefore, far from being straightforward. On the one hand, green energy 
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was constructed as offering solutions to core energy security challenges by being able to 
provide environmentally-friendly availability of energy, energy independence, 
decentralisation and diversification. On the other, it was constructed as a threat to the current 
energy system in two different ways: (i) as a threat to short-term energy security as a result 
of grid upgrading issues, grid balancing and intermittency issues; and (ii) as a threat to the 
maintenance of the energy infrastructure as well as to the current electricity market dynamics 
and its dominant players as a result of technological development and challenges associated 
with consumers seeking independence from utilities and desiring energy self-sufficiency.  One 
can observe, therefore, that green energy was framed as a means to tackle energy security 
issues, but also a cause for the upsurge of emerging energy security problems.  
These findings reveal how existing discursive constructions are broadening, deepening 
and transforming the relationship between energy security and law and policies on green 
energy as well as showing its complexity, particularly as a result of technological innovation 
and the emergence of new challenges to energy infrastructure and market operators 
following the increasing integration of green energy sources into the system. These challenges 
will certainly benefit from further research and analysis in terms of solutions, particularly in 
terms of how the legal and regulatory framework can assist in tackling those issues and 
supporting the transition to a green energy system in GB. 
By presenting the multiple voices of participants from different sectors of the 
economy in GB, this chapter calls for integration and dialogue so to contribute to a more 
sophisticated debate amongst energy players. This, in turn, would help achieve a better 
understanding of the current challenges posed to the energy transition. It was not possible to 
explore in depth all the concerns advanced by participants in this chapter. However, the 
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discussion and findings are valuable in pointing to areas for future research as well as 
informing the analysis of the interplay between energy security and green energy in the law 
of the WTO under chapter 6.  
In line with the approach adopted in this thesis, one which aims to capture a plurality 
of views and the discursive frames that arise from them, the next chapter examines the official 
discourse surrounding energy security and law and policy on green energy development in 
Brazil, an example of a perspective from an emerging economy with a dominant low carbon 
energy system. The contextual variations provided by the case study on Brazil in the next 
chapter cast further light on the nexus of interests at work across this contested field.
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CHAPTER 5 
ENERGY SECURITY AND GREEN ENERGY IN BRAZIL: THE DISCOURSE OF ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT  
 
1. Introduction 
1.1. Aim and contribution of the chapter 
As in the case study on Great Britain, this chapter aims to answer the research 
questions at the centre of this thesis in the context of Brazil: (i) how has energy security been 
discursively constructed? (ii) what are the discursive links between energy security and law 
and policies promoting green energy? (iii) what are the implications of energy security 
construction to law and policy on green energy development? As yet, there is no definitive, 
agreed-upon understanding of the meaning of the term ‘green energy’, and it is not the 
objective of this work to analyse the debate surrounding what types of energy sources fall 
within the ‘green’ category. For the purpose of this chapter, green energy is referred to as 
alternative energy sources, a term that is prevalent in the Brazilian discourse, and includes 
wind, solar, bioenergy and small-scale hydropower1 energy resources. 
The discussion which follows attempts to contribute to the need to overcome the 
complicated situation which humankind currently faces in ensuring energy security without 
environmental and climate change imbalances and with social justice globally. It is widely 
acknowledged that the energy transition of the 21st century will need to be rapid.2 In order 
                                                          
1 The concept of small hydropower under Brazilian regulation includes installed capacity of 30,000 KW and a 
maximum inundated area of reservoir of 3 km². See ANEEL Resolution 394 of 4 December 1998. 
2 See, for example, Barry D Solomon and Karthik Krishna, ‘The Coming Sustainable Energy Transition: History, 
Strategies, and Outlook’ (2011) 39(1) Energy Policy 7422; Benjamin K Sovacool, ‘How Long Will It Take? 
Conceptualizing the Temporal Dynamics of Energy Transitions’ (2016) 13 Energy Research & Social Science 202. 
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to assist moves towards the goal of a just low-carbon energy transition taking place as well as 
to ensure that the share of green energy deployment to energy systems is increased 
worldwide, it is crucial to understand the connections between energy security and green 
energy in diverse contexts. The fact that Brazil has a very different energy system and energy 
law and policies from Great Britain makes Brazil a relevant case study to add variety and 
complexity to the analyses presented in the thesis and, as a result, bring additional 
understanding. As with the case study of GB, the findings of the case study of Brazil will also 
serve to inform the legal analyses surrounding room for green energy security in the law of 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) under chapter 6. 
Brazil is an emerging economy which has and will have to cope with a strong increase 
in energy demand in the future. The country currently ranks 10th in the world in terms of 
energy consumption3 and has a population of more than 208.5 million inhabitants,4 which 
grew 21 per cent when compared to 20015 and is predicted to grow almost another 30 million 
by 2047.6 This, combined with efforts to climb the ladder of socioeconomic development, 
mean that energy demand in Brazil is likely to rise sharply. The latest BP Energy Outlook 
report, for instance, foresaw a growth of 60 per cent in Brazil’s energy consumption by 2040.7 
                                                          
3 Central Intelligence Agency, ‘The World Factbook’, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/rankorder/2233rank.html> accessed 6 November 2018. 
4 Estimate provided by Resolution 2 of 28 August 2018 of the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics, 
available at 
http://pesquisa.in.gov.br/imprensa/jsp/visualiza/index.jsp?jornal=515&pagina=55&data=29/08/2018. 
5 Daniel Silveira, ‘Brasil Tem Mais de 208,5 Milhões de Habitantes, segundo o IBGE’, Economia (29 August 2018) 
<https://g1.globo.com/economia/noticia/2018/08/29/brasil-tem-mais-de-208-milhoes-de-habitantes-
segundo-o-ibge.ghtml> accessed 6 November 2018. 
6 Carlos Brito and Darlan Alvarenga, ‘População Brasileira Chegará a 233 Milhões em 2047 e Começará a 
Encolher, Aponta IBGE’, Economia (25 July 2018) 
<https://g1.globo.com/economia/noticia/2018/07/25/populacao-brasileira-chegara-a-233-milhoes-em-2047-
e-comecara-a-encolher-aponta-ibge.ghtml> accessed 6 November 2018. 
7 BP, ‘BP Energy Outlook 2018 – Brazil’ <https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/en/corporate/pdf/energy-
economics/energy-outlook/bp-energy-outlook-2018-country-insight-brazil.pdf> accessed 6 November 2018. 
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Globally, Brazil has one of the highest shares of energy generated from renewable 
sources8 and, according to the International Energy Agency, it has the greenest energy mix 
worldwide.9 The Brazilian power sector, however, is dominated by large-scale hydropower, 
an energy source which has become controversial as a result of its environmental and social 
impacts,10 as well as due to studies demonstrating that large-scale hydropower plants have 
the potential to produce high amounts of methane – a greenhouse gas – owing to methane 
leakage that can take place when areas are flooded to create reservoirs.11 Brazil is also a 
leading producer and consumer of bioenergy and has been a pioneer in the worldwide 
promotion of and support to biofuels, discursively emphasising, in particular, the right to 
social and economic development and the needs of poorer communities.  
Against this background, the case of Brazil brings value and novelty to this work 
because of two main reasons: (i) there is a lack of comprehensive socio-legal energy studies 
research in developing countries12 – which, as pointed out by Sovacool, “are the very places 
                                                          
8 In the power sector, renewable sources account for 80.4% of the domestic supply of electricity in Brazil. See, 
Ministério de Minas e Energia (MME), Balanço Energético Nacional 2018: Ano Base 2017 (Ministério de Minas e 
Energia, Empresa de Pesquisa Energética 2018), 16.  
9 Fatih Birol, ‘Renewables 2018: Market Analysis and Forecast from 2018 to 2023’ 
<https://www.iea.org/renewables2018/> accessed 6 November 2018. 
10 See, for example, D M Rosenberg, R A Bodaly and P J Usher, ‘Environmental and Social Impacts of Large Scale 
Hydroelectric Development: Who Is Listening?’ (1995) 5(2) Global Environmental Change 127; Michael M 
Cernea, ‘Hydropower Dams and Social Impacts: A Sociological Perspective’, The World Bank Paper No. 16 
January 1997 
<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/446311468761673943/585559324_20040283053533/addition
al/multi-page.pdf> accessed 6 November 2018; André Marconato Ramos and Humberto Prates da Fonseca 
Alves, ‘Conflito Socioeconômico e Ambiental ao Redor da Construção da Usina Hidrelétrica Belo Monte’ (2018) 
46 Desenvolvimento e Meio Ambiente 174; Philip Martin Fearnside, ‘Belo Monte: Atores e Argumentos na Luta 
sobre a Barragem Amazônica mais Controversa do Brasil’ (2018) 1(42) Revista NERA 1; Antti P Eloranta and 
others, ‘Hydropower Impacts on Reservoir Fish Populations Are Modified by Environmental Variation’ (2018) 
618(5) Science of The Total Environment 313. 
11 N Barros and others, ‘Carbon Emission from Hydroelectric Reservoirs Linked to Reservoir Age and Latitude’ 
(2011) 4 Nature Geoscience 593; Benjamin L Miller and others, ‘Methane Ebullition in Temperate Hydropower 
Reservoirs and Implications for US Policy on Greenhouse Gas Emissions’ (2017) 60 Environmental Management 
615. 
12 Benjamin K Sovacool, ‘What Are We Doing Here? Analysing Fifteen Years of Energy Scholarship and Proposing 
a Social Science Research Agenda’, (2014) 1 Energy Research and Social Science 1, 8. 
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in the world where future growth in energy demand will likely be the greatest, [but] where 
capacity to acquire capital and technology will be the most limited”13 – and (ii) although there 
are case studies of Brazil in the area of energy law,14 there is  absence of studies on the 
construction of energy security in Brazil in particular.15  
 
1.2. Structure of the chapter 
To set the stage for this analysis of energy security and green energy in Brazil, this 
chapter starts with a brief background to the energy governance in Brazil. It then outlines the 
investigative method used to gather and analyse the data it is based around. In line with the 
methodological approach adopted in this thesis and explained in chapter 2, socio-legal 
discourse analysis, this chapter traces the way that energy security is construed and given 
meaning and significance through the articulation and production of ‘texts’ of many kinds, 
from speeches to policy statements and laws, with emphasis on the energy security discursive 
frames’ role in constructing or deconstructing green energy initiatives. As underscored 
several times already, understanding the discursive framing of energy security and its links 
with law and policies on green energy development is important because when one frame is 
selected from amongst a range of competing frames it has consequences for how green 
energy development is subsequently seen and acted on. 
                                                          
13 Benjamin K Sovacool, ‘What Are We Doing Here? Analysing Fifteen Years of Energy Scholarship and Proposing 
a Social Science Research Agenda’, (2014) 1 Energy Research and Social Science 1, 22. 
14 See, for example, Maria-Augusta Paim and others, ‘Evaluating regulatory strategies for mitigating hydrological 
risk in Brazil through diversification of its electricity mix’ (2019) 128 Energy Policy 393. 
15 A recent literature survey covering 104 energy security studies, identified 68 country-specific energy security 
studies and none of them referred to Brazil, see B W Ang, W L Choong and T S Ng, ‘Energy security: Definitions, 
Dimensions and Indexes’ (2015) 42(1) Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 1077, 1082. 
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  The first product of this approach is an initial analysis of the socio-legal factors 
underpinning the emergence of national rules that have encouraged the promotion of green 
energy initiatives through national policymaking. This examination of socio-legal factors 
provides the groundwork for an analysis of the interplay between energy security and green 
energy law and policies in Brazil. The purpose of this deeper level of analysis is to reveal how 
the concept of energy security is conceptualised and contextualised in Brazil within the period 
of analysis (January 2001-December 2015). This is useful as energy security constructions are 
analysed not at a static point in time, but over a period of years. Such enhanced analysis better 
captures the heterogeneity of perspectives advanced in a national context, the findings of 
which may require policymakers, planners and analysts to re-examine their own assumptions 
about what energy security is, and how it can be best improved. Following this, this chapter 
then moves on to analyse and reflect upon the ways in which the discursive links between 
energy security and green energy law and policies have been forged in practice. 
 
1.3. Summary of findings  
This chapter will demonstrate that energy security is discursively framed differently in 
different green energy law and policies within different energy sectors. Due to its importance 
to economic and social stability in Brazil, when a positive frame in relation to the links 
between energy security and green energy development is made, it has the implication of 
promoting green energy. On the contrary, when a negative frame on the connections 
between energy security and green energy development is formed, it has the implication of 
hindering green energy development. In particular, this chapter will reveal two main findings: 
(i) that a positive frame for energy security and green energy connection is advanced in the 
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context of the transport sector, which, as a result, supported biofuels development; and (ii) 
that a dominant negative frame is advanced in the context of deployment of green energy, 
solar and wind in particular, in the electricity system in Brazil, which, as a result, hindered 
solar and wind energy technologies and promoted fossil fuels development. This negative 
frame coupled with the absence in the official discourse of reference to emerging innovative 
technologies with the potential to minimise green energy intermittency issues, such as energy 
storage and smart grid, have had the result of contributing to Brazil moving in an opposite 
direction to a low carbon energy transition. 
This chapter argues that Brazil should be seeking further diversification of its energy 
matrix by increasing the share of green energy sources and creating supportive laws and 
policies for the development, commercialisation and deployment of emerging green energy 
technologies to unlock their potential for the country. In order to assist with this task, a 
dominant positive frame should be forged in relation to the interplay between energy security 
and wind and solar energy development, and a broader concept of energy security should be 
incorporated in law and policies. This chapter also points out that further research is needed 
to identify the legal, regulatory and social challenges in order to enable the development, 
commercialisation and deployment of emerging green energy technologies in Brazil, 
particularly around energy storage and smart grid. 
 
2. Background to energy governance in Brazil 
The President of the Republic of Brazil (President) is both the head of State and the 
head of government.16 A number of government institutions are involved in the development 
                                                          
16 Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil, article 84.  
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of energy policies in Brazil, as shown in figure 1 below. In terms of institutions, at the top of 
the organogram is the National Council for Energy Policy (CNPE). The CNPE is directly linked 
to the Presidency of the Republic with the attribution of proposing to the President national 
energy policies.17 The final decision of the proposed energy policies by the CNPE lies with the 
President who then ultimately defines the national energy policy of the country.18   
The Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME) is another key agency directly related to the 
Brazilian energy policymaking process. The MME is responsible for the planning, supervision 
and implementation of national energy policies.19 The President has the exclusive power to 
appoint and dismiss the Minister of the MME without participation of the National 
Congress.20 The planning of the energy sector by the MME is supported by research carried 
out by the Company for Energy Research (EPE).21 The Electricity Industry Monitoring 
Committee (CMSE) supervises the continuity and security of electricity supply in the 
country.22 The Federal Electricity Regulatory Agency (ANEEL) is responsible for regulating and 
controlling the generation, transmission, distribution and commercialisation of electricity in 
compliance with national policies and existing legislation.23 The Electricity System National 
Operator (ONS) coordinates and controls the generation and transmission of electricity in the 
National Interconnected System (Sistema Interligado Nacional – SIN) under the regulation and 
control of ANEEL.24 The Chamber of Electric Energy Commercialisation (CCEE) manages the 
operation of the Brazilian power market and, by delegation of ANEEL, execute the regulated 
                                                          
17 Law 9,478 of 6 August 1997, article 2, and Provisional Measure N 870 of 1 January 2019, article 14. 
18 Law 9,478 of 6 August 1997, article 2, and Provisional Measure N 870 of 1 January 2019, article 14. 
19 Ministério de Minas e Energia, ‘Competências’ <http://www.mme.gov.br/web/guest/acesso-a-
informacao/institucional/competencias> accessed 11 May 2019. 
20 Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil, article 84.  
21 Law 10,847 of 15 March 2004. 
22 Law 10848 of 15 March 2004, article 14. 
23 Law 9,427 of 26 December 1996. 
24 Law 9648 of 27 May 1998, article 13. 
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power auctions.25 The Petroleum, Natural Gas and Biofuels Agency (ANP) is responsible for 
regulating the petroleum, natural gas and biofuels industry in Brazil.26 
 
Figure 1: Institutional structure of the energy sector in Brazil 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s own. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
25 Law 10848 of 15 March 2004, article 4. 
26 Law 9,478 of 6 August 1997, as amended by Law 11,097 of 13 January 2005 and by Law 12,490 of 16 September 
2011. 
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3. Method 
3.1 Data selection 
The method of data selection adopted in this chapter follows the principle of a top-
down approach, starting from a ‘universe of possible texts’27 and progressively narrowing the 
choices. All of the texts taken into consideration refer to energy matters. The initial set of 
texts identified according to that criterion were then sampled according to the Relevance 
Sampling Method, also known as ‘purposive sampling’.28 They were sampled according to the 
timeframe (only texts from January 2001 to December 2015 are included), theme (energy 
supply) and additional relevance criteria (e.g. via a focus on documents from relevant energy 
bodies). This method of data selection yielded 162 texts. These are not meant to be taken as 
representative of a population of texts; rather, they are the population of relevant texts, 
excluding the textual units that do not possess relevant information.29  The documents were 
obtained from the Brazilian National Archive, the President of the Republic Archive and the 
Federal Senate Archive during the author’s stay in Brazil from December 2015 to February 
2016. All the official documents selected for analysis are outlined in chronological order in 
Annex 1. 
In terms of identifying relevant official texts, the analysis revealed that several 
government bodies are involved in the development of green energy in Brazil. However, for 
the purpose of analysis only the main regulatory instruments and documents of the main 
bodies with direct responsibility for the development of energy in the country were selected 
                                                          
27 Stefan Titscher and others, Methods of Text and Discourse Analysis (Sage 2000), 33. 
28 K Krippendorf, Content Analysis: An Introduction to its Methodology (Sage Publications, Inc 2004), 119. 
29 Ibid. 
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– the Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME), the Brazilian Federal Electricity Regulatory Agency 
(ANEEL) and the National Council for Energy Policy (CNPE). 
In terms of their roles, the MME is responsible for the planning, supervision and 
implementation of national energy policies.30 ANEEL is responsible for regulating and 
controlling the generation, transmission, distribution and commercialisation of electricity in 
compliance with national policies and existing legislation.31  The CNPE acts as an aid to the 
President of Brazil in the formulation of energy policies.32 Statements and speeches of the 
President of Brazil (President) that referred to the supply of energy were also selected 
because the words of the leader of the Executive as the head of the State and Government 
carry particular weight and set out directions around energy policy. In terms of legislation, 
the main legislative acts applicable to the development of energy, particularly green energy, 
at the federal level were selected. The documents that preceded the enactment of the 
legislative acts, such as reports, technical notes and meeting records, were also analysed.  
The Petroleum, Natural Gas and Biofuels Agency (ANP) also plays an important role in 
the development of green energy in the country, particularly biofuels, as it is the federal 
governmental agency responsible for the regulation of the biofuels sector.33 However, as the 
key elements regarding biofuels development were enacted via federal legislation, the 
regulatory instruments issued by ANP were not included in this analysis.  
The time frame for the analysis is from January 2001 to December 2015. The reason 
for starting the analysis in 2001 is because until 2001 green energy had a minor presence in 
                                                          
30 Ministério de Minas e Energia, ‘Competências’ <http://www.mme.gov.br/web/guest/acesso-a-
informacao/institucional/competencias> accessed 1 May 2018. 
31 Law 9,427 of 26 December 1996. 
32 Law 9,478 of 6 August 1997. 
33 Law 9,478 of 6 August 1997, as amended by Law 11,097 of 13 January 2005 and by Law 12,490 of 16 September 
2011. 
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the Brazilian electricity sector, contributing less than three per cent of the total energy mix.34 
However, as it will be further explained, Brazil suffered a crisis in the electricity sector in 2001 
and this provided a new discursive context in which green energy initiatives were framed and 
re-framed. The period for the analysis ended in December 2015, because, as previously 
mentioned, documents were obtained from archives during the author’s stay in Brazil from 
December 2015 to February 2016.  
 
3.2 Data analysis 
Following the methodology of this thesis explained in chapter 2, this chapter adopts a 
data-driven inductive or ‘bottom up’ approach to data analysis, focusing on the overall 
messages emerging from the evidence as opposed to adopting a grand theory before study 
commenced.  
Therefore, in view of determining how specific kinds of discourses emerge out of the 
text in a dialogue with the reader or recipient to whom the text addresses itself, the 
documents were analysed through the method of interrogative insertion, where by 
formulating and inserting questions into a text, the analyst attempts to uncover the logic of 
the discourse and the direction and emphasis of the argument made in the texts.35 It involved 
a careful reading of the texts of the documents and then proceeded with an interrogation of 
the texts organised around the thesis principal research questions: (i) how has energy security 
been discursively constructed? (ii) what are the discursive links between energy security and 
                                                          
34 Congresso Nacional (Brazil), Comissão Mista Especial Destinada a Estudar as Causas a Crise de Abastecimento 
de Energia no País, bem como Propor Alternativas ao seu Equacionamento, A Crise de Abastecimento de Energia 
Elétrica: Relatório (Senado Federal, Secretaria Especial de Editoração e Publicações 2002), 5. 
35 Nicholas Walliman, Social Research Method: The Essentials (SAGE Publications Ltd 2006), 140. 
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green energy law and policies? (iii) what are the implications of energy security construction 
to law and policy on green energy development?  
 
3.3 Translation 
Unless otherwise stated, the author has carried out all translations from the original 
Portuguese text.  
 
4. National forces influencing green energy development  
By way of background, this section aims to analyse the socio-legal factors that 
influenced the emergence of national rules which have promoted green energy development 
in Brazil. This section focuses on the relevant legislative acts from January 2001 to December 
2015 and attempts to draw out the socio-legal factors foregrounded by the legal texts 
themselves as well as their stated implications for current practices. Table 1 below, which is 
subsequently analysed, provides a summary of the drivers as specifically mentioned in 
legislative instruments that promoted green energy development in Brazil. In summary, the 
drivers found are: energy access, economic development, environmental protection, climate 
change, social development and energy security. The role played by energy security in green 
energy development is at the core of this thesis and will be examined under section 4.  
 Table 1 
LEGISLATION/ 
REGULATIONS 
DATE ENERGY 
TYPE 
OBJECTIVE DRIVERS 
Resolution 24 05/07/2001 Wind Created the 
PROEOLICA 
 Foreseen energy deficit; 
 Security of supply; 
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programme to 
promote wind energy. 
 Economic, social and 
environmental 
development. 
Law 10,438 
(Provisional 
Measure 14 
of 
21/12/2001) 
26/04/2002 Wind 
Biomass 
Small hydro 
Created the 
Programme for 
Incentive of Alternative 
Electric Energy Sources 
(PROINFA). 
 Foreseen energy deficit; 
 Security of supply; 
 Reduction of hydropower 
dependency; 
 Use of local resources 
instead of fuel importation; 
 Access to energy/ support 
to rural electrification; 
 Reduction of greenhouse 
gases emissions. 
Decree 4,873 11/11/2003 Mainly solar Created the 
programme ‘Light for 
All’. 
 Access to energy; 
 Social goal; 
 Economic development of 
rural areas. 
ANEEL 
Normative 
Resolution 83 
20/09/2004 Solar Regulated the use of 
household 
photovoltaic systems 
for the electrification 
of isolated areas. 
 Access to energy; 
 Social goal; 
 Economic development of 
rural areas. 
Law 11,097 
(Provisional 
Measure 214 
of 
13/09/2004) 
13/01/2005 Biodiesel Introduced biodiesel to 
the Brazilian energy 
matrix 
 Social inclusion; 
 Economic development; 
 Environment protection; 
 Pollution reduction  
 Improvement of quality of 
life of urban centres;  
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 Technology development; 
 Security of supply. 
Law 11,116 
(Provisional 
Measure 227 
of 
06/12/2004) 
18/05/2005 Biodiesel Created a registry of 
biodiesel producers 
and importers and 
provided for the tax 
regime for biodiesel 
producers and 
importers. 
 Economic development; 
 Improvement of quality of 
life of urban centres;  
 Greenhouse gases 
emissions reduction; 
 Technology development; 
 Social inclusion. 
Decree 5,882 31/08/2006 Wind 
Biomass 
Small hydro 
Regulated PROINFA  Reduction of greenhouse 
gases emissions; 
 The use of financial 
resources from Clean 
Development Mechanisms 
to reduce PROINFA costs. 
CNPE 
Resolution 7 
05/12/2007 Biodiesel  Established guidelines 
for the formation of 
biodiesel stocks. 
 Security of supply; 
 Ensure the protection of the 
interests of consumers with 
regard to price, quality and 
supply of biodiesel; 
CNPE 
Resolution 2 
13/03/2008 Biodiesel  Set the minimum 
percentage of biodiesel 
to be added to diesel 
oil at 3%. 
 Increase in employment 
and income; 
 Social development; 
 Development of national 
industry of goods and 
services; 
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 Reduction in oil imports, 
with gains in the 
commercial balance; 
 Decrease of vehicle 
pollutants emissions. 
CNPE 
Resolution 2 
27/04/2009 Biodiesel Increased the biodiesel 
blending mandate to 
4% from July 2009. 
 Increase in employment 
and income; 
 Development of national 
industry of goods and 
services; 
 Social development; 
 Reduction in oil imports 
with gains in the 
commercial balance; 
 Decrease of vehicle 
pollutants emissions. 
CNPE 
Resolution 6 
16/09/2009 Biodiesel  Increased the biodiesel 
blending mandate to 
5%. 
 Development of national 
industry of goods and 
services; 
 Increase in employment 
and income; 
 Reductions of greenhouse 
gases emission; 
 Reduction in oil imports 
with gains in the 
commercial balance. 
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Law 12,187 29/12/2009 Low carbon 
emission 
energy 
sources 
Established the 
National Policy on 
Climate Change. 
 Reduction of greenhouse 
gases emissions; 
 Socio-economic 
development; 
 Poverty eradication; 
 Reduction of socio 
inequalities. 
Law 12,490 
(Provisional 
Measure 532 
of 
28/04/2011) 
16/09/2011 Biofuels Biofuels were included 
expressly in the 
Brazilian legislation as 
a key energy resource 
for the country, as well 
as the security of 
supply of biofuels 
throughout the 
country as being one of 
the objectives of the 
National Energy Policy. 
 Security of supply; 
 Price regulation; 
 Protection of consumers in 
relation to price, quality and 
supply; 
 Economic and technological 
development; 
 Promotion of Brazil´s 
competitiveness in the 
international market of 
biofuels; 
 Reduction of greenhouse 
gases emissions. 
Law 12,783 
(Provisional 
Measure 579 
of 
11/09/2012) 
11/01/2013 Wind 
Small hydro 
Biomass 
Solar 
Promoted the 
competitiveness of 
energy produced from 
wind power, 
thermosolar, 
photovoltaic, small 
hydro, biomass, other 
 Reduction of energy costs; 
 Energy security (availability 
and affordability of 
electricity); 
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renewables and 
natural gas. 
Law 12,859  
(Provisional 
Measure 613 
of 
07/05/2013) 
10/09/2013 Bioethanol Reduced the tax for 
bioethanol. 
 Reduction of ethanol costs; 
 Reduction of oil 
consumption and 
importation with gains in 
the commercial balance; 
 Reduction of greenhouse 
gases emissions. 
Law 13,033 
(Provisional 
Measure 647 
of 
28/05/2014) 
24/09/2014 Biofuels Increased the biodiesel 
blending mandate to 
5%. 
 Balanced environment; 
 Reduction of greenhouse 
gases emissions; 
 Increase in employment, 
income and high value-
added products; 
 Reduction in oil imports 
with gains in the 
commercial balance; 
 Energy security (protect the 
national supply in atypical 
situations). 
Law 13,097 
(Provisional 
Measure 656 
of 
07/10/2014) 
15/01/2015 Wind Provided import tax 
exemptions for wind 
turbine components. 
 Increase in competitiveness 
of national industry in the 
face of international 
industry; 
 Reduction of energy price. 
CNPE 
Resolution 3  
21/09/2015 Biodiesel  Authorised and set 
guidelines for the 
 Economic, social and 
environmental basis; 
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commercialisation and 
the voluntary use of 
biodiesel. 
 Consumers´ protection. 
 
4.1 Energy access 
Lack of modern energy access remains an enduring global problem, limiting 
opportunities for income generation and the ability to tackle extreme poverty.36 Conversely, 
ensuring access to energy supplies serves as a means to promote economic development by 
increasing productivity and growth. In Brazil, the benefits brought by improving access to 
energy were a theme in speeches of the President across the period chosen for analysis. For 
instance: 
Those who participate in these projects [rural electrification], particularly in 
the poorest regions of the country, know the benefit a pole, a wire and a light 
brings. They know what the possibility of making a flour mill means, the 
possibility of placing a pump to draw water means, what the possibility of 
making a machine to make bran, to grind corn, means. It is something of great 
magnitude, and possibly many people from the city are not entirely clear about 
the importance of light.37 
Energy access was also a recurrent theme in the legal framework. Law 10,438 of 26 
April 2002, which created the Alternative Energy Sources Incentive Programme (PROINFA),38 
                                                          
36 Benjamin K Sovacool and Ira M Drupady, Energy Access, Poverty, and Development: The Governance of Small-
scale Renewable Energy in Developing Asia (Routledge 2016), 1. 
37 Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, ‘Speech at the Launching Ceremony of the Universal National Programme for Access 
and Use of Electric Power’, Brasília-DF, 11 November 2003. 
38 Only wind, biomass and small-scale hydro energy sources were included in PROINFA. 
152 
 
under article 13, marks the universalisation of energy access in Brazil, announcing the 
promotion of universal electricity services across all of the national territory with the aim of 
combating energy poverty in Brazil. As explained by the President: 
(…) there are 12 million families in Brazil that still lack electricity (…); we have 
in Brazil nearly three countries the size of Paraguay without electricity, in a 
country that has the possibility to produce as much energy as is needed.39 
In Brazil, solar energy has played an important role in achieving the social aim of 
universal energy access and tackling energy poverty. In terms of its framing, it is a poverty-
alleviating energy resource. However, the incentive programmes targeting alternative energy 
sources in Brazil did not initially include solar. The situation changed following various public 
energy access programmes from the 1990´s, such as ‘Luz da Terra’ (Light of the Land),40 ‘Luz 
no Campo’ (Light in the Countryside),41 and ‘Luz para Todos’ (Light for All),42 which involved 
government as well as businesses and non-profit organisations. These programmes envisaged 
the provision of energy services through renewable energy, particularly via the use of solar 
panels.  
These programmes were aimed at providing electricity to isolated poor communities, 
which did not have access to electricity supply through the conventional network. They 
prioritised the provision of electricity to government funded schools, health centres and 
water supply wells, and projects aimed at local and family agricultural development. Thus, 
solar energy served as a means of rescuing the poor, isolated and distant rural communities 
                                                          
39 Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, ‘Speech at the Opening Ceremony of the Electrification Network in 53 Settlements’, 
Sidrolândia-MS, 22 February 2005. 
40 Decree n. 41,187 of 25 September 1996. 
41 Presidential Decree of 2 December 1999. 
42 Decree 4,873 of 11 November 2003.  
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by providing energy services, improving their living standards as well as ensuring 
environmental sustainability.  In this way, solar was positioned within the wider discourse of 
energy policy in Brazil. 
 
4.2 Economic development 
What emerges very powerfully through the texts is the stress on the importance of 
energy supply to economic development. As the President put it in 2004: ‘The truth is that no 
country develops without energy.’43 The role that green energy promotion has played in the 
drive to achieve economic development is multi-fold.  
Firstly, as explained in the previous section, green energy promotion was discursively 
positioned as a means to pursue the economic development of rural areas, through public 
energy access programmes.  
Secondly, the texts work to mutually elaborate a rationale for green energy 
development in terms of increasing employment and income as well as the acquisition and 
development of technology and development of a national industry of goods and services. As 
stated by the President using PROINFA as the example: 
PROINFA was a model (…), our first successful experience of wind power and 
biomass, one that shows we can be acquiring new technology (…).44 
  Thirdly, the pursuit of green energy, specifically biofuels, is discursively tied to an 
economic strategy centred on maintaining the continuity of energy supply as well as bringing 
                                                          
43 Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva,’ Speech at the Official Ceremony of the Construction and Installation of Turbines of 
the Tucuruí Hydroelectric Plant’, Tucuruí – Pará, 25 November 2004. 
44 Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, ‘Speech at the Opening of the Brazilian Forum on Climate Change Meeting’, Brasília-
DF, 30 November 2004. 
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gains in the national balance of payments through the reduction of oil imports. As explained 
by the Minister of Mines and Energy in relation to the use of biodiesel: 
Biodiesel, as a vegetable oil, will be an alternative energy source, and at the 
same time a strategic energy resource from an economic point of view, if we 
take into account the fact that global oil reserves are not renewable and they 
will deplete if their exploration keeps on increasing.45 
 Conversely, wind and solar energy sources also appear in presidential speeches as 
insufficient to provide economic development in the country, as exemplified in a presidential 
speech: 
[…] solar energy and wind power are still complementary energies. They do 
not guarantee the country's development, social inclusion and sustainability, 
they do not support the production of energy, they are complementary.46 
 This demonstrates, therefore, that the country’s economic, social and sustainable 
development has also been discursively used to downplay the importance of wind and solar 
energy sources.  
 
4.3 Environmental matters 
Some regulatory instruments discursively present green energy development as a way 
forward in achieving a balanced environment. The PROEOLICA programme which promoted 
wind energy, for instance, was supported by the argument that it would attract 
                                                          
45 Exposure of Motives 44/MME of 9 September 2004. 
46 Dilma Rouseff, ‘Speech during the Start Ceremony of the Deviation of the Madeira River for the Santo Antônio 
Hydroelectric Power Plant’, Porto Velho-RO, 5 July 2011.  
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environmental development.47 Environmental matters have also been discursively implicated 
in the debates within high ranking meetings regarding energy development. As stated in a 
CNPE meeting, for instance: ‘ecological and socio-economic issues should be considered 
strategically on [energy] projects before any signalling to the market for eligible 
exploitations.’48  
However, these discursive attempts to knit together green energy projects and 
environmental protection have also met resistance. Green energy projects have been 
characterised as facing difficulties in meeting the demands of environmental agencies. Taking 
one example, environmental licencing has gradually come to be portrayed as a villain in 
relation to green energy projects. Reports by the Federal Senate49 and the Federal Court of 
Accounts50 have shown concerns over the lack of clear and objective definitions of the 
necessary criteria for the granting of licences as well as uncertainties in relation to timescale 
and the length of the process, delays due to judicial decisions and lack of technicians to 
analyse environmental studies and the general complexity of the environmental licencing 
process as a whole. As an illustration of the success of this counter-discourse in 
problematising the practical implementation of green energy initiatives, a new legal 
framework is currently under debate which would speed up the environmental licencing 
process for energy projects while taking into account concerns over the environmental 
impacts of the activity and any compensatory measures due.51  
                                                          
47 Resolution 24 of 5 July 2001.  
48 Records of the 27th Ordinary CNPE Meeting of 17 December 2013. 
49 Comissão de Serviços de Infraestrutura, Política Nacional de Recursos Hídricos: Abastecimento, Energia e 
Saneamento Básico (Senado Federal 2015). 
50 See the 2014 Federal Court of Accounts report on the auditing of processes and contracts of implementation 
of wind parks in Bahia, Rio Grande do Norte, Ceará and Rio Grande do Sul, in Tribunal de Contas da União (TCU), 
Relatório TC 017.421/2013-6 of 18 June 2014. 
51 Project of Law of the Federal Senate 654 of 2015. 
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By way of another example, environmental conflicts in relation to how green energy 
development projects have been implemented have also been brought to the discursive 
surface. In this rather different form of counter-discourse, such things as, for instance, the 
devastation of sand dunes, interference with aquifers, visual and noise pollution in the case 
of wind energy52 have all come to be discursively juxtaposed against the claims of 
environmental protection. 
In relation to interference with aquifers used by indigenous populations in the case of 
small-scale hydropower, for instance, statements like this one from the Federal Public 
Ministry in Rondonia do a particular kind of discursive work:53 
…[S]mall-scale hydropower plants are considered "clean energy" because they 
do not have an environmental impact on the rivers where they are installed. 
However, over the years, several small-scale hydropower plants have been 
installed in the bed of the Branco River, which have caused serious 
environmental and social impacts to the indigenous population who inhabit 
the region. This was because environmental impact studies only took dams 
into account individually – one by one – and disregarded the fact that, from an 
environmental point of view, a group of small-scale hydropower plants is 
equivalent to a large enterprise. 
In this statement, doubt is discursively introduced along a new plane. Rather than 
treating the issuing of environmental licenses for green energy projects as too inflexible, they 
                                                          
52 See Antonio Jeovah Meireles, ‘Danos Socioambientais Originados pelas Usinas Eólicas nos Campos de Dunas 
do Nordeste Brasileiro e Critérios para Definição de Alternativas Locacionais’ (2011) 11 Confins [Online]. 
53 ‘Conjunto de Pequenas Centrais Hidrelétricas Prejudica Índios e Meio Ambiente em Rondônia’ (Procuradoria 
da República em Rondônia, 28 June 2011) < http://www.mpf.mp.br/ro/sala-de-imprensa/noticias-ro/conjunto-
de-pequenas-centrais-hidreletricas-prejudica-indios-e-meio-ambiente-em-rondonia> accessed 29 March 2016. 
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instead emerge as flexible enough to allow green energy projects which cause environmental 
and social impacts. 
 The process of facilitating the issue of environmental licenses to speed up energy 
projects has also been criticised by scholars.54 Environmental conflicts have been invoked in 
academic studies55 and complaints have been registered in the Map of Conflict, 
Environmental Injustice and Health56 from social movements and affected population groups. 
In addition, civil lawsuits have been filed by the Federal Public Ministry due to environmental 
protection concerns, particularly in relation to wind power57 and small-scale hydropower 
projects,58 with the allegation that appropriate environmental studies are not being carried 
out in relation to energy projects. This demonstrates a growing opposition movement against 
the green energy industry due to conflicts over environmental impacts. As the above suggests, 
environmental conflict is both expressed through and given shape by discursive practices, 
with one side finding its statements repositioned, modified and made to serve quite different 
ends to the ones they were initially meant to serve – one person’s inexcusable delay in 
                                                          
54 Marcelo Firpo de Souza Porto, Renan Finamore and Hugo Ferreira, ‘Injustiças da Sustentabilidade: Conflitos 
Ambientais Relacionados à Produção de Energia “Limpa” no Brasil’ (2013) 100 Revista Crítica de Ciências Sociais 
37, 40. 
55 See Antonio Jeovah Meireles, ‘Danos Socioambientais Originados pelas Usinas Eólicas nos Campos de Dunas 
do Nordeste Brasileiro e Critérios para Definição de Alternativas Locacionais’ (2011) 11 Confins [Online]; Keith 
Brower Brown, ‘Wind Power in Northeastern Brazil: Local Burdens, Regional Benefits and Growing Opposition’ 
(2011) 3(4) Climate and Development 344; Alice Nataraja Santos, A Energia Eólica no Litoral do NE no Brasil: 
Desconstruindo a "Sustentabilidade" para Promover "Justiça Ambiental" (Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung 2014). 
56 The Map of Conflicts, Environmental Injustice and Health is the result of a project developed jointly by the 
Oswaldo Cruz Foundation and the NGO Fase with the support of the Department of Environmental and Workers 
Health and of the Ministry of Health. The map was launched in 2010 and currently has over 500 environmental 
conflicts spread throughout Brazil. See <http://www.conflitoambiental.icict.fiocruz.br/index.php> accessed 30 
December 2018. 
57 See, for example, civil lawsuit JFCE/LN-0000396-30.2009.4.05.8101-ACP, filed on 21 September 2009 against 
the construction of Aracati Eolic Park. 
58 See, for example, civil lawsuit JF-RO-0012760-49.2011.4.01.4100-ACP, filed on 27 September 2011 against the 
construction of small hydropower plants Santa Cruz de Monte Negro, Jamari and Canaã; and civil lawsuit 
0000736-29.2015.403.6125, filed on 1 June 2015 by Sao Paulo Federal Public Ministry against the construction 
of small hydropower plants in Pardo river.  
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environmental licencing for much needed energy is another person’s healthy governmental 
and judicial oversight. 
 
4.4 Climate change 
The fact that explicit major forces driving green energy policies in Brazil have 
motivations other than climate change has been echoed in the literature.59 An analysis of the 
Brazilian legal framework on green energy development within the period of study (2001-
2015) corroborates the finding that curbing energy’s contribution to climate change did not 
initially surface as an important priority. For instance, in the aforementioned 2001 wind 
energy development programme PROEOLICA and 2003 energy access programme ‘Light for 
all’, which promoted solar energy, climate change issues were not even mentioned. The 
impact of reducing greenhouse gas emissions was raised as one of the benefits for the 
implementation of the main programme for incentivising alternative energy sources, 
PROINFA.60 However, the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions as an aim of PROINFA was 
not included in the wording of the original legislation in 2002. It was in 2006 that new 
legislation was enacted to expressly include the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions in the 
legal discourse itself so as to explicitly allow the use of the financial resources from Clean 
Development Mechanisms61 to offset costs of the PROINFA programme.62  
                                                          
59 Roberto Schaeffer and others, Who Drives Climate-relevant Policies in Brazil? (Institute of Development 
Studies/Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro 2015), 22. 
60 Exposure of Motives 00376-A-CCIVIL/MF/MME/MDIC of 21 December 2001. 
61 This allows emission-reduction projects in developing countries to earn certified emission reduction (CER) 
credits, which can be traded and sold, and used by industrialized countries to a meet a part of their emission 
reduction targets under the Kyoto Protocol. See UNFCCC, ‘What is the CDM’ 
<https://cdm.unfccc.int/about/index.html> accessed 7 November 2018. 
62 Decree 5,882 of 31 August 2006. 
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Similarly to PROINFA, reducing greenhouse gas emissions was discursively construed 
as a factor surrounding the initial discussions of biodiesel promotion,63 but it was not 
specifically included in the biodiesel legislation. Law 11,097 of 13 January 2005 (the Biodiesel 
Law), for example, expressly introduced biodiesel as a key fuel in the Brazilian energy matrix. 
It also set the objective to increase the share of biofuels in the national energy matrix on 
economic, social and environmental grounds. Climate change concerns, therefore, were 
articulated in the discussions of Brazilian regulatory instruments for biodiesel, but not 
expressly included in legislation.  It was only in 2011, via the enactment of Law 12,490 of 16 
September 201164 that the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions was included as an aim in 
official legal discourse and directly connected with biofuels.65 The absence of express 
references to the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions in the original official legislation 
shows, therefore, that, although climate change concerns were taken into account as a factor 
for the initial creation and implementation of some forms of green energy, they were not 
considered the primary driver.  
Today, green energy and climate change are directly and expressly linked in Brazil’s 
official legal discourse nationally and internationally. In its climate action plan submitted to 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in the context of the 
negotiations to the 2015 Paris Agreement,66 Brazil committed to reduce greenhouse gas 
                                                          
63 See, for example, reasons given for the enactment of Provisional Measure 227 of 6 December 2004, EM 
Interministerial nº 00166/2004 - MF/MDA/MME <http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato2004-
2006/2004/Exm/EM-166-04.htm> accessed 19 November 2018. 
64 Law 12,490/2011 changed Law 9,478 of 6 August 1997 which provides for the national energy policy. 
65 See article 1 of Law 12,490/2011 which included the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and pollutants in 
the energy and transport sector, including via the use of biofuels, as an aim of the Brazilian national energy 
policy. 
66 See Brazil´s Intended Nationally Determined Contribution towards Achieving the Objective of the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (28 September 2015) 
<https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/Brazil/1/BRAZIL%20iNDC%20engl
ish%20FINAL.pdf > accessed 25 November 2018. 
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emissions by 37% below 2005 levels in 2025. In addition to measures focusing on 
deforestation and land use, the country has sought to promote the role played by green 
energy in meeting this target in the international arena. It has done this by, for example, 
committing to the adopting of measures which will increase the share of green energy in the 
power supply to 23% by 2030 by focusing on wind, solar and biomass67 and to increasing the 
share of sustainable biofuels in its energy mix to approximately 18% by 2030, by expanding 
biofuel consumption, increasing ethanol supply, including by increasing the share of advanced 
biofuels (second generation), and increasing the share of biodiesel in the diesel mix.68 
Therefore, Brazil´s commitments in the international arena have discursively elevated climate 
change as an important driver for green energy development.  
 
4.5 Social issues 
The regulatory framework for green energy development discursively presents social 
development and social inclusion as one of its goals. The biodiesel programme, for example, 
created the Social Fuel Seal (SFS), Selo Combustível Social,69 which promotes the inclusion of 
small agriculture in the biodiesel production chain, particularly from the poorest and most 
disadvantaged regions in Brazil. Biodiesel producers must purchase a certain percentage of 
feedstock from family-based farmers, enter into contracts with them to establish specific 
income levels, and guarantee technical assistance and training.70 As such, this procedure 
                                                          
67 Ibid 3. See also, Eduardo Braga, ‘A Matriz Energética Brasileira e os Desafios do Setor em Decorrência das 
Mudanças Climáticas’ (Senado Federal, Comissão Mista Permanente Sobre Mudanças Climáticas 2015). 
68 Ibid. 
69 Decree 5,297 of 6 December 2004. 
70 Decree 5,297 of 6 December 2004, article 2, paragraph 1. 
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allows small communities to generate an income from the plantation and harvest of 
feedstock.  
However, social conflicts have not been absent from green energy development. In 
fact, social issues have become discursively relevant in high ranking debates. In the CNPE’s 
meeting of 17 December 2013, for example, it was acknowledged that ‘social issues have been 
overtaking environmental issues in regard to conflicts over the development of energy 
projects’.71  
Social conflicts in the development of green energy projects are mainly framed as a 
result of their negative impacts on small farmers, local and indigenous communities and 
riverine populations by lowering their quality of life, for instance, due to the displacement of 
communities, blocking access to fishing areas and damage to homes from construction 
equipment.72 Two cases can serve as illustration. First, there have been land conflicts and 
displacement of traditional populations in Caetité-BA, where wind parks were constructed.73 
Second, indigenous populations and energy companies have been in conflict in relation to the 
construction of Juruena small hydropower plant in the state of Mato Grosso due to a drastic 
reduction in fish population numbers in the river which are essential for food and for the 
maintenance of the indigenous cultural practices.74 The conflict was intensified when about 
                                                          
71 Records of CNPE meeting of 17 December 2013. 
72 For a research based on qualitative interviews with local and regional stakeholders in a wind energy state in 
Brazil, see Keith Brower Brown, ‘Wind Power in Northeastern Brazil: Local Burdens, Regional Benefits and 
Growing Opposition’ (2011) 3(4) Climate and Development 344. 
73 Comissão Pastoral da Terra, ‘O Avanço do Capital e sua Influência nos Modos de Vida das Populações 
Tradicionais no Município de Caetité (BA)’ (13 August 2013) 
<http://www.cptnacional.org.br/index.php/publicacoes/noticias/artigos/1676-o-avanco-do-capital-e-sua-
influencia-nos-modos-de-vida-das-populacoes-tradicionais-no-municipio-de-caetite-ba> accessed 29 March 
2016; Iasmin Santana and Allan Lustosa, ‘Na Bahia, Energia Eólica Impacta Comunidade’ (2 September 2014) 
<http://www.canalibase.org.br/na-bahia-energia-eolica-impacta-comunidade> accessed 25 January 2017.  
74 Ministério Público Federal, ‘MPF Recebe Relatório contra a Construção de Hidrelétricas no Vale do Juruena 
(MT)’ (1 August 2016) < http://www.mpf.mp.br/mt/sala-de-imprensa/noticias-mt/mpf-recebe-relatorio-contra-
a-construcao-de-hidreletricas-no-vale-do-juruena-mt> accessed 25 January 2017. 
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120 native Indians invaded and set fire to a small hydropower construction site.75 Therefore, 
just as was the case with environmental conflicts, although green energy development has 
social inclusion as one of its key goals, concrete green energy projects have raised concerns 
about their negative social impacts. 
 
5. The role played by energy security in green energy development 
In the previous section, the socio-legal factors that influenced the emergence of 
national rules which have promoted green energy development in Brazil were explained as a 
background to understand what kind of forces were at play in Brazil at the time of enactment 
of green energy law during the period of analysis. Energy security was also one of the factors 
that influenced law and policies on green energy development and is at the centre of this 
thesis. This section, therefore, aims to unveil the interplay between energy security and green 
energy and focuses on the thesis key research questions: (i) how has energy security been 
discursively constructed? (ii) what are the discursive links between energy security and law 
and policies promoting green energy? (iii) what are the implications of energy security 
construction to law and policy on green energy development? 
As explained in chapter 3, this thesis focuses on energy security in the sense of security 
of energy supply, and although the notion of “energy security” is widely debated within 
academic literature, an agreed definition has not yet been reached. While some scholars 
argue that a broader array of criteria needs to be considered as a key component of energy 
security concepts – such as availability, reliability, affordability as well as environmental, 
                                                          
75 Beto Ricardo and Fany Ricardo (ed), Povos Indígenas no Brasil: 2006/2010 (Instituto Socioambental 2011), 
580. 
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climate and social considerations – others argue for a narrow notion of energy security and a 
clear separation between energy security and other policy objectives, leading to the definition 
of energy security as the continuity of energy supplies relative to demand. At the same time 
as these debates have unfolded, governments around the world, and Brazil is no exception, 
have been enacting new legislation, introducing new policies and, through both, weaving 
understandings of energy security into the discursive fabric of their societies’ laws and 
policies. Against this background, this section aims to examine how energy security has been 
configured as a concern in green energy law and policies in Brazil between January 2001 and 
December 2015. 
The analysis is split into two discernible discursive periods; the period of the 2001 
energy crisis (2001-2002) and the post-crisis period (2003-2015), respectively. This distinction 
is drawn in clear-cut ways for analytical purposes; in reality, the boundaries of each of the 
periods identified are fluid (that is, to a certain extent they overlap). The reason for 
distinguishing them is to identify the main discursive strands that have been central to the 
construction of the links between energy security and green energy law and policies in Brazil, 
establishing, in particular, continuities and changes in the ways in which it has been framed.  
 
5.1 Energy security and green energy during the 2001 energy crisis (2001-2002) 
5.1.1 Constructing energy security 
This section will demonstrate that, during the 2001 energy crisis in Brazil, energy 
security was conceptualised narrowly as uninterrupted availability of energy supply and was 
treated as intrinsically linked to the country’s economic development. There was no expressly 
stated association of energy security with national security in any of the documents analysed 
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and there was no reference in the legal and political official discourse to any form of military 
action as a result of energy shortage. The creation of a sense of urgency around the provision 
of energy supply was pursued mainly as a result of energy being framed as an essential 
element to support the growth of the economy. Additionally, in the official legal and political 
discourses, there is no reference to social unrest as one of the main reasons for adopting 
measures to ensure energy supply. Some street protests, however, did take place and were 
framed by the media at the time as being responses to electricity rationing and its negative 
impact on labour markets and jobs, not directly correlated to limitations on the use of modern 
appliances, focusing, as such, on the argument of economic development. What the 2001 
energy crisis reveals, therefore, is that energy interruption in Brazil can cause economic 
instability and, as a result, lead to social instability. If necessary measures are not taken to 
correct imbalances in the energy supply, it might ultimately lead to economic collapse and 
chaos that disrupt the typical social order of society in Brazil.  
2001 is significant in this context as it was in that year that Brazil went through what 
became generally known as the 2001 energy crisis, when the country had to ration electricity 
usage for several months to prevent large-scale blackouts. This situation was characterised 
by low water levels in the many reservoirs that are used to power Brazil´s major hydroelectric 
generation facilities as a result of low amounts of rainfall in 2000 and early 2001, as well as 
by Brazil’s significant dependence on electricity generated from hydrological resources. At 
that time, more than 80% of energy generation in Brazil came from hydroelectric power. The 
energy capacity of Brazil in 2001 is summarised in the table below.76 
                                                          
76 Congresso Nacional (Brazil), Comissão Mista Especial Destinada a Estudar as Causas a Crise de Abastecimento 
de Energia no País, bem como Propor Alternativas ao seu Equacionamento, A Crise de Abastecimento de Energia 
Elétrica: Relatório (Senado Federal, Secretaria Especial de Editoração e Publicações 2002), 5. 
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Table 2: Utilities in operation (December 2001) 
Type Quantity Power (MW) % of total 
Wind  6 18.8 0.03 
Biomass 151 8791 1.18 
Small scale hydro 309 1,002.3 1.35 
Large scale hydro  123 61,018.8 82.06 
Thermal 434 9,470.8 12.74 
Nuclear 2 1,966.0 2.64 
Total 1,025 74,355.8 100.00 
 
The lack of financial investment in the energy sector came to be discursively framed 
as one of the reasons for the energy crisis.77 As pointed out by the President: 
 It is true that the reservoirs were being depleted. But they were being 
depleted because there was effectively a lack of generation and distribution in 
the past. We are paying the price for the improvidence or impossibility, due to 
economic reasons, of investment in the past.78  
This period was characterised by language that emphasised tension and uncertainty, 
with frequent invocations of ‘risk’, ‘vulnerability’, ‘emergency’ and ‘crisis’, as well as the 
emergence of an alarmist discourse framed in terms of urgency and deployed to convey the 
sense that Brazilian society was at risk from interruption of its energy supply. In the 
President’s own terms: 
We think it is very important right now that whatever is decided in terms of 
energy has priority. And when I say ‘everything that is decided in terms of 
                                                          
77 See Congresso Nacional (Brazil), Comissão Mista Especial Destinada a Estudar as Causas da Crise de 
Abastecimento de Energia no País, bem como Propor Alternativas ao seu Equacionamento, A crise de 
Abastecimento de Energia Elétrica: Relatório (Senado Federal, Secretaria Especial de Editoração e Publicações 
2002), 19. Tribunal de Contas da União (Brazil), Relatório de Auditoria: Crise de Energia Elétrica (Tribunal de 
Contas da União 2001), 4. See also João Lizardo R Hermes de Araújo, The Case of Brazil: Reform by Trial and 
Error? (Elsevier 2006). 
78 Fernando Henrique Cardoso, ‘Statement in National Radio and Television’, Brasília-DF, 7 May 2001.  
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energy,’ I am not referring only to rationalised energy usage. I am referring 
especially to measures necessary to increase energy supply, under the 
coordination of Minister José Jorge.79 
In addition to framing energy as an issue of absolute priority and creating a sense of 
importance and urgency required to resolve the problem, other elements of securitisation 
can also be found in the manner which government sought to bypass the legislative process, 
by taking exceptional measures without the normal democratic scrutiny. As an illustration, 
during the 2001 energy crisis, the government enacted energy law via the use of provisional 
measures, a constitutional mechanism that has the force of law and may be adopted by the 
President of the Republic in relevant and urgent cases without first being submitted to the 
National Congress for deliberation.80  
However, it is widely acknowledged that provisional measures in Brazil are not used 
just in extraordinary moments. On the contrary, they are frequently issued as an instrument 
of governance to promote the governmental agenda and to implement public policies.81 
Nevertheless, on the one hand, use of such instruments results in a lack of open or collective 
political deliberation as public decisions cannot be analysed in detail and discussed in public 
– they are, therefore, characteristic of a shift towards securitisation. On the other hand, 
energy was not expressly associated with national security in any of the documents analysed 
and there was no reference to any form of military action as a result of energy shortage. 
                                                          
79 Fernando Henrique Cardoso, ‘Statement after the Energy Crisis Committee Meeting’, Brasilia-DF, 14 May 2001. 
80 Federal Constitution of 1988, article 62. 
81 See, for example, Carmem Arias, ‘Um Estudo sobre as Medidas Provisórias no Brasil’ (20010 6(2) Mediações: 
Revista de Ciências Sociais 29; Luciano Da Ros, ‘Poder de Decreto e Accountability Horizontal: Dinâmica 
Institucional dos Três Poderes e Medidas Provisórias no Brasil pós-1988’ (2008) 16(31) Revista de Sociologia e 
Política 143; Felipe de Paula, ‘Does Brazil have a Legislative Policy?’ (2016) 4(3) The Theory and Practice of 
Legislation 329. 
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Therefore, some elements of securitisation within the concept explained under chapter 3 are 
found in the energy discourse in Brazil, but it still lacks the express connection between 
energy and national security.  
The creation of a sense of urgency to provide energy supply was pursued mainly as a 
result of energy being framed as an essential element to support the growth of the economy. 
This demonstrates that, at the time of the 2001 energy crisis, economic development was 
being presented as the crucial and priority driver for undertaking measures to ensure 
continuity of energy supply in Brazil. Energy consumption associated with economic growth 
and the argument that imbalances in energy supply and demand would negatively impact the 
country’s economic development can be found in the majority of the texts of this period. The 
lack of energy supply as one of the most important impediments for economic growth in Brazil 
is also echoed in the literature.82 As stated by the President: ‘The development of the country 
demands energy’;83 ‘The growth rates in Brazil are consistent today. (…) today we see the 
output of Brazilian industry as very significant, this means we have to increase the supply of 
energy a lot.’84 
The document justifying the enactment of provisional measure 2,147 of 15 May 2001, 
which created the Energy Crisis Committee (Câmara de Gestão da Crise de Energia Elétrica – 
GCE), recognised that energy shortage can substantially impact social relations.85 Indeed, 
                                                          
82 Alexandre Macchione Saes and Felipe Pereira Loureiro, ‘What Developing Countries' Past Energy Policies Can 
Tell Us about Energy Issues Today? Lessons from the Expropriation of American Foreign and Power in Brazil 
(1959–1965)’ (2014) 29 Utilities Policy 36, 36. 
83 Fernando Henrique Cardoso, ‘Speech at the ceremony to sign agreements relating to the public service 
concession of electric power transmission between the Union and Amazon Company of Power Transmission and 
Para Company of Power Transmission’, Brasilia-DF, 12 June 2001. 
84 Fernando Henrique Cardoso, ‘Speech at the Ceremony Introducing the Ministers of Social Security and Mines 
and Energy’, Brasilia-DF, 13 March 2001. 
85 Exposure of Motives 00203 of 15 May 2001, justifying the enactment of provisional measure 2,147 which 
created the Energy Crisis Committee, see Congresso Nacional (Brazil), Diário do Congresso Nacional (n 29, 
Congresso Nacional, 2 August 2001), 13402. 
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street protests took place and were framed by the media as being responses to electricity 
rationing and its negative impact on labour markets and jobs, not correlated to limitations on 
the use of modern appliances.86 The focus, therefore, was on the argument of economic 
development. However, in the official legal and political discourses, there was no reference 
to social unrest as one of the main reasons for adopting measures to ensure energy supply. 
The political discourse was framed in a positive way by thanking and praising the population 
for the cooperation and support. 
An additional analysis, conducted as part of the present study, of articles published in 
2001 in one of the main newspapers in Brazil, Folha de S. Paulo, identified no reference to 
protests sparked by a lack of energy supply correlated to limitations on the use of modern 
appliances. While a thorough analysis of all the media discourse at the time of the 2001 
energy crisis would be needed to confirm the veracity of this statement, it is worth noting 
that no academic studies associate the electricity rationing episode in Brazil in 2001 with 
social unrest due to customers’ inability to use electric appliances. What the 2001 energy 
crisis reveals, therefore, is that energy interruption in Brazil can cause economic instability 
and, as a result, social instability and might ultimately lead to economic collapse and chaos 
that disrupt the typical social order of society if necessary measures are not taken to correct 
the scenario. 
Provisional Measure 2,147, under article 1, also framed energy security narrowly in 
the sense of ‘uninterrupted availability of energy supply’, a concern that appeared in all 
documents in this analysis. In fact, the terms ‘energy security’ or ´security of energy supply’ 
                                                          
86 See, for example, Rafael Garcia, ‘Protesto na Paulista Critica Racionamento de Energia e Pede CPI’, Folha de S. 
Paulo (18 May 2001); ‘Crise de Energia Traz Ameaça de 'Apagão'’, Memorial da Democracia (1 June 2001) < 
http://memorialdademocracia.com.br/card/crise-de-energia-traz-ameaca-de-apagao> accessed 1 November 
2018. 
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were not widely used. The term ‘security of supply’ was only deployed once in the official 
discourse during this period in connection with electricity and natural gas importation.87 
However, while not formulated in precisely those terms, the legal provision of Provisional 
Measure 2,147, in which the Energy Crisis Committee was created to ‘propose and implement 
emergency measures to match the demand and supply of electricity in order to avoid 
unfortunate or unexpected interruptions in electricity supply’ significantly characterises 
energy security narrowly as ‘uninterrupted availability of energy supply’. 
Taking front stage at a time when Brazil was struggling to meet its energy 
requirements, the focus on energy security was distinctly framed in terms of energy 
availability and on its correlation to economic development. Other elements of the broader 
concept of energy security, such as environmental protection, also appeared in the discourse 
as concerns, albeit not as core priorities. Rules were thus created to speed up the analysis of 
environmental impact reports and for the procedures concerning environmental licenses in 
relation to energy projects, as well as to simplify the procedures for obtaining environmental 
licences in energy projects of small environmental impact.88 The introduction of these 
measures followed on from the President´s statement:  
There must be greater speed in project evaluation. This will require special 
measures in the Ministry of the Environment, which is directly linked to the 
granting of authorisations. Of course, we must always take into account 
environmental issues. But also, given the nature of the emergency we face, 
those decisions can be faster.89 
                                                          
87 CNPE Resolution 1 of 17 September 2001. 
88 Provisional Measure 2,147, article 8. 
89 Fernando Henrique Cardoso, “Statement after the Energy Crisis Committee Meeting’, Brasilia, 14 May 2001. 
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In another example, the official discourse presents a conflict between energy supply 
and socio-economic development on the one hand, and environmental protection on the 
other. This is clearly seen in discussions surrounding the delay of works related to the 
generation and transmission of energy due to environmental issues. The official discourse 
presents a position where, if there is tension between energy supply, socio-economic 
development and environmental protection, as a priority, energy supply and socio-economic 
development should come first. According to the President: 
It makes no sense at all, even in the name of environmental protection as a 
valid principle, to forbid the population from having the minimum welfare 
needed and getting a job to survive. These things must be reconciled. We must 
converge, respect the environment, but respect above all the hunger for 
energy and the desire of the Brazilian people to grow.90 
At this time, climate change concerns were also acknowledged in the official energy 
discourse. The President, for instance, stated his certainty that “all of us, who are aware of 
such things [climate change], know that climate change is a challenge. If we today are 
suffering from these rain changes, God only knows, when one looks over a period of 100 
years, one sees that the average rainfall for every 20 years has decreased.”91 At the time of 
the energy crisis, in March 2002, the Kyoto Protocol was sent for ratification to the National 
Congress in Brazil,92 which would give it force of national law. However, Brazil was not part of 
Annex 1 of the Kyoto Protocol and, as such, had no mandatory emissions reduction targets. 
                                                          
90 Fernando Henrique Cardoso, ‘Speech at the Inauguration Ceremony of William Arjona Thermoelectric Plant’, 
28 June 2001, Campo Grande. 
91 Fernando Henrique Cardoso, ‘Speech at the inauguration ceremony of William Arjona thermoelectric plant’, 
28 June 2001, Campo Grande. 
92 The Kyoto Protocol was ratified by the Legislative Decree 144 of 20 June 2002.  
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Therefore, apart from including the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions as one of the 
impacts of the implementation of the main programme for incentive of green energy sources, 
PROINFA,93 climate change concerns had little influence on energy law and policies during this 
period, and were certainly not included within energy security definition. 
 
5.1.2 Energy security and the push for fossil fuel promotion 
It is generally acknowledged by scholars94 and demonstrated in the laws enacted at 
the time that the period of the 2001 energy crisis in Brazil clearly advances one main energy 
strategy: to diversify away from hydropower. In the previous section it was shown that, during 
this period, energy security was narrowly construed as ‘uninterrupted availability of energy 
supply’ and intrinsically linked to the country’s economic development. In this context, two 
interrelated frames for the connection between energy security and green energy promotion 
are developed, frames whose principal features can be summarised as follows: a positive 
frame within which green energy is important for energy diversification; however, at the same 
time, alongside it, a negative frame, where green energy is treated as a complementary 
energy source due to its costs, intermittent nature and insufficiency for supporting economic 
development.  
As explained in the introduction of this chapter, understanding the discursive framing 
of energy security and its links with law and policies on green energy development is 
important because when one frame is selected from amongst a range of competing frames it 
                                                          
93 Exposure of Motives 00376-A-CCIVIL/MF/MME/MDIC of 21 December 2001. However, reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions were not included as an aim in the wording of the original legislation in 2002. 
94 See, for example, Carla Kazue Nakao Cavaliero and Ennio Peres Da Silva, ‘Electricity Generation: Regulatory 
Mechanisms to Incentive Renewable Alternative Energy Sources in Brazil’ (2005) 33 Energy Policy 1745; Richard 
L Ottinger, Douglas S de Figueiredo and Lia Helena M L Demange, ‘Case Study of Renewable Energy in Brazil’, in 
Richard L Ottinger (ed), Renewable Energy Law and Development: Case Study Analysis (Elgar 2013), 108. 
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has consequences for how green energy development is subsequently seen and acted on. 
Thus, the positive frame in relation to the links between energy security and green energy 
had the implication of contributing to the development of green energy for the purpose of 
diversifying the energy matrix. However, simultaneously framing green energy as a 
complementary source had the implication of promoting it only for small-scale projects. Thus, 
although green energy was framed as playing a role in ensuring energy security via the 
diversification of the Brazilian energy matrix, the construction of energy security at this time 
as uninterrupted availability of energy supply served mainly to promote fossil fuels 
development as essential for energy security. This argument is evidenced by the following 
analysis. 
 The role played by green energy in the strategy to diversify the Brazilian energy matrix 
away from hydropower is evidenced, for instance, in the legal statement which constructs the 
main programme for incentive of green energy sources, PROINFA, as ‘an effort to guarantee 
the diversification of the Brazilian energy matrix, searching for solutions using alternative 
energy sources, independent from hydrological conditions (…)’.95 
This position is the culmination of a series of prior moves. The first stage in the 
promotion of green energy to diversify the energy matrix in Brazil during the period in analysis 
was the creation of the Emergency Programme for Wind Energy, PROEOLICA, via Resolution 
24 of 5 July 2001, which promoted 1,050 MW generated from wind energy by December 
                                                          
95 Office of the Chief of Staff, Ministry of Mines and Energy, Ministry of the Economy and Ministry of 
Development, Industry and Foreign Trade, ‘Exposição de Motivos Interministerial 00376-A-
CCIVIL/MF/MME/MDIC’, 21 December 2001. 
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2003.96 This programme had a short-term design that did not promote the long-term 
establishment of a wind industry in Brazil.97  
The development of the wind energy sector in Brazil at this time in a short-term period 
was promoted via agreements and partnership between public and private institutions, but 
was said to face challenges as a result of the currency exchange rate due to two reasons: (i) 
there was only one national manufacturer of complete equipment for wind turbines and few 
manufacturers for parts of wind turbines. In terms of viability for wind energy projects in 
Brazil in the short-term, the industry could not be dependent on few suppliers, so it was 
expected that the majority of wind equipment would be imported; and (ii) wind energy 
projects were considered capital intensive, requiring, therefore, long-term finance (15-20 
years). However, foreign investments would not be available for wind energy projects due to 
the devalued currency exchange. The price set for purchase of wind energy was low when 
converted to US dollars as a result of the devalued currency exchange, which, therefore, 
would not recompense the investment.98 Other factors, such as options for purchase/rental 
of adequate land to develop wind projects, connection to the grid, acquisition/confirmation 
of wind resources data in different places and cancellation of requests for wind parks due to 
a variety of reasons, such as restrictions from the Civil Aviation Department, also contributed 
to the delay of implementation of wind projects in Brazil at this time.99 Although promoted 
                                                          
96 Energy Crisis Committee Resolution 24 of 5 July 2001, article 1. 
97 U Wachsmann and MT Tolmasquim, ‘Wind Power in Brazil—Transition Using German Experience’ (2003) 28(7) 
Renewable Energy 1029, 1037. 
98 Electronic correspondence from Mr Andre Leal, Executive Director of SeaWest Windpower do Brasil, to the 
Minister of Mines and Energy, Mr Jose Jorge de Vasconcelos Lima, and the Minister Chief of Staff of the 
Presidency of the Republic, Mr Pedro Parente, on 29 October 2001. 
99 Letter EN-ANEEL-20/11/01-001 from Mr Alberto Seisdedos Fernandez del Pino, Director of Enerbrasil, to the 
Brazilian Federal Electricity Agency (Agência Nacional de Energia Elétrica – ANEEL) on 20 November 2001, in 
reply to ANEEL document Offício n. 400/2001 – SCG/ANEEL of 12 November 2001. 
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via PROELICA, wind energy was also presented in the discourse ‘as expensive and insufficient 
for maintaining continuity of energy supply’.100  
A few months later, the President passed Provisional Measure 14 of 21 December 
2001, which created the Alternative Energy Sources Incentive Programme (PROINFA)101 
designed to stimulate electricity generation from three green energy sources (wind, biomass 
and small-scale hydro) and a long-term basis to develop these energy sources was thus 
created. PROINFA was then enacted by Law 10,438 on 26 April 2002 (converted from the 
Provisional Measure 14/2001), and was later revised and amended by Decree 4541 of 23 
December 2002, Law 10,762 of 11 November 2003 and Decree 5,025 of 30 March 2004, as 
well as regulated by MME Norm 45 of 30 March 2004. Two distinct phases were set up. In its 
first phase, to be met by December 2006,102 the programme was to establish fifteen-year 
contracts for generating 3300 MW, equally distributed amongst wind energy, biomass and 
small hydro resources.103 The second phase originally established a target share of 10% for 
green energy sources in Brazil's electricity consumption within twenty years.104 
Accompanying PROINFA’s legislation was a discursive assertion that the promotion of green 
energy was essential to guarantee the diversification of the energy matrix, as exemplified in 
the legal reasons given to justify the creation of PROINFA: 
Due to the critical situation of the power sector during this year which is 
spreading throughout the country to the detriment of all Brazilian citizens, 
                                                          
100 Fernando Henrique Cardoso, ‘Speech to Celebrate the World Environment Day’, Brasilia-DF, 5 June 2001. 
101 The first study about PROINFA was presented to the Executive members of the Energy Crisis Committee in a 
meeting on 29 October 2001. See Núcleo Executivo da Câmara de Gestão da Crise de Energia Elétrica – GCE, ‘Ata 
N. 22/01, Reunião realizada em 29 de Outubro de 2001’. 
102 This date was later extended to December 2008 by Law 11,075 of 30 December 2004; to December 2010 by 
Law 11,943 of 28 May 2009; to December 2011 by Law 12,431 of 24 June 2011. 
103 Law 10,438 of 26 April 2002, article 3. 
104Law 10,438 of 26 April 2002, article 3. 
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there was an urgent need to promote investments and incentives for 
electricity production which are independent from weather issues that as 
factors are difficult to predict. In this sense, the creation of PROINFA was 
envisioned (…). This proposal represents an effort to guarantee the 
diversification of the Brazilian energy matrix, searching for solutions with the 
use of alternative energy sources, independent from hydrological conditions 
(…).105 
However, this period presented the promotion of fossil fuels as critical to ensuring 
energy security within its narrow concept of uninterrupted availability of energy supply and 
with the aim of diversifying away from large-scale hydropower. When compared with fossil 
fuel promotion, green energy development played only a minor role. The Strategic 
Programme for Increase of Electricity Supply (2001-2003)106 predicted the increase of 
electricity supply from the following energy sources:107 
Table 3 
Energy source (units) Increase of supply 
2001 2002 2003 Total 
Thermoelectricity (26)  1,517 3,599 5,100 10,216 
Hydroelectricity (21) 1,237 3,513 3,053 7,803 
Energy import 548 1,488 800 2,836 
Wind power 50 500 500 1,050 
Cogeneration (natural 
gas and biomass) 
160 300 500 960 
Small-scale 
hydropower 
46,6 400 400 846,9 
Total (MW) 3,558.9 9,800 10,353 23,711.9 
                                                          
105 Office of the Chief of Staff, Ministry of Mines and Energy, Ministry of the Economy and Ministry of 
Development, Industry and Foreign Trade, ‘Exposição de Motivos Interministerial 00376-A-
CCIVIL/MF/MME/MDIC’, 21 December 2001. 
106 Ministry of Mines and Energy, ‘Strategic Programme for Increase of Electricity Supply (2001-2003)’, approved 
by the Energy Crisis Committee during meeting of 5 July 2001, see Energy Crisis Committee, ‘Meeting of 5 July 
2001, ATA n. 02/2001’. 
107 Ministry of Mines and Energy, ‘Strategic Programme for Increase of Electricity Supply (2001-2003)’ obtained 
from the Brazilian National Archive. 
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This push for fossil fuels in Brazil was framed in a unique kind of context. While many 
countries power generation was and remains dominated by fossil fuels and the deployment 
of green energy was and is needed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, the Brazilian power 
sector did not need to decarbonise; instead it needed to add fossil fuels to ensure energy 
security.108 The increase of fossil fuels, particularly natural gas, in the Brazilian energy matrix 
to ensure energy security regularly appeared in presidential speeches109 and in discussions at 
the Energy Crisis Committee’s110 and CNPE’s meetings.111 Thermoelectric power plants, using 
natural gas mostly imported from Bolivia, were considered the main short-term alternative 
for reducing the dependency on the hydrological power regime.112 As the President stated: 
(…) there must be an energy supply process that is independent of rainfall. 
Brazil has lived a lifetime dependent on the rain, and a country that has the 
Brazilian industrial capacity cannot settle for this. We must have the 
complementarity of hydroelectricity and thermoelectricity.113 
The focus on thermoelectric power stations is exemplified in the following statement: 
There will be more than 11,000 megawatts by 2002. This entails the 
construction and the beginning of thermoelectric operation. Although the 
                                                          
108 Fernando Henrique Cardoso, ‘Speech at the Opening Ceremony of Thermoelectric Power Plant of Nova 
Piratininga’, Santo Amaro-SP, 4 July 2002. 
109 See, for example, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, ‘Speech at the Ceremony to Sign Agreements relating to the 
Public Service Concession of Electric Power Transmission between the Union and Amazon Company of Power 
Transmission and Para Company of Power Transmission’, Brasilia, 12 June 2001; Fernando Henrique Cardoso, 
‘Speech at the meeting of the Energy Crisis Committee’, Brasilia, 5 July 2001; Fernando Henrique Cardoso, 
‘Speech at the Opening Ceremony of Thermoelectric Power Plant of Nova Piratininga’, Santo Amaro-SP, 4 July 
2002. 
110 See, for example, meetings of 5 July 2001 and 29 October 2001. 
111 See, for example, CNPE Resolution 1 of 17 September 2001; CNPE Resolution 3 of 6 August 2002;  
112 Ministry of Mines and Energy, ‘Strategic Programme for Increase of Electricity Supply (2001-2003)’, approved 
by the Energy Crisis Committee during meeting of 5 July 2001, see Energy Crisis Committee, ‘Meeting of 5 July 
2001, ATA n. 02/2001’. 
113 Fernando Henrique Cardoso, ‘Speech at the Ceremony Introducing the Ministers of Social Security and Mines 
and Energy’, Brasilia, 13 March 2001. 
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original plan was 49 thermoelectric plants, in the revisions made by the 
Minister José Jorge it is going to be possible to recover the time lost with the 
regulatory as well as financial and economic difficulties, to recover energy and 
build 30 thermoelectric power stations by 2003, in the next three years, which 
will give Brazil a more secure energy matrix and consequently reduce the 
vulnerability of our system in relation to rainfall.114  
The push for thermoelectricity presented in the energy discourse was accompanied 
by change in practice. In January 2002, there was 2,753MW of generation capacity from 
thermoelectric using gas, and 14 other large-scale thermoelectric plants were in construction 
totalling an installed power generation capacity of 6,857 MW.115 This, therefore, shows that 
the positive association between energy security and fossil fuels meant promoting it in large-
scale. 
 
5.2 Energy security and green energy in the post-crisis period(2003-2015) 
5.2.1 Constructing energy security  
This section will demonstrate that, during the post-crisis period, the concept of energy 
security was expanded. Although environmental, climate change and social inclusion 
concerns within the energy debate started coming to the fore more prominently, 
uninterrupted availability, affordability and reliability appeared as the key elements for the 
construction of energy security. The official legal concept of energy security in Brazil thus 
                                                          
114 Fernando Henrique Cardoso, ‘Speech at the Ceremony to Sign Agreements relating to the Public Service 
Concession of Electric Power Transmission between the Union and Amazon Company of Power Transmission 
and Para Company of Power Transmission’, Brasilia, 12 June 2001. 
115 Agência Nacional de Energia Elétrica (Brazil), Atlas de Energia Elétrica do Brasil (ANEEL 2002), 92. 
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remains notably narrower than the broader scholarly definitions presented in chapter 3. This 
section will also point out that, as was the case around the 2001 energy crisis, national 
security was not linked to energy security in any of the documents analysed. In addition to 
the continued construction of energy security in the context of economic development, 
security of energy supply was recurrently emphasised as an essential element to attract 
investments.  
Although Brazil had overcome the 2001 energy crisis by the end of 2002, the fear of a 
recurrence has appeared frequently in texts. The government and commentators have been 
continually on the lookout for warning sign of a repeat of the 2001 episode and continue to 
introduce measures discursively justified by the need to avoid it. As stated in a Federal Senate 
report, ‘[t]he effects of the blackout at the beginning of the last decade are still latent in the 
Brazilian people’s memory. At that time, it was possible to realise just how important the 
security of energy supply was in the country.’116 The blackout was, therefore, discursively 
presented as a clear indicator of the reliance of Brazilian society on uninterrupted energy 
supply. 
The effects of the energy crisis were felt deeply. It wiped out expected Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) growth of 4 per cent117 and cost the country 10 billion US dollars.118 In addition 
to the continued construction of energy security as a vehicle of economic development, 
security of energy supply was recurrently emphasised as an essential element to attract 
investments during this period since ‘everyone knows that any businessperson in the world, 
                                                          
116 Comissão de Serviços de Infraestrutura, Política Nacional de Recursos Hídricos: Abastecimento, Energia e 
Saneamento Básico (Senado Federal 2015), 19. 
117 Brazil’s growth in 2001 was 1.3 per cent, a drop from 4.1 per cent in 2000. See The World Bank, ‘GDP Growth 
(annual %)’ < https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG> accessed 27 November 2018. 
118 Peter Kingstone, Critical Issues in Brazil’s Energy Sector: The Long (And Uncertain) March to Energy 
Privatization in Brazil (The James A Baker III Institute for Public Policy of Rice University 2004), 1. 
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who wants to use his money for investment somewhere, requires a guarantee of energy 
supply’.119 As a result, concerns that the 2001 energy crisis would hinder investment in Brazil 
were also raised. As the President put it: 
After the blackout, I thought that Brazil could not win the trust of any investor, 
Brazilian or foreign, if we could not give an objective answer to the question of 
energy security to be offered to all Brazilians.120  
After all, energy is the basis for the industrialization of a country. If you do not 
have energy to sell, be it gas, be it biomass, be it hydroelectric , be it any form, 
even diesel oil, if we do not have this to offer, we will have little chance of 
bringing investors here.121 
The post-energy crisis phase, therefore, presents itself as an all-embracing policy 
direction predicated on guaranteeing energy supply to attract internal and international 
investment, bring about economic development and avoid another energy crisis. Similarly to 
the 2001 energy crisis period, national security was not linked to energy security in any of the 
documents analysed. There was, however, an acknowledged association of energy 
interruption with conflicts, as evidenced in a presidential speech: 
Incidentally, it is worth remembering that in many cases, history shows that 
due to interruptions in [energy] supply, even wars were made.122 
                                                          
119 Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, ‘Speech at the Visit of Ceremony to the Works of the Wind Farm Osorio’, Osório-RS’, 
19 April 2006. 
120 Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, ‘Speech at the Opening Ceremony of Viana Electric Power Substation’, Viana-ES, 30 
January 2006. 
121 Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, ‘Speech at the Signing Ceremony of the Concession Contracts of Hydroelectric Plants 
with Entrepreneurs’, Brasília-DF, 15 August 2006. 
122 Dilma Rousseff, ‘Speech during the Introduction of Magda Chambriard, General Director of the National 
Petroleum Agency (ANP)’, Rio de Janeiro-RJ, 21 March 2012.  
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 The concept of energy security in official texts during this phase was expanded. In 
addition to the continuous focus on uninterrupted availability of energy supply, references to 
affordability and reliability were introduced expressly in legislation. For instance, Law 10,848 
of 15 March 2004, enacting on the commercialisation of electricity, embodied the term 
energy security123 and stated that the sale of electricity ‘should provide general criteria for 
the guarantee of electricity supply to ensure the proper balance between supply reliability 
and reasonableness of rates and prices (…)’.124 Availability, affordability and reliability in 
support of economic development appeared as the most recurrent criteria during this period:  
We know that one of the great challenges of a country is to have affordable 
and secure energy. The lack of electricity constrains the growth of a country 
under any circumstances. And this growth has its assurance given by the 
availability of this energy both in terms of its security as of low tariffs.125 
The focus on affordability was due to the increase in energy price as a result of the 
measures taken during the 2001 energy crisis period.126 Electricity tariffs increased by 31.1 
per cent for industrial consumers and 64.1 percent for residential consumers.127 As such, 
affordability repeatedly appeared in documents of this period as an important aspect in the 
development of energy: 
It is good and necessary to have plenty of energy, but it is also necessary that 
people can pay the tariff and industries do not lose competitiveness due to the 
                                                          
123 Law 10,848 of 15 March 2004, article 1, paragraph 10. 
124 Law 10,848 of 15 March 2004, article 1, X. 
125 Dilma Rousseff, ‘Speech during the Announcement Ceremony of the Investment Programme in Energy’, 
Brasília-DF, 11 August 2015. 
126 Ibid. 
127 José Goldenberg and Luiz Tadeu Siqueira Prado, ‘Reforma e Crise do Setor Elétrico no Período FHC’ (2003) 
15(2) Tempo Social 219, 235. 
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cost of electricity. The price of energy cannot be a barrier to the well- being of 
families, nor an obstacle to the growth of the Brazilian productive sector.128 
Furthermore, with the development of the Light for All programme in 2003,129 as 
pointed out in section 3.1 above, access to energy also discursively entered the energy 
debate. Energy access is far from an official concern alone, however, with recent scholarship 
noting that survey respondents from Brazil rated affordability and equitable access to energy 
services to be of higher importance to the national energy culture than respondents from 
Denmark, Germany, Japan, Singapore, and the USA.130 
Environmental concerns also began to surface more regularly in the energy discourse 
after the 2001 energy crisis. A presidential speech of the time serves as an example of the 
increased focus on environmental matters: 
Today it is not so easy to build a hydroelectric power plant like we built Itaipu in 
the 70s. Today the legislation is tougher, environmentalists are overseeing more, 
demanding more. And today, too, governments have more responsibility and are 
doing things more carefully, because we are not thinking only of our generation, 
we are not thinking only of our children or our grandchildren.131 
The official discourse attempted to place environmental protection on an equal 
footing with energy security, in which fossil fuel exploration in Brazil, for example, should 
                                                          
128 Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva,’ Speech at the Official Ceremony of the Construction and Installation of Turbines of 
the Tucuruí Hydroelectric Plant’, Tucuruí – Pará, 25 November 2004. 
129 Decree 4,873 of 11 November 2003.  
130 Benjamin K Sovacool, ‘Differing Cultures of Energy Security: An International Comparison of Public 
Perceptions’ (2016) 55 Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 811, 819. 
131 Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, ‘Speech at the Opening Ceremony of Generating Units of Itaipu Hydroelectric Power 
Plant’, Foz do Iguaçu-PR, 21 May 2007. 
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“safeguard the environment and security”.132 However, environmental concerns and energy 
security were still seen as separate and independent concepts, not unified within the 
definition of energy security. This was also a period which saw the judicialisation of energy 
projects over environmental and social matters, as there was a growing reliance on courts 
and judicial means for addressing environmental and social concerns and halting energy 
projects which were advanced in the official discourse as essential to ensure energy security 
in Brazil. The construction of Belo Monte dam, for instance, was subject to considerable 
controversy133 and gave rise to lawsuits134 due to its impacts on the environment, indigenous 
communities and nearby populations. 
As a result of this judicialisation of energy projects, the official discourse promoted 
communication between environmental and energy departments in order to avoid lawsuits135 
and the need for a joint effort between institutions such as the Public Ministry, NGOs, 
environmental institutions, the judiciary power.136 In addition, as explained under section 3.3 
above, partially as a result of delays in energy projects due to judicial decisions, proposals 
were also put forward to enact law that would accelerate the environmental licencing 
process. Currently under debate is a project that would see news laws designed to speed up 
                                                          
132 Dilma Rousseff, ‘Speech during the Introduction of Magda Chambriard, General Director of the National 
Petroleum Agency (ANP)’, Rio de Janeiro-RJ, 21 March 2012. 
133 See, for example, Ed Atkins, ‘Dams, Political Framing and Sustainability as an Empty Signifier: The Case of Belo 
Monte’ (2018) 50(2) Area 232; André Marconato Ramos and Humberto Prates da Fonseca Alves, ‘Conflito 
Socioeconômico e Ambiental ao Redor da Construção da Usina Hidrelétrica Belo Monte’ (2018) 46 
Desenvolvimento e Meio Ambiente 174; Philip Martin Fearnside, ‘Belo Monte: Atores e Argumentos na Luta 
sobre a Barragem Amazônica Mais Controversa do Brasil’ (2018) 1(42) Revista NERA 1. 
134 See civil lawsuit n 2006.39.03.000711-8/PA. In 2011, a complaint was also filed before the Inter-American 
Commission of Human Rights, see, for example, precautionary measure 382/10 - Indigenous Communities of 
the Xingu River Basin, Pará, Brazil < http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/decisions/precautionary.asp> accessed 20 
November 2018.  
135 Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, ‘Speech during a Visit to the Works of the Jirau Hydroelectric Plant’, Porto Velho-RO, 
12 March 2009. 
136 Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, ‘Speech at the Signing Ceremony of the Concession Contracts of Hydroelectric Plants 
with Entrepreneurs’, Brasília-DF, 15 August 2006. 
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the environmental licencing process for energy projects while taking into account concerns 
over the environmental impacts of the activity and initiating any compensatory measures 
due.137 These proposals were advocated in a presidential speech: 
[…] there is no doubt that the [energy] bills have increased and we deplore it. 
But they increased precisely because, given the lack of water to keep the lights 
on, we had to use thermoelectric power and therefore pay far more than we 
would have paid if there was only hydroelectric power in our system. Hence I 
welcome all this effort to establish a joint relationship with the National 
Congress to create a “fast track”, i.e. a fast and secure way for dealing with 
licenses that are strategic for the country’s growth in the medium to long-
term.138 
 Therefore, these proposals to speed up the environmental licencing process in relation 
to energy projects were advanced in the discourse with a view of ensuring energy availability, 
affordability and the country’s growth. 
At the same time, climate change concerns within the energy debate started coming 
to the fore more prominently, not only in presidential speeches, but also in the legal 
discourse. In presidential speeches, policies promoting biodiesel were particularly linked with 
climate change. In 2005, for example, the President stated that the National Programme on 
Biodiesel “was not only about an answer to the depletion of world oil reserves, but also an 
imperative of planetary survival that the Kyoto Protocol enshrined in the form of a new 
                                                          
137 Project of Law of the Federal Senate 654 of 2015. 
138 Dilma Rousseff, ‘Speech during the Announcement Ceremony of the Investment Programme in Energy’, 
Brasília-DF, 11 August 2015. 
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consensus amongst nations.”139 In addition, as mentioned under section 3.4 above, in 2006 
new legislation was enacted to expressly include the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions 
as an aim for PROINFA.140 In 2011, the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions was included 
as an aim of national energy policy in the official legal discourse.141 Furthermore, Brazil 
included energy in its climate action plan submitted to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in the context of the negotiations around the 2015 
Paris Agreement.142  
The concept of energy security in legal documents during this time in Brazil, however, 
did not include the broader elements of environmental protection, climate change and social 
inclusion. This can be evidenced in Law 10,848 of 15 March 2004 which is the law in force 
today and its focus on availability, reliability and affordability as criteria for security of 
electricity supply. The legal official concept of energy security in Brazil thus remains notably 
narrower than the broader scholarly definitions presented in chapter 3. 
 
5.2.2 The multiple frames around the interplay between energy security and green 
energy   
The period of 2003-2015 continues advancing the frames from the 2001 energy crisis 
period in which, as a positive framing, green energy is treated as important for energy 
diversification; while, at the same time, as a negative framing, it is downgraded as a 
                                                          
139 Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, ‘Speech at the Opening Ceremony of Biodiesel Plant Agropalma’, Belem-PA, 27 April 
2005. 
140 Decree 5,882 of 31 August 2006, article 1, paragraph 1. 
141 Law 12,490 of 16 September 2011.  
142 See Brazil´s Intended Nationally Determined Contribution towards Achieving the Objective of the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (28 September 2015) 
<www4.unfccc.int/submissions/indc/Submission%20Pages/submissions.aspx> accessed 25 January 2017. 
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complementary energy source and insufficient to meet the energy demand required to 
support economic growth. The novelty in this period is the emergence of an additional 
positive frame in connection with biofuels development. All frames for this period are 
analysed below. 
 
A. Biofuels and the emergence of a new positive frame 
This section will show that, in the context of biofuels, energy security concerns were 
framed in terms of energy use from exhaustible energy sources, dependency on imported 
energy sources, the oligopoly of oil producers and the uneven distribution of fossil fuels 
around the world as well as the risk of war associated with oil exploration. In law and policies, 
biofuels were construed as playing a key role in tackling these energy security concerns. This 
construction of a positive frame around the interplay between energy security and biofuels 
pushed forward the promotion of biofuels. 
Biofuels policies in Brazil revolve around two main categories: first, sugarcane ethanol, 
and secondly, biodiesel made from vegetable oils or animal fats. The first official national 
policy in Brazil for the use of ethanol143 was set out in 1931144 and took off in 1975 with the 
launch of the National Alcohol Programme (PROALCOOL) which aimed to progressively add 
alcohol to gasoline so as to ultimately reach 20 per cent of the mixture.145 As a result of the 
oil shocks and aiming to replace fossil fuel imports, another two biodiesel programmes were 
                                                          
143 The term sugarcane alcohol (álcool) was initially used. The term ethanol (etanol) was only introduced 
by ANP Resolution 39 of 10 December 2009, article 1, paragraph 3. 
144 Jose Moreira and Jose Goldemberg, ‘The Alcohol Program’ (1999) 27 Energy Policy 229, 231. 
Antônio José Ferreira Simões, ‘Biocombustíveis: A Experiência Brasileira e o Desafio da Consolidação 
do Mercado Internacional’ (2008) 17 <http://sistemas.mre.gov.br/kitweb/datafiles/NovaDelhi/pt-br/file/ 
Biocombustiveis_02-experienciabrasileira.pdf> accessed 10 November 2018. 
145 Decree N 76,593, of 14 November 1975.  
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created in 1980 and 1983 respectively: PROOLEO, the National Programme for the Production 
of Vegetable Oils for Energy Use, which enabled blending in natura raw vegetable oils into 
diesel and ultimately aimed at the complete substitution of diesel as fuel; and the Programme 
of Vegetable Oils – OVEG, which aimed to test different proportions of biodiesel in 
partnership with the automobile industry. As oil prices became stable, PROOLEO was never 
implemented and although the test results had been positive for biodiesel, the high costs of 
the product, at that time, prohibited its commercial use.146 In early 2000s the biodiesel policy 
returned to the Brazilian agenda with the launch of the National Programme for the 
Production and Use of Biodiesel (Programa Nacional de Produção e Uso do Biodiesel – PNPB) 
in 2004.147 In 2006, the dissemination of the use of biofuels worldwide became a priority for 
the Brazilian Government.148  
The Brazilian biofuels programmes have generated considerable controversy for many 
reasons, including their impact on food prices, deforestation and impact on sensitive 
ecosystems, the undermining of rural livelihoods, concentration of land into the hands of 
large corporations, displacement of smallholders as well as labour-related and human rights 
issues.149 However, as previously stated in chapter 3, green energy development does not 
preclude environmental impacts and this work analyses non-conventional energy sources 
which are considered ‘green’ in the country’s official discourse.  
                                                          
146 A P Rutherford, ‘Regulatory Framework for Biofuels in Brazil: History and Challenges under the Law of the 
WTO’ (2016) 34(2) Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law 213. 
147 Decree No 5,297 of 6 December 2004.  
148 Sybille Roehrkasten, Global Governance on Renewable Energy: Contrasting the Ideas of the German and the 
Brazilian Governments (Springer 2014), 174. 
149 See, for example, Bernardo Mançano Fernandes, Clifford Andrew Welch and Elienaí Constantino Gonçalves, 
‘Agrofuel Policies in Brazil: Paradigmatic and Territorial Disputes’ (2010) 37 Journal of Peasant Studies 793; 
Renata Marson Teixeira de Andrade and Andrew Miccolis, ‘Policies and Institutional and Legal Frameworks in 
the Expansion of Brazilian Biofuels’ (2011) Center for International Forestry Research Working Paper 71, 27–32. 
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As mentioned above, in the context of biofuels, energy security concerns were framed 
in terms of energy use from exhaustible energy sources, dependency on imported energy 
sources, the oligopoly of oil producers and the uneven distribution of fossil fuels around the 
world as well as the risk of war associated with oil exploration. This construction of a positive 
frame around the interplay between energy security and biofuels pushed forward the 
promotion of biofuels in a number of ways: 
(i) Concerns surrounding energy use from exhaustible energy sources supported the 
narrative of biofuels as a preferred substitute for finite oil not only from an energy 
strategic point of view, but also from an economic angle. As an illustration, upon 
discussion of Provisional Measure 214 of 13 September 2004, which was later 
converted to the Biodiesel Law,150 the Minister of Mines and Energy stated, as one of 
the reasons for the production of biodiesel at commercial scales, that biodiesel, as an 
oil from vegetable origin, constitutes ‘not only an alternative energy source, but also 
a strategic energy source from an economic point of view if we take into account that 
global oil reserves are not renewable and will deplete if oil exploration keeps on 
increasing’.151 Biodiesel as a preferred substitute for finite oil sources was also 
promoted in a presidential speech: 
(…) oil will end one day because we get it out of the deep sea or earth. Now 
our oil, the green castor, babassu, soybeans, sunflower, cottonseed oil never 
                                                          
150 Law 11,097 of 13 January 2005. 
151 Ministério de Minas e Energia, ‘Exposição de Motivo n° 44/2004, do Ministro de Estado de Minas e Energia’ 
(9 September 2004), 15. 
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ends, because if a tree stops producing, we plant another, and we will have a 
renewable energy matrix.152 
(ii) The co-relation between concerns over dependency on imported energy sources 
and its impact on the balance of payments supported the narrative which gave 
biofuels a key role in reducing the use of diesel oil, something which would enable 
Brazil to save on foreign exchange. As explained by the President: 
Brazil consumes 36 billion litres of diesel and imports 17 % of a total 
expenditure of about USD 800 million per year just for diesel. With the 
mandatory blending of 2% biodiesel to petroleum derivative, we will save USD 
160 million, and about USD 400 million with the addition of 5 % to the mix.153 
(iii) Concerns surrounding the oligopoly of oil producers and the uneven distribution 
of fossil fuels around the world154 advanced the narrative of biofuels as a way to 
democratise access to energy and energy production, as well as to achieve economic 
development and fair income distribution globally. As the President put it: 
Biofuels can create a supply that is more predictable and democratise access 
to reliable sources of energy. Whilst oil production is concentrated in only 15 
countries, it is estimated that over 120 countries have the potential to produce 
biofuels. After all, not everyone has the resources or technology to drill 
                                                          
152 Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, ‘Speech at the Ceremony relating to Castor Crop for the Production of Biodiesel’, 
Canto do Buriti/Eliseu Martins-PI, 4 August 2005. 
153 Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, ‘Speech at the Opening Ceremony of Biodiesel Plant Agropalma’, Belém-PA, 27 April 
2005. 
154 Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, ‘Speech at the International Conference on Biofuels’, Brussels- Belgium, 5 July 2007. 
The 12 largest oil companies control roughly 80% of petroleum reserves and oil and gas trade are controlled by 
a handful of government-dominated firms and major oil companies, see Marilyn A Brown and Benjamin K 
Sovacool, Climate Change and Global Energy Security: Technology and Policy Options (MIT Press 2011).  
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thousands of meters in search of oil but they can dig a hole a few centimetres 
to plant a cane or castor oil.155 
(iv) The risk of war associated with oil exploration was also construed as having a 
positive impact on biofuels promotion which was advanced as being able to de-
securitise energy by avoiding military conflict around competition for finite energy 
resources. As evidenced in presidential speeches:  
In fact, we’re doing more than creating a biodiesel programme, we are doing 
much more than just producing a new energy matrix. We are doing much more 
than just helping build workers’ organisations in cooperatives, helping family 
farmers and helping small and medium entrepreneurs in the field. A lot more. 
We are giving a signal to the world that in the near future oil will not be a 
reason for war in the world, or for a consumer country to invade a producer 
country.156 
The inclusion of biofuels in the international energy matrix will also help to 
eliminate another disturbing imbalance: 20 countries produce energy for 
approximately 200 countries. With the adoption of biofuels, more than 100 
countries can produce energy, democratizing its access. We will be reducing 
the asymmetries and inequalities between countries, consumers and 
producers of energy and preventing potential conflicts arising from 
competition for finite energy resources.157 
                                                          
155 Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, ‘Speech at the Opening of the Seminar on Biofuels’, Stockholm-Sweden, 12 
September 2007. 
156 Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, ‘Speech at the Opening Ceremony of the Biodiesel Plant Soyminas’, Cássia-MG, 24 
March 2005. 
157 Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, ‘Speech at the International Conference on Biofuels’, Brussels- Belgium, 5 July 2007. 
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 Therefore, biofuels were positioned as helping to ensure energy security in the 
country by playing a key role in the reduction and substitution of exhaustible energy sources, 
by democratising access to energy and energy production worldwide, as well as by achieving 
economic development and fair income distribution globally, and being able to de-securitise 
energy and avoid military conflict. This positive frame around energy security and biofuels 
had the implication of promoting biofuels in law and policies in Brazil.  
 
B. Green energy and diversification of the energy matrix  
As previously stated, the period of 2003-2015 continued advancing the frames from 
the 2001 energy crisis period in which, as a positive frame, green energy was treated as 
important for energy diversification; however, at the same time, as a negative frame, it was 
discursively downgraded to being only a complementary energy source and insufficient to 
meet the energy demands of a growing economy. Unlike the 2001 energy crisis which saw the 
promotion of green energy for small-scale projects, the dominant negative frame in relation 
to the links between energy security and green energy prevented the adoption of new specific 
policies and stimulus for green energy development in the electricity system. As will be 
demonstrated in the following section C, this negative frame contributed to the further 
promotion of fossil fuels.  
Mostly as a result of climatic conditions and Brazil’s dependency on hydropower, 
scholars have highlighted that Brazil has been suffering from an energy crisis with a frequency 
of 10-15 years, i.e. the years 1924, 1944, 1955, 1964, 1986, 2001 and 2015.158 In 2015, Brazil 
                                                          
158 Julian David Hunt, Daniel Stilpen and Marcos Aurélio Vasconcelos de Freitas, ‘A Review of the Causes, Impacts 
and Solutions for Electricity Supply Crises in Brazil’ (2018) 88 Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 208, 
208. 
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went through another water related episode, which became known generally as the ‘water 
crisis’ due to drought. The rhetoric of crisis is discernible in the speeches of the President at 
the time. For instance: 
We are now facing the challenge, perhaps the greatest challenge of the 
hydrologic history, the history of the waters of our country. It is the largest 
drought in the Northeast in the last 100 years (…). And what is unprecedented, 
it is the largest drought in the Southeast as well.   
In contrast with the 2001 energy crisis, there was no need to ration electricity. Scholars 
argued that rationing had been partially avoided because new transmission lines were built 
to interconnect the electricity grid from different regions.159 In addition to energy 
interconnection, the diversification of the Brazilian energy matrix was seized upon as a key 
factor in the official discourse. The role played by wind energy and biomass, for example, in 
ensuring energy security was discursively acknowledged, as exemplified in a presidential 
speech: 
Brazil is in the following situation: it has put a very important part of its eggs in 
the basket of hydroelectric power, which is very important and very good 
because it is the cheapest energy it has. But also it has put its remaining eggs 
in other baskets and this is what guarantees the energy security of the country. 
We have put our eggs in the baskets of thermal, wind and biomass.160 
                                                          
159 Rodrigo Corrêa da Silva, Ismael de Marchi Neto and Stephan Silva Seifert, ‘Electricity Supply Security and the 
Future Role of Renewable Energy Sources in Brazil’ (2016) 59 Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 328, 
335. 
160 Dilma Rousseff, ‘Speech at the Opening Ceremony of Geribatu Wind Farm and the Associated Transmission 
System in Santa Vitória do Palmar/RS’, Santa Vitória do Palmar-RS, 27 February 2015. 
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In 2015, Brazilian electricity supply had indeed diversified when compared to 2001, 
although hydropower remained the main source, accounting for 64 per cent of the national 
total electricity supply. According to the Ministry of Mines and Energy, in 2015, domestic 
electricity supply was generated by the following sources:161 
   Table 4 
Energy source Percentage 
Hydropower 64% 
Natural gas 12.9% 
Biomass 8% 
Oil 4.8% 
Coal 4.5% 
Wind 3.5% 
Nuclear 2.4% 
Solar 0.01% 
 
A combination of concerns about over-reliance on hydropower, risk of drought as well 
as problems with lawsuits halting energy projects – particularly new large-scale dams – due 
to environmental and social concerns, such as the construction of Belo Monte dam referred 
to under section 4.2.1 above and the fact that Brazil faces a near exhaustion of its 
environmentally feasible hydropower potential,162 contributed to efforts to diversify the 
Brazilian energy matrix away from large-scale hydropower with the inclusion of green energy 
sources, particularly wind and biomass. However, with the exception of biomass, despite 
contributing to diversification, green energy sources, such as wind and solar, played only a 
small role in the diversification of energy sources for the electricity system in Brazil.  
                                                          
161 Ministry of Mines and Energy, ‘Brazilian Energy Matrix Year 2015’, 16 
<https://ben.epe.gov.br/downloads/Relatorio_Final_BEN_2016.pdf> accessed 20 November 2018. 
162 Most of Brazil’s untapped hydropower potential lies in the Amazon region, and therefore faces severe local 
environmental constraints. See, Roberto Schaeffer and others, Who Drives Climate-relevant Policies in Brazil? 
(Institute of Development Studies/Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro 2015); André F P Lucena and others, 
‘Climate Policy Scenarios in Brazil: A Multi-model Comparison for Energy’ (2016) 56 Energy Economics 564. 
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Although Brazil has impressive solar power potential,163 there have been no policies 
focusing on its promotion on a large scale during this period. From 2003 to 2015, PROINFA 
and ‘Light for All’164 remained the programmes which promoted green energy sources for the 
electricity system. Law 12,783 of 11 January 2013 amended Law 10,438 of 26 April 2002, 
which created PROINFA, to include that funds from the Energy Development Fund (Conta de 
Desenvolvimento Energético – CDE) should be used to promote the competitiveness of 
energy produced from wind power, thermosolar, photovoltaic, small hydropower, biomass, 
other renewables and natural gas.  However, apart from the inclusion of this aim in the legal 
framework, there were no new specific policies and stimulus for green energy development 
in the electricity system for a period of circa 13 years. 
 
C. The continuation of the negative frame and the promotion of fossil fuels 
As noted above, compared to 2001, green energy technologies, such as biomass, wind 
and solar energy, saw increasing use in the electricity sector165 with a view to diversification, 
as a result of programmes started during the 2001 energy crisis. However, this section will 
show that the negative framing of green energy, particularly wind and solar energy, as 
insufficient to meet the energy demand required to support economic growth has 
contributed to preventing the promotion of these energy sources for large scale use. It will 
also be demonstrated that positive links in relation to energy security and fossil fuels had the 
implication of promoting fossil fuels development in the country. During this period, the 
                                                          
163 F Martins and E Pereira, ‘Enhancing Information for Solar and Wind Energy Technology Deployment in Brazil’ 
(2011) 39 Energy Policy 4378; T Viana and others, ‘Assessing the Potential of Concentrating Solar Photovoltaic 
Generation in Brazil with Satellite-derived Direct Normal Irradiation’ (2011) 85 Solar Energy 486. 
164 Light for All was created in 2003 via Decree 4,873 of 11 November 2003 with the aim of providing energy 
access. Please see section 3.1 above. 
165 Please see tables 2 and 3. 
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concept of energy security as availability, affordability and reliability of energy supply coupled 
with challenges over dependency on one energy source and on foreign energy resource 
advance a predominant paradigm of energy independence based on national fossil fuel 
exploration, where wind and solar energy sources played no role. 
The negative discursive construction in relation to green energy is evidenced in 
presidential speeches: 
Some people think that wind energy is the solution. It is not. Wind energy is a 
complementary and auxiliary thing. You can never think that wind energy will 
be the basis of the energy matrix of a country that wants to grow 5% per year. 
It's not possible.166 
No country in the world can provide power without dams in a system like ours, 
or thermal power plants, either thermal oil or thermal of fissile origin, as is the 
case with nuclear, because solar energy and wind power are still 
complementary energies. They do not guarantee the country's development, 
social inclusion and sustainability, they do not support energy production, they 
are complementary.167 
Brazil promoted fossil fuels, particularly oil and gas, as a way of making the country’s 
electricity sector more resilient to extreme weather events and guarantee energy security. In 
2001, a maximum of 12.74 per cent of electricity was generated from fossil fuels, as per table 
2. By 2015, this amount had increased to almost 23 per cent, as per table 3. The sharp increase 
                                                          
166 Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, ‘Speech at the Start-up Ceremony of Ethanol Usage in the Juiz de Fora Thermoelectric 
Power Plant’, Juiz de Fora – MG, 19 January 2010. 
167 Dilma Rouseff, ‘Speech during the Start Ceremony of the Deviation of the Madeira River for the Santo Antônio 
Hydroelectric Power Plant’, Porto Velho-RO, 5 July 2011.  
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of oil and gas consumption in Brazil is also clear. From 2004 to 2014 oil consumption increased 
54.9 per cent while natural gas consumption increased 100.6 per cent.168 During this period, 
in addition to dependency on one energy source and the need to diversify,169 energy security 
was framed in terms of dependency on foreign energy resource – gas from Bolivia in 
particular. 
In 2006, the Bolivian President, Evo Morales, nationalised the hydrocarbons industry 
in Bolivia and increased royalties from 50 per cent to 82 per cent in their two largest fields.170 
This had a negative impact on the security of energy supply in Brazil because, as stated above, 
during the 2001 energy crisis, thermoelectric power plants using natural gas mostly imported 
from Bolivia were developed as the main alternative to reduce the dependency on 
hydropower. The nationalisation of the hydrocarbons industry in Bolivia resulted in the 
appearance of alarmist language, such as the ‘gas crisis’.171 However, as previously stated, no 
explicit links were made between energy security and national security in the official 
discourse. This dependency on foreign energy resources was explained in a different way, as 
is clear in these excerpts from presidential speeches: 
And now a part of the Brazilian industrial production, particularly in the state 
of São Paulo, taxis in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, are dependent on gas. But 
some people have forgotten that this gas was not ours, they forgot that this 
                                                          
168 Conrado Augustus de Melo, Gilberto de Martino Jannuzzi and Sergio Valdir Bajay, ‘Nonconventional 
Renewable Energy Governance in Brazil: Lessons to Learn from the German Experience’ (2016) 61 Renewable 
and Sustainable Energy Reviews 222, 225. 
169 See, for example, Dilma Rousseff, ‘Speech at the Opening Ceremony of Geribatu Wind Farm and the 
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gas belonged to another country. And as a sovereign country it has the right to 
make the decision based on its assessment of the richness of its soil and 
subsoil. And it is no surprise what happened in Bolivia.172 
You see, for example, what happened with Brazil and Bolivia. Brazil suddenly 
prioritised an energy matrix which was not independent, where we did not 
have self-sufficiency. When we do not have self-sufficiency and the owner 
decides to say ‘I will not sell to you’ we are in trouble. 173 
As a result of the nationalisation of Bolivian gas, Brazil promoted the exploration of its 
natural gas to achieve self-sufficiency. The discourse, as such, reveals a predominant 
paradigm of energy independence based on fossil fuel exploration. Wind and solar energy 
sources were not discursively framed as playing a role in minimising any impact related to 
dependency on foreign energy resources. As indicated in presidential speeches: 
[…] it has been about three or four years since we had the first gas crisis. We 
held a meeting of the National Energy Policy Council at the time and decided 
that we would not be left with a sword to our head because of the gas bill, we 
were going to search for our own gas. We created the Plangás and today 
Petrobras already has a number of [its own sites]... How much gas are we 
exploring there? We are selling over 60 million cubic meters of gas.174 
                                                          
172 Luiz Inácio Lula da Sila, ‘Speech at the Opening Ceremony of the Hydroelectric Plant Eliezer Batista’, Aimorés-
MG, 5 May 2006. 
173 Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, ‘Speech at the Opening Ceremony of the Biodiesel Plant Barralcool’, Barra do Bugres-
MT, 21 November 2006. 
174 Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, ‘Speech during a Visit to Platform Facilities and Collection of First Oil Production of 
the Well in the Pre-salt Campo Baleia Franca’, Vitória-ES, 15 July 2010. 
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In 2006, President Lula called us all and created the Plangás. The 
Plangás was the anticipation of gas production in order for Brazil to reach self-
sufficiency.175 
However, even though gas self-sufficiency was presented as a priority in the discourse, 
in 2013 Brazil was still dependent on Bolivian gas. In 2013 Brazil imported 59% of its natural 
gas with Bolivia accounting for 67% of the total Brazilian gas imports.176 The claim that this 
dependency on gas from Bolivia constituted a threat to Brazilian energy security is also found 
in the literature.177 As a result of dependency on Bolivian gas, Brazil promoted the national 
exploration and production of oil and natural gas from conventional and unconventional 
petroleum resources.178 The approval of oil and gas exploration which requires the use of 
hydraulic fracturing (fracking) in 2013 caused controversy in Brazil and was challenged, among 
others, by politicians,179 the Federal Public Ministry, NGOs180 and the public in general.181 Civil 
                                                          
175 Dilma Rousseff, ‘Speech during the Announcement Ceremony of the Implementation of the Regasification 
Terminal of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) in Bahia’, Salvador-BA, 1 March 2011.  
176 Ministério de Minas e Energia (Brazil), Boletim Anual de Exploração e Produção de Petróleo e Gás Natural – 
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against the exploration of shale gas in the Amazon area. See Sílvia Mugnatto, ‘Indígenas do Amazonas ameaçam 
entrar em guerra com empresas para evitar exploração de gás na região’ Rádio Câmara (28 November 2013).  
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lawsuits were filed by the Federal Public Ministry on the basis that fracking causes irreversible 
harms to the environment, human health and regional economic activity.182  
Affordability, as part of the energy security concept adopted during this period, was, 
however, presented as an important driver in the official discourse when it came to pushing 
forward the exploration of fossil fuels in the country. For example, when rejecting the Project 
of Law 1409/13 which sought the suspension of CNPE Resolution 6, the Brazilian Mines and 
Energy Commission expressly advocated the exploration of shale gas as in the public interest. 
Presenting shale gas as a cheap and clean energy source, the Commission supported the view 
that shale gas had the potential to supply a great part of the Brazilian energy demand for 
decades and its exploration would positively impact gas for cooking and electric energy. This 
is because access to it would reduce the gas price as well as the operational costs of 
thermoelectric power plants thus benefiting, as such, society, in particular those on low 
income.183 Thus, the notion of energy security – framed in terms of concerns related to 
external energy dependency and affordable prices – was used to push forward the approval 
of a fossil fuel policy. 
The promotion of oil and natural gas in Brazil was also favoured by the discovery of 
significant offshore oil and natural gas reserves under extensive layers of salt and rocks (‘pre-
salt’) in 2007 with its exploration regulated by Law 12,351 of 22 December 2010. The daily oil 
output from pre-salt extraction rose from an average of approximately 41,000 barrels per day 
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in 2010 to 1 million barrels per day by mid-2016.184 In 2030 it is predicted that daily oil output 
will be around 31 million barrels.185 However, technical challenges surround the extraction of 
these reserves, given the depth and pressures involved, associated freezing temperatures, 
and distance offshore. In addition, the fields have the potential to include large volumes of 
associated natural gas for which major infrastructure would be required to either transport it 
to markets via pipelines or liquefy it at sea, both of which introduce additional technical, 
logistical, economic, and safety considerations.186 In this context, Brazil is now ranked 15th 
among the world's biggest proven oil reserves187 and 9th among the world's biggest oil 
producers.188 In the last decade, Brazil has, therefore, emerged as a significant fossil fuel 
player.  
As a result of pre-salt and Brazil’s rise to become one of the largest oil producers in 
the world, researchers have argued that renewable energy policies have been 
marginalised,189 that pre-salt might cause major changes to the national patterns of electricity 
generation190 and that the government’s disproportionate investment in exploration for fossil 
fuels is clearly at odds with its claims that Brazil is fully committed to a ‘clean’ energy 
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exploration-and-production/pre-salt/> accessed 26 November 2018. 
185 Ildo L Sauer and Larissa Araújo Rodrigues, ‘Pré-sal e Petrobras além dos Discursos e Mitos: Disputas, Riscos e 
Desafios’ (2016) 30(88) Estudos Avançados 185, 191. 
186 Eugene D Coyle and Richard A Simmons, Understanding the Global Energy Crisis (Purdue University Press 
2014), 56. 
187 Worldatlas, ‘The World’s Largest Oil Reserves By Country’ <https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/the-world-
s-largest-oil-reserves-by-country.html> accessed 26 November 2018. 
188 US Energy Information Administration, ‘What Countries Are the Top Producers and Consumers of Oil? The 10 
largest oil producers and share of total world oil production in 2017’ 
<https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=709&t=6> accessed 26 November 2018. 
189 Paulo Henrique Martinez and Roger Domenech Colacios, ‘Pré-Sal: Petróleo e Políticas Públicas no Brasil (2007-
2016)’ (2016) 1(5) Journal of Social, Technological and Environmental Science 145, 147. 
190 Richard L Ottinger, Douglas S de Figueiredo and Lia Helena M L Demange, ‘Case Study of Renewable Energy 
in Brazil’, in Richard L Ottinger (ed), Renewable Energy law and Development: Case Study Analysis (Elgar 2013), 
107. 
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matrix.191 It has been pointed out in the literature that the low-carbon energy system in Brazil 
could change in the future if the Brazilian system fails in boosting the large economic 
development while at the same time keeping its energy sector eco-friendly.192 Some 
researchers highlight the potential of Brazil to improve electricity supply security by 
increasing the share of green energy sources and increasing the energy storage potential of 
the country.193 Other researchers propose the use of a fraction of the pre-salt petroleum 
revenue to invest in the promotion and deployment of renewables in Brazil, including 
developing those energy sources not yet technologically mature, such as solar energy.194 The 
evidence presented here suggests a rather different picture. The analysis of official 
documents in Brazil for the post-energy crisis period (2003-2015) demonstrates that, with the 
exception of bioenergy, green energy law and policies were not further developed, 
particularly in relation to the electricity sector.  
An analysis of the official discourse in Brazil during the post-crisis period demonstrates 
two important points. First, it reveals that fossil fuels development has been advanced as 
essential for energy security in Brazil with regards to the electricity sector while green energy 
is construed as complementary energy and insufficient to meet the energy demands required 
for economic growth. Second, it shows a lack of debate in the official discourse surrounding 
emerging technological developments that can minimise the intermittency of green energy, 
                                                          
191 Marco Antonio Vieira and Klaus Guimarães Dalgaard, ‘The Energy-Security–Climate-Change Nexus in Brazil’ 
(2013) 22(4) Environmental Politics 610, 614. 
192 Fabio Farinosi, ‘Energy Transitions and Climate Security in Brazil’, in Robert E Looney (ed), Handbook of 
Transitions to Energy and Climate Security (Routledg 2017), 239. 
193 Julian David Hunt, Daniel Stilpen and Marcos Aurélio Vasconcelos de Freitas, ‘A Review of the Causes, Impacts 
and Solutions for Electricity Supply Crises in Brazil’ (2018) 88 Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 208. 
194 José Goldemberg and others, ‘Oil and Natural Gas Prospects in South America: Can the Petroleum Industry 
Pave the Way for Renewables in Brazil?’ (2014) 64 Energy Policy 58. 
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such as around energy storage and smart grid. There was no mention of energy storage or 
smart grid in any of the documents analysed.  
What this section demonstrates, therefore, is that the dominant positive frame on the 
interplay between energy security and fossil fuel, coupled with the prevalence of a negative 
discursive frame in relation to green energy technologies for the electricity sector and the 
absence of a debate in the official discourse surrounding emerging technological advances 
which support the deployment of green energy technologies are contributing to Brazil moving 
in an opposite direction to a low carbon energy transition.  
It seems clear that, in order to transition to a low carbon energy system, Brazil should 
be seeking further diversification of its energy matrix by increasing the share of green energy 
sources. Here, three actions would be of assistance. First, as demonstrated in this chapter, 
when a positive frame in relation to the links between energy security and an energy source 
is advanced, it has the implication of promoting such energy source. Therefore, a dominant 
positive frame should be forged in law and policies in relation to the interplay between energy 
security and green energy, particularly wind and solar energy. Second, the broader energy 
security concept should be incorporated in law and policies which includes environmental, 
climate and social considerations. As demonstrated in section 3, although there are social and 
environmental conflicts in relation to some green energy projects, nowadays green energy is 
directly linked with climate change in law and policies and solar energy has played an 
important role in achieving the social aim of universal energy access. Adopting this broader 
concept, therefore, would more clearly associate the role played by green energy in ensuring 
energy security. Third, Brazil should create law and policies which support the development, 
commercialisation and deployment of emerging green energy technologies. In order to assist 
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with this task, further research is needed to identify the legal, regulatory and social challenges 
to enable the development, commercialisation and deployment of emerging green energy 
technologies in Brazil, particularly around energy storage and smart grid. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This chapter analysed the interplay between energy security and green energy law 
and policies in Brazil. It uncovered the socio-legal factors underpinning the emergence of the 
national rules that encouraged the promotion of green energy initiatives in Brazil through 
national policymaking, a policy domain which included energy access, economic 
development, environmental protection, climate change, social development and energy 
security. After examining the forces that were at play in Brazil at the time of the enactment 
of green energy law and policies during the period of analysis (January 2001- December 2015), 
the chapter then moved on to investigate the interplay between energy security and law and 
policies on green energy development, a subject which is at the centre of this thesis. Based 
on the key research questions, the focus here was on the discursive construction of energy 
security and its law and policy on green energy development, as well as the discursive links 
between energy security and law and policies promoting green energy. In this process, the 
chapter established a number of important findings.  
By examining how the concept of energy security was conceptualised and 
contextualised in Brazil within the period of analysis, it revealed that, during the 2001 energy 
crisis, energy security concerns were distinctly focused on energy availability and reliability, 
while the concept adopted in the post-2001 energy crisis period was expanded to include 
affordability, confirming, as such, the evolving and multifaceted nature of the meaning of 
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energy security. However, it is clear that broader concepts of energy security found in the 
literature which include environmental, climate and social considerations have not reached 
the official discursive terrain of green energy law and policies in Brazil as yet.  
What emerged as a common feature from 2001 to 2015 is the absence of explicit links 
between energy security and national security/military action in the official discourse. The 
framing of energy security was in the context of economic development, demonstrating that 
energy security in Brazil is first and foremost an economic issue. This finding is relevant, 
because, although absent from the official discourse, street protests took place during the 
2001 energy crisis and were framed by the media at the time as being responses to electricity 
rationing and its negative impact on labour markets and jobs. What this reveals, therefore, is 
that energy interruption in Brazil can cause economic instability and, as a result, lead to social 
instability. If necessary measures are not taken to correct the imbalance in energy supply, the 
evidence suggests this can lead to economic crises and chaos that disrupts Brazil’s social 
order. 
The analysis of the links between energy security and green energy law and policies 
was further contextualised in relation to Brazil’s high dependence on large-scale hydropower 
and its pursuit of diversification in its energy matrix. This chapter demonstrated that energy 
security was discursively framed differently in different green energy law and policies within 
different energy sectors. Due to its importance to economic and social stability in Brazil, when 
the connections between energy security and an energy source were positively framed, it had 
the implication of promoting that energy source. On the contrary, when the connections 
between energy security and an energy source were negatively framed, it had the implication 
of hindering the development of such energy source.  
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Attention, therefore, should be paid to how the discourse of energy security has been 
framed in green energy law and policies and how it has affected green energy development. 
In this respect, this chapter showed that in the context of the transport sector, a positive 
frame in law and policies for energy security and biofuels connections was advanced in terms 
of biofuels’ key role in tackling energy security concerns over energy use from exhaustible 
energy sources, dependency on imported energy sources, the oligopoly of oil producers and 
the uneven distribution of fossil fuels around the world as well as the risk of war associated 
with oil exploration. This positive construction, as a result, has supported biofuels 
development.  
In the electricity sector, the dominant positive frame linked energy security and fossil 
fuel, with a particular emphasis on fossil fuel’s essential role in ensuring energy security via 
the diversification away from large scale hydropower and achievement of energy self-
sufficiency based on national fossil fuel exploration. Although there was a positive frame 
within which green energy was cast as important for energy diversification and which, 
therefore, saw its promotion for small-scale projects, a dominant negative frame was 
advanced in the context of the deployment of green energy, solar and wind in particular, in 
which it was treated as a complementary energy source due to its costs, intermittent nature 
and insufficiency for supporting economic development. This positive frame for fossil fuel and 
negative frame for wind and solar energy in law and policies coupled with the absence of any 
reference in the official discourse to emerging innovative technologies with the potential to 
minimise green energy intermittency issues have had the result of contributing to the 
hindrance of these green energy technologies and the promotion of fossil fuels development 
in Brazil. Consequently, Brazil is moving in an opposite direction to a low carbon energy 
transition. 
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It seems clear that, in order to move towards a low carbon energy transition, Brazil 
should be seeking further diversification of its energy matrix by increasing the share of green 
energy sources. Here, three actions would be of assistance. First, a dominant positive frame 
should be forged in law and policies in relation to the interplay between energy security and 
green energy, particularly wind and solar energy, since a positive frame in relation to this link 
has the implication of significantly contributing to the promotion of an energy source. Second, 
the broader energy security concept should be incorporated in law and policies which 
includes environmental, climate and social considerations. As demonstrated in this chapter, 
although there are environmental and social conflicts in relation to some green energy 
projects, nowadays green energy is directly linked with climate change in law and policies and 
solar energy has played an important role in achieving the social aim of universal energy 
access. Adopting this broader concept, therefore, would facilitate understanding on the role 
played by green energy in ensuring energy security. Third, Brazil should create law and 
policies which support the development, commercialisation and deployment of emerging 
green energy technologies to unlock their potential to the country, particularly around energy 
storage and smart grid – something research could contribute to by identifying, for example, 
the legal, regulatory and social challenges to enable the development and diffusion of such 
technologies.  
In line with the approach adopted in this thesis, the following chapter will examine 
the interplay between energy security and green energy in the law of the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), building on the findings of the case studies of GB and Brazil.
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CHAPTER 6  
 THE APPLICABILITY OF THE LAW OF THE WTO TO GREEN ENERGY SECURITY  
 
 
1. Introduction 
1.1. Aim and contribution of the chapter 
This chapter builds on the findings of the case studies on Great Britain (GB) and Brazil 
under chapters 4 and 5 respectively. These country case studies have shown that two main 
discursive frames can be found in relation to the interplay between energy security and 
national law and policies on green energy development: (i) the positive frame, which points 
out the importance of developing green energy to ensure energy security, i.e. green energy 
security; and (ii) the negative frame, where green energy is seen as negatively affecting 
energy security, particularly as a result of its intermittent nature, costs and insufficiency to 
meet the energy demands of a growing economy. 
Revealing these differences of approaches in relation to the interplay between energy 
security and green energy in the country case studies is relevant because this divergence of 
views, learnt in each country case study, may be at stake in legal disputes. In particular, legal 
disputes between countries concerning energy security and green energy development have 
already taken place within international trade law as encapsulated in the law of the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO), an international trade organisation which adjudicates between 
competing discursive claims and pronounces on their legal status.  
The WTO, therefore, was selected as a third case study because it shows how this 
diversity of views raised in national contexts leads to legal disputes in international forums 
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when attempts are made to address the issue of the interplay between energy security and 
green energy development. Literature on international green energy trade disputes in the 
WTO, however, have predominantly focused on the consistency of green energy policies with 
WTO law and the balance between WTO obligations and domestic public policy space as a 
way to address environmental and climate change objectives.1 Energy security as a 
justification under WTO rules for trade restrictive measures to support green energy 
development is largely unexplored. Thus, the key contribution of this study to the existing 
academic literature on green energy and the law of the WTO lies in the fact that it analyses 
the WTO rules on green energy through the prism of energy security. 
As countries transition to a low carbon energy system, the participation of green 
energy in the energy mix will increase worldwide. Thus, countries’ dependence on green 
energy as a dominant energy source may be greater in the future. In this sense, green energy 
will also increasingly play a larger role in ensuring energy security globally. It is therefore 
important to analyse green energy security in the law of the WTO for a number of reasons. 
First, the WTO acts as the primary global trade governance body and plays a key role in 
settling interstate trade disputes through panels and the Appellate Body of its Dispute 
                                                          
1 Luca Rubini, ‘Ain't Wastin' Time No More: Subsidies for Renewable Energy, the SCM Agreement, Policy Space, 
and Law Reform’ (2012) 15(2) Journal of International Economic Law 525; Aaron Cosbey and Petroc C Mavroidis, 
‘A Turquoise Mess: Green Subsidies, Blue Industrial Policy and Renewable Energy: The Case for Redrafting the 
Subsidies Agreement of the WTO’ (2014) 17(1) Journal of International Economic Law 11; Joanna I Lewis, ‘The 
Rise of Renewable Energy Protectionism: Emerging Trade Conflicts and Implications for Low Carbon 
Development’ (2014) 14(4) Global Environmental Politics 10; Thomas Cottier, ‘Renewable Energy and WTO Law: 
More Policy Space or Enhanced Disciplines?’ (2014) Renewable Energy Law and Policy Review 40; Avidan Kent 
and Vyoma Jha, ‘Keeping Up with the Changing Climate: The WTO's Evolutive Approach in Response to the Trade 
and Climate Conundrum’ (2014) 15 Journal of World Investment & Trade 245; Kati Kulovesi, ‘International Trade 
Disputes on Renewable Energy: Testing Ground for the Mutual Supportiveness of WTO Law and Climate Change 
Law’ (2014) 23(3) Review of European Community & International Environmental Law 342; Jaemin Lee, ‘SCM 
Agreement Revisited: Climate Change, Renewable Energy, and the SCM Agreement’ (2016) 15(4) World Trade 
Review 613. Huaxia Lai, ‘The Climate-Trade Conundrum: A Critical Analysis of the WTO’s Jurisprudence on 
Subsidies to Renewable Energy’, in Mitsuo Matsushita and Thomas J Schoenbaum (eds), Emerging Issues in 
Sustainable Development: International Trade Law and Policy relating to Natural Resources, Energy, and the 
Environment (Springer 2016). 
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Settlement Body (DSB). Since the WTO DSB has come to act as a significant international 
forum to channel complaints related to trade restrictive measures supporting green energy 
development, it is therefore relevant to explore trends in energy security put forward to this 
specialised tribunal. Second, as the WTO DSB makes crucial jurisprudential moves that impact 
domestic law and policies, WTO Member States need to take WTO rules into account when 
shaping their domestic green energy law and policies. Therefore, a legal analysis of energy 
security in the green energy context within the WTO rules is needed, in particular, how a well-
designed energy security policy promoting green energy could fail or succeed the various 
public policy exceptions provided in the law of the WTO. Third, with increasing green energy 
trade disputes under the WTO DSB over the years,2 more trade disputes might be heard at 
the WTO on the subject of green energy security as to the purpose of government support 
for green energy. This chapter, then, aims to answer the fourth key research question of this 
thesis: is there policy space for national green energy security in the law of the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO)? It, therefore, explores whether there is any flexibility within the current 
WTO rules and the interpretations given to them that permit trade restrictive measures that 
support national green energy development with a view of ensuring energy security, i.e. green 
energy security  
It is generally acknowledged in the literature that a successful transition to a low 
carbon energy system will require government support to develop new green energy sectors 
and technologies.3 Countries, therefore, have adopted trade restrictive measures, particularly 
                                                          
2 Since its creation in 1995, 15 cases involving green energy have been initiated under the WTO DSB as of January 
2019. In 2018, 4 green energy cases were initiated under the WTO. Please see appendix 3.  
3 See, for example, Marianne Fay, Stephane Hallegatte, and Adrien Vogt-Schilb, Decarbonizing Development: 
Three Steps to a Zero-Carbon Future (World Bank 2015); A A Amrutha,  P Balachandra and  M Mathirajan, ‘Model‐
based Approach for Planning Renewable Energy Transition in a Resource‐constrained Electricity System—A Case 
Study from India’ (2018) 42(3) International Journal of Energy Research 1023. 
209 
 
local content requirements and subsidies, as instruments to develop a national green energy 
industry. Local content requirements are often expressed as a percentage of a project that 
must be supplied by local firms (akin to a quota). They are used to support infant industry – 
especially in developing countries entering high-tech sectors such as green energy4 – to 
achieve economies of scale, as access to a growing domestic market shielded from 
international competition may in time enable domestic firms to develop economies of scale 
and technological capacity.5 The technology needed for green energy tends to be more 
expensive than traditional fuel sources,6 and investors also prefer low-risk, conventional 
technologies that can be built quickly instead of long-term, innovative technologies that make 
for riskier investment options. Therefore, government assistance is often considered key to 
encourage investment in innovative technologies like green energy.7  
In terms of subsidies, generally speaking, they are defined as a ‘financial contribution’ 
that confers a benefit. In the context of the WTO, a subsidy may exist in cases which involve 
‘any form of income or price support, which operates directly or indirectly to increase exports 
of any product from, or to reduce imports of any product into the territory of a Member 
State’.8 Not all subsidies violate WTO law, only the ones that distort trade.9 These trade 
restrictive measures do not prevent foreign direct investment or participation of the private 
sector. In fact, governments have tried to design green energy programmes in a way that 
                                                          
4 Gary Hufbauer and others, Local Content Requirements: A Global Problem (Peterson Institute for International 
Economics 2013), 2. 
5 Ibid 96-99. 
6 David Popp, Ivan Hascic and Neelakshi Medhi, ‘Technology and the Diffusion of Renewable Energy’ (2011) 33(4) 
Energy Economics 648, 648. 
7 Virginia R Hildreth, ‘Renewable Energy Subsidies and the GATT’ (2014) 14(2) Chicago Journal of International 
Law 702, 707. 
8 Article 1.1 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM) and Article XVI:1 of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994. 
9 The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM) establishes two categories of subsidy: (1) 
prohibited subsidies that are outright WTO unlawful under Article 3; and (2) actionable subsidies that may be 
illegal, depending on their impact under Article 5. 
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ensures the support is provided through private entities. However, the argument that the 
government does not provide support itself and the programme does not constitute a subsidy 
does not find support in the WTO rules.10 
A thorough economic analysis is necessary to evaluate which policy instruments best 
promote the development of a green energy industry. This is, however, outside the scope of 
this thesis. What is happening in practice is that local content requirements and subsidies are 
being used by Member States to support the development of green energy. These trade 
restrictive measures, however, have been challenged in green energy legal disputes under 
the WTO DSB. Canada — Renewable Energy,11 Canada — Feed-In Tariff Programme12 and 
India — Solar Cells13 are examples here. The analysis of these cases in the literature focuses 
on justifying these trade restrictive measures on environmental and climate change 
grounds.14 However, these cases also raise issues surrounding energy security as a justification 
under WTO rules for trade restrictive measures to support green energy development, but 
this has been largely unexplored. 
                                                          
10 Yulia Selivanova, ‘The WTO Agreements and Energy’, in Kim Talus (ed), Research Handbook on International 
Energy Law (Elgar Law 2014), 302. 
11 WTO, Canada — Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector – Report of the 
Appellate Body (6 May 2013) WT/DS412. 
12 WTO – Canada — Measures Relating to the Feed-in Tariff Programme – Report of the Appellate Body (6 May 
2013) WT/DS426. 
13 WTO, India — Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules – Report of the Appellate Body (16 
September 2016) WT/DS456. 
14 For Canada – Renewable Energy/FIT, see, for example, Luca Rubini, ‘Ain't Wastin' Time No More: Subsidies for 
Renewable Energy, the SCM Agreement, Policy Space, and Law Reform’ (2012) 15(2) Journal of International 
Economic Law 525; Aaron Cosbey and Petroc C Mavroidis, ‘A Turquoise Mess: Green Subsidies, Blue Industrial 
Policy and Renewable Energy: The Case for Redrafting the Subsidies Agreement of the WTO’ (2014) 17(1) Journal 
of International Economic Law 11; Jaemin Lee, ‘SCM Agreement Revisited: Climate Change, Renewable Energy, 
and the SCM Agreement’ (2016) 15(4) World Trade Review 613. For India — Solar Cells, see, for example, 
Sherzod Shadikhodjaev, ‘India – Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules´ (2017) 111 (1) 
American Journal of International Law 139; Vivasvan Bansal and Chaitanya Deshpande, ‘The India-Solar Cells 
Dispute: Renewable Energy Subsidies under World Trade Law and the Need for Environmental Exceptions’ 
(2017) 10(2) NUJS Law Review 209; Umair Hafeez Ghori, ‘“Reverse Permissibility” in the Renewable Energy 
Sector: Going Beyond the US-India Solar Cells Dispute’ (2018) 8(2) Asian Journal of International Law 322; 
Marianna Karttunen and Michael O Moore, ‘India-Solar Cells: Trade Rules, Climate Policy, and Sustainable 
Development Goals’ (2018) 17(2) World Trade Review 215. 
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Although some scholars have examined energy security within the WTO,15 only a few 
studies have analysed the lines of argument which have focused on the role played by green 
energy in configuring energy security as a facet of public policy in the WTO.16 These few 
studies mention the significance of green energy to energy security, for example, ‘the use of 
renewable energy will help towards energy security regionally’,17 ‘countries [are] aiming to 
improve their domestic capacity for renewable energy to facilitate energy security’,18 and the 
importance of green energy regulation in the WTO to energy security. As illustrated in one 
scholar’s words: ‘[l]ack of appropriate disciplines in the WTO in areas such as renewable 
energy constrain the development of this sector and impair energy security’.19 The role of 
green energy in ensuring ‘a more secure energy path’ has been recognised by the former WTO 
Director-General Pascal Lamy. As he put it, “[g]reater energy efficiency and clean energy will 
play a central role in moving the world onto a more secure and sustainable energy path.”20 In 
light of these markers both in academic work and statements by key figures in the WTO itself, 
                                                          
15 See, for example, Shiv Kumar Verma, ‘Energy Geopolitics and Iran–Pakistan–India Gas Pipeline’ (2007) 35(6) 
Energy policy 3280;  Wen-Chen Shih, ‘Energy Security, GATT/WTO, and Regional Agreements’, (2009) 49(2) 
Natural Resources Journal 433; Tang Qi, ‘The Implications of Reshaping Energy Trade Discipline on China’s Energy 
Security (2011) 5 Energy Procedia 562;  Sajal Mathur, Trade, the WTO and Energy Security: Mapping the Linkages 
for India (Springer 2014); Sherzod Shadikhodjaev, 'Russia and Energy Issues under the WTO System' (2016) 50(4) 
Journal of World Trade 705. 
16 See, for example, Rafael Leal-Arcas, Andrew Filis and Ehab S Abu Gosh, ‘Renewable Energy in the World Trade 
Organization’ in Rafael Leal-Arcas, Andrew Filis and Ehab S Abu Gosh (eds), International Energy Governance: 
Selected Legal Issues (Edward Elgar Pub Ltd 2014); Angelica P Rutherford, ‘Regulatory Framework for Biofuels in 
Brazil: History and Challenges under the Law of the WTO’ (2016) 34(2) Journal of Energy & Natural Resources 
Law 213; A Jayagovind, ‘Missing the Wood for the Trees: A Critique of the WTO Ruling in India: Solar Cells and 
Modules’ (2016) 56(2) Indian Journal of International Law 201.   
17 Rafael Leal-Arcas, Andrew Filis and Ehab S Abu Gosh, ‘Renewable Energy in the World Trade Organization’ in 
Rafael Leal-Arcas, Andrew Filis and Ehab S Abu Gosh (eds), International Energy Governance: Selected Legal 
Issues (Edward Elgar Pub Ltd 2014), 383. 
18 Aditya Sarmah, ‘Renewable Energy and Article III:8(A) of the GATT: Reassessing the Environment-Trade 
Conflict in Light of the Next Generation Cases’ (2017) 9(2) Trade, Law and Development 197, 219. 
19 James J Nedumpara, ‘Energy Security and the WTO Agreements’, in Sajal Mathur (ed), Trade, the WTO and 
Energy Security: Mapping the Linkages for India (Springer 2014), 71;  
20 Pascal Lamy, ‘Speech to the Workshop on the Role of Intergovernmental Agreements in Energy Policy 
organized by the Energy Charter Secretariat on 29 April 2013 at the WTO’ 
<https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl279_e.htm> accessed 20 June 2018. 
212 
 
the following sections will expand on the interaction between green energy and energy 
security in the WTO.  
 
1.2. Structure of the chapter 
In an attempt to answer the question of whether there is policy space for national 
green energy security in the law of the WTO and fill the gap in the literature, this chapter will 
have the following structure. The chapter begins with an overview of the nature of 
international trade in green energy, followed by an examination of green energy trade law 
under the WTO as a background for contextual purposes. The following section focuses on 
energy security in the law of the WTO. It reveals how energy security has been raised within 
the WTO green energy jurisprudence so far. Based on the findings of the case studies on GB 
and Brazil, it also analyses whether there is room for green energy security as a justification 
for trade restrictive measures. The final section elaborates on a proposal for policy space for 
green energy security in the law of the WTO. 
 
1.3. Summary of findings  
Overall, this chapter will demonstrate that green energy development has increasingly 
come to be associated with energy security in the WTO jurisprudence. An analysis of the WTO 
green energy disputes involving energy security will also reveal that energy security concepts 
have been raised differently by respondents, and broader concepts of energy security found 
in the literature which include environmental, climate and social considerations have not 
reached the jurisprudence in the WTO system yet. The analyses of room for green energy 
security as a justification for trade restrictive measures will demonstrate that there might be 
some room for green energy security within the defences under Articles III:8(a), XX(a) and (j) 
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and Article XXI. However, these defences have limited applicability and may also have 
undesirable outcomes. Finally, this chapter will argue that an evenly distributed market share 
of green energy technologies and equipment around the world is the best solution to ensure 
green energy security in the context of the just energy transition and propose a way forward 
to create the legal space in the WTO for trade restrictive measures aimed at ensuring green 
energy security. 
 
2. The nature of international trade in green energy  
Scaling-up the supply and use of green energy worldwide has mainly been associated 
with global efforts to curb climate change. For instance, agendas of multilateral leaders’ 
meetings, such as the Group of 7 major industrialized economies (G7), called for 
‘accelerat[ing] access to renewable energy in Africa and developing countries in other regions’ 
in the context of climate change.21 Many countries have embarked on proactive policies to 
expand the deployment of green energy. According to REN21, renewable power, for example, 
accounted for 70% of net additions to global power generating capacity in 2017.22 
Governments worldwide have passed a raft of national regulations to encourage or mandate 
increased use of green energy sources as a substitute for traditional energy sources. With 
growing green energy markets, international trade is also increasing.23 For example, the 
potential for biofuels to provide a major source of fuel for transportation has generated 
commitments of resources to that effort worldwide. This is especially true for the United 
                                                          
21 G7 Germany, ‘Leaders’ Declaration, G7 Summit, 7–8 June 2015’, 16  <https://www.g7 
germany.de/Content/EN/_Anlagen/G7/2015–06–08-g7-abschluss-eng_en.html> accessed 12 January 2019. 
22 Renewable Energy Policy and Network for the 21st Century (REN21), ‘Renewables 2018 Global Status Report’ 
<http://www.ren21.net/status-of-renewables/global-status-report/> accessed 20 June 2018. 
23 See, for example, Amy Myers Jaffe, ‘Green Giant: Renewable Energy and Chinese Power’, Foreign Affairs 
(Mar/Apr 2018); Pilita Clark, ‘The Big Green Bang: How Renewable Energy Became Unstoppable’, Financial Times 
(18 May 2017), <https://www.ft.com/content/44ed7e90-3960-11e7-ac89-b01cc67cfeec> accessed 20 June 
2018. 
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States, the European Union (EU) and Brazil, with total biofuel production in these countries 
increasing 462 per cent from 2001 to 2013.24  
Green energy technologies are made up of packages of goods, services and embedded 
intangibles (such as software) that come together as a result of multiple transactions involving 
the providers of supply chains operating across several jurisdictions. In this manner, the 
goods, services and intellectual property (IP) involved in any particular wind energy park or a 
solar photovoltaics (PV) installation, for example, have usually crossed several borders to get 
there. Any such equipment would generally also include locally produced components and 
services.25 For instance, solar firms in the US and the EU are linked with Chinese firms through 
global supply chains.26 The emergence of global supply chains has enabled solar photovoltaics 
companies to specialise in specific stages of manufacturing, and to scale up global solar 
photovoltaics production capacity.27 The photovoltaics industry consists of a long value chain 
from raw materials to photovoltaics system installation and maintenance. In general, when 
people talk about the PV industry, the main focus is on the solar-cell and module 
manufacturers. However, there is also the upstream industry (e.g. materials, polysilicon 
production, wafer production and equipment manufacturing) as well as the downstream 
industry (e.g. inverters, balance of system (BOS) components, system development, project 
development, financing, installations and integration into existing or future electricity 
infrastructure, plant operators, operation and maintenance).28 As a result of these 
                                                          
24 Jayson Beckman, ‘Biofuel Use in International Markets: The Importance of Trade’ (2015), 
<https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/44009/53707_eib144.pdf?v=42248> accessed 20 June 2018. 
25 Gary C Hufbauer, Ricardo Meléndez-Ortiz and Richard Samans, ‘Setting the Horse Before the Cart to Preserve 
a Viable World’, in Gary C Hufbauer, Ricardo Meléndez-Ortiz and Richard Samans (eds), The Law and Economics 
of a Sustainable Energy Trade Agreement (Cambridge University Press 2016), 3. 
26 Jonas Nahm, ‘Renewable Futures and Industrial Legacies: Wind and Solar Sectors in China, Germany, and the 
U.S’, (2017) 19(1) Business and Politics 68. 
27 Jonas Nahm and Edward S Steinfeld, ‘Scale-up Nation: China's Specialization in Innovative Manufacturing’ 
(2014) 54 World Development 288, 298. 
28 Arnulf Jäger-Waldau, PV Status Report 2017 (Publications Office of the European Union 2017), 52. 
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developments, the nature of the green energy sector has resulted in increasing tradability of 
green energy goods and services, and internationalisation of green energy activities.  
The trend towards privatisation and liberalisation of the energy sector has also 
accelerated green energy trade. Until the 1980s, it was a conventional wisdom of the post-
war years that markets are hopelessly inadequate in providing appropriate energy supplies,29 
and governments worldwide have considered the energy sector too crucial to be left to 
market forces. Accordingly, monopoly was the norm.30 However, with the deregulation 
movement, there was a paradigm shift in the electricity industry across the world from a 
system of State ownership and centralised management to one that favours decentralised 
structures, competition, independent regulatory oversight, and private ownership.31 As a 
result, trade in electricity is a new dimension of trade in energy, in which the green energy 
sector plays an important role. As such, industries in the green energy sector have not been 
dominated by State-owned vertically integrated utilities, who would typically have engaged 
in the production, transport and distribution of energy products. As a result, this has left 
ample margins for trade and competition. 
 
3. Green energy trade and the law of the WTO: an overview  
This section introduces some of the key rules of WTO law as well as examines how 
green energy has been addressed in the law of the WTO.  
 
 
                                                          
29 D Helm, Energy, the State and the Market (Oxford University Press 2004), 1. 
30 Daniel Kirschen and Goran Strbac, Fundamentals of Power System Economics (John Wiley 
& Sons 2004), 1. 
31 OECD, Regulatory Reform in Network Industries: Past Experience and Current Issues (OECD Economic Outlook 
67, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2000). 
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3.1. WTO main trade obligations 
The WTO was created in 1995 as the successor to, and incorporates within it, the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). As a forum for negotiation to reduce trade 
barriers, the GATT oversaw eight rounds of multilateral trade negotiations, culminating in the 
Uruguay Round that created the WTO32 with the WTO taking responsibility for establishing 
the rules governing the international trading system within a multilateral framework. 
Generally speaking, WTO rules are aimed at liberalising global trade and are based on 
agreements negotiated by Member States.33 As part of that, the GATT/WTO system provides 
a framework for conflict resolution in international trade relations. 
The principle of non-discrimination constitutes a cornerstone in international trade 
relations.34 WTO law requires States to abide by the non-discrimination obligations of most-
favoured nation and national treatment. The Most Favoured Nation (MFN) obligation is 
reflected in several WTO Agreements,35 including GATT Article I. The MFN obligation under 
GATT Article I requires WTO Members to grant any ‘advantage, favour, privilege or immunity’ 
given to one WTO Member to ‘like products’ originating from all other WTO Members. The 
WTO members are obliged to grant MFN treatment immediately and unconditionally. Thus, 
according to the MFN obligation, discrimination between trading partners is prohibited under 
WTO law. The National Treatment obligation under GATT Article III:4 implies non-
discrimination between domestic and imported goods. The basic concept is that imported 
products shall be accorded treatment ‘no less favourable’ than that accorded to domestic 
                                                          
32 Robert M Stern, ‘The Multilateral Trading System’, in Arvid Lukauskas, Robert M Stern, and Gianni Zanini (eds), 
Handbook of Trade Policy for Development (OUP 2013), 43. 
33 For an overview of WTO agreements, see WTO, ‘Understanding the WTO: The Agreements’ 
<https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm1_e.htm> accessed 1 January 2019. 
34 Nicolas F Diebold, ‘Standards of Non-Discrimination in International Economic Law’ (2011) 60 
International & Comparative Law Quarterly 831, 831. 
35 See also General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), Article 2; and Agreement on Trade-related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property (TRIPS), Article 4. 
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products. While MFN applies to both imports and exports, the national treatment is 
applicable only to non-discrimination of imports, and not exports.36 
The GATT recognises that derogations from international trade obligations are 
sometimes necessary to protect legitimate non-trade policy interests. This is possible, for 
example, by virtue of GATT Article XX entitled ‘general exceptions’ and Article XXI entitled 
‘security exceptions’.  In section 4 below, these exceptions will be analysed in the context of 
green energy security. 
 
3.2.  Green energy trade and the law of the WTO 
The world is currently going through a period of legal, economic and political 
quarrelling around the evolution of green energy technologies,37 particularly with respect to 
trade.38 As governments put in place policies to stimulate the green energy sector, trade 
tensions arise that test the limits of existing trade rules. Several disputes on related policies 
have been brought to the dispute settlement system of the WTO.  
Given the ongoing disputes at an international level, there is increased 
acknowledgement of the interaction between trade and energy, and regulating green energy 
trade has been recognised as one of the WTO’s key challenges.39 The former Director General 
of the WTO, Pascal Lamy, stated in 2013 that ‘what is sorely lacking in the current WTO 
                                                          
36 Yulia Selivanova, ‘The WTO Agreements and Energy’, in Kim Talus (ed), Research Handbook on International 
Energy Law (Elgar Law 2014), 282. 
37 Gary C Hufbauer, Ricardo Meléndez-Ortiz and Richard Samans, ‘Setting the Horse Before the Cart to Preserve 
a Viable World’, in Gary C Hufbauer, Ricardo Meléndez-Ortiz and Richard Samans (eds), The Law and Economics 
of a Sustainable Energy Trade Agreement (Cambridge University Press 2016), 2.  
38 Please see appendix 3 for a list of green energy trade disputes under the WTO system. 
39 WTO, ‘World Trade Report 2007: Six Decades of Multilateral Trade Cooperation: What Have We Learnt?’, v. 
<https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/world_trade_report07_e.pdf> accessed 16 June 
2018. 
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context is a constructive and forward-looking discussion among members on the rapidly 
expanding trade and energy interface’.40  
Energy is not specifically addressed in the law of the WTO and has not been singled 
out as a specific sector of trade under the WTO system.41 When the original GATT was drafted 
in 1947, energy was not contemplated. The former WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy 
explained the absence of energy as a distinct sector by stating that ‘[w]hen the rules of the 
GATT — which preceded the WTO – were negotiated 60 years ago, opening trade in energy 
was not a political priority. World energy demand was a fraction of today’s and you could buy 
a barrel of crude oil for USD20 at current prices.’42  Cross-border trade for grid-linked energy 
was not very developed at the time of the GATT negotiations either.43 In addition, at that time, 
green energy was neither on the agenda of the institutions of global governance nor the 
domestic policy agenda of member countries. Thus, interest in green energy was not a major 
concern. The emphasis was on economic reconstruction following the destruction of World 
War II, and avoiding a depression like that which took place after World War I.  
Nevertheless, although the rules of the WTO were not directly negotiated with energy 
in mind, many scholars have argued that WTO rules are applicable to trade in energy and 
                                                          
40 Pascal Lamy, ‘Speech to the Workshop on the Role of Intergovernmental Agreements in Energy Policy 
organized by the Energy Charter Secretariat on 29 April 2013 at the WTO’ 
<https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl279_e.htm> accessed 20 June 2018. 
41 See, for example, Ricardo Meléndez-Ortiz and Mahesh Sugathan, ‘Enabling the Energy Transition and Scale-
Up of Clean Energy Technologies: Options for the Global Trade System – Synthesis of the Policy Options’, (2017) 
51(6) Journal of World Trade 933, 936. Rafael Leal-Arcas, Andrew Filis and Ehab S Abu Gosh, ‘Energy as a Special 
Sector in the World Trade Organization’ in Rafael Leal-Arcas, Andrew Filis and Ehab S Abu Gosh (eds), 
International Energy Governance: Selected Legal Issues (Edward Elgar Pub Ltd 2014). Timothy J Richards and 
Lawrence Herman, ‘Relationship between International Trade and Energy’ 
<https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/wtr10_richards_herman_e.htm> accessed 20 June 2018. 
42 Pascal Lamy, ‘Doha Round Will Benefit Energy Trade’, in his speech at the 20th World Energy Congress on 15 
November 2007 in Rome < https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl80_e.htm> last accessed 31 May 
2017. 
43 Yulia Selivanova, ‘The WTO Agreements and Energy’, in Kim Talus (ed), Research Handbook on International 
Energy Law (Elgar Law 2014), 275. 
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energy products.44 This implies that the non-discrimination principles of WTO law form an 
integral part of the legal framework that applies to international trade in energy. In practice, 
WTO rules have been treated as applicable to green energy trade disputes and the first cases 
on green energy decided by the WTO DSB made it clear that green energy falls under the 
disciplines of the GATT and its related agreements. The fact that many of the main green 
energy producing and exporting countries as well as suppliers and importers of green energy 
generation equipment in the world, such as China, the US and the EU,45 are WTO members 
who have subscribed to its robust dispute settlement system,46 may have contributed to the 
emergence of the WTO as a forum for green energy trade-related disputes. 
Due to the multifaceted character of green energy trade, which encompasses a wide 
range of matters ranging from, for instance, trade in goods to trade in services, various 
agreements covered under the WTO system are relevant to green energy matters. As 
demonstrated by Thomas Cottier,47 tariffs on hardware, such as photovoltaic equipment, fall 
under Articles II and XXVIII GATT. Import and export restrictions on green energy are dealt 
                                                          
44 See, for example, Gabrielle Marceau, ‘The WTO in the Emerging Energy Governance Debate’, in Joost 
Pauwelyn (ed), Global  Challenges  at  the  Intersection  of  Trade,  Energy  and  the  Environment (Centre for 
Trade and Economic Integration 2010), 26;  Alan Yanovich,‘WTO Rules and the Energy Sector’, in Yulia Selivanova 
(ed) Regulation of Energy in International Trade Law: WTO, NAFTA, and Energy Charter Treaty (Kluwer 2011), 2; 
Timothy Meyer, ‘The World Trade Organization’s Role in Global Energy Governance’, in Thijs Van de Graaf and 
others (eds), The Palgrave Handbook of the International Political Economy of Energy (Palgrave 2016), 144. 
Timothy J Richards and Lawrence Herman, ‘Relationship between International Trade and Energy’ 
<https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/wtr10_richards_herman_e.htm> accessed 20 June 2018. 
45 See Mahesh Sugathan, ‘Winds of Change and Rays of Hope: How Can the Multilateral Trading System Facilitate 
Trade in Clean Energy Technologies and Services?’ in: The El 5 Initiative Strengthening the Multilateral Trading 
System: Clean Energy and the Trade System Group: Proposals and Analysis, ICTSD Paper, Geneva 2013 
<http://www.ictsd.org/downloads/2014/01/el 5-clean-energy-compilation.pdf> last accessed 27 April 2017.    
46 See, for example, Isabelle Van Damme, Treaty Interpretation by the WTO Appellate Body (OUP 2009); Alberto 
Álvarez-Jiménez, ‘The WTO Appellate Body Decision-making Process: A Perfect Model for International 
Adjudication?’ (2009) 12(2) Journal of International Economic Law 289; Rafael Leal-Arcas, ‘Comparative Analysis 
between NAFTA’s Chapter 20 and the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding’ (2011) 8(3) Transnational 
Dispute Management 1; Rafael Leal-Arcas, Andrew Filis and Ehab S Abu Gosh, ‘Energy as a Special Sector in the 
World Trade Organization’ in Rafael Leal-Arcas, Andrew Filis and Ehab S Abu Gosh (eds), International Energy 
Governance: Selected Legal Issues (Edward Elgar Pub Ltd 2014); Timothy Meyer, ‘Explaining Energy Disputes at 
the World Trade Organization’ (2017) International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 1. 
47 Thomas Cottier, ‘Renewable Energy and WTO Law: More Policy Space or Enhanced Disciplines?’ (2014) 
Renewable Energy Law and Policy Review 40, 42. 
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with under Articles XI and XX GATT. Local content rules and government procurement are 
addressed by Article III GATT, the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs), 
and the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA). Trade remedies (safeguards, anti-
dumping, subsidies and countervailing measures) extend to energy and are subject to the 
disciplines of Articles VI, XVI, XIX GATT, as well as to the Anti-Dumping Agreement (ADA), the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM) and the Agreement on 
Safeguards (SG). Biofuels partially fall under the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA), with the 
application of its regime to bioethanol. Furthermore, the green energy sector is strongly 
based upon services, such as metering, scoping, scouting, engineering and maintenance of 
installations and finance, and thus fall under the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS). Technical standards, which are of crucial importance for safety as well as for achieving 
high productivity, fall under the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). Finally, green 
energy may touch upon intellectual property rights, transfer of technology and competition 
under the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs). 
 An important issue in ongoing international debates on energy is how it should be 
defined for WTO purposes. For instance, should energy be defined in terms of products or in 
terms of their use? Marceau suggests that energy should be defined as the action (product 
and process) through which energy-containing natural resources are transformed and 
consumed in response to a series of societal and individual human requirements for heat and 
power. However, the author notes that such a definition is not sufficient for WTO purposes 
as it does not fall neatly within the goods/services parameters of the WTO.48 There is no 
agreement, for instance, on whether electricity qualifies as a good or a service under WTO 
                                                          
48 Gabrielle Marceau, ‘The WTO in the Emerging Energy Governance Debate’, in Joost Pauwelyn (ed), Global  
Challenges  at  the  Intersection  of  Trade,  Energy  and  the  Environment (Centre for Trade and Economic 
Integration 2010), 26. 
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rules.49 This impacts upon electricity produced from green energy sources because WTO rules 
are based on a distinction between goods and services and, depending on the classification, 
different WTO rules apply. However, whilst classificatory ambiguities should certainly be 
noted in terms of their legal relevance, it is not the purpose of this chapter to provide a 
detailed analysis with regards to this matter. Rather, the emphasis is on the policy space for 
green energy security in the law of the WTO, an issue that will, in all likelihood, have to be 
addressed as a result of increasing links between energy security and green energy 
development, and as this body of law continues to be elaborated. 
When it comes to the development of case law, environmental and climate change 
concerns have been the central issue with regards to green energy in the context of WTO law. 
Many of the main contemporary green energy goods and services, such as wind turbines, 
solar panels and solar water heaters, geothermal energy sensors and storage technologies 
like batteries, have been negotiated as environmental goods and services in the Doha Round, 
the latest round of trade negotiations among the WTO’s membership.50 While there is a lack 
of specific rules on green energy and related products under the WTO system, there is 
reference to sustainable development in the 1994 WTO agreement’s preamble. The preamble 
covers the need for the Contracting Parties to make ‘optimal use of the world’s resources in 
accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and 
preserve the environment’, and this element has been widely associated with green energy 
in the literature as well as in WTO case law. What is lacking is an analysis of green energy 
security within the WTO, an issue which will be examined in the following section. 
                                                          
49 See, for example, Henok Birhanu Asmelash, ‘Energy Subsidies and WTO Dispute Settlement: Why Only 
Renewable Energy Subsidies Are Challenged’ (2015) 18(2) Journal of International Economic Law 261.  
50 WTO, ‘Negotiations on Trade and the Environment’ 
<https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/envir_negotiations_e.htm> accessed 16 June 2018. 
222 
 
 
4. Energy security and green energy in the WTO jurisprudence  
An examination of room for national policy space for green energy security in the law 
of the WTO only makes sense if it is first acknowledged that green energy plays a role in 
ensuring energy security. Evidence from the case studies of GB and Brazil highlight the 
importance of green energy to energy security in a variety of ways. As green energy 
deployment in countries’ energy mixes increases and may become the dominant energy 
source, it is likely that national law and policies on green energy development will come to be 
associated with energy security more widely. This section, therefore, will investigate how 
energy security has been construed within the WTO green energy jurisprudence so far. 
The multifaceted concept of energy security has been extensively discussed in chapter 
3. The case study on Brazil demonstrated the evolving concept of energy security within a 
specific country, while the case study on GB showed the dynamic and controversial concept 
of energy security within different sectors of the economy in a specific country. The WTO 
deals with different Member States, which will have different contexts and will, therefore, 
have a multiplicity of ways of understanding what energy security is.  
The differences in concepts of energy security and their uses have already come to be 
seen as a cause of controversy and debate, generating significant deadlock in international 
negotiations. As  one participant to the G8 Summit in St Petersburg put it: ‘[i]n preparing the 
St. Petersburg Summit´s final documents, the most stubborn arguments up to the last day 
concerned the interpretation of the very idea of “energy security”’.51  The recent WTO case 
                                                          
51 Nodari A Simonia, ‘Energy Security: Russia, the European Union and the G8’ in John Kirton, Marina Larionova 
and Paolo Savona (eds), Making Global Economic Governance Effective: Hard and Soft Law Institutions in a 
Crowded World (Ashgate 2010), 140. 
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on conventional energy between Russia and the European Union (EU), EU – Energy Package,52 
is another example of how a lack of agreed definition on security of energy supply can create 
controversy. In this case, Russia submitted that "neither the Directive nor any other EU 
authority on the record identifies a clear and consistent definition of security of supply"53 and 
in Russia's view, this was "deliberate" and meant to "maximize [the European Union's] 
discretion to define security of supply in the manner most advantageous to its overall 
objectives, to include reducing reliance on Russian pipeline transport services and natural gas 
imports."54 Therefore, an analysis of how energy security has been configured through WTO 
case law is important and timely. The definitions and interpretations of energy security in the 
WTO shape the term’s role in legal texts and negotiations. Its interpretation can not only 
shape the outcome of individual disputes but also determine future trends in national 
policymaking.  
WTO law does not provide a definition of energy security. Strictly speaking, there is 
no official definition of energy security in existing, legally binding instruments of international 
law. This complicates the process of clarifying the ‘ordinary meaning’ with reference to the 
term’s context. The WTO has been acting as a forum for energy disputes, particularly green 
energy, for some time. Since its creation in 1995, 17 cases55 involving energy have been 
initiated under the WTO DSB and, among those cases, 15 cases involved green energy as of 
23 January 2019. In total, three green energy cases make reference to energy security 
matters: Canada — Renewable Energy,56 Canada — Feed-In Tariff Programme,57 and India — 
                                                          
52 WTO, European Union and its member States – Certain Measures relating to the Energy Sector – Report of the 
Panel (10 August 2018) WT/DS476/R. 
53 Ibid [7.1147]. 
54 Ibid. 
55 See appendix 3.  
56 Canada — Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector, WT/DS412. 
57 Canada — Measures Relating to the Feed-in Tariff Programme, WT/DS426. 
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Solar Cells.58 These cases, which will be subsequently analysed, provide an indication of how 
energy security has been raised and dealt with in the WTO green energy jurisprudence so far.  
 
4.1. Canada — Renewable Energy and Canada — Feed-In Tariff Programme 
4.1.1. Facts 
In Canada — Renewable Energy and Canada — Feed-In Tariff Programme, the terms 
‘energy security’ or ‘security of energy supply’ were not expressly used. However, concerns 
around energy availability and reliability – constitutive elements that form part of the energy 
security concept as shown in the previous chapters – were expressly raised. The case Canada 
— Renewable Energy initiated by Japan in 2010,59 and prompted the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Body to decide, for the first time, on matters relating to trade in green energy, specifically the 
legal status of renewable energy and measures of support to enhance its contribution to a 
specific nation’s energy matrix. Almost a year later, the EU also started a dispute under 
Canada — Feed-In Tariff Programme with regards to the same issue.60 
The central complaint in these two cases related to the domestic content 
requirements for certain wind and solar photovoltaic electricity generation projects in the 
feed-in tariff programme (the ‘FIT Programme’), established by the Canadian Province of 
Ontario, and the discriminatory treatment affecting imports of renewable energy generation 
equipment this led to. Generally, a feed-in tariff (FIT) scheme is designed to promote 
investment in the development of the green energy industry. A FIT typically provides for a 
fixed price for green electricity per kilowatt-hour fed into the grid on a common basis via long-
                                                          
58 India — Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules, WT/DS456. 
59 WTO, Canada — Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector – Request for 
Consultations by Japan (13 September 2010) WT/DS412/1. 
60 WTO, Canada — Measures Relating to the Feed-in Tariff Programme – Request for Consultations by the 
European Union (11 August 2011) WT/DS426/1. 
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term contracts.61 Ontario linked eligibility for its FIT to a local content requirement, as an 
instrument to promote green industries.62 
Under the Government of Ontario’s FIT Programme, generators of electricity, 
producing from certain forms of renewable energy (wind, solar PV, renewable biomass, 
biogas, landfill gas, and waterpower), were paid a guaranteed price per kilowatt hour of 
electricity delivered into the Ontario electricity system under 20-year or 40-year contracts.  In 
the case of wind power projects having a capacity to produce electricity greater than 10 kW, 
and solar projects with a capacity of up to 10MW, some minimum level of domestic content 
had to be satisfied in the development and construction of the qualifying electricity 
generation facility.63  
Japan and the EU argued that Ontario’s FIT Programme granted and maintained 
prohibited subsidies that were contingent upon the use of domestic over imported renewable 
energy equipment from other WTO Members and accorded less favourable treatment to like 
products of Japanese and EU origin, contrary to the national treatment principle. On this 
basis, Japan and the EU submitted that the FIT programme was not compatible with Canada’s 
obligations under: (i) Articles 3.1(b) and 3.2 of the ASCM; (ii) Article III:4 of the GATT 1994; 
and (iii) Article 2.1 of the TRIMS Agreement.64 Thus, the complainants requested the 
elimination of the domestic content requirement.   
                                                          
61 Miguel Mendonça, David Jacobs and Benjamin K Sovacool, Powering the Green Economy: The Feed-in Tariff 
Handbook (Earthscan 2010), 15. 
62 Steve Charnovitz and Carolyn Fischer, ‘Canada–Renewable Energy: Implications for WTO Law on Green and 
Not-So-Green Subsidies’ (2015) 14(2) World Trade Review 177, 180. 
63 WTO,  Canada — Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector/ Canada — Measures 
relating to the Feed-in Tariff Programme – Reports of the Panels (19 December 2012)  WT/DS412/R and 
WT/DS426/R, [7.64]. 
64 Ibid [3.1]-[3.4]. 
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In response, Canada argued that the procurement of electricity through the FIT 
Programme fell within the scope of the government procurement exception under Article 
III:8(a) of GATT and as a consequence, was not subject to Article III of GATT and could not be 
inconsistent with Article 2.1 of the TRIMS Agreement as a result.65 Both the Panel and the 
Appellate Body found that the domestic content requirements under the FIT Programme 
were inconsistent with Article III:4 of GATT and Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement.66 In 
relation to the subsidy claim, the question of whether FITs qualify as a subsidy under the 
ASCM remained unanswered because neither the Panel nor the Appellate Body reached a 
final conclusion as to whether FIT confers a benefit within the meaning of Article 1.1(b). 
 
4.1.2. Energy security concepts  
Canada made it clear that the FIT programme had two important contributions to 
make: (i) in helping secure the supply of electricity, and (ii) in helping protect the environment 
as it reduced Ontario’s reliance on electricity from coal, thus reducing the production of 
greenhouse gases.67 Throughout its arguments, Canada emphasised that ‘FIT Programmes 
play an important role in securing clean electricity supply’.68 Although the wording ‘energy 
security’  or ‘security of energy supply’ was not explicitly used, the role played by the 
Government of Ontario in ensuring an adequate, reliable and secure supply of electricity, 
                                                          
65 WTO, Canada — Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector, Canada — Measures 
relating to the Feed-in Tariff Program – Reports of the Panels, Addendum, Annex A-3 (19 December 20012) 
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including from green sources, was highlighted throughout Canada’s arguments.69 Canada, 
therefore, focused on energy security in the sense of availability and reliability of energy 
supply. These are similar elements to those raised by the majority of participants in the case 
study on GB under chapter 4. The temporary shutdown of several nuclear facilities for 
maintenance, phasing out of coal-fired generation by 2014 and subsequent reduction in 
generation capacity, as well as the increase of Ontario’s population by 28% by 2030 and the 
subsequent increases in energy demand were all invoked to express concerns about energy 
security.70 
What is interesting in these cases is also how the Panel and the Appellate Body 
presented the link between energy security and green energy. While the Panel presented only 
a negative frame where green energy does not support energy security because of the 
intermittency of wind and solar energy sources,71 the Appellate Body advanced a positive 
frame where green energy does play a role in ensuring energy security in the long-term by 
reducing reliance on fossil energy resources.72 Therefore, in these cases, the Panel and the 
Appellate Body presented two different approaches in regard to framing green energy and 
energy security. From a legal perspective, this divergence in frames has implications for the 
interplay between energy security and green energy under WTO law, because the frame 
adopted can impact the applicability and interpretation of WTO provisions. The negative 
frame, for instance, reduces the room for energy security as a legal justification for trade 
restrictive measures adopted to promote green energy. 
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4.2. India – Solar Cells  
4.2.1. Facts  
India – Solar Cells is the first case in the history of the WTO case law where the wording 
‘energy security’ and ‘security of energy supply’ have been expressly used in connection with 
green energy development. This case was brought by the United States (US) against India 
concerning local content requirements imposed under the Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar 
Mission (National Solar Mission) for solar cells73 and solar modules. According to India, the 
National Solar Mission was a major initiative of the Government of India to promote 
ecologically sustainable growth while addressing India's energy security challenge, as well as 
to contribute to the global effort to meet the challenges of climate change.74 It was launched 
by the Government of India in 2010, with the aim of generating 20,000 megawatts (MW) of 
grid-connected solar power capacity by 2022. India subsequently increased that target to 
100,000 MW of grid-connected solar power capacity by 2022.75 In order to meet this target, 
the scheme provided that the Government of India would enter into long-term Power 
Purchase Agreements (PPAs) with private solar power developers (SPDs).76 
The US alleged that India required SPDs to purchase and use solar cells and solar 
modules of domestic origin to enter into and maintain PPAs with the Government of India. In 
addition, SPDs received certain benefits and advantages, such as long-term tariffs for 
electricity, contingent on the purchase and use of solar cells and solar modules of domestic 
                                                          
73 Solar cells are photovoltaic devices that are components of solar modules, also known as solar panels. See 
WTO, India- Certain Measures relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules – Report of the Panel (24 February 2016) 
WT/DS456/R, [2.1]. 
74 WTO, India- Certain Measures relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules – Report of the Panel, Addendum, 
Annex B-3 (24 February 2016) WT/DS456/R/Add.1, [3]. 
75 WTO, India- Certain Measures relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules – Report of the Panel (24 February 
2016) WT/DS456/R, [7.1]. 
76 Ibid [7.2]. 
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origin.77 The US claimed violations of the National Treatment obligation under GATT Article 
III:4 and Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement. India used the government procurement 
derogation under Article III:8(a) of GATT 1994, the ‘general or local short supply’ exception 
under GATT article XX(j) and the need to ‘secure compliance’ exception under GATT article 
XX(d).  
 
4.2.2. Energy security concepts  
Although ecological sustainability and climate change were also presented as driving 
forces for the National Solar Mission, India not only directly and explicitly associated green 
energy development with energy security, but also presented energy security as one of the 
priority drivers for the promotion of green energy. India asserted that its procurement of solar 
power was an act pursuant to the government purpose of promoting ecologically sustainable 
growth while addressing India’s energy security challenge.78 India’s focus on energy security 
is clearly discernible in its repeated invocation of ‘energy security’ or ‘security of supply’ 23 
times in its summaries of the arguments included in the Panel Report.79  
 In elucidating the meaning of energy security, India referred to definitions in which 
availability, reliability and affordability were emphasised as the main aspects of energy 
security. For instance, India mentioned the International Energy Agency (IAE) definition of 
‘the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price’, a report by the United 
Nations Development Programme, which similarly defines energy security as ‘the continuous 
                                                          
77 WTO, India—Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules – Request for Consultations and 
Supplementary Consultations by the United States (6 February 2013) WT/DS456/1 and WT/DS456/5. 
78 WTO, India- Certain Measures relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules – Report of the Panel, Addendum, 
Annexe B-3 (24 February 2016) WT/DS456/R/Add.1, [3]. 
79 Ibid [2], [3], [29], [34], [35], [36], [37], [43], [46], [49], [52], [53], [55] and [59]; WTO, India- Certain Measures 
relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules – Report of the Panel, Addendum, Annexes B-4 (24 February 2016) 
WT/DS456/R/Add.1, [21], [25] and [43].  
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availability of energy in varied forms in sufficient quantities at reasonable prices’, and its own 
Integrated Energy Policy, which affirms the need to ‘supply lifeline energy to all our citizens 
irrespective of their ability to pay for it as well as meet their effective demand for safe and 
convenient energy to satisfy their various needs at competitive prices, at all times and with a 
prescribed confidence level considering shocks and disruptions that can be reasonably 
expected’.80 Availability, reliability and affordability are similar energy security elements to 
those found in the current legal framework in Brazil, as shown in chapter 5.  
India pointed out that the Government of India was currently being challenged by 
crippling electricity shortages, the rising price of electricity, and the gradual shift towards 
imported coal to meet its energy demand, which India stated that in turn would only lead to 
further increase in electricity prices.81 In India’s arguments, energy security issues were 
triggered by energy deficit, increasing demands for energy, and India’s dependence on fossil 
fuels and imported materials for its energy requirements.82 Solar energy development would 
lead to energy security through displacement of coal and petroleum.83 Here, India can be seen 
associating energy security and solar energy through a positive frame highlighting the 
reduction of fossil fuel dependency, just like the official discourse in Brazil positively 
associated energy security and biofuels, as shown in chapter 5. By associating energy security 
with solar energy, India aimed to justify the adoption of national law and policies supporting 
solar energy, whilst having a restrictive effect on international trade.  
                                                          
80 WTO, India- Certain Measures relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules – Report of the Panel (24 February 
2016) WT/DS456/R, [7.16]. 
81 WTO, India- Certain Measures relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules – Report of the Panel, Addendum, 
Annex B-3 (24 February 2016) WT/DS456/R/Add.1, footnote 23. 
82 Ibid [33]. 
83 WTO, India- Certain Measures relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules – Report of the Panel (24 February 
2016) WT/DS456/R, [7.283]. 
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According to India, an essential corollary to the energy security objective was the need 
to ensure control over the country's energy destiny. This would require security of supply of 
energy products, such as solar cells and modules. These were, from India’s point of view, 
critical components intrinsic to solar power development and were currently being heavily 
imported, and, as a result, exposed India to the risks of market fluctuations in international 
supply.84 Thus, in pursuance of energy security, government intervention was necessary in 
order to ensure domestic resilience in addressing any supply side disruptions since any 
dependence on imports brought with it risks associated with supply side vulnerabilities and 
fluctuations.85 As such, from India’s perspective, the domestic content requirement measures 
disputed by the US did not seek to maximise self-sufficiency by reducing imports of solar cells 
and modules; instead they aimed to ensure the existence of an adequate domestic 
manufacturing capacity and human skills in order to reduce the risks linked to dependence 
solely on imports of solar cells and modules which were intrinsic to solar power generation.86 
Interestingly, some participants in the case study on GB in chapter 4 also highlighted the link 
between energy security and the importation of energy equipment, technology and expertise 
as well as maintenance of human resources in the country and their energy skills and 
capabilities. The question here then – which will be subsequently examined – is whether 
green energy equipment import dependence is a green energy security issue.  
 
 
 
                                                          
84 WTO, India- Certain Measures relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules – Report of the Panel, Addendum, 
Annex B-3 (24 February 2016) WT/DS456/R/Add.1, [35]. 
85 Ibid [33].  
86 Ibid [4]; WTO, India- Certain Measures relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules – Report of the Panel, 
Addendum, Annex B-4 (24 February 2016) WT/DS456/R/Add.1, [41]. 
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4.2.3. Is green energy equipment import dependence a green energy security issue? 
In the literature, trade appears as an indicator for energy security.87 In this approach, 
reducing barriers to trade fosters energy security, so the goal is to keep energy markets open 
and fight protectionism. Liberalisation of international trade is advanced by complainants in 
the WTO green energy disputes as a way to have access to the best available technology from 
the global marketplace at competitive prices.88 Countries which depend profoundly on energy 
equipment and technology imports have to rely on the secure and smooth-functioning of 
international trade in energy in order to ensure security of energy supply. Participants in the 
case study on GB also presented the argument that restrictions in access to green energy 
technology markets would affect energy security as some green energy equipment is not 
produced in the country. One can, therefore, conclude that green energy technology and 
equipment import dependence can entail green energy security issues, particularly for green 
energy import dependent countries, if trade is not available. 
Although green energy equipment can be easily traded or transported short and long 
distances, situations of supply constraints, such as political unrest, conflict and trade 
embargoes, can occur. These trade disruptions usually happen without much warning and do 
not allow time for countries to plan different energy strategies to ensure green energy 
security. One of the goals of the transition to a low carbon energy system is to increase the 
participation of green energy in the energy mix. As a consequence, countries dependent on 
                                                          
87 See, for example, Benjamin K Sovacool and Ishani Mukherjee, ‘Conceptualizing and Measuring Energy Security: 
A Synthesized Approach’(2011) 36 Energy 5343, 5352. 
88 See, for example, Japan’s position in WTO, Canada — Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy 
Generation Sector/ Canada — Measures relating to the Feed-in Tariff Program – Reports of the Panels, 
Addendum, Annex A-1 (19 December 2012) WT/DS412/R/Add.1 and WT/DS426/R/Add.1, [3]. See also EU’s 
position in WTO, Canada — Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector/ Canada — 
Measures relating to the Feed-in Tariff Program – Reports of the Panels, Addendum, Annex A-2 (19 December 
2012) WT/DS412/R/Add.1 and WT/DS426/R/Add.1, [2].  
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solar and wind energy as a dominant energy source, for example, may be more common in 
the future. In these cases, if a country’s energy mix is designed to be dependent on solar and 
wind energies, trade restrictions on equipment in this area without advance warning would 
not realistically allow countries to plan their energy supply from other energy sources and 
produce the necessary green energy equipment while the trade restrictions issues are solved.  
While a globally integrated and liberalised trade environment is presented as a 
solution for energy security issues, realistically, we currently do not live in a world where 
international trade is one hundred per cent guaranteed. Political unrest, conflict and trade 
embargoes, for example, can happen and cause supply constraints. It is wise, therefore, that 
countries ensure domestic resilience against disruptions in supplies of green energy 
technologies and equipment, by developing a local green energy technology manufacturing 
industry.  
The debate here, then, is about importing countries choosing to adopt some 
temporary trade restrictive measures non-compliant with WTO law in order to develop their 
national green energy industry and ensure long-term green energy security in the event of 
supply side disruption. One can argue that temporarily restricting trade imports could cause 
energy insecurity in importing countries. For example, if an importing country restricted the 
importation of non-locally produced green energy technology, it would negatively impact the 
security of green energy supply, because the country would not have this product available 
nationally and would not have access to the product internationally. Each country, however, 
is best situated to assess its own energy security interests and to decide whether essential 
energy security interests are at stake relative to certain types of trade measures. Energy 
security is context dependent and countries could plan their energy strategies to ensure that 
energy would still be available if they chose to temporarily restrict the trade. For instance, if 
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solar energy equipment importing countries wanted to develop their national solar energy 
industry, they could temporarily plan to ensure energy security from other energy sources 
while a percentage of its solar energy domestic market is developed. Strategic plans, 
therefore, could prevent any general energy supply interruption. 
Developing green energy technologies nationally is not an easy and straightforward 
task. The case of Brazil in chapter 5 serves as an example that green energy manufacturing 
facilities do not just spring up overnight. As seen in chapter 5, during the 2001 energy crisis, 
Brazil acted to develop wind energy via its Emergency Programme for Wind Energy, 
PROEOLICA, to ensure energy security. Evidence showed that a domestic manufacturing base 
could not be developed in the short-term, because the industry could not be dependent on 
very few national suppliers for the viability of wind energy projects in Brazil in that initial 
development period. At the time, there was only one national manufacturer of complete 
equipment for wind turbines and only a few manufacturers of parts for wind turbines. 
Therefore, it was expected that the majority of wind equipment would be imported. However, 
in cases where this international trade is restricted, the country would not be able to ensure 
its green energy security.  
Supply constraints on green energy equipment can result not only in physical supply 
interruptions, but can also have negative consequences for prices in green energy markets, 
which, as such, affect, in particular, energy security in the sense of availability and 
affordability. The concentration of green energy equipment producers in a small number of 
countries heightens the impact of these issues on energy market volatility, and periods of 
wildly fluctuating green energy equipment prices will have an impact on the green energy 
security of country importers, particularly on the element of affordability.  
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The question then is how likely is international trade on green energy equipment to 
be disrupted? So far there has not been any political unrest, conflict or trade embargoes with 
regards to green energy equipment. However, today there is concentration of some green 
energy equipment in the hands of a few. In 2016, for instance, of the 20 largest solar cells 
production companies, in terms of actual production/shipments, 11 were 100% Chinese and 
an additional five had Chinese participation.89 In the same year, China and Taiwan held a share 
of 68% of PV module production in the world.90 This market share dominance, on the one 
hand, may not have any negative impact on the energy security of an importer country if 
access to the supply of the product is stable, accessible and reliable. On the other hand, if this 
market share dominance makes international trade unreliable, then it is a factor which should 
be considered when examining energy security concerns.  
It seems an open matter as to whether the concentration of some green energy 
equipment production in the hands of a few is or is not a problem. However, one can safely 
conclude that market share dominance is not the ideal position for the world to be in. An 
evenly distributed market share of green energy technologies and equipment around the 
world is the best solution to ensure energy security in the context of the just energy transition. 
No country should depend totally on a few suppliers. The diversification of green energy 
players in the market is essential and the WTO has an important role to play in achieving this 
goal. In view of this, the next section will examine whether there is policy space within WTO 
law for Member States to adopt trade restrictive measures to develop their national green 
energy industry with a view of ensuring green energy security.  
                                                          
89 Arnulf Jäger-Waldau, PV Status Report 2017 (Publications Office of the European Union 2017), 59-64. 
90 Fraunhofer Institute for Solar Energy Systems, ‘Photovoltaics Report’ (26 February 2018), 5 
<https://www.ise.fraunhofer.de/content/dam/ise/de/documents/publications/studies/Photovoltaics-
Report.pdf> accessed 20 June 2018. 
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5. Green energy security as a justification for trade restrictive measures 
The previous section shows evidence that WTO Member States are increasingly 
associating energy security with green energy in their legal disputes under the WTO DSB. 
Member States which have adopted or intend to adopt trade restrictive measures to support 
national green energy development with a view of ensuring energy security should familiarise 
themselves with the following question: Does WTO law provide room for national public 
policy on green energy security grounds? This section aims at answering this question in the 
context of the WTO agreement on trade in goods, GATT, an agreement that has been raised 
in all green energy disputes in the WTO system so far.91 As such, this section is not intended 
to be either definitive or exhaustive of the legal defences around green energy security within 
all agreements of the WTO framework. Instead, it focuses on room for green energy security 
within the current exceptions under GATT.  
As a rule, WTO Member States are required to design their internal legislation and 
regulations in a way that is compatible with WTO law.92 However, if a WTO Member State 
wishes to pursue some legitimate non-trade policy objectives, it may enact certain measures 
that, although inconsistent with WTO rules, may still be justified under GATT. Literature on 
green energy development and the GATT exceptions focuses mainly on environmental and 
climate change grounds within the scope of GATT Article XX(b) relating to measures 
‘necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health’ and GATT Article XX(g) relating to 
‘the conservation of exhaustible natural resources’.93 In the context of green energy security, 
                                                          
91 Please see appendix 3. 
92 Daniel Peat, ‘The Perfect FIT: Lessons for Renewable Energy Subsidies in the World Trade Organization’ (2012) 
LSU Journal of Energy Law and Resources 1, 24; Kati Kulovesi, ‘International trade: Natural resources and the 
World Trade Organization’, in Elisa Morgera and Kati Kulovesi (eds), Research Handbook on International Law 
and Natural Resources (Elgar 2016), 54. 
93 See, for example, Luca Rubini, ‘Ain’t Wastin’ Time No More: Subsidies for Renewable Energy, The SCM 
Agreement, Policy Space, and Law Reform’ (2012) 15(2) Journal of International Economic Law 525; Peter 
Kayode Oniemola, ‘International Law on Renewable Energy: The Need for a Worldwide Treaty’ (2013) 56 German 
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the examination of four legal defences under GATT is pertinent: Article III:8(a), Article XX(a), 
Article XX(j) and Article XXI.  
 
5.1.  GATT Article III:8(a) 
Article III:8(a) of GATT provides: 
The provisions of this Article [National Treatment on Internal Taxation and 
Regulation] shall not apply to laws, regulations or requirements governing the 
procurement by governmental agencies of products purchased for 
governmental purposes and not with a view to commercial resale or with a 
view to use in the production of goods for commercial sale. 
Article III:8(a) of GATT exempts government procurement programmes from the 
national treatment obligation, leaving, as such, room for discrimination concerning the 
exercise of government actions relating to the procurement of ‘products purchased for 
governmental purposes, and not with a view to commercial resale or with a view to use in the 
production of goods for commercial sale’. Article III:8(a), therefore, establishes a derogation 
from the national treatment obligation under Article III for government procurement 
activities falling within its scope. 
In all three green energy security cases so far, Canada — Renewable Energy, Canada 
— Feed-In Tariff Programme and India – Solar Cells, this exception was raised in an attempt 
to justify the discriminatory measure adopted to support domestic green energy 
development. Canada’s and India’s argument was that the purchase of electricity from green 
energy was for government purposes not with a view to commercial resale or with a view to 
                                                          
Yearbook of International Law 281; Amber Rose Maggio, Environmental Policy, Non-Product Related Process and 
Production Methods and the Law of the World Trade Organization (Springer 2017). 
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use in the production of goods for commercial sale, as a result of government’s role in 
ensuring energy security. Although energy security as a legal defence per se is not part of 
Article III:8(a) of GATT, this is still an important case for green energy security, as green energy 
security can be raised as a rhetorical defence of the disputed procurement measures. It is has 
also been echoed in the literature that the decision on Canada — Renewable Energy, Canada 
— Feed-In Tariff Programme and India – Solar Cells in relation to GATT Article III:8(a) will have 
far reaching implications for the energy security debate.94 
The Panel and the Appellate Body interpreted Article III:8(a) of GATT differently in 
Canada — Renewable Energy/Feed-In Tariff Programme. The Panel found that the 
Government of Ontario’s purchases of electricity generated from green energy sources under 
the FIT programme were ‘with a view to commercial resale’, because whether an electricity 
system is highly regulated or made up entirely of competitive markets at the different levels 
of trade, the electricity purchased by the government and sold to retail consumers were in 
competition with private sector electricity retailers.95  
What can be concluded from the Panel’s reasoning is that, if countries with a 
competitive electricity market with private sector electricity retailers adopt trade restrictive 
measures to promote green energy development, these measures cannot be justified under 
GATT Article III:8(a) and will be considered in conflict with WTO law. As such, based on the 
Panel’s decision, to satisfy the ‘not with a view to commercial resale’ criteria and justify their 
trade restrictive measure to support green energy development under GATT Article III:8(a), it 
seems that countries would basically need to be in two positions: (i) have a nationalised 
                                                          
94 Aditya Sarmah, ‘Renewable Energy and Article III:8(A) of the GATT: Reassessing the Environment-Trade 
Conflict in Light of the Next Generation Cases’ (2017) 9(2) Trade, Law and Development 197, 212. 
95 WTO, Canada — Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector, Canada — Measures 
relating to the Feed-in Tariff Program – Reports of the Panels (19 December 2012) WT/DS412/R and 
WT/DS426/R, [7.148]. 
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electricity system, where the government is the only supplier of electricity; or (ii)  have 
government agencies acting on behalf of the government under the express authority 
conferred by it and be performing activities exclusively performed by the government. 
Sarmah argues that this appears to cover several public-private partnerships, especially those 
secured through a tendering process.96 However, there is no express confirmation of this by 
the Panel or Appellate Body in the cases. What seems certain is that companies cannot be 
involved in a competitive and commercial setup. 
The Appellate Body did not elaborate on ‘with a view to commercial resale’, so its 
position is unknown. The Appellate Body legal reasoning, applied in Canada — Renewable 
Energy/FIT Programme and followed in India – Solar Cells, was on the finding that the product 
of foreign origin allegedly being discriminated against must be in a competitive relationship 
with the product purchased by the government. In the given cases, the foreign product was 
the green energy generation equipment (manufactured/purchased by the private sector to 
generate electricity) while the product purchased by the Ontario and India governments was 
electricity. Therefore, the discrimination relating to generation equipment contained in the 
FIT Programme was not covered by the derogation of Article III:8(a) of the GATT 1994.97 The 
Appellate Body’s approach has been criticised in the literature in favour of the Panels’ 
approach.98  
What is crucial in the Appellate Body’s decision is that it is irrelevant that the products 
(i.e. solar panels) might be in a close relationship, in the sense that electricity cannot be 
                                                          
96 Aditya Sarmah, ‘Renewable Energy and Article III:8(A) of the GATT: Reassessing the Environment-Trade 
Conflict in Light of the Next Generation Cases’ (2017) 9(2) Trade, Law and Development 197, 213. 
97 WTO, Canada — Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector, Canada — Measures 
relating to the Feed-in Tariff Program – Reports of the Appellate Body (6 May 2013) WT/DS412/AB/R and 
WT/DS426/AB/R, [5.79]. 
98 Arwel Davies, ‘The GATT Article III:8(a) Procurement Derogation and Canada – Renewable Energy’ (2015) 18(3) 
Journal of International Economic Law 543. 
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generated and then procured without electricity generating equipment (i.e. solar panels). 
Under the current technological stage, without solar cells and modules there is no solar 
generated electricity. Therefore, solar cells are a central aspect of solar electrical power 
generation. If the Appellate Body’s position is followed in future disputes, one of the primary 
conditions for Article III:8(a) of the GATT to be applied is that the trade restrictive measures 
should be in relation to the product purchased by the government. Therefore, if the trade 
restrictive measures are directed to green energy equipment, then the government itself 
should purchase the equipment and generate green electricity. This would, as a result, 
amount to a situation where the government could only directly acquire the green energy 
equipment and generate electricity from it. This implies the existence of an electricity market 
structure with more government interference and participation in the electricity sector, as 
the role of electricity generation would be carried out by the government.  
If governments want electricity to be generated by the private sector, and then be 
purchased by governments, in order to apply Article III:8(a) of the GATT, the trade restrictive 
measure would need to be in relation to green electricity not green energy generation 
equipment (i.e solar panels). However, in these circumstances, there would be no direct 
incentive to develop a national green energy manufacturing industry, as the electricity 
producers could import all equipment to generate green electricity. Therefore, what can be 
concluded here is that the panel and Appellate Body may have wanted to prevent 
protectionist measures, but their limited approach may have had the opposite effect. As 
shown in the case study in GB, for example, participants pointed out that the government 
would be held responsible and accountable for energy interruption in the country. This may 
also apply to many other countries. As such, in attempting to prevent trade litigation and be 
compliant with WTO law, Member States, particularly countries facing energy security issues, 
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may decide to take control of their national electricity system and exclude the participation 
of the private sector so as to enable them to adopt policies necessary to ensure their green 
energy security.  
 
5.2.  GATT Article XX 
GATT Article XX provide exceptions to its main substantive obligations. The adequacy 
and sufficiency of Article XX exceptions to enable Member States to meet contemporary 
challenges have been questioned in the literature.99 With respect to green energy security, 
Article XX(a) and (j) are most relevant. Article XX(a) and (j) states:  
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which 
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between 
countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on 
international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the 
adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures: 
(a) necessary to protect public morals; 
(j) essential to the acquisition or distribution of products in general or local short 
supply; Provided that any such measures shall be consistent with the principle that 
all contracting parties are entitled to an equitable share of the international supply 
of such products, and that any such measures, which are inconsistent with the 
other provisions of the Agreement shall be discontinued as soon as the conditions 
giving rise to them have ceased to exist. The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall review 
the need for this sub-paragraph not later than 30 June 1960. 
                                                          
99 Christiane Conrad, Processes and Production Methods (PPMs) in WTO Law: Interfacing Trade and Social Goals 
(Cambridge University Press 2011), 248. 
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According to the interpretation by the Appellate Body of the introductory paragraph 
to Article XX, known as the “chapeau”, exceptions under Article XX have to observe the 
requirements in the chapeau of Article XX: the measures must not be applied in a manner 
which involves ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination’ and they must not be used as a 
‘disguised restriction on international trade’.100 The application of GATT Article XX involves a 
two-tier test: (i) justification under one of the exceptions – (a) and (j) for green energy security 
– and (ii) examination of the chapeau. The chapeau is examined after a disputed measure is 
found to fall provisionally under one of the specific exceptions.101 A panel adjudicating Article 
XX should first consider the threshold question to see if the governmental measure being 
litigated fits within the range of policies covered by the exceptions in the paragraphs of Article 
XX. If so, then the chapeau would be examined. The burden of proof lies on the party invoking 
these exceptions.102 
There is controversy over whether Article XX can be invoked to justify breaches of 
WTO Agreements other than GATT. Subsidies, for example, are enacted under the ASCM 
which does not integrate the provisions of GATT Article XX. In China – Raw Materials, the 
Panel held that GATT exceptions could only be applied to violations of the GATT unless 
specifically incorporated into a non-GATT instrument.103 For Rubini, the need to include 
‘express language’ referring to GATT Article XX is ‘unduly restrictive’ and ‘clearly wrong under 
general principles of interpretation’.104 However, in China – Publications and Audiovisual 
                                                          
100 See WTO, United States – Import Prohibition on Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products – Appellate Body Report 
(6 November 1998) WT/DS58/AB/R, [150]. 
101 Ibid [119]. 
102 Steve Charnovitz, ‘Trade and Environment’, in Arvid Lukauskas, Robert M. Stern and Gianni Zanini (eds), 
Handbook of Trade Policy for Development (Oxford Scholarship Online 2014), 900. 
103 WTO, China — Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials – Panel Report (5 July 2011) 
WT/DS394/R, WT/DS395/R, WT/DS398/R. 
104 Luca Rubini, ‘Ain’t Wastin’ Time No More: Subsidies for Renewable Energy, The SCM Agreement, Policy Space, 
and Law Reform’ (2012) 15(2) Journal of International Economic Law 525, 565. 
243 
 
Products dispute, the Appellate Body held that Article XX of the GATT could apply to China’s 
Protocol of Accession,105 and for the first time it showed a positive attitude towards the idea 
that Article XX might be applicable beyond the scope of the agreement.106 This topic, 
nonetheless, is still being debated and, therefore, it is uncertain whether Article XX can be 
used to justify green energy subsidies under the ASCM.  
Article XX(a) and (j) will be analysed in the following sections.  
 
5.2.1 Article XX(a) – Social disruption within public morals exception?  
As shown in the case study of Brazil, and acknowledged by participants in the case 
study of GB, lack of energy supply can lead to social disruption. In this context, the 
maintenance of public order as an exception may be applicable to green energy security, i.e. 
as a defence for trade restrictive measures to promote green energy development with a view 
of ensuring energy security. 
However, unlike Article XIV(a) of the GATS which expressly includes as defence 
measures necessary to “protect public morals” or to “maintain public order”, the exception 
IN Article XX(a) of the GATT does not expressly include the wording “to maintain public order”. 
Article XX(a) of the GATT applies to measures “necessary to protect public morals” only.  
Nonetheless, difficulty remains in determining whether policy objectives invoked in a specific 
case would actually fall within the scope of public morals or order.107 In this case, could social 
                                                          
105 WTO, China – Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and 
Audiovisual Entertainment Products – Appellate Body Report (21 December 2009) WT/DS363/AB/R. 
106 Joost Pauwelyn, ‘Squaring Free Trade in Culture with Chinese Censorship: The WTO Appellate Body Report 
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disruption as a result of lack of energy supply be included within the public morals exception 
under GATT Article XX(a)? 
The interpretation of “public morals” was developed by the Panel in US – Gambling108 
and adopted by the Panel in China – Publications and Audiovisual Products. In particular, it 
was held that "the term 'public morals' denotes standards of right and wrong conduct 
maintained by or on behalf of a community or nation”109 and that “the content of these 
concepts for Members can vary in time and space, depending upon a range of factors, 
including prevailing social, cultural, ethical and religious values.”110 The panel also 
acknowledged that in applying this and other similar societal concepts, Member States 
“should be given some scope to define and apply for themselves the concepts of 'public 
morals' ... in their respective territories, according to their own systems and scales of 
values”.111 
It can be argued that cases of social unrest as a result of lack of energy supply are likely 
to affect the standards of right and wrong maintained by a country. Thus, following Brazil – 
Taxation,112 the responding party would have had to establish that green energy development 
was very important to the country, as a means of maintaining its standards of right and wrong, 
and that green energy security as a public policy objective at issue was indeed a public moral 
objective according to its value system.113 As such, the discriminatory aspects of the trade 
restrictive measure would need to be necessary in order to ensure continuity of green energy 
supply. 
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However, in Brazil – Taxation, the Panel also ruled that imports must be taken into 
account when assessing continuity of supply in a WTO Member State.114 Thus, the exception 
under Article XX(a) would probably not succeed for green energy security if green energy 
technologies were available to be imported. Also, the complaining parties would probably 
suggest WTO-consistent alternative approaches, such as the lowering of trade barriers to 
green energy technologies, as a more effective approach of achieving green energy security 
objectives. WTO-consistent alternative approaches could be valid for ensuring short-term 
energy security, but not for long-term energy security in circumstances where countries are 
adopting strategies to have domestic green energy technologies available in cases of trade 
supply disruptions. Thus, the exception under Article XX(a) is only likely to succeed in 
situations where there is no green energy technologies available in the international market 
to be imported. However, as previously stated, the development of a green energy 
technology industry is not straightforward, so countries would be in a position where they 
would need to cope with social disruption for some time until their domestic industry is 
developed to ensure green energy security. 
Although not available under GATT Article XX(a), the public order exception is 
available under the WTO agreement on services set out at GATS Article XIV(a), which establish 
under footnote 5 that ‘[t]he public order exception may be invoked only where a genuine and 
sufficiently serious threat is posed to one of the fundamental interests of society’. An analysis 
of the defences under GATS is outside the scope of this chapter. However, the recent Panel’s 
decision in EU – Energy Package115 on the public order exception under GATS Article XIV(a) 
provides insights into how future disputes on green energy security may unfold in the WTO 
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DSB, as the Panel concluded that security of energy supply is a fundamental interest of society 
within the meaning of footnote 5 to Article XIV(a) of the GATS.116 
EU – Energy Package is a recent and the only WTO case so far where security of energy 
supply was directly related to maintenance of public order. In EU – Energy Package, the 
European Union (EU) raised the public order exception under GATS Article XIV(a), arguing that 
the trade restrictive measure was necessary to ensure the EU’s security of energy supply and 
hence to maintain public order on the basis that security of energy supply is a fundamental 
interest of society.117 Although dealing with the interpretation of the public order exception 
rather than the public morals exception, and with conventional energy rather than green 
energy, the recent Panel’s decision in EU – Energy Package made important remarks relating 
to the concept of security of energy supply.  
According to the Panel, the lack of a definition of security of energy supply in a 
Member State’s legal documents are no basis for concluding that Article XIV(a) covers only 
fundamental interests which are defined in the challenged measure or elsewhere in the 
legislation of the responding party. However, a certain minimum level of clarity is required in 
order to assess, in a meaningful manner, whether a stated interest can be considered a 
fundamental interest of society within the meaning of footnote 5. Also, as the responding 
party bears the burden of making a prima facie case when advancing a defence, it is then for 
the responding party to provide sufficient clarity concerning the meaning of the concept of 
security of energy supply during the proceedings.118  
Thus, there is no reason as to why the same conclusions should not be applied to the 
public morals exception. This, therefore, means that, if energy security is invoked as an 
                                                          
116 Ibid [7.1156]. 
117 Ibid [7.1143].  
118 Ibid [7.1149] – [7.1153]. 
247 
 
element of public morals, legal documents do not necessarily need to define what energy 
security is as long as the concept is defined with clarity during proceedings. Given the 
multiplicity of energy security concepts shown in previous chapters, and the manipulation of 
energy security language for one’s own interest as shown in the case study on GB in chapter 
4, this approach leaves broad discretion for energy security to be defined in proceedings in a 
way which is most advantageous for the responding party. It is unfortunate that the Panel 
took this approach as, based on this, it would be wise for Member States not to define energy 
security in their laws and policies, as this would limit the range of interpretative possibilities 
relating to the concept that a respondent party could raise as defence. However, such an 
approach will not bring clarity or stability to the green energy security debate.  
Another important finding of EU – Energy Package is that the Panel did not require 
imminent or actual social unrest to grant the defence. Therefore, that social disruption has 
materialised is not a prerequisite for the public order exception.119 What is needed is the 
existence of a real and true possibility of security of supply being undermined.120 As this was 
the standard applied to public order, there is no reason as to why a Panel would apply a higher 
standard to the public morals exception. Therefore, it seems that it is sufficient for a Member 
State to show evidence that social unrest as a result of lack of security of green energy supply 
would undermine the protection of public morals. The materialisation of social unrest is not 
necessary. However, this exception for green energy security is still likely to fail if there is 
international green energy technologies trade. This exception, therefore, does not allow for 
countries to strategically prepare in advance for long-term green energy security in 
circumstances where international trade is not available.  
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5.2.2  Article XX(j) – Short supply exception   
Article XX(j) was interpreted for the first time by the WTO DSB in India – Solar Cells. 
When raising Article XX(j) exception as a defence, India advocated a holistic approach by 
arguing that the domestic content requirement measures and the basis for invoking Article 
XX(j) needed to be seen in the context of the overall objectives of energy security and 
ecologically sustainable growth for which acquisition or distribution of indigenously 
manufactured solar cells and modules was essential,121 as well as being seen in the context of 
India's overall energy scenario and the challenges it was currently facing, which were 
characterised by India's rising energy deficit, and its dependence on fossil fuels and imported 
materials for its energy requirements.122 
The US, as complainant and appellee, made no categorical comments in relation to 
India’s public policy regarding energy security. The US advocated the narrow approach of 
taking into account the language of the WTO provisions only and not considerations regarding 
the achievement of policy objectives.123 For the US, the policy rationale behind the measure 
should not be considered a valid ground. In the US’s written submissions to the Panel and to 
the Appellate Body, the wording ‘energy security’ or ‘security of supply’ was never used in the 
US’s own arguments. The US acknowledged the environmental underpinnings of the National 
Solar Mission by noting that the promotion of solar energy was ‘a laudable goal that the 
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United States and many other WTO Members share, and it is not this environmental objective 
that the United States challenges in this dispute .‘124  
The US gave no explanation about the lack of debate on their part concerning energy 
security as a public policy and the reason as to why this was not advanced remains unknown. 
Two hypothetical reasons for this can only be briefly surmised here. It could be that the US 
decided not to draw attention to energy security as an important factor as a diversionary 
tactic to actually prevent the Panel and Appellate Body from having to acknowledge energy 
security as an important ground for derogation, or that the US genuinely thought that energy 
security played no explicit role in the configuration of the issues at stake in this case. However, 
there is no certainty in these arguments. Whatever the reason might be, the US decision not 
to engage with the energy security argument reveals a tension surrounding this issue and the 
potential for energy security to be deployed in various strategic ways to suit certain policy 
needs. 
The Panel did not endorse India’s argument, but limited and centred its legal reasoning 
on the interpretation of the terms of the provisions pursuant to the ordinary meaning of the 
terms,125 as well as in light of the interpretation related to the history of Article XX(j) as a way 
of confirming its interpretation.126 
India’s policy objectives were dismissed as ‘legally irrelevant’ by the Panel: 
‘[…] we do not consider that these wider objectives of energy security and 
sustainable development would be legally relevant to the question of whether 
the DCR measures are “essential to the acquisition” of products in short supply 
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under Article XX(j). We therefore disagree with India's statement that, in the 
context of Article XX(j), the DCR measures must “be examined in the context 
of the overall objectives of energy security and ecologically sustainable growth 
for which acquisition or distribution of domestically manufactured solar cells 
and modules is essential”.127 
Similarly to the Panel, the Appellate Body’s analysis was limited to the interpretation 
of the language in the articles raised by the parties. The Appellate Body conﬁrmed the Panel’s 
ﬁnding that India’s lack of domestic manufacturing capacity was not sufﬁcient to constitute 
product shortage and agreed that India merely identiﬁed potential disruptions to imports and 
failed to demonstrate any actual disruptions. Energy security as a public policy played no role 
in the legal reasoning of the Panel or the Appellate Body. For the Panel, policy objectives are 
legally irrelevant under article XX(j). For the Appellate Body, policy considerations may inform 
the nature and extent of the provisions under Article XX(j), but the party invoking the 
exception must demonstrate the applicability of the ordinary meaning of the terms of the 
WTO provisions.128 Therefore, the focus has been primarily on the need for the invoking party 
to meet the substantive requirements of the relevant provision of WTO law. 
Turning to the interpretation of the language under Article XX(j), the argument that 
import dependency amounts to energy security concerns will most likely fail in any dispute. 
Based on the Panel and Appellate Body’s decision, it can be understood that the following 
criteria must apply concomitantly: 
 (i) Members are not entitled to an equitable share in the international production of 
green energy products but instead are entitled to an equitable share of the international 
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supply of green energy products. Therefore, a Member State cannot raise the argument that 
it needs its own domestic production of green energy equipment when there is access to the 
international supply of the product. Thus, if there is supply availability of the product in the 
international market, Article XX(j) cannot be raised; 
(ii) There must be imminent risks of supply shortage or actual supply shortage of green 
energy equipment, not potential risks. The simple existence of low domestic manufacturing 
capacity does not qualify as an imminent risk. Thus, evidence of the lack of supply or evidence 
of imminent risks of supply shortage is key for the applicability of Article XX(j). Arguments 
about possible shortages in the future do not fall within Article XX(j). The level of domestic 
production, the relevant product and geographic market, potential price fluctuations, and 
accessibility of international supplies, for instance, will be taken into account to demonstrate 
the availability and sufficiency of the product.129 Also, in assessing whether a product is in 
general or local short supply, the stage of development of a Member State should be taken 
into account in determining exposure to supply disruption. As noted by the Appellate Body, 
‘different levels of economic development of Members may, depending on the 
circumstances, impact the availability of supply of a product in a given market. Developing 
countries may, for example, have less domestic production, and may be more vulnerable to 
disruptions in supply than developed countries.’130 Although the Appellate Body leaves more 
room to apply the short supply exception under Article XX(j) to developing countries, only 
allowing imminent or actual risks of supply shortage may still cause greater adverse impact 
on developing countries that are dependent on imported green energy technological 
products. These products require a certain level of human and technological expertise and 
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time in order to develop an adequate domestic manufacturing capacity, and if there is a 
significant imminent or actual supply shortage it may be too late to adopt measures that avoid 
green energy supply disruption. 
(iii) The trade restrictive measures must be essential to address the situation of short 
supply. The meaning of essential was not clarified by the Appellate Body. However, the 
Appellate Body points out that the same process of weighing and balancing a series of factors 
for a “necessity” analysis under Article XX(d) is relevant in assessing “essential” under Article 
XX(j).131 
Therefore, for trade restrictive measures with a view to developing green energy to 
be justified under GATT Article XX(j), there must be an imminent or actual supply shortage 
and the measures must be essential to addressing the supply shortage. The position is, 
therefore, based on short-termism, which can cause great adverse impact on countries 
dependent on imported green energy technological products in an event of unavailability of 
the products in the market. These products require a certain level of human and technological 
expertise and time in order to develop an adequate domestic manufacturing capacity and if 
there is a significant imminent or actual supply shortage it may be too late to adopt measures 
that avoid green energy supply disruption. Also, based on the interpretation given to GATT 
Article XX(j), the argument of developing a green energy domestic manufacturing capacity in 
order to ensure long-term green energy security has no chance to succeed.  
 
5.3 GATT Article XXI: national security 
GATT Article XXI provides: 
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Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed 
(a) to require any contracting party to furnish any information the disclosure 
of which it considers contrary to its essential security interests; or 
(b) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action which it considers 
necessary for the protection of its essential security interests 
(i) relating to fissionable materials or the materials from which they are 
derived; 
(ii) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war 
and to such traffic in other goods and materials as is carried on directly 
or indirectly for the purpose of supplying a military establishment; 
(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations; 
or 
(c) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action in pursuance of its 
obligations under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of 
international peace and security. 
Article XXI permits derogation from otherwise applicable trade obligations, such as the 
WTO provisions of national treatment and MFN, in cases of ‘essential security interest’. Unlike 
the general exceptions under Article XX, the security exception encompasses a non-
conditional provision. As one scholar has argued, for WTO members, security exceptions 
represent ‘an indispensable escape mechanism or safety valve’132 when their very existence 
is under threat. In the literature, the view is also advanced that, with Article XXI, Members 
have sought to retain a degree of autonomy over decisions in ‘sensitive’ policy areas, while 
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balancing the tension between their national security and free trade.133 Scholars agree that 
the language of Article XXI is broad and ambiguous,134 giving Member States an open-ended 
discretion and a potential power to abuse it.135 One researcher has even claimed that leaving 
national security exceptions vague was necessary from a practical standpoint for Members to 
reserve the space to argue for positions of law when the actual security dispute occurs.136 The 
question then is whether green energy security falls within the security exception under GATT 
Article XXI.  
 
5.3.1. Invoking GATT Article XXI: the self-judging character of essential security 
provisions?  
 Before the analysis of the applicability of GATT Article XXI to green energy security, an 
important issue is the invocation of GATT Article XXI. A number of authors have debated the 
self-judging character of essential security provisions. As a brief analysis, at invocation, a 
contest exists between security exceptions as self-judging ‘release valves’ on the one hand, 
where only WTO Member States have the authority to define their ‘essential security 
interests’,137 and as a justiciable and limited means of escaping trade obligations on the other 
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hand, where security exceptions allow members restricted, but lawful, derogation from their 
trade obligations subject to review by a dispute settlement body.138 The central question 
therefore is who must decide whether the essential security interests of a State are at stake: 
only the State adopting the measures or is that invocation subject to some form of judicial 
review? 
Some scholars argue that the strand of thinking which emerged during the drafters’ 
discussions was that the security exception is subject to reviewable limitations.139 However, 
the US — Helms Burton140 case raised fundamental concerns about whether the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body had the authority to determine a member’s invocation of the security 
exceptions. In US — Helms Burton, the US argued that WTO panels were not competent to 
determine politically intense concerns relating to State survival and national security,141 
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irrespective of the potential for abuse of the system.142 However, the practice of the WTO on 
this issue is inconclusive.143 
The ones who adopt the self-judging view mostly argue that a textual interpretation 
of Article XXI leads to this approach144 or that the matters raised by Article XXI are political 
questions, and, as such, are not capable of judicial determination.145 From the other 
perspective, some authors argue that the WTO system is rule-oriented and that one should 
take into account the centrality of the dispute settlement system to the whole system.146 As 
such, the perception of unfettered discretion could not be sustained in connection with the 
security provisions of WTO law as this school of thought leads to the result that a Member 
State could invariably circumvent its WTO obligations by simply invoking security reasons, 
and, as a result, negatively impact a rules-based system that seeks to ensure stability and 
predictability in the international trade order.147 According to Akande and Williams, the WTO 
system must be ‘faithful’ to the terms of the security exception, but ‘at the same time seeks 
to prevent abuse of the system’.148 What is clear is that to accept Article XXI to be interpreted 
exclusively by the country invoking it could lead to abuse of this exception. However, as the 
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self-judging nature of the security exception has never been expressly confirmed by a panel 
or an Appellate Body’s ruling in the context of the WTO dispute settlement, this topic remains 
uncertain.  
 
5.3.2. Applicability of Article XXI to green energy security 
So far, Article XXI has not been determined by any GATT/WTO dispute resolution 
panel.149 Article XXI is divided into three paragraphs, but, generally speaking, the security 
exception embraces five categories: (1) national security information (Article XXI(a)); (2) 
fissionable materials (Article XXI(b) (i)); (3) military goods and services (Article XXI(b)(ii)); (4) 
war or international emergencies (Article XXI(b)(3)); and (5) UN obligations (Article XXI(c)).150 
Common to the first two paragraphs of Article XXI is that both provide that the 
essential security interest of the WTO Members is protected under the security exception. 
However, the difference between them lies in the fact that paragraph (a) allows for 
abstention from actions in order to protect these interests, whereas paragraph (b) provides 
that a Member State could, for the interest of its essential security interests, take certain 
actions, even though they might be infringing. Paragraph (c) requires prior decision under the 
UN Charter in order to become applicable. Thereby, this provision expressly gives priority to 
the obligations under the UN and specifically the Security Council, when clashing with the 
GATT.151 
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That the term ‘essential security interests’ includes matters beyond purely military 
threats can be safely concluded from the expansive reference to ‘other emergency in 
international relations’ which has been suggested to mean ‘serious international tension’.152 
As explained in chapter 3, energy security can be closely tied up with national security. 
Although GATT Article XXI was not drafted with energy trade in mind,153 the fact that 
traditional energy goods could rely on the national security exception under Article XXI has 
already been accepted by the WTO.154 Nonetheless, the reference to ‘traditional energy 
goods’ can be precisely interpreted as fossil fuels and nuclear energy. Scholars have also 
already suggested the use of energy security as a ground on which national measures can be 
insulated from trade under the national security exception of GATT Article XXI on the basis 
that energy products and services are absolutely essential for society to function.155 However, 
their analysis points towards reference to fossil fuels and nuclear energy only. There are no 
studies which examine whether green energy security can fall within the national security 
exception under GATT Article XXI. What can be safely inferred is that including green energy 
security as a ground under Article XXI would require the terms of this provision to be 
interpreted in light of contemporaneous circumstances.  
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As shown in the case study of Brazil, there was no express association of energy 
security with national security in law and policies in any of the 162 documents analysed. In 
the case study of GB, interviews with leading energy experts did not present express evidence 
of an association of energy security with national security either. If Brazil or GB, for example, 
wanted to raise green energy security within the scope of Article XXI, evidence in laws and 
policy documents of green energy security being defined as essential security interests would 
be necessary if the approach taken is that the panel and the Appellate Body should examine 
whether a Member’s explanation is reasonable or whether the measure constitutes an 
apparent abuse. Therefore, national security as the fundamental component of green energy 
security being reflected in laws and policies would be important for an Article XXI defence to 
have any chances of succeeding. However, if Article XXI is interpreted as allowing Members 
States to invoke the provision free from any judicial review, Brazil, GB or any State’s arbitrary 
declaration on the need to protect security interests would need to be accepted and no 
evidence would be necessary. On this latter view, Member States could easily raise Article 
XXI, particularly paragraph (b)(iii), on the grounds of green energy security as an essential 
security interest. 
However, would the association of green energy security with national security be 
beneficial? In a positive vein, it would promote the national development of green energy. 
However, in a negative vein, Member States would be securitising the promotion of green 
energy. As explained under chapter 3, securitising green energy can, for instance, make the 
development of green energy a justification for using military force or other instruments of 
coercion, override access to information, reinforce the discourses of control, restrict public 
participation and limit individual freedom. These consequences would certainly not be 
desirable. In any case, given the rarity of invocations of Article XXI, Member States do not 
260 
 
seem to be willing to defend their measures by an invocation of the security exception in 
formal dispute resolution proceedings. It is, therefore, unlikely that Article XXI would be 
raised on the grounds of green energy security. Another way of attempting to include green 
energy security within the scope of Article XXI is to ask whether economic security can 
amount to national security interest. This will be analysed below.  
 
5.3.3. Is economic security a national security interest under Article XXI? 
 It is widely acknowledged that energy is an essential enabler of economic prosperity. 
As demonstrated in the case studies of GB and Brazil, energy supply interruption not only 
negatively impact the economy in terms of production and job availability, for instance, but 
also in terms of attracting investments. Energy security is, therefore, essential for the well-
functioning of an economy. In the case study of Brazil, in particular, the framing of energy 
security was in the context of economic development, demonstrating that energy security in 
Brazil is first and foremost an economic issue. In this sense, green energy supply interruption, 
particularly supply of biofuels in the context of Brazil, could negatively impact the economy 
not only as a result of lack of energy, but also as a result of reduction of the economic output 
for the country from biofuels. Therefore, associating green energy with economic security is 
not a difficult task. In these circumstances, could Brazil raise the argument of economic 
security under Article XXI in order to adopt trade restrictive measures to promote green 
energy development? 
 So far, economic security has not been invoked under GATT Article XXI in a WTO 
dispute. However, in the literature, economic security has been argued to be a dimension of 
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national security,156 particularly as a result of increased interdependence in global markets 
where one nation’s default may trigger a worldwide chain reaction, cascade failures and may 
cause a calamity.157 Economic security has been broadly defined to include securing a nation’s 
industrial and technological base, access to critical materials and resources and the 
functioning of critical infrastructures and services that are required for critical societal 
functions158 as well as with reference to global capital and commodities markets flows.159  
 In terms of the inclusion of economic security within the national security exception 
under GATT Article XXI, according to Broome, the few disputes in the GATT invoking Article 
XXI, as well as the negotiating history of Article XXI do not seem to support economic security 
within the meaning of “essential security interests.”160 In his view, equating economic security 
with national security in the context of Article XXI would likely constitute an unacceptably 
broad interpretation of Article XXI.161  
 However, the broader concept of economic security would not be difficult to be 
included within the dimension of essential security interests under Article XXI if a 
contemporary interpretation was adopted. It would be important for a Member State raising 
this point to show in its laws and policies that its society places a great importance on its 
economic security as a national security interest if Article XXI is not seen as self-judging. 
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However, the fact that Article XXI has not been applied in a decided WTO case so far indicates 
that Member States seem to be reluctant to partake in the securitisation agenda. It also 
suggests that the security exception clause might be applicable only in rare circumstances.  
As the textual content of the GATT was not fully developed regarding the situations 
where measures could be adopted for security reasons, the scope of Article XXI is still quite 
unsettled. As shown under chapter 3, one of the consequences of securitisation is that 
security concerns can be devised in order to achieve certain policy aims. Policy makers can 
place a specific matter of interest under the security umbrella to prioritise and push forward 
the approval of preferred policies. However, care should also be taken in its interpretation as, 
in the words of Professor Jackson, the national security exception ‘can reopen the door to 
arbitrary abuse’.162  GATT Article XXI should not be seen as a political instrument with the aim 
to enable the contracting parties to take actions or adopt measures with a view of achieving 
a particular public policy and protecting certain interests, such as green energy security. Its 
applicability should be as a last resort. 
 
5.4 Final remarks on the section 
This section has demonstrated that there might be some room for short-term green 
energy security within the defences under Articles III:8(a), XX(a) and (j) and Article XXI. 
However, under Article XX(a), this means that the defence only applies in circumstances 
where there is no international trade available, and the exception under Article XX(j) also 
requires actual or imminent short supply. These defences, therefore, are of no use to 
countries wishing to apply trade restrictive measures to develop their green national industry 
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as a strategic way to prepare them for any circumstances where there is no international 
trade, such as political unrest, conflict and trade embargoes. 
For long-term green energy security, i.e. countries seeking to develop their domestic 
green energy industry so that they do not become overly dependent on imports and 
international trade in cases of trade disruption, the only possible defences are under GATT 
Article III: 8(a) and GATT Article XXI. However, according to the Panel’s and Appellate Body’s 
decisions on green energy jurisprudence so far, it seems that trade restrictive measures under 
Article III(8) will only have chances to succeed in a scenario where the energy market structure 
is basically nationalised, that is, without the participation of the private sector in a competitive 
relationship. Invocation of the national security exception under Article XXI to defend trade 
restrictive green energy measures may also be possible, but will have the consequence of 
green energy being securitised. From the foregoing analysis, therefore, it is seems that room 
for long-term green energy security is only available under GATT if the government takes 
control over the energy market or if green energy is expressly associated with national 
security.  
 Future WTO Panels and the Appellate Body could follow a different approach, be it a 
wider and holistic one or even a more restrictive approach, as the Appellate Body has a 
significant amount of discretion in how they interpret WTO provisions.163 Previous cases 
show, for example, that some adjudicators in the GATT/WTO have contributed to shifts in the 
meaning of the general exceptions enshrined in Article XX of the GATT.164 Nevertheless, while 
in WTO jurisprudence previous decisions are not biding for all future cases, the Appellate 
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Body strives to maintain consistency between a ruling in an appeal and of that in subsequent 
appeals involving the same issue.165  
An option for reverting the limited defences available for long-term green energy 
security could be the adoption of a broader, holistic and contemporary interpretation of the 
provisions, involving weighing and balancing the importance of the interest being protected, 
the contribution of the measure to the protection of that interest, and the trade-
restrictiveness of the measure, in light of any WTO-consistent less trade-restrictive 
reasonably-available alternatives that could achieve the same level of protection. As per Van 
Damme, ‘[t]reaties are incomplete. Nothing is decided comprehensively in advance. Treaties 
reﬂect a negotiated political compromise and will leave issues unanswered, unprovided for, 
or unclear.166 Such is the case for green energy security when the texts of the WTO 
agreements were negotiated.  
Nonetheless, how far can the WTO DBS adjudicators go beyond what could be 
considered ‘ordinary interpretation’? The answer is controversial and brings criticisms of 
illegitimacy directed at the WTO system as a whole. The ﬁne line between interpretation of 
factual circumstances of vague provisions and that which goes beyond is hard to draw. What 
is clear, nonetheless, is that the modern world faces challenges which were not in place when 
WTO law was enacted. Therefore, WTO rules are not well designed to address some issues. 
For example, transitioning to a greener energy supply whist having to cope with increasing 
population and rising energy demand is a key issue worldwide, and the terms of the WTO 
provisions were not negotiated with these problems in sight. A reductionist interpretation, 
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particularly if the interpretation of WTO law is by recourse to the history of the provision, may 
not be able to take into account the current challenges faced by society or prepare society for 
possible future challenges. The primary responsibility for achieving green energy security lies 
not with the WTO, but rather its Members: national governments. 
 Rule change through litigation strategies to alter the interpretation of existing WTO 
rules also has additional negative aspects, such as governments having to use taxpayers’ 
money to resort to the lengthy and costly litigation process under the WTO. This would 
particularly affect developing and least developed countries as they often lack the resources 
to participate in the litigation.167 Also, the decisions still would not bring legal certainty as 
decisions are not authoritative in all future cases. WTO rules, nonetheless, must address the 
concerns of Member States in ensuring green energy security without fearing WTO litigations. 
The next section will propose a possible solution.  
 
6. Proposal for green energy security in the law of the WTO 
The previous section demonstrated that policy space for green energy security within 
the GATT exceptions is limited, particularly for long-term green energy security strategies. 
However, green energy security solutions must be not only short-term, but also long-term. 
The beneﬁts of trade do not necessarily imply that WTO membership has been doing an 
adequate and sufficient job of promoting green energy security worldwide. Green energy 
security should be a critical long-term domestic policy goal, and, as such, should not be 
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ignored in the WTO and should assume a high profile in this system due to the need to 
transition to a low carbon energy system.  
The WTO seeks liberalised trade in a world where green energy technologies are still 
an emerging industry in most countries. The WTO, therefore, should support the creation of 
competitive and stable domestic industries that could supply the domestic and international 
markets. The proposal which follows is based on the assumption that where domestic 
producers could not compete with foreign imports absent government protection, WTO law 
should allow the protection afforded to domestic producers, so that such producers can 
develop their industry. Support for the development of domestic green energy industries 
worldwide could enable an otherwise uncompetitive domestic industry to become 
competitive to such an extent that it could supply the national and international markets, 
resulting in a more evenly distributed global green energy market and lower prices for 
consumers and, therefore, a net welfare benefit in terms of social development and inclusion 
worldwide.   
There might be WTO compliant incentives available to promote green energy 
development domestically. However, if countries are using local content requirements and 
subsidies non-compliant with WTO law, one could expect that this would be based on an 
economic and technical analysis of the most viable and efficient manner to develop a green 
energy industry nationally in accordance with a country’s circumstances. Therefore, as long 
as there is evidence of this economic and technical analysis, i.e. an analysis of absence of 
viable and efficient non-trade restrictive measures to foster the development of a domestic 
green energy industry, Member States should be allowed some policy space to develop their 
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green energy industry with a view of ensuring short-term and long-term green energy 
security. The proposal below will elaborate on how to create such policy space. 
The WTO multilateral trading system could and should become a relevant tool for 
supporting green energy security in a world where green energy security concerns are 
becoming increasingly more widespread and attempts are made to carry out a just energy 
transition. However, how do we create the legal space in the WTO for trade restrictive 
measures aiming to ensure green energy security? A proposal will be discussed in the 
following subsection. 
6.1. Proposal – The way forward 
While the multilateral trade rules are oriented towards ensuring market access, WTO 
law should also be supporting green energy scale-up. Thus, the proposal is to allow temporary 
trade restrictive measures subject to an economic and technical analysis of the most viable 
and efficient manner to develop green energy technologies domestically in accordance with 
a country’s circumstances, so that Member States can develop a percentage – ten per cent, 
for example, to be agreed amongst Member States – of their national green energy industry. 
This would temporarily bring the world to a scenario in which there would be two basic groups 
of main players: (i) countries with national green energy industry developed and (ii) countries 
with no or emerging green energy industry.  
These two groups would have differing sets of trade obligations. Countries with no or 
emerging green energy industry would enjoy “special and differential treatment,” to allow 
them to develop a percentage of their domestic industry. Although this approach means that 
the trade regime would be asymmetrical, this asymmetry would be temporary, as when 
countries achieved, for example, ten per cent of domestic market share, they would graduate 
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to taking on full trade obligations. One may criticise this proposal as inadequate for a 
sustainable non-discriminatory multilateral trading system. However, this type of measures 
would be transitional and would assist in bringing a plurality of green energy players into the 
national and global green energy markets. By increasing the number of market participants, 
it would boost reliability of green energy technologies supply. With a plurality of green energy 
players worldwide, unpredicted trade restrictions scenarios would also be less likely to cause 
green energy interruption, as this proposal would support the opening of new routes to 
supply of green energy technologies. How the proposal could be implemented is discussed as 
follows.  
 
6.2. How to implement the proposal? 
Member States need to use a pragmatic approach to address green energy security. 
Thus, Member States could consider two options: (i) add a permanent green energy security 
exception; or (ii) agree on a temporary implementation of a waiver. 
Amendment of existing WTO rules and the formulation of new rules in order to 
strengthen policy space for green energy security purposes could be an option via the 
inclusion of a green energy security exception under GATT. Attempting to amend agreements 
under the WTO is, nonetheless, quite complicated, not only because of the nature of the 
negotiations, but also because of the body’s decision-making processes.168 Realistically, 
negotiations on this process would be complex, time consuming and subject to political will. 
Given the unsuccessful Doha Round trade talks, the latest round of trade negotiations among 
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the WTO membership,169 this option seems unfeasible at the moment. It would, nonetheless, 
serve to demonstrate the functionality of the global trade body’s negotiating arm. 
Waivers may also be an option. The WTO’s waiver power is found in Article IX:3 of the 
Agreement Establishing the WTO (WTO Agreement). It allows the Ministerial Conference ‘[i]n 
exceptional circumstances. . . to waive an obligation imposed on a Member by this Agreement 
or any of the Multilateral Trade Agreements, provided that any such decision shall be taken 
by three-fourths of the Members’. Thus, the WTO waiver is the power of the WTO Ministerial 
Conference to suspend any legal obligation of the WTO Agreement or the annexed 
Multilateral Trade Agreements170 to address tensions, such as the tension between 
international governance and domestic government, and the tension between societies at 
different stages of economic development and with different forms of government.171 The 
waiver is a binding legal act which formally suspends legal obligations and thus allows for non-
compliance without putting into question the validity of WTO law.172 The waiver, therefore, 
can allow Member States to take measures in violation of WTO obligations in respect of green 
energy development. Thus, Member States should consider the waiver as an option for policy 
space for green energy security as its use would ﬂexibilise WTO law and thus address the 
tensions identiﬁed above.  
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The terms and conditions governing the applicability of the waiver for the 
development of a minimal percentage of a national green energy industry in line with the 
aforementioned proposal should provide for specific time limits to be set when a waiver is 
granted, an annual review and its termination. 
A waiver decision, according to Article IX:3 of the WTO Agreement, needs to be 
adopted by three-fourths of the members. Although this is a strict voting requirement, it is 
less challenging than attempts to modify WTO texts. However, waivers are not granted to 
developed Member States to allow them to adopt protectionist measures.173 Therefore, 
waiver to allow green energy development could only be granted to developing and least-
developed country members. This limitation, nonetheless, should not prevent the use of a 
waiver as, in practice, developing and least-developed country members have far greater 
difficulties in developing their national green energy industry.  
The waiver would, therefore, allow developing and least-developed Member States to 
maintain trade restrictive measures in violation of WTO law for green energy security reasons 
to allow a minimal percentage of a national green energy industry to be developed. An 
exception in this direction could provide the right incentives for countries to acquire serious 
commitments on long-term green energy security and at the same time promote the stability 
of the multilateral trading system with the existence of a plurality of green energy players 
widespread around the world.  
The international community needs to respond realistically to countries wanting to 
develop their green energy industry on the basis of ensuring green energy security. With this 
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proposal, domestic policies supporting the development and scale-up of green energy for 
energy security purposes would be more explicitly permissible and thus sheltered from 
challenge. This proposal is intended to open the debate in this direction.  
 
7. Conclusions 
This chapter examined whether there is any flexibility within the current GATT/WTO 
rules and the interpretation given to them that permit trade restrictive measures which 
support green energy security. It showed that green energy development has increasingly 
come to be associated with energy security in the WTO jurisprudence. An analysis of the WTO 
green energy disputes involving energy security revealed that broader concepts of energy 
security found in the literature which include environmental, climate and social 
considerations have not reached the jurisprudence in the WTO system yet.  
Energy security concepts have been raised differently by respondents. While in 
Canada — Renewable Energy and Canada — Feed-In Tariff Programme the concept focused 
on availability and reliability, in India – Solar Cells, in addition to availability and reliability, 
affordability is also placed as part of the energy security concept. Interestingly, the energy 
security concept as raised by Canada is the same concept raised by the majority of 
participants in the case study of GB, which is correlated to the view adopted by the UK 
government in recent policy documents. The concept raised by India which include the 
elements of availability, reliability and affordability is the same concept in the current legal 
framework in Brazil as shown in chapter 5. However, energy security concept is dynamic and 
evolves, so it may be just a coincidence that developed countries, i.e. Canada and UK, 
currently use the same concept, while emerging economies, i.e. India and Brazil, currently use 
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the same concepts. Further comparative studies on the topic would be necessary to draw any 
further conclusions here.  
What was also an interesting finding in the analyses of Canada — Renewable Energy 
and Canada — Feed-In Tariff Programme was the fact that the panel and Appellate Body 
presented a different framing for green energy and energy security links. While the panel 
focused on green energy not supporting energy security due to green energy intermittent 
nature, the Appellate Body advanced the role played by green energy in ensuring energy 
security in the long-term. From a legal perspective this divergence in frames has implications 
for the interplay between energy security and green energy under WTO law, because the 
frame adopted can impact the applicability and interpretation of WTO provisions. The 
negative frame, for instance, cuts down the room for energy security to be raised as a legal 
defence for trade restrictive measures adopted to promote green energy. Such negative 
frame might signal about the inability of WTO to adapt to a changing global landscape and 
add to the discontent among its membership. 
The analyses of room for green energy security as a justification for trade restrictive 
measures concluded that there might be some room for short-term green energy security 
within the defences under Articles III:8(a), XX(a) and (j) and Article XXI. However, under Article 
XX(a), this means that the defence only applies in circumstances where there is no 
international trade available, and the exception under Article XX(j) also requires actual or 
imminent short supply. These two exceptions under GATT Article XX are only likely to succeed 
in situations where there are no green energy technologies available in the international 
market to be imported. However, the development of a green energy technology industry is 
not straightforward, so countries would be left in a position where they would need to cope 
with the negative consequences of imminent or actual green energy supply disruption for 
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some time until their domestic industry is developed to ensure green energy security. These 
defences are also inapplicable to countries wishing to adopt trade restrictive measures to 
develop their national green energy industry as a strategic way to prepare them for any 
circumstances where there is no international trade, such as political unrest, conflict and 
trade embargoes. 
For long-term green energy security, i.e. countries wanting to develop their domestic 
green energy industry so that they do not become overly dependent on imports and 
international trade in cases of trade disruption, the only possible defences are under GATT 
Article III: 8(a) and GATT Article XXI. However, according to the Panel’s and Appellate Body’s 
decisions on green energy jurisprudence so far, it seems that trade restrictive measures under 
Article III:8(a) will only have chances to succeed in a scenario where the energy market 
structure is basically nationalised, that is, without the participation of the private sector in a 
competitive relationship. The panel and Appellate Body may have wanted to prevent 
protectionist measures, but their limited approach may have the opposite effect. In 
attempting to prevent trade litigation and be compliant with WTO law, State Members, 
particularly countries facing energy security issues, may decide to take control of their 
national electricity systems and exclude the participation of the private sector to adopt 
policies necessary to ensure their green energy security.  
Trade restrictive measures within the national security exception under Article XXI may 
also be possible, but will have the consequence of securitising green energy, which is not 
desirable. However, given how rarely GATT Article XXI is invoked, Member States do not seem 
to be willing to defend their measures via the invocation of the security exception in formal 
dispute resolution proceedings. In any case, given the negative consequences of 
securitisation, such as justification for using military force or other instruments of coercion, 
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overriding access to information, reinforcing discourses of control, restricting public 
participation and limiting individual freedom.  
 An option for reverting the limited defences available for green energy security could 
be the adoption of a broader, holistic and contemporary interpretation of the terms of the 
provisions, involving weighing and balancing the importance of the interest being protected, 
the contribution of the measure to the protection of that interest, and the trade-
restrictiveness of the measure, in light of any WTO-consistent less trade-restrictive 
reasonably-available alternatives that could achieve the same level of protection. However, 
rule change through litigation strategies to alter the interpretation of existing WTO rules has 
negative aspects, such as governments having to use taxpayers’ money to resort to the 
lengthy and costly litigation process under the WTO. This would particularly affect developing 
and least developed countries as they often lack the resources to participate in the 
litigation.174 Also, the decisions still would not bring legal certainty as decisions are not 
authoritative in all future cases.  
This chapter argued that an evenly distributed market share of green energy 
technologies and equipment around the world is the best solution to ensure green energy 
security in the context of the just energy transition. The WTO multilateral trading system 
could and should become a relevant tool for supporting green energy security in a world 
where green energy security concerns are becoming increasingly more widespread and 
attempts are made to carry out a just energy transition. This work, therefore, proposed a way 
forward to create the legal space in the WTO for trade restrictive measures aimed at ensuring 
green energy security. The proposal involved allowing temporary trade restrictive measures 
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subject to an economic and technical analysis of the most viable and efficient manner to 
develop green energy technologies domestically in accordance with a country’s 
circumstances, so that Member States could develop a percentage of their national green 
energy industry. With this proposal, domestic policies supporting the development and scale-
up of green energy for energy security purposes would be more explicitly permissible and 
thus sheltered from legal challenge. This proposal is intended to open the debate in this 
direction. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
 
1. Introduction 
This concluding chapter will look into some of the implications of the findings of this 
thesis for the ways in which we can understand the interplay between energy security and 
law and policies on green energy development as well as for the literature review in chapter 
3.  
In addition to pulling together the main insights and conclusions from the previous 
chapters, this final chapter will draw out the key lessons of the study and will eke out further 
implications for the disagreement on energy security concepts and for the plurality of views 
on the interplay between energy security and law and policies on green energy development. 
This chapter has three sections. The first section summarises the methodology and 
research questions. It then elaborates on the main research findings, how each chapter 
relates to each another and contributes to the literature. The final section explains the 
imitations of the thesis and sets out future avenues for expanding this research. 
 
2. Methodology and research questions  
The overarching aim of this thesis was to capture the plurality of views and the 
discursive frames that arise in relation to the interplay between energy security and national 
and international law and policies on green energy development, based on the argument that, 
if we want to have a just energy transition, we ought to pay closer attention to this 
relationship.  
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In order to achieve the thesis’ goal, this research took a socio-legal perspective, as it 
sought to study the law in its multiple and interconnected contexts. As well as adopting a 
socio-legal perspective, this thesis operated within a broadly constructionist frame, where 
there was a commitment to the idea that participants actively make or construct the world of 
everyday life and its constituent elements. Thus, the main point of this thesis was to treat the 
law and the category of ‘energy security’ within it as a construction which gains relevance 
through the activities and practices of people all working to shape it in various ways. 
In order to highlight the contextual specificity of the diversity of ways of discursively 
framing energy security as well as the different ways that energy security and green energy 
were discursively linked, this thesis adopted case studies as a research design. Aimed at 
ensuring the greatest difference or maximum variation between the cases, this thesis 
examined the interplay between energy security and law and policy on green energy 
development in the context of three very different case studies (i) Great Britain (GB), (ii) Brazil 
and (iii) the World Trade Organisation (WTO). 
 This study initially carried out an empirical assessment of national law and policies on 
green energy development in the two country case studies: GB and Brazil. In order to establish 
the parameters within which to conduct this research, three initial research questions were 
posed, as follows: 
1. How has energy security been discursively constructed? 
2. What are the discursive links between energy security and law and policies 
promoting green energy? 
3. What are the implications of energy security construction to law and policy on green 
energy development? 
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In attempting to address these questions, the research adopted discourse analysis as 
a methodological approach for the country cases studies, something which is rare in the socio-
legal literature on energy security and green energy. It investigated discourses surrounding 
energy security as  defined and given meaning and significance through the articulation and 
production of ‘texts’ of many kinds, from speeches to policy statements to legal rulings, and 
the practices those texts were part and parcel of. More specifically, this study examined the 
discursive frames which dominated the energy security discourse in different contexts. This 
thesis has shown that understanding the discursive framing of energy security was important, 
because when one frame was selected from among a range of competing frames it had 
consequences for how green energy development was seen and acted upon. 
Revealing these differences in the country case studies in chapters 4 and 5 was 
relevant because this divergence of views and approaches, learnt in each country case study, 
was at stake in legal disputes. In particular, legal disputes between countries concerning 
energy security and green energy development have already taken place within international 
trade law as encapsulated in the law of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), an international 
trade organisation which adjudicates between competing discursive claims and pronounces 
on their legal status. The WTO, therefore, was an important third case study because it 
showed how this diversity of views raised in national contexts could lead to legal disputes in 
international forums when attempts were made to address the issue of the interplay between 
energy security and green energy development. 
Due to these different approaches to national energy policies on the interplay 
between energy security and green energy development, which could be at stake in legal 
disputes, it was relevant to examine how the WTO jurisprudence perceived this interplay and 
how the law of the WTO applied to countries that wanted to reduce green energy import 
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dependency on the grounds of energy security. Therefore, the investigation of energy security 
and green energy in the law of the WTO was based on the thesis’ fourth research question: 
4. Is there policy space for national green energy security in the law of the WTO? 
The main research findings and contributions of this thesis are explained in the 
following section.  
 
3. Main research findings and contributions  
Running throughout this thesis is the examination of two main topics: (i) the question 
of the proper definition of the term “energy security”, and (ii) the implications of the links 
between energy security and law and policies on green energy development. These are no 
simple issues, as will be subsequently summarised. 
 
3.1. Lessons from the energy security definitions  
As seen in the literature review in chapter 3, existing scholarly debates on energy 
security demonstrate that energy security is a complex and multifaceted topic1 and the 
mainstream academic literature on energy security is characterised by a pervasive lack of 
consensus in relation to its different concepts and dimensions. While Winzer reduces energy 
security to the simple proxy of energy supply relative to demand,2 the International Energy 
Agency (IEA)’s mainstream definition stipulates that energy security is about uninterrupted 
availability at reasonable prices.3 There is, however, evidence in the scholarly debate of a 
                                                          
1 Felix Ciută. 'Conceptual Notes on Energy Security: Total or Banal Security?' (2010) 41(2) Security Dialogue 
123, 127. 
2 Christian Winzer, ‘Conceptualizing Energy Security’ (2012) 46 Energy Policy 36. 
3 3 IEA, “Energy Security”(2014) <http://www.iea.org/topics/energysecurity/> last accessed 14 May 2019. 
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recent broadening of the energy security concept with the inclusion of environmental, climate 
and social considerations.4   
The diversity of accounts provided by the case studies shows that there is no 
unanimity here. The findings of the case studies of GB and Brazil in chapters 4 and 5 and legal 
analysis of the WTO green energy jurisprudence in chapter 6 demonstrate the discursive 
contests that lead to divergent constructions of energy security not only in the context of 
different countries, but also in different sectors of the economy within a country. The 
polysemic, multi-dimensional, contextual and dynamic nature of energy security, advanced 
by Chester,5 can, therefore, be observed in the variety of definitions of energy security given 
in the case studies examined in this thesis.  
The empirical work in GB shows that, on the one hand, energy security is discursively 
constructed in an alarmist and fearful manner by focusing on “lights going out” and, on the 
other, in a broader and holistic manner emphasising affordability, sustainability and human 
welfare. However, the majority of energy security definitions given by energy experts in GB 
focused on the elements of availability and reliability, advancing, therefore, a narrow 
definition of energy security found in the mainstream academic literature. This, nonetheless, 
does not question the construction of the broader energy security concepts also advanced by 
some participants in GB and, therefore, shows that there is no uniform understanding of 
energy security here. 
The case study of Brazil uncovers the evolving and multifaceted nature of the meaning 
of energy security. By examining how the concept of energy security was conceptualised and 
                                                          
4 See, for example, Aleh Cherpa and Jessica Jewell, ‘The Concept of Energy Security: Beyond the Four As’ 
(2014) 75 Energy Policy 415. 
5 L Chester, ‘Conceptualising Energy Security and Making Explicit its Polysemic Nature’ (2010) 38 Energy Policy 
887; 
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contextualised in Brazil within the period of analysis (2001-2015), it reveals that, during the 
2001 energy crisis, energy security concerns were distinctly focused on energy availability and 
reliability, while the concept adopted in the post-2001 energy crisis period was expanded to 
include affordability.  
These divergent constructions of energy security definitions are also found in legal 
disputes under the WTO Dispute Settlement Body. While in Canada — Renewable Energy and 
Canada — Feed-In Tariff Programme the concept raised by Canada focuses on availability and 
reliability, in India – Solar Cells, in addition to availability and reliability, affordability is also 
placed by India as part of the energy security concept. Interestingly, the energy security 
concept as raised by Canada is the same concept raised by the majority of participants in the 
case study of GB, which is correlated to the view adopted by the UK government in recent 
policy documents, as demonstrated in chapter 4. The concept raised by India which includes 
the elements of availability, reliability and affordability is the same concept found in the 
current legal framework in Brazil as shown in chapter 5. However, the concept of energy 
security is dynamic and evolves, so it may be just a coincidence that developed countries, i.e. 
Canada and the UK, currently use the same concept, while emerging economies, i.e. India and 
Brazil, currently use the same concept. Further comparative studies on the topic would be 
necessary to draw any further conclusions here.  
Overall, what the results demonstrate is that broader concepts of energy security 
found in the academic literature which include environmental, climate and social 
considerations have not reached the discursive terrain of green energy law and policies in the 
official discourse in Brazil, in the majority of views of participants in GB - particularly by the 
government and industry – or in legal green energy disputes in the WTO system.  
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In order to assist the just energy transition, as defined in chapter 1, this thesis puts 
forward the adoption of the broader energy security concept in law and policies which 
includes affordability, environmental, climate and social considerations. However, as it was 
shown, although the adoption of and elaboration on energy security concepts would bring 
clarity to the debate, it might disadvantage countries in legal disputes in the WTO system 
where recent jurisprudence in the case of EU – Energy Package, between Russia and the 
European Union (EU), required only certain minimum level of clarity on the concept of energy 
security.  Adopting a specific concept would limit a country’s capacity to break the concept 
up and reform it along lines which suit their own interests in the context of winning a legal 
dispute. It is unfortunate, therefore, that the WTO jurisprudence has taken this approach as 
this will serve as an obstacle for countries to engage in a more meaningful debate.  
Another consequence of the non-inclusion of these elements within the concept of 
energy security is that energy law and policies pursuing energy security can be created which 
negatively impact affordability, the climate, the environment and social inclusion. 
Encapsulating these elements within the concept of energy security would, therefore, assist 
the move towards a just energy transition, as law and policies pursuing energy security would 
need to be justified under this broader frame, with much present law and policy falling short 
of that standard. Political will would be necessary to adopt this broader energy security 
concept, as countries may be at a disadvantage if the broader definition of energy security is 
set up as this would limit their ability to play with the concept to suit their own interests. 
The academic literature examined in chapter 3 also focuses on the competing 
dimensions of energy security. The variety of indicators put forward by scholars shows the 
complexity in analysing national energy security policies and performance. There is no 
agreement here either. Academic studies present large variations in the choice of indicators 
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and in the way energy security indexes are framed and constructed, including an Energy 
Justice Metric as a way to try to achieve a just and equitable balance between the competing 
demands of the energy trilemma.6 The interview data from the empirical studies in GB reveals 
a number of contending energy security indicators offered by participants. For instance, 
although control over energy sources is advanced by participants from all sectors, its meaning 
is cast in opposing terms from having control via reliance on indigenous sources of energy 
supply, on the one hand, to having control via the ability to effectively manage energy supply 
from trade around the world, on the other.  
In Sovacool and Mukherjee’s study, for instance, trade in energy sources appears as 
an indicator for energy security.7 In this approach, reducing barriers to trade fosters energy 
security, so the goal is to keep energy markets open and fight protectionism. However, a 
contribution of this thesis to the literature lies in the fact that import dependency of energy 
equipment, technology and energy expertise is also seen as essential for energy security by 
some participants in  the empirical work in GB, indicators that are absent from the present 
academic literature.  
This thesis shows that these contending energy security indicators, which lead 
countries to adopt opposing national energy policies, are found in legal disputes in the WTO 
system. On the one hand, liberalisation of international trade is advanced by complainants in 
the WTO green energy disputes as a way to have access to the best available technology from 
the global marketplace at competitive prices, as seen in Japan’s position in Canada —
Renewable Energy/ Feed-in Tariff. On the other hand, countries which depend profoundly on 
                                                          
6 Raphael J Heffron, Darren McCauley and Benjamin K Sovacool, ‘Resolving Society's Energy Trilemma through 
the Energy Justice Metric’ (2015) 87 Energy Policy 168. 
7 See, for example, Benjamin K Sovacool and Ishani Mukherjee, ‘Conceptualizing and Measuring Energy Security: 
A Synthesized Approach’(2011) 36 Energy 5343, 5352. 
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green energy equipment and technology imports have to rely on the secure and smooth-
functioning of international trade in energy in order to ensure security of energy supply, and 
shows concern over their energy security as a result of this import dependency, as raised by 
India in India – Solar Cells. These different views on energy security, therefore, contribute to 
the literature on energy law, particularly by adding ways in which the energy security and 
reliability principle of energy law8 can be understood.  
 
3.2. Lessons from the implications of energy security – green energy links 
Another difference present in the country case studies examined in this thesis, which 
is also found in legal disputes in the WTO system, is in relation to the links between energy 
security and green energy development. The case studies of GB and Brazil show that positive 
and negative links are forged concerning the interplay between energy security and law and 
policies on green energy development. In GB, participants deployed a positive frame to point 
out the importance of developing green energy to ensure energy security as a result of energy 
availability, energy diversification, energy independence and energy decentralisation. In 
Brazil, law and policies on biofuels in particular were constructed in a positive frame around 
the energy security-green energy links as a result of their role in tackling energy security 
concerns framed in terms of energy use from exhaustible energy sources, dependency on 
imported energy sources, the oligopoly of oil producers and the uneven distribution of fossil 
fuels around the world as well as the risk of war associated with oil exploration. Wind energy 
was also framed as playing a role in ensuring energy diversification.  
                                                          
8 Raphael J Heffron and others, ‘A Treatise for Energy Law’, (2018) 11(1) Journal of World Energy Law & 
Business’ 34.  
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In relation to the negative frame, in GB, energy security and green energy 
development links were framed negatively as a result of grid upgrading issues and unreliability 
due to intermittency, and this created a general indisposition among some participants to 
associate green energy sources with energy security in a positive way. In Brazil, green energy, 
particularly wind and solar, was framed negatively as being insufficient to meet the energy 
demand required to support economic growth. 
These positive and negative frames are found in legal disputes in the WTO system. In 
terms of positive frames, in India’s arguments in the case of India – Solar Cells, for instance, 
solar energy development would lead to energy security through displacement of coal and 
petroleum. Here, India can be seen associating energy security and solar energy through a 
positive frame highlighting the reduction of fossil fuel dependency, just like the official 
discourse in Brazil positively associate energy security and biofuels, as shown in chapter 5. In 
the disputes of Canada — Renewable Energy and Canada — Feed-In Tariff Programme, 
Canada put forward the role played by green energy in helping secure the supply of electricity 
which was needed as a result of the temporary shutdown of several nuclear facilities for 
maintenance, phasing out of coal-fired generation and subsequent reduction in generation 
capacity, as well as the increase of Ontario’s population by 28% by 2030 and the subsequent 
increases in energy demand. 
What is also interesting in the WTO cases is how the Panel and the Appellate Body 
presented the link between energy security and green energy differently in Canada — 
Renewable Energy and Canada — Feed-In Tariff Programme . As was demonstrated in chapter 
6, while the Panel presented only a negative frame where green energy does not support 
energy security because of the intermittency of wind and solar energy sources, the Appellate 
Body advanced a positive frame where green energy plays a role in ensuring energy security 
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in the long-term by reducing reliance on fossil energy resources. Therefore, in these cases, 
the Panel and the Appellate Body presented two different approaches in regard to framing 
green energy and energy security. From a legal perspective, this divergence in frames has 
implications for the interplay between energy security and green energy under WTO law, 
because the frame adopted can impact the applicability and interpretation of WTO provisions. 
The negative frame, for instance, reduces the room for energy security as a legal justification 
for trade restrictive measures adopted to promote green energy. 
The analysis in chapter 6 shows evidence that WTO Member States are increasingly 
associating energy security with green energy in a positive frame in their legal disputes under 
the WTO DSB. These countries are adopting trade restrictive measures to support national 
green energy development with a view of ensuring energy security. As explained in chapter 
6, literature around green energy trade disputes in the WTO DSB focuses its analysis on 
environmental/climate change grounds.9 However, this thesis adds to the literature in 
international trade law as it shows a new perspective that these cases also raise issues 
surrounding energy security as a justification under WTO rules for trade restrictive measures 
to support green energy development. The significance of the divergences revealed in this 
thesis is also to draw the attention of policymakers and legal practitioners to the potential 
differences in national energy policies that pursue different objectives of trade liberalisation, 
energy security and green energy development. 
                                                          
9 See, for example, Luca Rubini, ‘Ain't Wastin' Time No More: Subsidies for Renewable Energy, the SCM 
Agreement, Policy Space, and Law Reform’ (2012) 15(2) Journal of International Economic Law 525; Aaron 
Cosbey and Petroc C Mavroidis, ‘A Turquoise Mess: Green Subsidies, Blue Industrial Policy and Renewable 
Energy: The Case for Redrafting the Subsidies Agreement of the WTO’ (2014) 17(1) Journal of International 
Economic Law 11; Thomas Cottier, ‘Renewable Energy and WTO Law: More Policy Space or Enhanced 
Disciplines?’ (2014) Renewable Energy Law and Policy Review 40. 
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This thesis shows that countries that are taking trade restrictive measures to promote 
green energy development on energy security grounds should then familiarise themselves 
with the question of whether WTO law provides room for national public policy on green 
energy security grounds. The legal analyses of room for green energy security as a justification 
for trade restrictive measures concluded that there might be some room for short-term green 
energy security within the defences under Articles III:8(a), XX(a) and (j) and Article XXI. 
However, under Article XX(a), this means that the defence only applies in circumstances 
where there is no international trade available, and the exception under Article XX(j) also 
requires actual or imminent short supply. These defences, therefore, are inapplicable to 
countries wishing to adopt trade restrictive measures to develop their national green energy 
industry as a strategic way to prepare them for any future circumstances where there is no 
international trade, such as political unrest, conflict and trade embargoes. 
For long-term green energy security, i.e. countries wanting to develop their domestic 
green energy industry so that they do not become overly dependent on imports and 
international trade in cases of future trade disruption, the only possible defences are under 
GATT Article III: 8(a) and GATT Article XXI. However, according to the Panel’s and Appellate 
Body’s decisions on green energy jurisprudence so far, it seems that trade restrictive 
measures under Article III:8(a) will only have chances to succeed in a scenario where the 
energy market structure is basically nationalised, that is, without the participation of the 
private sector in a competitive relationship. The Panel and Appellate Body may have wanted 
to prevent protectionist measures, but their limited approach may have the opposite effect, 
as countries may decide to take control of their national electricity systems and exclude the 
participation of the private sector to adopt policies necessary to ensure their green energy 
security.  
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Literature review in chapter 3 also showed that countries may make connections 
between energy security and national security, although these connections were not found 
in the case studies of GB and Brazil. In terms of international trade law, trade restrictive 
measures within the national security exception under Article XXI may be possible, but will 
have the consequence of securitising green energy, which, as shown in chapter 3, has 
undesirable consequences. This thesis also elaborates on economic security within the scope 
of the national security exception under Article XXI. Taking the case study of Brazil as example, 
where the framing of energy security is in the context of economic development, this thesis 
finds that associating green energy with economic security is not a difficult task if a 
contemporary interpretation of Article XXI is adopted. However, given how rarely GATT 
Article XXI is invoked, Member States do not seem to be willing to defend their measures via 
the invocation of the security exception in formal dispute resolution proceedings.  
 An option for reverting the limited defences available for green energy security could 
be the adoption of a broader, holistic and contemporary interpretation of the terms of the 
provisions, involving weighing and balancing the importance of the interest being protected, 
the contribution of the measure to the protection of that interest, and the trade-
restrictiveness of the measure, in light of any WTO-consistent less trade-restrictive 
reasonably-available alternatives that could achieve the same level of protection. However, 
rule change through litigation strategies to alter the interpretation of existing WTO rules has 
negative aspects, such as governments having to use taxpayers’ money to resort to the 
lengthy and costly litigation process under the WTO. This would particularly affect developing 
and the least developed countries as they often lack the resources to participate in the 
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litigation.10 Also, the decisions still would not bring legal certainty as decisions are not 
authoritative in all future cases.  
This thesis argues that an evenly distributed market share of green energy 
technologies and equipment around the world is the best solution to ensure green energy 
security in the context of the just energy transition. In this regard, it demonstrates that the 
law of GATT/WTO presents limited room for green energy security as a justification for trade 
restrictive measures, and the limited applicability of defences available may have undesirable 
outcomes.  It then proposes a way forward to create the legal space in the WTO for trade 
restrictive measures aimed at ensuring green energy security. The proposal involves allowing 
temporary trade restrictive measures subject to an economic and technical analysis of the 
most viable and efficient manner to develop green energy technologies domestically in 
accordance with a country’s circumstances, so that Member States can develop a percentage 
of their national green energy industry. With this proposal, domestic policies supporting the 
development and scale-up of green energy for energy security purposes would be more 
explicitly permissible and thus sheltered from legal challenge. This proposal is intended to 
open the debate in this direction. What also emerge from the analysis in the case studies is 
that the interplay between energy security and green energy poses challenges to a transition 
to a green energy system. For instance, when the connections between energy security and 
green energy development are negatively framed, it has the implication of hindering green 
energy development. Another challenge can be seen in the process of energy politicisation in 
GB, which is framed as having negative impacts on green energy development due to vested 
interests, unequal lobbying power and association of green energy with left-wing politics.  
                                                          
10 Gary N Horlick and Katherine Fennell, ‘WTO Dispute Settlement from the Perspective of Developing Countries’ 
in Yong-Shik Lee and others (eds), Law and Development Perspective on International Trade Law  (Cambridge 
University Press 2011), 163. 
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In order to assist the just energy transition, this thesis argues for the incorporation of 
a dominant positive frame in relation to the interplay between energy security and law and 
policies on green energy development since a positive frame in relation to this link has the 
implication of significantly contributing to the promotion of an energy source. It also advances 
the need to embrace emerging green energy technologies in energy systems and the need for 
further research in the area to unlock its potential were also advanced.  
Finally, this thesis highlights that the interplay between energy security and green 
energy development is far from straightforward, as existing discursive constructions are 
broadening, deepening and transforming the relationship between energy security and law 
and policies on green energy as well as showing its complexity. This thesis does not seek to 
close down the diversity of views on the topic. Instead, the analysis in this thesis and its 
proposals are intended to stress the importance of this under analysed topic and open the 
debate in this direction.  
 
4.  Limitations of the thesis and future avenues for expanding this research 
Due to the multi-disciplinary nature of energy research, its complexity and the global 
challenge where it is inserted, it was not possible to explore in depth all the various aspects 
on the interplay between energy security and law and policies on green energy development. 
The case study of Brazil, for instance, would benefit from interviews with players in the energy 
sector in this country to highlight the plurality of views and perspectives on the subject as 
well as improve the understanding of problems associated with energy security and green 
energy development. Undertaking research of that kind was not possible in this case due to 
delays concerning the approval of the ethics application by the Brazilian National Ethics 
Committee as well as the extreme politicisation of energy politics in Brazil at the time the 
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study was conducted. However, while this necessitated a shift of research strategy, that was 
ultimately to the benefit of the thesis in two ways. First, it allowed the different empirical 
sections of this thesis to focus on three different though related things: the contestation of 
green energy security definitions across different sectors of an economy (GB); the 
incorporation of green energy security into law and policy (Brazil); and the adjudication of 
disputes around law and policy in relation to green energy security (WTO). Second, it 
underscored the point that green energy security is political and its politicisation is something 
that countries must find ways of managing if they are to move towards a just energy 
transition. 
Also, many very interesting topics associated with the theme of this thesis fell outside 
of this work. To give two examples, it can be mentioned (i) the role of governments and the 
market in ensuring energy security, and (ii) the interplay of energy security and green energy 
in all of the WTO agreements. 
Results of this study point towards the emergence of novel themes which would 
benefit from further research, particularly relating to legal and societal challenges as a result 
of the development, commercialisation and deployment of green energy technologies, such 
as the emergence of ‘prosumers’ and energy storage.  
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Interview Guide 
 
My research project aims to analyse the relationship between global security 
concerns and the law/policies surrounding green energy development from a 
socio-legal and empirical perspective. The interview will be based on the broad 
questions outlined below and followed up with secondary questions based on 
your responses: 
 
 
 What do you understand by the term 'energy security'? 
 How important is energy security for energy policies in your country? 
 How important is climate change/ the environment for energy policies in your 
country? Do you see them as 'security' issues? 
 What are your views on the growing argument of nuclear as green energy? 
 From your point of view what is the impact that security has had on the 
expression, shape, scope and character of policy, investment and legislation in 
the field of green energy? 
 From your point of view what are the short and long term implications of the use 
of 'security' to the decision making process in relation to green energy 
development? 
 What are your views on the relationship between energy security, public 
participation and access to information concerning green energy policies? 
 From your point of view, what role do security concerns play in finding a balance 
between energy supply and environmental and climate change concerns? 
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APPENDIX 2 
SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS SELECTED FOR ANALYSIS FOR CHAPTER 5 
Type Date Name Authority Main objective 
Speech 13/03/2001 Speech at the 
ceremony introducing 
the Ministers of Social 
Security and Mines 
and Energy 
President  Introduced the 
new Minister of 
Mines and Energy 
and highlighted 
the energy 
challenges ahead. 
Statement 07/05/2001 Statement on national 
radio and television 
President  Informed the 
public of the need 
for energy 
rationing. 
Statement 14/05/2001 Statement after the 
Energy Crisis 
Committee Meeting 
President  Informed the 
public of the 
initial decisions 
made to 
overcome the 
energy crisis. 
Legislation 15/05/2001 Provisional measure 
2,147 
Executive 
Power  
Created the 
Energy Crisis 
Committee and 
established 
guidelines for 
programmes to 
cope with the 
energy crisis. 
Note 15/05/2001 Exposure of motives 
00203 
Executive 
Power 
Gave reasons to 
enact Provisional 
Measure 2,147. 
Statement 18/05/2001 Statement on national 
radio and TV on the 
day of the 
implementation of the 
emergency 
programme of 
electricity 
consumption 
reduction 
President Informed the 
public of the need 
to reduce energy 
consumption. 
Statement 25/05/2001 Statement President  Discussed 
measures that 
affected 
consumers´ 
rights. 
Speech 5/06/2001 Speech in the 
ceremony to celebrate 
President  Speech to 
celebrate the 
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the World 
Environment Day 
World 
Environment Day 
Speech 12/06/2001 Speech at the 
ceremony to sign 
agreements relating to 
the public service 
concession of electric 
power transmission 
between the Union 
and Amazon Company 
of Power Transmission 
and Para Company of 
Power Transmission.  
President  Discussed the 
energy crisis and 
solutions. 
Speech 27/06/2001 Speech on a visit to the 
San Alberto field of 
natural gas processing  
President  Discussed the 
new plant of 
natural gas 
processing done 
by Petrobras in 
San Alberto – 
Bolivia.  
Speech 28/06/2001 Speech at the 
inauguration 
ceremony of the 
William Arjona 
thermoelectric plant 
President  Inaugurated the 
first 
thermoelectric 
plant which uses 
gas from Bolivia. 
Speech 04/07/2001 Opening speech at the 
meeting of the 
Brazilian Forum of 
Climate Change 
President  Discussed climate 
change. 
Meeting record 05/07/2001 Meeting N. 02/2001 Energy 
Crisis 
Committee 
Discussed 
measures to 
overcome the 
energy crisis. 
Speech 05/07/2001 Speech at the meeting 
of the Energy Crisis 
Committee  
President  Informed the 
decisions taken at 
the Energy Crisis 
Committee 
meeting. 
Regulation 05/07/2001 Resolution 24 Executive 
Power  
Created the 
PROEOLICA 
programme to 
promote wind 
energy. 
Speech  06/07/2001 Speech on a visit to the 
Luis Eduardo 
Magalhaes 
hydroelectric plant 
President  Informed society 
of the actions to 
overcome the 
energy crisis. 
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Speech 20/07/2001 Speech on a visit to the 
Sergio Motta 
hydroelectric plant 
President  Discussed the 
Brazilian energy 
matrix.  
Speech 24/07/2001 Speech at the 
launching ceremony of 
the business call notice 
to integrate the share 
capital of the Amazon 
Gas Company 
President  Discussed the 
energy problem in 
the Amazon area.  
Speech 13/08/2001 Speech at the opening 
ceremony of Boa Vista 
substation  with Brazil-
Venezuela energy 
transmission line 
President Discussed grid 
interconnection 
between Brazil 
and Venezuela. 
Speech 03/09/2001 Speech at the 
presentation 
ceremony of the 
installation project of 
wind turbines from the 
Wobben factory in the 
Port of Pecem 
industrial complex 
 
President Discussed wind 
energy. 
Regulation 17/09/2001 CNPE Resolution 1 CNPE Enacted about 
energy 
integration policy, 
electricity and 
natural gas 
imports. 
Speech 05/10/2001 Speech at the 
inauguration 
ceremony of Luis 
Eduardo Magalhaes 
hydroelectric plant 
 
President  Discussed energy 
production. 
Speech 17/10/2001 Speech at the 
sanctioning ceremony 
of the project of law 
which provides for the 
National Policy 
Conservation and 
Rational Use of Energy 
President Discussed the 
National Policy 
Conservation and 
Rational Use of 
Energy. 
Meeting record 29/10/2001 Meeting N. 22/01 Energy 
Crisis 
Committee 
Discussed 
measures to 
overcome the 
energy crisis. 
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Electronic 
correspondence 
29/10/2001 Electronic 
correspondence from 
Mr Andre Leal, 
Executive Director of 
SeaWest Windpower 
do Brasil, to the 
Minister of Mines and 
Energy 
SeaWest 
Windpower 
do Brasil / 
MME 
Stated challenges 
for the 
development of 
the wind energy 
sector in Brazil. 
Letter 20/11/2001 Letter EN-ANEEL-
20/11/01-001 from Mr 
Alberto Seisdedos 
Fernandez del Pino, 
Director of Enerbrasil, 
to the Brazilian Federal 
Electricity Agency 
Director of 
Enerbrasil / 
ANEEL 
Stated reasons for 
the delay of 
implementation 
of wind projects 
in Brazil 
Legislation 21/12/2001 Provisional measure 14 Executive 
Power 
Created the 
Program for 
Incentive of 
Alternative 
Electric Energy 
Sources 
(PROINFA). 
Note 21/12/2001 Exposure of motives 
00376-A-
CCIVIL/MF/MME/MDIC 
Executive 
Power  
Gave reasons to 
enact Provisional 
Measure 14. 
Speech 06/02/2002 Speech at the 
ministerial meeting – 
Work Program for 
2002 
President  Discussed the 
Work Program for 
2002. 
Speech 13/03/2002 Speech at the 
ceremony which signs 
the message 
forwarding the Kyoto 
protocol to the 
national congress for 
ratification 
President  Forwarded the 
Kyoto Protocol to 
the National 
Congress for 
Ratification. 
Meeting record 16/04/2002 Debate and Voting  Federal 
Senate 
Debate and voting 
for the conversion 
of Provisional 
Measure 14 into 
Law 10,438/02 in 
the plenary of the 
Federal Senate.  
Speech 23/04/2002 Speech at the signing 
ceremony of the 
concession contracts 
for the construction 
President  Discussed 
changes in the 
energy system 
regulation. 
334 
 
and exploitation of 
new hydroelectric 
power plants 
Legislation 26/4/2002 Law 10,438 Legislative 
Power 
Created the 
Program for 
Incentive of 
Alternative 
Electric Energy 
Sources 
(PROINFA). 
Speech 24/05/2002 Speech at the opening 
ceremony of Cana 
Brava hydroelectric 
power plant 
President Discussed the 
increase in energy 
production. 
Speech 28/06/2002 Speech in the rotor 
installation ceremony 
in the hydroelectric 
plant of Tucuruí 
President  Discussed the 
increase in energy 
production. 
Speech 04/07/2002 Speech at the opening 
ceremony of the 
thermoelectric power 
plant of Nova 
Piratininga 
President  Discussed energy 
development. 
Report 28/08/2002 The electricity supply 
crisis: final report 
National 
Congress – 
Special 
Mixed 
Commission 
to study the 
energy 
crisis.   
Studied the 
causes of the 
energy supply 
crisis and 
proposed 
alternatives to 
address the issue.  
Legislation 23/12/2002 Decree 4,541  Executive 
Power  
Regulated 
PROINFA 
Speech 02/05/2003 Speech at the opening 
ceremony of 
companhia energética 
Santa Elisa 
thermoelectric power 
plant 
President  Discussed the 
alternative energy 
matrix. 
Speech 06/05/2003 Speech at a meeting 
with representatives of 
the sugar and alcohol 
sector 
President Discussed the 
development of 
alcohol as fuel. 
Speech 25/06/2003 Speech at the first 
infrastructure seminar 
for sustainable 
development 
President  Discussed Brazil´s 
development 
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Legislation 11/11/2003 Law 10,762  Legislative 
Power 
Amended 
PROINFA 
Speech 11/11/2003 Speech at the 
launching ceremony of 
the national program 
for universal access 
and use of electricity 
President  Discussed rural 
electrification. 
Legislation 11/11/2003 Decree 4,873 Executive 
Power  
Created the 
program ‘Light for 
All’. 
Legislation 11/12/2003 Provisional measure 
144 
President  Established the 
principles for the 
energy sector. 
Note 11/12/2003 Exposure of motives 
EM 00095/MME 
Executive 
Power 
Gave reasons to 
enact Provisional 
Measure 144. 
Speech 16/01/2004 Speech at the official 
opening ceremony of 
the Padre Carlos plant 
(Poço de Caldas-MG) 
President  Discussed the 
electricity sector. 
Speech 16/01/2004 Speech at the 
launching ceremony of 
biofuels pole  
President  Discussed 
biodiesel 
production. 
Legislation 15/03/2004 Law 10,848 Legislative 
Power 
Established the 
principles for the 
energy sector. 
Legislation 30/03/2004 Decree 5,025 Executive 
Power  
Regulated 
PROINFA. 
Regulation 30/03/2004 MME norm 45  MME Regulated 
PROINFA. 
Speech 02/04/2004 Speech at the opening 
ceremony of Três 
Lagoas thermoelectric 
President  Discussed 
unfinished energy 
projects. 
Speech 09/06/2004 Speech at the contract 
signing ceremony of 
the Light for All 
program 
President  Discussed the 
Light for All 
program. 
Speech 30/07/2004 Speech at the decree 
signing ceremony that 
regulates Law 10,848, 
which provides for the 
sale of electricity 
President  Discussed the 
decree which 
regulates Law 
10,848. 
Legislation 30/07/2004 Decree 5,163 Executive 
Power 
Regulated the 
sale of electricity. 
Note 09/09/2004 Exposure of 
Motives 44/MME 
Executive 
Power 
Gave reasons to 
enact Provisional 
Measure 214. 
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Legislation 13/09/2004 Provisional Measure 
214 
President  Introduced 
biodiesel into the 
Brazilian energy 
matrix. 
Report 14/09/2004 ANEEL report 
regarding normative 
resolution 83 
ANEEL Reasons for 
regulation of 
electricity supply 
to isolated 
communities 
through individual 
systems of 
electricity 
generation via the 
use of renewable 
energy. 
Regulation  20/09/2004 Normative resolution 
83 
ANEEL Regulated the use 
of household 
photovoltaic 
systems for the 
electrification of 
isolated areas. 
Speech 25/11/2004 Speech at the official 
ceremony of the 
construction and 
installation of turbines 
of the Tucuruí 
Hydroelectric Plant 
President  Discussed 
electricity 
generation. 
Speech 30/11/2004 Speech at the opening 
of the Brazilian Forum 
on Climate Change 
meeting 
President  Discussed 
biodiesel 
development. 
Legislation 06/12/2004 Provisional measure 
224 
President  Created a registry 
of biodiesel 
producers and 
importers and 
provided for the 
tax regime for 
biodiesel 
producers and 
importers.  
Note 06/12/2004 Exposure of motives 
EM Interministerial 
00166/2004-
MF/MDA/MME 
Executive 
Power 
Gave reasons to 
enact Provisional 
Measure 224. 
Speech 06/12/2004 Speech at the 
launching ceremony of 
President  Discussed the 
biodiesel 
program. 
337 
 
the National Biodiesel 
Program 
Debate 16/12/2004 Plenary debate for the 
enactment of law 
11,097/2005. 
Federal 
Senate 
Debated the 
enactment of Law 
11,097. 
Speech 20/12/2004 Speech at the 
launching ceremony of 
the investment fund 
holdings 
Brazil Energy 
President Discussed energy 
investment. 
Speech 11/01/2005 Speech at the opening 
ceremony of the 
hydroelectric power 
plant Monte Claro 
President Discussed energy 
production. 
Legislation 13/01/2005 Law 11,097  Legislative 
Power 
Introduced 
biodiesel into the 
Brazilian energy 
matrix. 
Speech 22/02/2005 Speech at the opening 
ceremony of the 
electrification network 
in 53 settlements 
President  Discussed energy 
access. 
Speech 24/03/2005 Speech at the opening 
ceremony of the 
biodiesel plant 
Soyminas 
President  Discussed 
biodiesel 
production. 
Speech 27/04/2005 Speech at the opening 
ceremony of biodiesel 
plant Agropalma 
President  Discussed 
biodiesel 
production. 
Legislation 18/05/2005 Law 11,116 Legislative 
Power 
Created a registry 
of biodiesel 
producers and 
importers and 
provided for the 
tax regime for 
biodiesel 
producers and 
importers. 
Speech 04/08/2005 Speech at the 
ceremony relating to 
castor crop for the 
production of biodiesel 
President  Discussed 
biodiesel 
production. 
Speech 04/08/2005 Speech at the opening 
ceremony of the 
biodiesel plant Brasil 
Ecodiesel S/A 
President  Discussed 
biodiesel 
production. 
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Speech 10/08/2005 Speech at the visit to 
the works of the 
hydroelectric plant 
Peixe Angical 
President  Discussed energy 
development. 
Speech 17/11/2005 Speech at the 
ceremony of the social 
fuel seal 
President  Discussed the 
biodiesel 
program. 
Speech 30/01/2006 Speech at the opening 
ceremony of the 
Electric Power 
Substation Viana 
President Discussed energy 
supply. 
Speech 03/02/2006 Speech at the signing 
ceremony of biodiesel 
purchase agreements 
of the ANP auction 
President Discussed 
biodiesel 
production. 
Speech 19/04/2006 Speech at the visit to 
the works of the wind 
farm Osorio 
President  Discussed energy 
supply. 
Speech 05/05/2006 Speech at the opening 
ceremony of the 
hydroelectric plant 
Eliezer Batista 
President  Discussed the 
nationalisation of 
Petrobras in 
Bolivia. 
Speech 20/06/2006 Speech at the 
launching ceremony of 
cornerstone of 
biodiesel plant BSBios 
President  Discussed 
biodiesel.  
Speech 20/06/2006 Speech at the 
ceremony of the 
industrial test of H-Bio 
President Discussed 
biodiesel.  
Speech 25/07/2006 Speech at the signing 
ceremony of the 
contracts of the 2nd 
public auction of 
biodiesel 
President  Discussed 
biodiesel.  
Speech 31/07/2006 Speech at the opening 
of the meeting on 
biodiesel 
President  Discussed 
biodiesel.  
Speech 15/08/2006 Speech at the signing 
ceremony of the 
concession contracts 
of hydroelectric plants 
with entrepreneurs 
President Discussed energy 
production. 
Speech 31/08/2006 Speech at the first 
national meeting on 
biofuels 
President  Discussed 
biofuels. 
Legislation 31/08/2006 Decree 5,882 Executive 
Power 
Amended Decree 
5,025/2004. 
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Added the 
reduction of 
greenhouse gases 
emissions as an 
aim of PROINFA. 
Speech 21/11/2006 Speech at the opening 
ceremony of the 
biodiesel plant 
Barralcool 
President  Discussed 
biodiesel. 
Policy 
document 
2007 The National Energy 
Plan 2030 (PNE) 
MME Provides a long-
term integrated 
energy strategy. 
Speech 31/01/2007 Speech at the opening 
ceremony of biodiesel 
plant Ecodiesel 
President  Discussed 
biodiesel. 
Speech 10/02/2007 Speech at the opening 
ceremony of the 
biodiesel plant  
Ecodiesel 
President  Discussed 
biodiesel. 
Legislation 27/02/2007 Decree 6,048 Executive 
Power 
Allowed A1 to A5 
auctions 
exclusively for 
renewables. 
Speech 18/05/2007 Speech at the opening 
ceremony of biodiesel 
plant Ecodiesel 
President  Discussed 
biodiesel.  
Speech 21/05/2007 Speech at the opening 
of the seminar on 
Biofuels 
President  Discussed 
biodiesel.  
Speech 21/05/2007 Speech at the opening 
ceremony of 
generating units of 
Itaipu hydroelectric 
power plant 
President  Discussed Itaipu 
hydroelectric 
power plant. 
Legislation 15/06/2007 Law 11,488 Legislative 
Power  
Created a fiscal 
incentive regime 
for infrastructure 
development, 
known as REIDI, 
which energy 
projects could 
benefit from. 
Speech 05/07/2007 Speech at the 
International 
Conference on Biofuels 
President  Discussed 
biofuels. 
Speech 09/08/2007 Speech at the opening 
ceremony of the 
President  Discussed 
biofuels. 
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Jamaica Broilers 
Group´s Ethanol Plant 
Speech 21/08/2007 Speech in the opening 
ceremony of the 
biodiesel plant Bertin 
President  Discussed 
biodiesel. 
Speech 12/09/2007 Speech at the opening 
of the seminar on 
biofuels 
President Discussed 
biofuels. 
Regulation 05/12/2007 CNPE resolution 7 CNPE Established 
guidelines for the 
formation of 
biodiesel stocks. 
Speech 21/01/2008 Speech at the 
introduction of the 
Mines and Energy 
Minister Edison Lobão 
President Discussed energy 
shortage in Brazil. 
Regulation 13/03/2008 CNPE resolution 2 CNPE Set the minimum 
percentage of 
biodiesel to be 
added to diesel oil 
at 3%. 
Speech 03/06/2008 Speech at the meeting 
of the high level of 
FAO on food security, 
climate change and 
bioenergy 
President  Discussed food 
security, climate 
change and 
biofuels. 
Speech 20/08/2008 Speech  
at the opening 
ceremony of the 
second commercial 
biodiesel plant of 
Petrobras 
President  Discussed 
biodiesel. 
Speech 20/08/2008 Speech at the opening 
ceremony of the 
terminal of liquefied 
natural gas 
regasification 
President  Discussed energy 
supply. 
Speech 21/11/2008 Speech at the closing 
of the plenary session 
of the International 
Conference on Biofuels 
President  Discussed 
biofuels, food 
security and 
climate change. 
Regulation 12/02/2009 MME norm 60  MME Approved the 
manual for special 
projects in the 
context of the 
Universal National 
Program for 
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Access and Use of 
electricity - "Light 
for All". 
Speech 12/03/2009 Speech during a visit to 
the works of the Jirau 
hydroelectric plant 
President  Discussed energy 
development and 
the world 
economic crisis. 
Speech 06/04/2009 Speech during the 
opening ceremony of 
the Darcy Ribeiro 
biodiesel plant 
President Discussed biofuels 
and the world 
economic crisis. 
Regulation 27/04/2009 CNPE resolution 2 CNPE Increased the 
biodiesel blending 
mandate to 4% 
from July 2009. 
Speech 12/05/2009 Speech during a visit to 
the works of Euzébio 
Rock thermoelectric 
plant  
President  Discussed the 
world economic 
crisis. 
Legislation 28/05/2009 Law 11,943 Legislative 
Power 
Extended the date 
for PROINFA 
projects to start 
commercial 
operations to 
December 2010. 
Regulation 16/09/2009 CNPE resolution 6 CNPE Increased the 
biodiesel blending 
mandate to 5%. 
Speech 23/10/2009 Speech during the 
announcement of the 
mandatory blend of 
5% biodiesel to diesel 
President  Discussed 
biodiesel. 
Legislation 29/12/2009 Law 12,187 Legislative 
Power 
Established the 
National Policy on 
Climate Change. 
Speech 19/01/2010 Speech at the start-up 
ceremony of ethanol 
usage in the Juiz de 
Fora thermoelectric 
power plant 
President  Discussed 
thermoelectric 
with ethanol 
usage and climate 
change. 
Speech 15/07/2010 Speech during a visit to 
platform facilities and 
collection of first oil 
production at the well 
in the pre-salt Campo 
Baleia Franca  
President Discussed pre-
salt.  
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Speech 13/08/2010 Speech during a visit to 
the  works of turbines 
of hydropower plant 
President  Discussed the 
Brazilian energy 
matrix.  
Speech 26/08/2010 Speech at the signing 
ceremony of the 
concession contract 
for the Belo Monte 
hydroelectric plant 
President  Discussed the 
construction of 
Belo Monte and 
environmental 
issues.  
Speech 19/10/2010 Speech during the 
opening ceremony of 
two hydroelectric 
plants in Goiás 
President  Discussed energy 
investment. 
Speech 26/11/2010 Speech during the 
opening ceremony of 
the gas thermoelectric 
park in the North 
President  Discussed gas 
development. 
Meeting record 13/12/2010 21st CNPE ordinary 
meeting  
CNPE Discussed the 
situation of the 
National Energy 
Policy. 
Legislation 22/12/2010 Law 12,351 Legislative 
Power 
Established the 
framework for the 
exploration of oil 
and gas in the 
pre-salt area.  
Speech 01/03/2011 Speech during the 
announcement 
ceremony of the 
implementation of the 
Regasification Terminal 
of Liquefied Natural 
Gas (LNG) in Bahia’ 
President  Discussed gas 
development. 
Legislation 28/04/2011 Provisional measure 
532 
Executive 
Power 
Biofuels were 
included expressly 
in the Brazilian 
legislation as a 
key energy 
resource for the 
country, as well 
as the security of 
supply of biofuels 
throughout the 
country as one of 
the objectives of 
the National 
Energy Policy. 
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Note 28/04/2011 Exposure of motives 
EM INTERMINISTERIAL 
N 00013 / MME / MF / 
MDIC/ MAPA/ MC/MP 
 
Executive 
Power 
Gave reasons to 
enact Provisional 
Measure 532 
Speech 05/07/2011 Speech during the start 
ceremony of the 
deviation of the 
Madeira River for the 
Santo Antônio 
hydroelectric power 
plant 
President  Discussed 
hydroelectricity 
generation. 
Legislation 16/09/2011 Law 12,490 Legislative 
Power  
Biofuels were 
included expressly 
in the Brazilian 
legislation as a 
key energy 
resource for the 
country, as well 
as the security of 
supply of biofuels 
throughout the 
country as one of 
the objectives of 
the National 
Energy Policy.  
Speech 22/09/2011 Speech at the high-
level meeting on 
nuclear safety 
President  Discussed nuclear 
safety. 
Meeting record 05/12/2011 23rd CNPE ordinary 
meeting 
CNPE Discussed energy 
policies. 
Legislation 23/12/2011 Decree 7,660  Executive 
Power 
Provided import 
tax exemptions 
for wind power 
equipment, and 
set those for solar 
PV equipment in 
the 2% to 10% 
range. 
Speech 21/03/2012 Speech during the 
introduction of Magda 
Chambriard, general 
director of the 
National Petroleum 
Agency (ANP) 
President Discussed energy 
supply.  
Regulation 05/06/2012 Normative resolution 
493 
ANEEL Regulated 
electricity supply 
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through individual 
systems of 
electricity 
generation via the 
use of renewable 
energy. 
Meeting record 26/06/2012 24th CNPE ordinary 
meeting 
CNPE Discussed energy 
supply. 
Legislation 11/09/2012 Provisional measure 
579 
Executive 
Power 
Promoted the 
competitiveness 
of energy 
produced from 
wind power, 
thermosolar, 
photovoltaic, 
small hydro, 
biomass, other 
renewables and 
natural gas. 
Note 11/09/2012 Exposure of motives 
EM Interministerial nº 
37/MME/MF/AGU                         
Executive 
Power 
Gave reasons to 
enact Provisional 
Measure 579. 
Speech 11/09/2012 Speech during the 
announcement 
ceremony of the 
reduction of energy 
cost 
President  Discussed the 
energy sector.  
Speech 17/10/2012 Speech at the opening 
ceremony of the 
Estreito hydroelectric 
power plant 
President  Discussed 
hydroelectricity. 
Legislation 11/01/2013 Law 12,783 Legislative 
Power  
Promoted the 
competitiveness 
of energy 
produced from 
wind power, 
thermosolar, 
photovoltaic, 
small hydro, 
biomass, other 
renewables and 
natural gas. 
Statement 23/01/2013 Statement on lower 
electric power rates 
President  Discussed lower 
electric power 
rates. 
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Note 30/04/2013 Exposure of motives 
EM nº 00090/2013 MF 
Executive 
Power 
Gave reasons to 
enact Provisional 
Measure 613. 
Legislation 07/05/2013 Provisional measure 
613 
President  Reduced the tax 
for bioethanol. 
Regulation 25/06/2013 CNPE Resolution 6 CNPE Authorised the 
exploration and 
production of 
petroleum and 
natural gas. 
Legislation 10/09/2013 Law 12,859 Legislative 
Power 
Reduced the tax 
for bioethanol. 
Speech 29/10/2013 Speech during the 
opening ceremony of 
the 500 kV electrified 
line between Villa 
Hayes and the power 
substation on the right 
bank of Itaipu 
President  Discussed energy 
interconnection 
and 
infrastructure.  
Speech 08/11/2013 Speech during the 
completion ceremony 
of Platform P-58 in Rio 
Grande / RS 
President Discussed oil 
exploration in 
Brazil. 
Meeting record 17/12/2013 27th CNPE ordinary 
meeting 
CNPE Discussed the 
national energy 
policy. 
Note 09/05/2014 Exposure of motives 
EMI nº 00015/2014 
MME MAPA MF MDA 
MDIC 
Executive 
Power 
Gave reasons to 
enact Provisional 
Measure 647. 
Legislation 28/05/2014 Provisional measure 
647 
President Set the minimal 
biodiesel blending 
mandate at 7%. 
Speech 28/05/2014 Speech during the 
announcement 
ceremony of measures 
for promotion of the 
production and 
consumption of 
biodiesel 
President  Discussed 
biodiesel. 
Speech 01/07/2014 Speech during the 
commemoration 
ceremony of 500,000 
barrels of oil from the 
pre-salt in Rio de 
Janeiro / RJ 
President  Discussed pre-salt 
area. 
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Note 12/09/2014 Exposure of motives 
EMI nº 00144/2014 MF 
MJ MTE MDIC BACEN 
Executive 
Power 
Gave reasons to 
enact Provisional 
Measure 656. 
Legislation 24/09/2014 Law 13,033 Legislative 
Power 
Set the minimal 
biodiesel blending 
mandate at 7%. 
Legislation 07/10/2014 Provisional measure 
656 
President  Provided import 
tax exemptions 
for wind turbine 
components. 
Meeting record 09/12/2014 29th CNPE ordinary 
meeting 
CNPE Discussed the 
national energy 
sector. 
Legislation 19/01/2015 Law 13,097 Legislative 
Power 
Provided import 
tax exemptions 
for wind turbine 
components. 
Speech 27/02/2015 Speech at the opening 
ceremony of Geribatu  
Wind Farm and the 
associated 
transmission system in 
Santa Vitória do 
Palmar/RS 
President  Discussed wind 
energy. 
Speech 28/02/2015 Speech at the 
inauguration 
ceremony of the wind 
farm Artilleros 
President  Discussed wind 
energy. 
Meeting record 30/06/2015 30th CNPE ordinary 
meeting 
CNPE Discussed the 
national energy 
sector. 
Speech 11/08/2015 Speech during the 
announcement 
ceremony of the 
Investment Program in 
Energy 
President  Discussed energy 
investment. 
Legislation 18/08/2015 Provisional measure 
688 
President  Provided for the 
renegotiation of 
the hydrological 
risk of electricity 
generation. 
Note 18/08/2015 Exposure of motives 
EMI 00023/2015 MME 
AGU MF 
Executive 
Power 
Gave reasons to 
enact Provisional 
Measure 688. 
Regulation 21/09/2015 CNPE resolution 3 CNPE Authorised and 
set guidelines for 
the 
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commercialisation 
and the voluntary 
use of biodiesel. 
Meeting record 08/12/2015 31st CNPE ordinary 
meeting 
CNPE Discussed the 
national energy 
sector. 
Legislation 08/12/2015 Law 13,203 Legislative 
Power 
Provided for the 
renegotiation of 
the hydrological 
risk of electricity 
generation. 
Report 2015 National Policy of 
Water Resources: 
Supply, Energy and 
Basic Sanitation 
Federal 
Senate 
Evaluated the 
National Water 
Resources Policy, 
with emphasis on 
supply issues, 
energy and 
sanitation. 
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APPENDIX 3 
 
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WTO ENERGY DISPUTE CASES 
Full case title  Measure at issue Agreements cited Dispute status 
United States — 
Standards for 
Reformulated and 
Conventional 
Gasoline, WT/DS2 
The “Gasoline Rule” 
under the US Clean Air 
Act set different 
methods for domestic 
and imported gasoline. 
GATT 1994: Art. I, III, 
XXII:1 
Technical Barriers to 
Trade (TBT): Art. 2, 
14.1 
Final decision 
in 1996 
Canada — Certain 
Measures Affecting 
the Renewable 
Energy Generation 
Sector, WT/DS412 
Local content 
requirements in 
Ontario’s Feed in Tariff 
programme for wind and 
solar PV. 
GATT: Art. III:4, III:5, 
XXIII:1 
ASCM: Art. 1.1, 3.1(b), 
3.2 
TRIMS: Art. 2.1 
Final decision 
in 2013 
China - Measures 
concerning Wind 
Power Equipment, 
WT/DS419 
Grants, funds, or awards 
to enterprises 
manufacturing wind 
power equipment in 
China. 
GATT 1994: Art. XVI:1 
ASCM: Art. 3, 25.1, 
25.2, 25.3, 25.4 
 
In 
consultations 
Canada — Measures 
Relating to the Feed-
in Tariff Programme, 
WT/DS426 
Local content 
requirements in 
Ontario’s Feed in Tariff 
programme for wind and 
solar PV. 
GATT 1994: Art. III:4 
ASCM: Art. 1.1, 3.1(b), 
3.2 
TRIMS: Art. 2.1 
Final decision 
in 2013 
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United States — 
Countervailing Duty 
Measures on Certain 
Products from China, 
WT/DS437 
Imposition of 
countervailing duty 
measures by the United 
States on certain 
products from China 
(including solar panels 
and wind towers). 
GATT: Art. VI  
 ASCM: Art. 1.1, 2, 
11.1, 11.2, 11.3, 12.7 
and 14(d) 
Final decision 
in 2014 
European Union and 
a Member State — 
Certain Measures 
Concerning the 
Importation of 
Biodiesels, 
WT/DS443 
EU and Spain’s measures 
affecting the importation 
of biodiesels for 
accounting purposes 
with regard to the 
compliance with the 
mandatory targets for 
biofuels. 
GATT: Art. III:1, III:4, 
III:5 and XI:1  
TRIMS: Art. 2.1 and 
2.2  
 
Establishment 
of a panel 
deferred 
European Union and 
Certain Member 
States — Certain 
Measures Affecting 
the Renewable 
Energy Generation 
Sector, WT/DS452 
Domestic content 
restrictions that affect 
the renewable energy 
generation sector 
relating to the feed‑in 
tariff programmes of EU 
member States. 
GATT: Art. I, III:1, III:4, 
III:5 
ASCM: Art. 1.1, 3.1(b), 
3.2 
TRIMS: Art. 2.1, 2.2 
In 
consultations 
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India — Certain 
Measures Relating 
to Solar Cells and 
Solar Modules, 
WT/DS456 
Domestic content 
requirements under the 
India’s Jawaharlal Nehru 
National Solar Mission 
(“NSM”) for solar cells 
and solar modules. 
GATT: Art. III:4  
TRIMS: Art. 2.1  
ASCM: Art. 3.1(b), 3.2, 
5(c), 6.3(a) and (c), 
and 25  
Final decision 
in 2016 
European Union — 
Certain Measures on 
the Importation and 
Marketing of 
Biodiesel and 
Measures 
Supporting the 
Biodiesel Industry, 
WT/DS459 
Two types of measures 
adopted by the 
European Union and 
certain member States: 
(a) measures to promote 
the use of energy from 
renewable sources and 
to introduce a 
mechanism to control 
and reduce greenhouse 
emissions; and (b) 
measures to establish 
support schemes for the 
biodiesel sector. 
GATT: Art. I:1, III, III:1, 
III:2, III:4, III:5 
TBT: Art. 2.1, 2.2, 5.1, 
5.2 
TRIMS: Art. 2.1, 2.2 
ASCM: Art. 3.1(b), 3.2, 
5(b), 5(c), 2.3, 1.1, 
6.3(a) 
In 
consultations 
European Union — 
Anti-Dumping 
Measures on 
Two claims against the 
EU: (a) provisional and 
definitive anti-dumping 
The Anti-Dumping 
Agreement: Art. 1, 
2.1, 2.2, 2.2.1.1, 2.2.2, 
Final decision 
in 2016 
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Biodiesel from 
Argentina, 
WT/DS473 
measures imposed on 
biodiesel originating in 
Argentina; and, (b) a 
provision in Council 
Regulation (EC) 
1225/2009 of November 
2009, which refers to the 
adjustment or 
establishment of costs 
associated with the 
production and sale of 
products under 
investigation in the 
determination of 
dumping margins. 
2.4, 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, 
6.2, 6.4, 6.5, 6.5.1, 
9.3, 18 and 18.4. 
GATT: Art. VI   
European Union and 
its Member States — 
Certain Measures 
Relating to the 
Energy Sector, 
WT/DS476 
Measures which 
regulated the natural gas 
sector and sought to 
facilitate the 
development of natural 
gas infrastructure within 
the European Union. 
GATS: Articles II, VI, 
XVI and XVII; 
GATT: Articles I, III, X 
and XI; 
 ASCM: Article 3;   
TRIMS: Article 2. 
 
Panel report 
circulated on 
10 August 
2018 
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European Union — 
Anti-Dumping 
Measures on 
Biodiesel from 
Indonesia, 
WT/DS480 
Two claims against the 
EU: (a) provisions of 
Council Regulation (EC) 
No 1225/2009 on 
protection against 
dumped imports from 
countries not members 
of the European 
Community; and (b) anti-
dumping measures 
imposed in 2013 by the 
European Union on 
imports of biodiesel 
originating in, inter alia, 
Indonesia. 
The Anti-Dumping 
Agreement: Art. 1, 2, 
2.1, 2.2, 2.2.1.1, 2.2.2, 
2.3, 2.4, 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 
3.5, 6.5, 6.5.1, 7.1, 
7.2, 9.2, 9.3, 15 and 
18.4 
GATT: Art. VI, VI:1 and 
VI:2  
Panel report 
circulated on 
25 January 
2018 
United States — 
Certain Measures 
Relating to the 
Renewable Energy 
Sector, WT/DS510 
Domestic content 
requirements and 
subsidies instituted by 
the governments of the 
states of Washington, 
California, Montana, 
Massachusetts, 
Connecticut, Michigan, 
GATT: Art. III:4, XVI:1 
ASCM: Art. 3.1(b), 3.2, 
5(a), 5(c), 6.3(a), 25 
TRIMS: Art. 2.1 
Panel 
composed on 
24 April 2018 
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Delaware and 
Minnesota, in the energy 
sector. 
United States — 
Safeguard measure 
on imports of 
crystalline silicon 
photovoltaic 
products, WT/DS545 
Definitive safeguard 
measures imposed by 
the United States on 
imports of certain 
crystalline silicon 
photovoltaic products. 
the Agreement on 
Safeguards: Articles 1, 
2.1, 3.1, 3.2, 4.1, 4.2, 
5.1, 5.2, 7.1, 7.4, 8.1, 
12.1, 12.2 and 12.3;  
GATT: Article X:3, XIII 
and XIX:1(a).  
In 
consultations 
United States — 
Safeguard Measure 
on Imports of 
Crystalline Silicon 
Photovoltaic 
Products, WT/DS562 
Definitive safeguard 
measure imposed by the 
United States on Chinese 
imports of certain 
crystalline silicon 
photovoltaic products. 
the Agreement on 
Safeguards: Articles 
2.1, 2.2, 3.1, 3.2, 4.1, 
4.2, 5.1, 7.1, 7.4, 8.1, 
12.1, 12.2 and 12.3;  
GATT: Articles X:3, 
XIII, XIX:1(a) and 
XIX:2. 
In 
consultations 
United States — 
Certain Measures 
Related to 
Renewable Energy, 
WT/DS563 
Domestic content 
requirements and 
subsidies instituted by 
the governments of 
SCM Agreement: 
Articles 3.1(b) and 
3.2;  
TRIMS Agreement: 
Articles 2.1 and 2.2; 
In 
consultations 
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certain US states and 
municipalities. 
GATT: Article III:4. 
Peru — Anti-
dumping and 
countervailing 
measures on 
biodiesel from 
Argentina, 
WT/DS572 
Anti-dumping and 
countervailing measures 
imposed by Peru on 
biodiesel from 
Argentina. 
Anti-dumping (Article 
VI of GATT 1994): Art. 
2.2, 2.2.1.1, 2.2.2(iii), 
3.1, 3.4, 3.5, 5.2, 5.3, 
5.8, 6.5, 9.3, 18.1, 
18.4 
Subsidies and 
Countervailing 
Measures: Art. 1.1(a), 
1.1(a)(1)(iii), 1.1(b), 
10, 12.4, 14(d), 15.1, 
15.4, 15.5, 19.1, 19.4, 
32.1, 32.5 
GATT 1994: Art. VI:1, 
VI:2, VI:3, VI:5(a) 
In 
consultations 
 
 
 
